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  ABSTRACT 
The investigation of emphasis framing effects is one of the most often analyzed 
types of communication influences on citizens’ attitudes in political communication 
research. A large volume of empirical studies suggests that simple changes in the emphasis 
on a specific aspect of an issue or event can produce significantly different issue attitudes. 
This has fostered discussions on citizens’ susceptibility to irrational attitude formation 
under one-sided framing conditions. 
However, the empirical paradigm from which to research emphasis framing effects 
has received important criticism in the last years. Much of this criticism argues that the 
investigated frames are often confounded by varying thematic information. This implies 
that susceptibility to framing effects is overstated in the literature and may originate from 
differing issue-specific information, not from the frame emphases themselves. If this 
critique would be empirically supported and only varying thematic information is 
responsible for framing effects, the effects reported in the literature would imply that 
attitudinal shifts are not irrational, but the result of rationally learning from different 
thematic information. Moreover, the theoretical contribution of the emphasis framing 
approach would be seriously questioned and could be nothing more than the longstanding 
concept of persuasion based on the provision of new thematic information. 
To test whether emphasis frames exert unique effects on citizens’ issue attitudes, 
this study introduces the concept of salience emphasis frames as a type of framing that is 
not confounded through the provision of additional issue-specific information, but uses 
well-known and cross-thematic patterns of interpretation such as political values to 
contextualize thematic information. In addition, the study integrates the varying argument 
strength of thematic information and citizens’ political value preferences as two further 
variables that could condition the framing effect. This enables testing salience emphasis 
framing effects in differently challenging situations. 
The results of a 2x3x2 online experiment with a representative sample (N = 833) 
show that issue-specific argument strength affects issue attitudes but one-sided salience 
emphasis frames also demonstrate clear attitudinal effects, mainly via changing citizens’ 
evaluation of issue-specific argument strength. The framing effect is present regardless of 
whether the frame contextualizes weak or strong issue-specific arguments for an attitude in 
accordance with the frame and regardless of whether the frame is value-resonant or non-
resonant. Moreover, value-resonant frames suppress the effects of issue-specific argument 
strength, and citizens follow “their” frame in the same manner regardless of thematic facts. 
These results confirm that salience emphasis frames can exert unique attitudinal 
effects independently from persuasion with new thematic information and thus, underline 
the relevance of emphasis framing as a distinctive form of communicative influence. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that one-sided salience emphasis frames endanger citizens’ 
rationality in attitude formation and can lead to unsubstantiated attitudinal shifts, which 
might distort democratic decision-making.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Why did political communication research examine 
emphasis framing effects in the past? 
Citizens’ attitudes toward political issues are the foundation of collectively binding decision-
making in democratic societies. As famously declared in Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the “will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government” (United Nations, 1948), as long as this will does not endanger 
the protection of other human rights (see Article 30 in the UDHR). In times of permanent 
campaigning, social media metrics about highly debated issues and issue positions, and polls 
on citizens’ issue attitudes, the legitimacy of governmental decisions not only relies on the 
results of elections or referenda but also on whether the government includes the will of 
the people when deciding on specific policies and issues during the term of office (Lilleker, 
2006). 
However, citizens’ issue attitudes do not simply exist from the outset. These 
attitudes not only result from personal factors such as citizens’ deeply rooted political core 
values (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010), past experiences (Liu & Hilton, 2005), and 
education (Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty, & Deary, 2010). They also evolve in communicative 
processes (Entman, 1989). Citizens expose themselves to political information to form 
attitudes toward current political issues, and political actors try to influence this attitude 
formation via communicating to and with citizens to gain public support for their goals to 
finally increase the legitimacy of their proposed or enacted political decisions. 
Since communication research began in the 1940s, scholars have been interested in 
the question of how communication, especially media communication, affects citizens’ 
attitudes toward political issues (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011). Various types of 
communication have been analyzed in the last decades to better understand how effectively 
they influence political attitudes. This has sometimes led to contrary conclusions about the 
influence of communication on citizens’ attitudes, which range from minimal to conditional 
to strong effect. However, one type of communication has provided “evidence of 
significant media effects” (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011, p. 178), and thus received more 
attention in academia and beyond in the last 20 years than most other types of 
communicative influences, namely the effects of emphasis frames on citizens’ issue 
attitudes (D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). 
The central idea of emphasis framing is that issues can be presented from various 
perspectives (Chong & Druckman, 2007b). Depending on which of these perspectives is 
highlighted (Entman, 1993), citizens tend to follow the more salient issue perspective when 
interpreting the issue (Matthes & Schemer, 2012). These perspectives, or frames, “make 
sense of relevant issues” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3) by diagnosing, evaluating, and 
I INTRODUCTION 2 
prescribing issues or events with common interpretative patterns deeply rooted in societies 
(Entman, 1993) such as freedom, security, or environmentalism. Moreover, the salient issue 
perspective – i.e., the applied frame – often contains a specific valence, i.e., a positive or 
negative stance toward the issue, which can lead to an issue attitude aligned with the valence 
of the highlighted perspective (de Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011). That is, 
emphasis on a specific aspect of an issue defines for citizens “how events should be 
understood” (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, p. 641), and this understanding often guides their 
issue attitudes. 
For instance, a communicator can discuss the issue of genetically modified plants by 
emphasizing that modified and thus more resistant crop plants are important in supplying 
food for the poverty-stricken parts of the population in countries with difficult climatic 
conditions. This humanitarian frame evaluates genetically modified plants as an opportunity 
to help overcome hunger and diseases caused by nutrition deficiencies, thus suggesting 
supporting the approval of these plants. However, a political actor can also apply an 
economic-liberalism frame to the same issue, highlighting that the increased harvest yield 
brought about by the modified plants secures farmers’ profit, enabling them to reduce the 
prices for food, and thus benefitting consumers. In addition, one can apply an 
environmental frame to the issue, emphasizing the danger of reduced biodiversity owing to 
genetically modified plants and the unforeseeable consequences of irreversible human 
interventions in nature. This frame evaluates the issue in the opposite direction and rather 
suggests opposing the approval of genetically modified plants. In contrast, a nationalist 
frame for the same issue would rather lead to supporting the approval by making more 
salient that not allowing these plants in the country hinders research on the technology of 
the future and causes the exodus of expert knowledge and high-tech jobs to other countries 
that do allow genetically modified plants. 
As these examples illustrate, framing an issue by emphasizing a subset of 
considerations is easy for communicators and does not require more than selecting a 
convincing aspect of an issue and making this more salient than other perspectives 
(Entman, 1993). Therefore, emphasis framing is considered a communicative tool with 
minimal costs (Jacoby, 2000) that political actors often employ to influence public opinion 
(Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010 ⁠, 2012⁠; Z. Pan & Kosicki, 2001). In democratic societies, political 
actors are in constant competition regarding the interpretation of issues to legitimize their 
goals. Framing allows them to reduce the complexity of these issues to easily 
understandable considerations with an evaluative component. Through strategic frame 
choices (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012), political actors try to influence the process of public 
frame-building (D. A. Scheufele, 1999⁠; Sheafer & Gabay, 2009) to position their frame as 
the dominant interpretative pattern for specific issues in classic mass media coverage and 
in the newsfeeds of social media users. 
A large volume of empirical studies has revealed that the political actor who wins 
the framing contest and presents its frame to citizens has good opportunities to influence 
not only citizens’ issue thoughts (de Vreese, 2004 ⁠; Shen, 2004b) but also their issue attitudes 
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(Chong & Druckman, 2007a) and decision-making (Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996). This 
is especially the case in one-sided situations in which citizens are only exposed to one frame 
for an issue (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017) and when the frame highlights applicable 
considerations (Chong & Druckman, 2007c) related to well-known and culturally shared 
political values (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Entman, 1993). This is termed value framing (e.g., 
Shen & Edwards, 2005). The literature notes one-sided emphasis framing effects for many 
different topics ranging from energy and immigration policies (Druckman, Peterson, & 
Slothuus, 2013) via social welfare (Slothuus, 2008), climate change (Nisbet, Hart, Myers, & 
Ellithorpe, 2013), health conditions in prisons (Matthes & Schemer, 2012), emergent 
technologies (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011), and enlargement of the European Union (de 
Vreese et al., 2011) to urban growth projects and hate group rallies (Chong & Druckman, 
2007a), to name just a few examples. 
Given the clear empirical evidence for emphasis framing effects suggested by the 
literature, scholars began questioning citizens’ rationality when forming attitudes under 
one-sided emphasis framing conditions (cf. Chong & Druckman, 2007b⁠; Druckman, 
2001a). When simple and small changes in the presentation of the same issue are sufficient 
to influence which policies citizens support or oppose, “framing effects suggest that 
distributions of public preferences are arbitrary, and that political elites can manipulate 
popular preferences to serve their own interests” (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 120). 
One-sided emphasis frames can push citizens away from their political values (Beattie 
& Milojevich, 2017) implying that their issue attitudes under framing conditions do not 
represent their policy preferences, but result from the issue perspective made salient for 
them. Given that democratic theory builds on the idea of rational citizens with clear 
preferences and that the aggregated preferences of all (or more precisely: the majority of) 
citizens should guide political decisions (Downs, 1957), emphasis frames seem to bias 
public opinion formation and thus pose a risk to democratic decision-making processes. 
However, in the political world outside the laboratory, it does not seem that all 
citizens act completely irrationally and do not show any stable preferences for specific 
policies, parties, or politicians (Converse, 2000). How can citizens show empirically rather 
stable preferences when empirical results suggest the existence of emphasis framing effects 
and that framing is a tool often applied by political actors? The easy answer to this question 
is that the literature also shows many moderators of framing effects on the individual and 
contextual level (for an overview, see e.g., Borah, 2011a⁠; de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012). For 
example, the effects of emphasis frames tend to be stronger when they match citizens’ 
individual schemas (Shen, 2004a) and their political values (Shen & Edwards, 2005), or 
when citizens possess a low need to evaluate (Druckman & Nelson, 2003). That is, 
emphasis framing effects do not work uniformly for all citizens, but often need additional 
conditions to influence their issue attitudes. Most important is that the simultaneous 
presentation of two competing frames seems to cancel out framing effects (Hartman & 
Weber, 2009 ⁠; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004), limiting the strong influences revealed for one-
sided emphasis frames. 
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As sole exposure to one frame for an issue is a somewhat unrealistic setting, because 
citizens are often exposed to various frames for an issue, it could be argued that while 
emphasis framing effects can potentially lead to arbitrary preferences in the electorate, the 
more realistic setting of frame competition prevents the realization of this potential. 
However, more recent studies on emphasis framing effects suggested that when one-sided 
frames compete over time in a setting of being exposed to one frame first and to a counter-
frame later in time, these one-sided frames can still be influential and reverse initial framing 
effects, albeit not for all citizens equally (Chong & Druckman, 2010⁠, 2013 ⁠; Lecheler & de 
Vreese, 2013 ⁠; Matthes & Schemer, 2012). 
Essentially, in very realistic settings of sequential news exposure, one-sided emphasis 
frames can threaten rational attitude formation and lead to an arbitrary oscillation of 
citizens’ issue attitudes between different issue positions, leading to the question whether 
their attitudes actually express their preferences or are merely the result of biased and 
unstable attitude formation induced by simple changes in the frame of an issue. Given the 
importance of citizens’ attitudes in the decision-making process in democracies and the 
results outlining that emphasis frames can influence attitudes, the concept of emphasis 
framing effects has received ample attention in political communication research in the last 
20 years. 
Moreover, the emphasis framing approach is more than an approach by which to 
better understand communicative effects. Perhaps unlike any other approach in 
communication research, the concept of emphasis framing enables researchers to 
analytically track the entire process of public communication. This is achieved by 
integrating formerly separated research areas ranging from the strategic communication of 
political actors (e.g., Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012) via the role of the news media in sending and 
transforming the frames used by political actors (e.g., Brüggemann, 2014) to the attitudinal 
effects of frames in public communication on citizens (e.g., Schemer, Wirth, & Matthes, 
2012). This integrative power is a unique strength of the emphasis framing approach (de 
Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Matthes, 2012⁠; D. A. Scheufele, 1999), explaining its high relevance in the 
field of communication research. 
Given this brief and straightforward summary of the central results of research on 
emphasis framing effects, the question on why this book examines these effects again 
remains. The reason for this re-examination is that the emphasis framing approach has 
recently received substantial criticism regarding whether most empirical studies on 
emphasis framing effects actually tested for these effects in accordance with the theory 
(Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017) and whether 
emphasis framing effects exist at all (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). This is briefly discussed 
next in Chapter 1.2. 
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1.2 The need to re-examine emphasis framing effects and 
the key research question of this book 
Notwithstanding the evidence for (one-sided) emphasis framing effects generated over the 
past decades (see Chapter 1.1), the empirical paradigm employed to investigate these effects 
has recently been subject to important criticism. The fundamental argument underlying this 
criticism is that the frames investigated in previous research are often confounded with 
varying thematic information (Cacciatore et al., 2016⁠; Leeper & Slothuus, 2017⁠; D. A. 
Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). Leeper and Slothuus (2017) analyzed more than 100 studies 
that investigated emphasis framing effects, concluding that nearly all studies worked with 
confounded stimuli in which the emphasis on a specific frame co-varied with the 
presentation of different issue-specific information. 
For instance, when the topic of a new surveillance law was framed by emphasizing 
the importance of interpreting the new law in terms of its consequences for civil rights, the 
stimulus contained the additional thematic information that the law would allow that every 
citizen could be surveilled without being under reasonable suspicion. However, this 
thematic fact is missing in the other stimulus that employs a safety frame and emphasizes 
the importance of interpreting the law based on its consequences for national security. 
Instead, this stimulus contains very different information on the topic such as the amount 
of criminal acts the new law will prevent. 
According to Leeper and Slothuus (2017), this confounding has three potential 
consequences for the emphasis framing effects approach. First, it is a mismatch with the 
theory of emphasis framing effects, because the theory defines information-based 
persuasion effects as the result of providing new thematic information. In contrast, framing 
only emphasizes how this information should be weighted (Kinder, 2003⁠; Nelson, Oxley, 
& Clawson, 1997). Hence, confounding these two aspects dilutes the concept of emphasis 
framing and makes it indistinguishable from other means of persuasion such as that based 
on the provision of new information, which threatens the theoretical survivability of the 
framing approach as a unique concept (see also Cacciatore et al., 2016 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele 
& Iyengar, 2017). Second, the confounding in previous studies means it is unclear whether 
the framing effects reported in the extant literature are actually the result of the emphasis 
on a specific frame or not simply originate from the differing issue-specific information. 
Thus, emphasis framing effects could be overstated in the literature and might not exist in 
non-confounded situations. Third, the confounding has implications for how to interpret 
the revealed emphasis framing effects in terms of citizens’ rationality in attitude formation. 
If the reason for these effects is that different thematic information is presented together 
with different frame emphases, attitudinal differences between citizens exposed to different 
frames might not be arbitrary, but can be likewise the result of rationally learning from the 
different thematic information. Thus, the framing effects found could be a much less 
convincing indicator for arbitrary preferences in the electorate, and employing emphasis 
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frames in political communication might not threaten democratic decision-making as much 
as the literature presumes. 
This criticism scrutinizes a huge body of empirical studies but one must be cautious 
in unreservedly following the proposed criticism. This becomes most evident when 
considering the classic definition of emphasis framing proposed by Entman (1993). He 
defines, “To frame is to select [emphasis added] some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient [emphasis added] in a communicating text” (p. 52). Given this definition, 
it seems that the theory of emphasis frames enables constructing frames in different ways. 
On one hand, it seems possible to construct emphasis frames in the confounded way by 
selecting issue-specific information and presenting only this subset of thematic information 
(e.g., a new infrastructure project creates 100 new jobs), while omitting issue-specific 
information not aligned with the frame (e.g., the project endangers a neighboring nature 
reserve). On the other, the definition also allows for the construction of emphasis frames 
in a non-confounded way by increasing the salience of one frame (e.g., it is important to 
evaluate the project in light of its consequences for the environment), while not omitting 
the thematic facts regarding the effects of the project on the economy as well as on the 
environment. 
That is, the criticized confounding of frames with different thematic information 
must not necessarily contrast the definition of emphasis frames. One could even argue that 
political actors do not simply limit the construction of their frames to solely making a 
perspective more salient, while avoiding the confounding of their frames by the provision 
of additional thematic information. Often, they also present additional facts underlining the 
importance of their chosen frame. Thus, former studies on emphasis framing effects are 
not uninformative or unnecessary, but provide evidence for the attitudinal effects of a mix 
between frames and selected thematic information, which can be considered emphasis 
framing effects. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile responding to the criticism and re-examining these 
effects by investigating whether emphasis frames exert attitudinal effects when not 
confounded through the provision of additional thematic information. This test not only 
strengthens the theoretical uniqueness of the emphasis framing approach in contrast to 
persuasion based on providing new information, but it also enables a more precise analysis 
of citizens’ rationality in attitude formation under framing conditions. Therefore, this book 
introduces the concept of salience emphasis frames as a type of framing that is not 
confounded with new issue-specific information but that uses well-known and cross-
thematic patterns of interpretation such as political values to contextualize thematic 
information. Accordingly, the superordinate research question addressed in this book is 
“How susceptible are citizens to salience emphasis framing effects and how rational 
is their attitude formation under framing conditions?” 
In addition to examining the attitudinal effects of salience emphasis frames in 
general, this study also presents a framework that allows testing the stability of such effects 
when circumstances become increasingly challenging for the existence of these effects. For 
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this purpose, the study integrates two further variables that could condition the effects of 
salience emphasis frames: the varying argument strength of thematic information the frame 
contextualizes and citizens’ political value preferences. 
Citizens’ preferences for political core values (e.g., civil rights, egalitarianism, or 
safety) play an important role in attitude formation and generally guide citizens to interpret 
issues or events under the umbrella of their core beliefs (Ciuk, Lupton, & Thornton, 2017 ⁠; 
Feldman, 1988 ⁠; Jacoby, 2006). In addition, former studies on emphasis framing effects 
revealed that these preferences also moderate the effects of frames. Specifically, when the 
frame employs a political value that matches citizens’ value structure, i.e., when the frame 
is value-resonant, framing effects tend to be stronger (A. C. Andrews, Clawson, Gramig, & 
Raymond, 2017 ⁠; Schemer et al., 2012⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005). However, this does not 
mean that non-resonant frames are completely ineffective. It can also be that emphasis 
frames influence the attitudes of citizens with non-matching values (Beattie & Milojevich, 
2017⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007a). Thus, this study investigates whether salience emphasis 
framing effects are conditioned by citizens’ political value preferences or also occur in the 
more challenging situation of non-matching values. 
Furthermore, this book clarifies the effectiveness of salience emphasis frames in 
different informational settings. To this end, it investigates whether framing effects only 
occur when the substantive thematic information the frame contextualizes has high issue-
specific argument strength for an attitude in accordance with the frame or also when 
argument strength is weak. Moreover, this enables examining whether the frame effect itself 
alters the attitudinal effect of the thematic information, i.e., of the factual content about an 
issue. For instance, it allows investigating whether salience emphasis frames suppress the 
effects of issue-specific argument strength, which would be a strong indicator of biased and 
irrational attitude formation under framing conditions. 
In addition, the separation of thematic information and salience emphasis frames as 
two independent variables enables a more precise test of the mediation processes 
underlying framing effects. Thus far, the literature provides equivocal results on which 
psychological mechanisms are responsible for framing effects (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2011⁠; 
Druckman & Nelson, 2003⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Lecheler, de Vreese, & Slothuus, 
2009⁠; Nelson, 2004 ⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997 ⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999 ⁠; Slothuus, 2008). 
This could be a consequence of the confounding of these two variables, which confuses 
the psychological mechanisms of information-based persuasion and framing. Therefore, 
the last step of this study is to re-examine these mediators in a non-confounded setting, 
which may clarify the mechanisms behind framing effects. Finally, another mediator is 
proposed that considers more directly the biased evaluation of thematic information than 
do the mediators noted in the literature. 
The superordinate research question and briefly mentioned sub-questions are 
answered through an experiment with a representative sample of Swiss citizens (N = 833). 
The next Chapter 1.3 provides an overview of the structure of this book. 
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1.3 Structure of this book 
This book is structured in five parts to answer the superordinate research question 
presented in Chapter 1.2 before, namely how susceptible are citizens to form their attitudes 
based on salience emphasis frames not confounded with new thematic information. A 
classic structure is followed, in which the theoretical argument is first elaborated based on 
an extensive literature review (see Part II). Then, testable hypotheses and research 
questions are proposed (see Part III), followed by a description of the empirical method 
employed to address them (see Part IV). Next, the empirical results are provided (see Part 
V) and conclusions presented with a discussion of the implications derived from the results 
of the study (see Part VI). 
Given the equivocal understanding in the literature of what framing is (Entman, 
1993), the theory section (Part II) starts by clarifying the notion of emphasis frames and 
emphasis framing effects. To this end, the concept is differentiated from other types of 
frames and framing effects often analyzed in political communication that should not be 
mixed with the emphasis framing approach, such as equivalency framing (see Chapter 2.1). 
Following this, seminal studies on one-sided emphasis framing effects on citizens’ issue 
attitudes are described, and the interpretation of their results as indicators of citizens’ 
irrationality in attitude formation under framing conditions discussed (see Chapter 2.2). 
The next Chapter 2.3 “zooms” into the classic effect of one-sided emphasis frames and 
introduces the psychological mechanisms (i.e., the mediators) analyzed in the literature to 
explain the influence of these frames on citizens’ issue attitudes. Then, Chapter 2.4 shows 
that emphasis framing effects do not work uniformly, but that many moderating variables 
on the individual and contextual level can either foster or reduce the effectiveness of frames, 
which suggests that emphasis framing does not always endanger citizens’ rationality in 
attitude formation. Thereafter, the multiple roles of political core values in emphasis 
framing are delineated (see Chapter 2.5). The first role is as citizens’ individual preference, 
which independently influences their issue attitude. The second is as an aspect often used 
to construct emphasis frames, namely value framing. Third is as a moderator of emphasis 
framing effects. Next, Chapter 2.6 presents the results of previous research on emphasis 
framing effects over time to better understand their persistence on the long run. Chapter 
2.7 provides a provisional conclusion about citizens’ susceptibility to emphasis framing 
effects based on the results presented in the preceding chapters. 
Chapter 2.8 then responds to the recently raised criticism on the empirical paradigm 
used to investigate emphasis framing effects. First, it explains the criticized confounding of 
frame emphases by the provision of different, new thematic information and the 
implications thereof for assessing the strength of framing effects and citizens’ rationality in 
attitude formation under framing conditions is explained. Second, the concept of salience 
emphasis frames as a non-confounded type of frame is introduced. Third, the variables of 
issue-specific argument strength and citizens’ political value preference are integrated to 
clarify the conditions that can potentially affect the effectiveness of such frames. Last, this 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 9 
subchapter proposes a refined understanding of the mediators responsible for the effects 
of salience emphasis frames. Thereafter, Part III proposes testable hypotheses and research 
questions on how salience emphasis frames affect citizens’ issue attitudes. 
Part IV of the book presents the empirical method employed to address the 
hypotheses and research questions. Because the methods section is rather extensive, this 
part begins with a brief overview of its structure (see Chapter 4.1) before explaining the 
experimental approach of the study in Chapter 4.2. Next, Chapter 4.3 provides detailed 
information on the sample, measurements, and procedure of the experiment, after which 
the wide range of tests conducted to confirm the experimental validity of the study is 
described in detail (see Chapter 4.4). The methods section ends with a summary in 
Chapter 4.5 comparable with classic space-constrained methods sections in scientific 
journals. As such, only reading this part of the methods section should be sufficient to 
understand the results. 
The next section of the book (see Part V) presents the results of the experiment 
along the single hypotheses and research questions, and offers interpretations of the single 
results. The section is divided into two parts. First, Chapter 5.1 provides the results 
concerned with the direct effects of salience emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitudes. 
Chapter 5.2 then displays the results of the mediation analyses to understand the indirect 
psychological mechanisms underlying the direct effects. 
Finally, Part VI discusses the results on a more abstract level. Chapter 6.1 elaborates 
the implications of the results for assessing the strength of framing effects and citizens’ 
rationality in attitude formation. The potential societal implications of the results are then 
discussed (see Chapter 6.2). Chapter 6.3 demonstrates the meaning of the results for the 
general future of researching emphasis framing effects in political communication. 
Subsequently, Chapter 6.4 provides some more specific recommendations for future 
research based on the limitations of this study. Finally, the book ends with concluding 
remarks on emphasis framing effects in political communication in Chapter 6.5. 
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II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 
2.1 The notion of framing and framing effects in political 
communication research: Clarifying definitional ambiguity 
2.1.1 Emphasis frames and other types of frames in political messages 
In the last decades, the concept of framing has received more attention from political 
communication scholars than most other theoretical ideas in communication science 
(Busby, Flynn, & Druckman, 2018 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). The concept has 
stimulated hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies with thematic foci on poverty (S.-
H. Kim, Carvalho, & Davis, 2010), financial crises (Quiring & Weber, 2012), military 
inventions (Edy & Meirick, 2007), and political scandals (Kepplinger, Geiß, & Siebert, 
2012), for example. Studies have examined framing at different stages in the communication 
process such as communicators’ (often strategic) decisions on how to frame an issue or 
event, how news media use frames in their issue coverage, and how citizens employ frames 
when interpreting issues (for an overview, see de Vreese, 2005 ⁠; Matthes, 2007b, pp. 33–
132). In so doing, framing studies employed various methods such as interviews (e.g., 
Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010), content analyses (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis, Schultz, & Oegema, 2015), 
surveys (e.g., Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2016), experiments (e.g., Igartua & Cheng, 2009), 
and linkage analyses (e.g., Wettstein, 2012). 
This mix of topical foci, units of analysis, and methods illustrates the strong 
integrative power of the framing approach as a unified framework to analyze the 
production, exchange, and effects of the meaning of politically relevant issues and events 
(Matthes, 2012). However, this mix also elucidates a central weakness of the framing 
approach, namely its definitional ambiguity. Sometimes, very different phenomena are 
subsumed unfoundedly under the term framing (Matthes, 2009), and too often, the term 
framing is merely used as an unspecified, higher-level metaphor for more specific aspects 
of messages (Matthes, 2007b, pp. 316–318). Ultimately, the thoughtless usage of the general 
term framing threatens the future of the concept, which is why it is important that scholars 
always label precisely the types of frames they are investigating and definitions thereof 
(Cacciatore et al., 2016). Hence, this subchapter differentiates the concept of emphasis 
frames from the related but different types of frames, which while also prevalent in political 
communication processes, are not in the narrower focus of this study. 
Before differentiating the types of frames, the level on which level this 
differentiation takes place must be clarified. As mentioned, the literature locates frames at 
various stages in the collective production of meaning and distinguishes mainly between 
individual frames and media frames (D. A. Scheufele, 1999). Individual frames (or “frames 
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in thought,” see Druckman, 2001a) are present in the minds of political communicators, 
journalists, and citizens and refer to the organizing principles and schemata individuals 
employ to understand issues and process information meaningfully (also see Entman, 1993 ⁠; 
B. T. Scheufele, 2004). In contrast, media frames (or “frames in communication,” see 
Druckman, 2001a) are located on the level of the message. The term media frame describes 
the presence of frames in what is communicated. However, the term is somewhat 
problematic, as it does not explicitly include non-mediated, direct interpersonal 
communication and often reduces media to journalistic news media (e.g., D. A. Scheufele, 
1999). Political communication increasingly takes place on online social platforms through 
which political actors and citizens can bypass professional news media (Chadwick, 2017) 
when applying – consciously or unconsciously (Gamson, 1989) – a specific frame to a 
political issue in their communication (i.e., when framing an issue). Thus, it seems more 
appropriate to speak broadly of frames in political messages to refer to communicated frames, 
instead of employing the term media frames. 
At the level of frames in political messages, the literature provides three popular 
systematizations: 
1) The first noteworthy systematization is the probably most often employed one in 
communication science and differentiates between generic frames and issue-specific frames 
(de Vreese, 2005 ⁠; de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012 ⁠; Vliegenthart, 2012). Issue-specific 
frames are tied to only one issue or event and highlight a specific aspect thereof. 
Such frames are highly content-related and concerned with the substantive thematic 
aspects of an issue. For example, Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2017) 
analyzed the news media’s issue-specific framing of the Euro crisis in Spanish and 
German online news outlets between 2010 and 2014. Based on a data-driven, 
quantitative content analysis, the authors identified four relevant frames for this 
issue, which were concerned with the different substantive thematic aspects 
discussed by the Spanish and German news media. The frame “bank crisis” 
described the Euro crisis as a consequence of the financial market meltdown in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers Inc. bankruptcy and discussed how the banks 
responsible for the crisis should financially contribute through increased taxes or 
shareholders’ contributions to stabilize the European currency. In contrast, the 
“sovereign debt” frame emphasized the crisis as the result of public deficits that 
were too high. The third frame, “conditional assistance,” highlighted the importance 
of providing monetary help to nations with financial problems, but under the strict 
condition of deeper European integration and governmental austerity measures. 
The last frame was that of “competitiveness,” which focused on how European 
nations should increase their economic competitiveness by reforming their labor 
markets or social security systems to overcome the crisis. 
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In contrast to issue-specific frames, generic frames “transcend thematic limitations 
and can be identified in relation to different topics” (de Vreese, 2005, p. 54). These 
frames focus less on the argumentative content of an issue, such as the pros and 
cons of different issue positions, and more on the general patterns that particularly 
news media employ for the presentation and narration of issues. This allows 
comparing the prevalence of the same frame across issues. For example, Semetko 
and Valkenburg (2000) identified five generic frames often prevalent in news 
coverage: The frame “attribution of responsibility” focuses on the search for the 
culprit(s) of political developments, and the “human interest frame” refers to a 
general emphasis on the portrayal of feelings and private details rather than on a 
societal angle. The “conflict frame” highlights disagreement among (political) actors 
and describes politics in the sense of winners and losers, while the “morality frame” 
contains prescriptions on what is morally right and wrong. Finally, the “economic 
frame” focuses on the economic consequences of an issue or event. Other generic 
frames proposed by scholars include the “strategy frame,” sometimes also called the 
“horse-race frame” (Cappella & Hall Jamieson, 1996), which is comparable with the 
previously mentioned conflict frame or “episodic frames” (Iyengar, 1991) that focus 
on the individual rather than societal level, as also does the human interest frame. 
2) A second systematization of message frames is offered by Matthes (2007b, pp. 55–
62). He refined the systematization mentioned before using not only the criteria of 
issue-specific versus cross-thematic frames but also the degree to which the frame 
is concerned with the substantive content of a topic. Specifically, at the higher order 
level of his systematization, he distinguished between formal-stylistic frames and content-
related frames. Formal-stylistic frames are generic frames, such as the human interest 
or conflict frame, which have nothing in particular to do with the topic framed but 
rather describe formal types of story narrations (e.g., from the perspective of an 
individual or by focusing on the conflict between actors without discussing what the 
conflict is about). In contrast, content-related frames are concerned with the 
substantive thematic aspects of an issue or event. However, Matthes (2007b, pp. 55–
62) argued that substantive frames must not be only issue-specific, but that content-
related frames can also use cross-thematic interpretations to frame the thematic core 
of an issue or event. Thus, he proposed distinguishing the level of content-related 
frames as issue-specific and cross-thematic frames. 
An example of these types of content-related frames is provided in a further study 
by Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2019). They re-analyzed the same 
substantive frames they found in the aforementioned study on the Euro crisis 
(Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017). They checked which frames were 
exclusively tied to the specific issue of the Euro crisis and which frames mirrored 
cross-thematic patterns of interpretation related to the substantive thematic 
arguments on the Euro crisis, but were also applicable to different issues. They 
found that two of the substantive content-related frames found in the data-driven 
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procedure were pure issue-specific frames only applicable to the specific topic of 
the Euro crisis, e.g., the “conditional assistance” frame that emphasized highly 
specific measures to solve the crisis. However, the other two frames clearly mirrored 
the superordinate (economic) ideologies of either neoliberalism (i.e., free markets) 
or Keynesianism (i.e., state intervention), and thus employed cross-thematic but 
content-related frames. For instance, the “competitiveness” frame employed the 
well-known neo-liberal perspective and argued for free markets and a less prominent 
government to solve the crisis. This perspective was not only important for the Euro 
crisis, but also prevalent in the framing of other issues such as social welfare or 
educational policy (for more examples of cross-thematic content-related frames, see 
Hopkins & Mummolo, 2017). 
3) The third systematization of frames relevant in the literature is most prominent in 
political science and differentiates between equivalency frames and emphasis frames 
(Borah, 2011a ⁠; Druckman, 2001a). This systematization is grounded in the 
disciplinary roots of framing research, but does not consider the formal-stylistic 
frames of the (journalistic) presentation and narration of issues developed in the 
field of communication science. Instead, it integrates the concept of equivalency 
frames, which originated in psychological (and economic) research (e.g., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984⁠; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998), and consider such frames as 
“different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases” (Druckman, 2001a, p. 228) 
employed to present an issue. Like formal-stylistic frames in the systematization by 
Matthes (2007b), equivalency frames are cross-thematic and not directly related to 
the substantive content of an issue. However, formal-stylistic frames differ 
materially from each other. For instance, the formal-stylistic frame “conflict” is 
logically different from the “human interest” frame, and both contain different 
subsets of thematic information telling people either about the rivalry between 
political actors that try to win the game for political power (i.e., conflict frame) or 
about the private lives of political actors (i.e., human interest frame). Unlike formal-
stylistic frames, equivalency frames are logically interchangeable and contain 
identical information. They only vary in how this information is presented. Such 
frames present the same information as gains or losses (e.g., Druckman, 2001c⁠; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979⁠; Pedersen & Larsen, 2018), also sometimes referred to 
in the literature as positive or negative framing (e.g., Druckman, 2004 ⁠; Koch & Peter, 
2017⁠; Osmundsen & Petersen, 2019). For example, a new policy for the labor market 
can be framed by focusing either on the gain that it will help 5% of the unemployed 
find a new job or on the loss that 95% of the unemployed will not benefit from the 
new policy. 
In contrast, emphasis frames (Borah, 2011a ⁠; Druckman, 2001a) are rooted in 
sociological research (e.g., Goffman, 1974 ⁠; Snow & Benford, 1992), and concerned 
with the substantive aspects of an issue or event. Thus, they are comparable to the 
concept of content-related frames proposed by Matthes (2007b). Emphasis frames 
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select a specific thematic aspect of an issue such as competitiveness or conditional 
assistance in the Euro crisis (see again Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017⁠, 
2019), and make this aspect more salient in a political message (Entman, 1993⁠; 
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Therefore, some authors refer to emphasis frames by 
using also the term “issue frames” (e.g., Jacoby, 2000⁠; Nelson & Kinder, 1996 ⁠; 
Slothuus, 2008 ⁠; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). Emphasis frames can be either issue-
specific or cross-thematic and unlike equivalency frames, different emphasis frames 
for an issue are not logically equivalent. For instance, when applying different 
emphasis frames to the issue of federal assistance to the poor, such as the 
“humanitarianism” or “government expenditures” frame (Druckman, 2001b), these 
frames are not logically interchangeable because humanitarianism is not the same as 
the government’s budget. However, equivalency frames such as 5% unemployment 
versus 95% employment are logically the same (Druckman, 2001a). 
 
Figure 1 proposes a further systematization of frames in political messages that 
unifies the three systematizations described above and thus, should cover all three 
superordinate types of message frames relevant in the field of political communication 
research. First, formal-stylistic frames rooted in media and journalism studies are unrelated 
to the specific topic framed. Rather, they are concerned with the generic and cross-thematic 
principles of the presentation and narration of issues or events such as focusing on human 
interest or conflict. Second, equivalency frames are likewise cross-thematic and unrelated 
to framed issues or events but the concept originates from psychological research and only 
considers logically equivalent frames such as the logically interchangeable presentation of 
gains or losses. Third, emphasis frames are about the substantive aspects of an issue and 
thus content-related. This conception was first developed in the field of sociology. One can 
further distinguish issue-specific emphasis frames tied to only one issue (e.g., for the Euro 
crisis the frame of providing financial aid to countries with overly high public debts only 
under the condition of deeper European integration) and cross-thematic emphasis frames, 
which while also concerned with the substantive aspects of a specific issue, can be applied 
to various other issues (e.g., the environmentalism frame). 
Of course, all three types of frames are relevant objects of political framing research, 
and empirical studies have revealed important effects of the different types of frames. In 
the field of equivalency framing, for example, studies relatively consistently show that 
people tend to avoid losses (e.g., Druckman & McDermott, 2008), and when policy 
problems are framed in terms of losses rather than gains, citizens are more willing to make 
more risky political choices (Osmundsen & Petersen, 2019), which can threaten the 
rationality of democratic decision-making. However, equivalency frames are seldom used 
in real political communication outside the laboratory, because different political options 
are rarely logically equivalent and communicators do not limit their framing to the 
presentation of such frames (Slothuus, 2008 ⁠; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). 
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Potentially problematic societal outcomes have also been found in the area of 
formal-stylistic frames. For instance, empirical studies revealed that frames such as the 
strategy or conflict frame can increase citizens’ political cynicism (de Vreese & Elenbaas, 
2008⁠; Elenbaas & Vreese, 2008 ⁠; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001) or polarize those 
belonging to different social groups (J. Han & Federico, 2018). Formal-stylistic frames are 
more prevalent in news coverage than equivalency frames. However, as they are not 
concerned with the substantive aspects of political issues, they are less important in 
analyzing the formation of political issue attitudes and rather relevant for examining the 
side effects of specific types of news media coverage such as political cynicism. In contrast, 
emphasis frames are highly prevalent in real political communication in all kinds of political 
messages, not only in news coverage. Therefore, they receive the most attention in political 
communication research. Moreover, they are content-related by offering interpretations for 
the substantive content of political issues. As this book is interested in the formation of 
citizens’ issue attitudes under framing conditions, it focuses on emphasis framing and the 
effects thereof in the following chapters. 
Before considering the effects of emphasis frames in the next subchapter (see 
Subchapter 2.1.2), it is important to define the concept of emphasis frames. The probably 
most often cited definition is by Entman (1993), and this book follows his general definition 
stating that to “frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52). This way, emphasis frames “suggest how 
events should be understood” (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, p. 641) by focusing on “a subset 
of potentially relevant considerations” (Druckman, 2001a, p. 230) to construct a specific 
meaning of the framed issue or event for the audience (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). 
Often, an applied emphasis frame not only offers a specific interpretative pattern for an 
issue, but this salient issue perspective contains a specific valence suggesting how to 
Frames 
Equivalency 





(not related to issue 
content, cross-thematic) 
Issue-specific Cross-thematic 
Figure 1. Types of frames in political messages 
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evaluate the topic (de Vreese et al., 2011). For example, when a political actor speaks about 
offshore oil drilling, she or he can use different emphasis frames to provide a specific issue 
interpretation (cf. Druckman et al., 2013). Here, the actor could employ an environmental 
frame highlighting the potential negative outcomes for the maritime environment, such as 
the risk of an accident leading to contamination of the ocean with oil, suggesting a negative 
evaluation of the topic. Alternatively, the actor could use an economic benefits frame 
emphasizing the value of drilling, as oil is (still) an indispensable resource for the economy 
of modern societies, and thus highlight a positive evaluation of offshore oil drilling. 
 
Summary 
This subchapter differentiated the concept of emphasis frames from other types of message 
frames analyzed in political communication research, such as (journalistic) formal-stylistic 
or equivalency frames. Emphasis frames are content-related frames that can either be issue-
specific or cross-thematic when highlighting a specific perspective of an (political) issue or 
event to construct a certain meaning for it. This book focuses on the effects of citizens’ 
exposure to emphasis frames. As such, the next subchapter (see Subchapter 2.1.2) defines 
in detail an emphasis framing effect. 
2.1.2 Emphasis framing effects and issue attitude as the key dependent 
variable 
Despite the common idea that an emphasis framing effect is an effect on individuals, there 
are two competing approaches to how the literature defines such effects. One line of 
research bases its definition on the psychological mechanism (i.e., the mediator, see Baron 
& Kenny, 1986) underlying emphasis framing effects on individuals (Nelson, Clawson, & 
Oxley, 1997⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999). Researchers using this 
approach argue that one can only speak of an emphasis framing effect when it results from 
changes in the importance citizens attribute to the specific dimension highlighted by the 
frame (i.e., belief importance change, see Chapter 2.3 for a detailed description of the 
mediating processes behind emphasis framing effects). If, in contrast, the effect is mediated 
via changes in the mere cognitive accessibility (Higgins, 1996) of the consideration the 
frame emphasized, then it is a priming effect (Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997). Furthermore, 
when the effect is mediated via changes in citizens’ beliefs (i.e., learning from new 
information), authors adopting this approach claim it is a learning effect, not an emphasis 
framing effect (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). 
The other line of research defines emphasis framing effects based on the message 
characteristic an individual is exposed to, i.e., based on the independent variable of the 
effect. This approach is more common in the literature and understands emphasis framing 
effects on individuals as the result of exposure to an emphasis frame (Druckman, 2001b ⁠; 
Slothuus, 2008), regardless of the underlying psychological mechanism that explains the 
effect (Chong & Druckman, 2007a ⁠, 2007b). However, this does not necessarily mean that 
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this line of research does not differentiate emphasis framing effects, priming effects, and 
learning effects. Rather, this differentiation occurs on the side of the message, not of the 
mediator. While a priming effect is the result of an (unrelated) “preceding stimulus or event 
on how we react […] to some subsequent stimulus” (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Klinger, & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 2007, p. 53), an emphasis frame is an integral part of the same stimulus and 
directly connects the emphasis on a certain aspect with the issue or event (de Vreese 
& Lecheler, 2012). In contrast, a learning effect is the result of the provision of new 
information, not of an emphasis frame highlighting a specific issue perspective in a stimulus 
(Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). 
There are two reasons to favor the latter definitional approach. First, the exact 
psychological mechanisms underlying emphasis framing effects are still unclear (see 
Chapter 2.3), making it impossible to define emphasis framing effects based on these 
mechanisms without running into the problem of a shaky definition. Second, it is much 
more common in the logic of effects research to define an effect on the individual – i.e., 
the changes in the dependent variable – as the result of exposure to a specific message 
characteristic, i.e., the independent variable (Potter, 2011). As outlined before in 
Subchapter 2.1.1, emphasis frames in communication (not in thought, see again 
Druckman, 2001a for this differentiation) are such a message characteristic. Thus, along 
with most other studies in the literature, this book understands emphasis framing effects as 
the effects triggered by exposure to an emphasis frame used in a (political) message. 
However, to the define such effect as emphasis framing effects, the question remains 
regarding on which dependent variable of the individual the effect occurs. Again, the 
literature is equivocal on this point. Empirical studies have investigated emphasis framing 
effects on numerous of variables such as causal attributions (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001), 
emotions (Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004), voting intentions (Bechtel, Hainmueller, 
Hangartner, & Helbling, 2015 ⁠; Schemer et al., 2012), behavioral intentions such as 
information seeking (Borah, 2011b⁠, 2018), the choice and evaluation of political candidates 
(Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998 ⁠; B. T. Scheufele, 2010⁠; Shah et al., 1996), issue thoughts 
and issue interpretations (de Vreese, 2004 ⁠; G. Han, Chock, & Shoemaker, 2009 ⁠; Shen, 
2004a⁠, 2004b), perceptions of risks (Cobb, 2005), cognitive complexity (Huang, 2010 ⁠; Shah, 
Kwak, Schmierbach, & Zubric, 2004), and issue attitudes (Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003 ⁠; 
Chong & Druckman, 2007a ⁠; de Vreese et al., 2011 ⁠; Igartua & Cheng, 2009 ⁠; Lecheler, Keer, 
Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015⁠; Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997⁠; Tewksbury, Jones, Peske, Raymond, 
& Vig, 2000 ⁠; Zilli Ramírez & Verkuyten, 2011). 
Some authors prefer a narrow definition and only judge effects of emphasis frames 
on individuals’ issue interpretation (or issue thoughts) as emphasis framing effects, while 
they define attitudinal (i.e., persuasive) effects only as a possible but not necessary 
subsequent outcome of these emphasis framing effects (e.g., Matthes & Schemer, 2012). In 
contrast, most other authors focus on (issue) attitude as the central dependent variable of 
emphasis framing effects, because most emphasis frames contain a specific valence that can 
be attitudinally relevant (e.g., Busby et al., 2018 ⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007c⁠; de Vreese et 
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al., 2011⁠; Slothuus, 2008). However, is it helpful to limit the definition of emphasis framing 
effects to a certain dependent variable? This could easily create blind spots on the effects 
of an emphasis frame on other variables located at the individual level. Thus, this book 
defines an emphasis framing effect as any effect the exposure to an emphasis frame in a political 
message exerts on an individual. 
Nevertheless, this book focuses in the following on only one dependent variable 
affected by emphasis frames, namely citizens’ attitude toward the framed (political) issue or 
event. First, it is the most often analyzed dependent variable of emphasis framing effects 
(de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012). This ensures that the analysis presented later can draw on 
the insights of previous research and can contribute to improving understanding of this 
most often analyzed dependent variable of emphasis framing effects. Second, a specific 
issue attitude is the classic outcome a political actor aims for when applying an emphasis 
frame to an issue. Third, according to the theory of planned behavior, (issue) attitude is one 
of the central variables leading to further behavioral outcomes (Ajzen, 1991). These further 
outcomes can be politically relevant, such as information-seeking, political participation, or 
voting. Thus, it is important looking at the effects of emphasis frames on citizens’ issue 
attitude, not only at issue interpretations, which might be less consequential. 
Given that this book focuses on the attitudinal effects triggered by exposure to an 
emphasis frame and thus, understands these frames in political messages as a specific 
persuasive tool to influence citizens’ issue attitude toward the framed (political) topic, the 
term issue attitude must be briefly defined. In general, an “attitude represents a summary 
evaluation of a psychological object” (Ajzen, 2001, p. 28) and “denote[s the] overall degree 
of favorability” (p. 29) attributed to the attitude object. Accordingly, an issue attitude indicates 
the degree of being against or in favor of a specific political topic. Examples of political issue attitudes 
include how strongly someone supports or opposes governmental subventions for a 
manned space flight to the planet Mars, the introduction of a new tax on carbon dioxide 
emissions, or a quota for women in leadership positions. 
Emphasis frames (see Subchapter 2.1.1) and emphasis framing effects on citizens’ 
issue attitude (see Subchapter 2.1.2) have now been defined, clarifying what this book is 
about. Next, Chapter 2.2 presents the results of empirical studies that investigated the 
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2.2 Simple emphasis framing effects 
2.2.1 Empirical results on simple one-sided emphasis framing effects 
Besides the few exceptional works employing linkage analyses that match media content 
analyses with survey data on citizens’ exposure to (differently framed) content and its 
subsequent attitudinal effects over time (Matthes, 2007b⁠, 2008⁠; Matthes & Schemer, 2012 ⁠; 
Schemer et al., 2012 ⁠; Wettstein, 2012), most studies on emphasis framing effects use 
experimental designs. This is especially the case when studies investigate simple emphasis 
framing effects. This subchapter focuses on the experimental studies of simple emphasis 
framing effects, although the book later presents some of the insights from the more 
complex linkage analyses that also consider individual differences in susceptibility to 
emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.4.1) and changes in these effects over time 
(see Chapter 2.6). A simple emphasis framing effect is a difference in issue attitude evoked by single 
exposure to one emphasis frame compared to single exposure to another emphasis frame for the same issue 
but with the opposite valence. The occurrence of this effect does not rely on further individual or contextual 
conditions. In abstract terms, a simple emphasis framing effect is a main effect of the factor 
emphasis frame containing at least two different framing levels. Moreover, this main effect 
is not allowed displaying a disordinal interaction effect with further variables, as a disordinal 
interaction would  indicate that the emphasis framing effect does not exist on aggregate, 
but works differently for specific subgroups or contextual situations (Reinard, 2006, 
pp. 214–220). 
When experimental studies investigate simple emphasis framing effects, they mostly 
compare the one-sided framing of an issue between two emphasis frames with the opposite 
valence. They rarely consider more frames or a control group without explicit frames (see 
the results of a meta-analysis by Leeper & Slothuus, 2017, which investigated more than 
100 studies on emphasis framing effects). That is, in most studies, each experimental group 
receives only one uncontested emphasis frame for the same issue to assess how different 
framing leads to different issue attitudes (cf. Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). Furthermore, 
most studies rely on self-produced framing stimuli that mimic media products (e.g., news 
articles, TV news stories, social media posts), not on the real content of political 
communication (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2011⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999⁠; Slothuus, 2008). This 
ensures experimental control over the stimulus, guaranteeing that everything is constant for 
different framing conditions except the frame of interest (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011). 
That is, these studies prefer the internal validity of the causality test over the external validity 
of the stimulus material for generalization to real media content (de Vreese, 2004). 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the employed stimuli are unrealistic 
and do not allow for any conclusions beyond the used stimuli. Often, the production of 
stimuli follows results of previous analyses of real political communication content (e.g., de 
Vreese et al., 2011) and the general stylistic criteria of media content such as the structure 
of a news article (e.g., Slothuus, 2008). This ensures the realistic analysis of the effects of 
the frames prevalent for a specific issue and can thus increase the external validity of the 
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stimuli up to a certain extent. In addition, most constructions of stimuli follow the 
established standard of using core elements that present the same information about a topic 
or event across framing conditions, and frame-carrying elements, which differ according to the 
framing condition and emphasize a different aspect of the issue (de Vreese & Lecheler, 
2012). These frame-carrying elements, also called framing devices, include the headline, lead, 
visual material, quotes, metaphors, exemplars, or concluding remarks of a political message 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1989⁠; Z. Pan & Kosicki, 1993⁠; Tankard, 2001). 
For instance, Shen (2004b) constructed two differently framed versions of a 
newspaper article on stem cell research based on actual news coverage and varied the 
headline, the introduction, and concluding paragraph, while holding constant “a core 
section of two paragraphs with background information” (p. 406). In the condition with 
the “medical benefits” emphasis frame, the article used the headline “Expanding Stem Cell 
Research Brings Medical Benefits” (p. 405), and the introduction and concluding paragraph 
described the issue emphasizing the benefits of expanding stem cell research for progress 
in medical treatments. In contrast, in the condition with the “ethical” emphasis frame, the 
same newspaper article started with the headline “Expanding Stem Cell Research Raises 
Serious Moral Questions” (p. 405), and the introduction and end of the article focused on 
the ethical question of how to deal with (irreversible) genetic interventions. In both 
experimental conditions, the different introductions and conclusions were of the same 
length and used the same writing style. Only the emphasis frame varied between the two 
experimental groups. 
The results of this study conducted with participants from the US showed that 
participants exposed to the medical benefits emphasis frame afterwards supported stem cell 
research significantly more strongly than those that read the news article with the ethical 
frame (Shen, 2004b). Moreover, the study replicated the findings of a simple emphasis 
framing effect for a second issue, namely oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 
Participants exposed to an environmental frame for this issue emphasizing the danger of 
drilling for wildlife opposed drilling in the Arctic significantly more strongly than did those 
exposed to the economic benefits frame, which highlighted the positive effects of drilling 
for the economy (Shen, 2004b). 
In another experimental study on simple emphasis framing effects, Tang and Huhe 
(2014) showed participants from China an online news article dealing with the 
government’s space program. One group received an “advancements in technology” 
emphasis frame highlighting that the program showcases China’s technological progress, 
thereby employing the official view favored by the government. The other group was 
exposed to an alternative “social welfare” frame emphasizing that the space program wasted 
valuable financial resources that could have been better invested in improving people’s 
standard of living. Results revealed that participants who read the social welfare frame 
opposed the space program significantly more strongly than those exposed to the 
technology frame (Tang & Huhe, 2014). 
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 Slothuus (2008) also investigated simple emphasis framing effects in an experimental 
setting using respondents from Denmark and a different political issue. Specifically, 
participants read a news article on a draft of a new social welfare bill proposed by the 
government that would reduce welfare benefits after the first six months of unemployment. 
One emphasis frame for this topic, the “job frame,” highlighted that the bill would function 
as an economic incentive to search for a new job, which would help unemployed citizens 
re-enter the workforce. In contrast, the “poor frame” emphasized that the new bill would 
not help reduce unemployment, but would increase the number of people who are poor. 
Again, the results of this study showed the importance of emphasis framing in the 
formation of issue attitudes. Participants exposed to the job frame favored the 
implementation of the new bill significantly more strongly than those reading the news 
story about the bill with the poor frame. Unlike the two studies presented above, this one 
also contained a control group reading a news story unrelated to the new bill. Both framing 
conditions also differed significantly from the control group in the direction of the 
employed emphasis frame (Slothuus, 2008). 
A study by Nelson and Oxley (1999), in which two experiments were conducted 
with participants from the US, provides two further examples of simple emphasis framing 
effects. In the first experiment, respondents read a newspaper story dealing with a land 
development project in Florida. One emphasis frame focused on the possible economic 
gains if the new project was realized by presenting quotes highlighting the creation of jobs 
and increase in tax revenues for the region. The other frame was an environmental frame 
emphasizing that the new infrastructure project would threaten some species with 
extinction if implemented. As expected, issue attitudes differed significantly depending on 
exposure to the different emphasis frames. Respondents in the condition with the 
economic frame supported the land development project significantly more strongly than 
participants reading the same news article but with a focus on the environment. 
In the second experiment dealing with the welfare reform of a “family cap” that 
would deny single mothers additional financial benefits after the first child, the simple 
emphasis framing effect was not statistically significant (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). However, 
the descriptive statistics revealed a noticeable difference in the expected direction between 
the two conditions employing different emphasis frames. When the welfare reform was 
framed as a “threat to children” by including quotes and photos to emphasize that it would 
punish innocent children, participants opposed the reform more strongly than did those 
exposed to the “personal responsibility” emphasis framing, which highlighted that mothers 
would have to learn to shoulder the financial burden of their reproductive decisions.    
Nelson also lead a further experimental study on the probably most often cited 
example of emphasis framing effects: the framing of a planned rally by the Ku Klux Klan, 
a radical white supremacist organization (Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997). When a “free 
speech” emphasis frame highlighted in a real TV news item that civil rights allow everyone 
to conduct a rally, US participants exposed to this news item were significantly more 
tolerant of an approval of the planned rally compared to respondents receiving the “public 
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order” frame, which underlined the danger of escalating violence during the rally. To ensure 
internal validity beyond the selected real TV news items with different emphasis frames, 
which might also have differed in terms of other dimensions, the authors fully replicated 
their findings in a second experimental test employing a constructed newspaper article with 
full control over the framing conditions (Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997). 
In three further experiments conducted with US participants, Nelson (2004) 
investigated emphasis framing effects by manipulating newspaper articles for three other 
political issues. The first experiment dealt with the topic of an adoption reform that would 
allow adopted children to obtain information on their biological parents, thus not 
protecting the parents’ identity. The “children’s rights” emphasis frame highlighted that it 
is the fundamental right of children “to know who you are and where you came from” (p. 
588), whereas the “parents’ rights” frame emphasized the importance of respecting the right 
of protecting the identity of biological parents who put their child up for adoption. As 
expected, participants exposed to the children’s rights emphasis frame supported the 
adoption reform significantly more strongly than did respondents who read the news article 
with the parents’ rights frame. 
The second experiment investigated the issue of affirmative action for minorities 
regarding their admission to universities, i.e., the selection of students based not only on 
previous grades and test scores, but also on racial and class criteria to increase the share of 
students from underrepresented groups at universities (Nelson, 2004). This topic was 
framed in two different ways for participants. One group received an “excellence” emphasis 
frame that focused on universities’ mission to select students based only on test scores to 
ensure that the best-qualified students receive places at universities regardless of race or 
class. In contrast, the second group of participants was exposed to an “opportunity” frame 
emphasizing that universities also have a societal role and should give minorities additional 
opportunities to obtain higher education. The results showed that the second group 
supported measures for affirmative action significantly more strongly than those in the 
group with the excellence emphasis frame. 
The last experiment also demonstrated significant attitudinal effects of emphasis 
frames (Nelson, 2004). In this experiment, the issue was granting school vouchers financed 
by taxpayers to poor families so that these families could freely decide which school their 
children would attend. The emphasis frame “school quality” explained this issue by 
focusing on the potential of school vouchers to increase the quality of public schools, as 
the vouchers would increase the competition between schools for pupils with the vouchers. 
The “church-state” frame presented a different viewpoint on the issue by highlighting that 
vouchers would lead to the hidden financial sponsoring of private schools with taxpayers’ 
money, as most families would decide to use their voucher for private schools. Moreover, 
religious organizations would own most private schools, through which they would be 
indirectly financed by the state, which would counter the idea of the separation of church 
and state. Again, exposure to one of these frames produced a significantly different attitude 
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toward the issue than exposure to the other. The school quality emphasis frame led to 
stronger support for school vouchers than the church-state frame (Nelson, 2004). 
It would be easily possible to expand the list of experimental studies consistently 
revealing significant simple emphasis framing effects for a wide range of other political 
issues including government assistance to the poor, government spending on AIDS, 
affirmative action (all Nelson & Kinder, 1996), enlargements of the European Union (de 
Vreese et al., 2011 ⁠; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006), welfare reforms (Shen & Edwards, 2005), 
financial investments in new European Union member states (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012), 
NATO’s military interventions in Kosovo (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006), and campaign 
finance laws (Druckman & Nelson, 2003), to name just a few further examples. However, 
reviewing all these studies would unnecessarily increase redundancy without providing 
deeper insights into simple emphasis framing effects. 
Thus, it seems more appropriate to look beyond the statistical significance of these 
effects and briefly review the effect size of emphasis framing effects. According to a meta-
analysis by Leeper and Slothuus (2017), which included more than 100 studies on emphasis 
framing effects, the mean effect of treatment-treatment comparisons (i.e., between two 
different emphasis frames) was d = 0.45, which can be considered a medium effect size (cf. 
Cohen, 1992). That is, simple emphasis framing does not strongly influence citizens’ 
attitudes in the sense of producing extremely different and polarized issue attitudes after a 
single exposure. However, emphasis framing still leads to notable attitudinal differences 
between citizens exposed to the different emphasis frames. Note though that the average 
effect of a single emphasis frame compared to a control group without an explicit frame is 
smaller: d = 0.28 (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017), which is a rather weak effect size. This implies 
that notable attitudinal differences mostly occur when different citizens are exposed to 
different emphasis frames. 
2.2.2 Summary and preliminary implications of simple emphasis framing 
effects for assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
(Experimental) studies on simple emphasis framing effects investigated how citizens’ issue 
attitudes differ depending on their exposure to a one-sided emphasis frame highlighting a 
specific issue perspective compared to situations in which they are exposed to another one-
sided emphasis frame focusing on another aspect of the issue with the opposite valence. As 
noted in Subchapter 2.2.1 before, at least the published results consistently revealed 
significant simple emphasis framing effects with a relative substantial effect size, implying 
that simple changes in the frame produce significantly different issue attitudes. (However, 
see Fanelli, 2012, for the general problem of publication bias in science favoring significant 
results over insignificant results, which could suggest that insignificant framing effects are 
simply less available in the literature.) Moreover, these simple emphasis framing effects 
occurred for the framing of various political issues and citizens from countries worldwide, 
indicating that the phenomenon is rather invariant to culture and political content. 
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Based on these results, it seems reasonable to summarize that simple emphasis 
frames affect considerably citizens’ issue attitudes. That is, it seems that citizens simply 
form their issue attitude based on the issue perspective made more salient in a political 
message, and not (or better: less) consider less salient aspects of the issue or those omitted 
in a specific message. Given this often-replicated result, it is probably justified to state that 
citizens are rather susceptible to base their attitudes on emphasis frames that require not 
much more from a communicator than highlighting the relevance of certain considerations. 
Whereas other means of persuasion may need much more resources to increase the 
likelihood of affecting citizens’ attitudes, such as building credible reputation of the 
communicator or the scientific production of compelling thematic facts for a specific issue 
position, it seems public opinion can be influenced by employing nothing more than an 
emphasis frame. Therefore, scholars consider emphasis framing a powerful political tool 
for political actors, because it requires only minimal costs to gain public support and 
thereby, political legitimacy for one’s issue position (e.g., Jacoby, 2000). 
What does the relative strength of simple emphasis framing effects mean for 
assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation? Emphasis “framing effects suggest that 
distributions of public preferences are arbitrary, and that political elites can manipulate 
popular preferences to serve their own interests” (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 120). 
When citizens prefer drilling in the Arctic after being exposed to an economic emphasis 
frame, but oppose it, when exposed to an environmental frame, it is difficult to state that 
this is a rational shift in attitude. Rationality can be defined as the consistency and coherence 
of preferences as long as the substantive information for (or against) a specific preference 
does not change (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Emphasis framing effects seem to violate 
this principle of rationality, as different emphasis frames lead to unsubstantiated and thus 
arbitrary attitudinal changes that do not follow the constant thematic core facts about an 
issue, but rely on easily changeable frame emphases that only alter how the information is 
presented. Therefore, particularly earlier literature on emphasis framing effects considered 
simple emphasis framing a threat to rational attitude formation (cf. Druckman, 2001a). 
However, not all authors agree with this conclusion (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 
2007b⁠; Druckman, 2001a ⁠; Leeper & Slothuus, 2017), as later studies on emphasis framing 
effects revealed that these effects tend to be more complex and rely on additional 
conditions. This suggests that susceptibility to emphasis framing effects is less arbitrary than 
initially expected. Thus, the conclusion of irrational attitude formation based on emphasis 
framing should be understood as preliminary. It is explored in greater detail when 
examining moderated emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.4.3 and Subchapter 
2.5.4) and the theoretical criticism of the construction of emphasis frames in empirical 
research (see Chapter 2.8). Before then, it is relevant to first gain deeper insights into how 
simple emphasis framing effects work on the psychological level by looking at the 
mechanisms that explain (i.e., mediate) these effects (see next Chapter 2.3). 
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2.3 Cognitive mediators of emphasis framing effects 
2.3.1 Cognitive accessibility vs. applicability 
The previous Chapter 2.2 showed that simple emphasis frames can considerably influence 
citizens’ issue attitudes. However, the question of how these effects work was not sufficiently 
answered. Research on psychological communication effects is always interested in testing 
not only whether certain message characteristics such as emphasis frames exert attitudinal 
effects but also in investigating the psychological mechanisms that lead to these effects. 
Examining these mechanisms can offer additional explanations of why an effect occurs, as 
it opens the “black box” of what happens within an individual that leads to a specific 
outcome after exposure to a specific message (Holbert & Stephenson, 2003). This chapter 
aims to offer such explanations for the effects of emphasis frames. Such mechanisms are 
referred to in the literature as mediators (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the process of a 
communication effect (or any other psychological effect), mediators are variables located 
between the cause of an effect (i.e., the independent variable) and the effect of interest itself 
(i.e., the dependent variable). That is, the logic underlying mediation is simply that an 
independent variable affects the mediator variable first and then, the mediator influences 
the dependent variable. For instance, when the independent variable is that the same 
message is presented to an individual as originating either from an expert or layperson, this 
variable first affects how credible the individual perceives the message to be (i.e., the 
mediating variable). In turn, the differently perceived credibility of the message then 
influences the dependent variable of how strongly the individual adopts an attitude in 
accordance with the direction of the message. 
The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the mediators of emphasis 
framing effects focuses on cognitive mediators (cf. de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012⁠; Matthes, 
2007b, pp. 91–127), i.e., on how frames affect citizens’ processing (and evaluation) of 
information, which then influences their issue attitudes. While interest in emotions as a 
complementary mediator of emphasis framing effects has recently increased (e.g., Clifford, 
2019⁠; Feinholdt, Schuck, Lecheler, & de Vreese, 2017⁠; Kühne, Weber, & Sommer, 2015), 
this book focuses on the better-established cognitive mediation mechanisms underlying 
framing. 
 
Accessibility and applicability as antagonistic mediators 
Among these cognitive mechanisms, an often debated question is whether emphasis 
framing effects influence citizens’ issue attitudes because the emphasized frame increases 
the cognitive accessibility of a certain aspect of an issue or because it influences the cognitive 
applicability of the aspect the emphasis frame made more salient (Cacciatore et al., 2016 ⁠; 
Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997⁠; Price & Tewksbury, 1997⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007). Both concepts are concerned with the activation of potentially available knowledge 
stored in the long-term memory, which must be activated in the working memory when 
processing information. However, the concepts differ in terms of when and how this 
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activated knowledge is used for interpreting a stimulus, i.e., incoming information (Higgins, 
1996). On one hand, accessibility refers to the general activation potential of a specific piece 
of knowledge for a specific individual (i.e., chronic accessibility). For example, the ease with 
which a person can activate the concept of racial discrimination might differ between 
someone often confronted with discrimination in the past and a person without such 
experience. On the other, a stimulus can make a specific concept or consideration 
temporarily accessible even for citizens for whom this consideration is less chronically 
accessible. For instance, even a person without personal experiences of discrimination can 
activate the concept thereof when it is salient enough in a stimulus and as long as the person 
has knowledge of this concept, i.e., as long as the consideration is available in the person’s 
memory (Higgins, 1996). 
Some scholars argue that emphasis framing effects work rather unconsciously by 
increasing the temporary accessibility of a specific aspect of an issue. Citizen then simply 
employ this accessible consideration when forming their attitude (e.g., McCombs & 
Ghanem, 2001). That is, these scholars understand framing effects as the result of a pure 
salience-based mechanism similar to the process underlying second-level agenda setting and 
priming, which both also work via increasing the accessibility of specific considerations, 
which then are more likely employed by a person at the time of attitude formation (cf. D. 
A. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The mechanism of accessibility relies on the idea that 
citizens are “cognitive misers” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) who want to avoid cognitive efforts 
and rely on heuristics that are often sufficient to come up with judgments that seem valid. 
An easily available (i.e., accessible) consideration can be such a heuristic, as the easy retrieval 
of the consideration suggests its validity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). That is, accessibility-
based accounts of emphasis framing effects assume that the salience of a certain aspect of 
an issue because of emphasis framing increases the temporary cognitive accessibility of this 
aspect. Citizens base their issue attitude on this more easily accessible consideration without 
further reasoning (cf. Cacciatore et al., 2016). For example, when a person receives an 
environmental frame highlighting the negative consequences of fracking for the 
environment, these environmental considerations are more accessible for the person than 
other considerations such as economic benefits. The person then forms her or his attitude 
toward fracking based on the more accessible environmental aspect activated in the 
working memory without elaborating why the attitude was based on the environmental 
aspect and not another consideration. 
In contrast, other scholars define emphasis framing effects as applicability-based 
effects (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016⁠; Price & Tewksbury, 1997 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele 
& Tewksbury, 2007). Broadly, applicability can be defined as the fit between a piece of a 
person’s knowledge and a stimulus. As such, applicability describes how well a stimulus 
matches an individual’s knowledge structure (Higgins, 1996). If information in a stimulus 
fits the person’s knowledge, the probability is higher that this information is activated in 
the working memory. Moreover, the likelihood increases that a person will activate further 
internal knowledge related to this information through spreading activation. That is, the 
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activation of the first piece of information leads to the activation of related information 
contained in a person’s long-term memory (B. T. Scheufele & Scheufele, 2010). On one 
hand, like accessibility, applicability is a characteristic of an individual representing how 
much a stimulus is aligned with that person’s prior knowledge. For instance, when a 
stimulus contains information on racial discrimination, this stimulus can be less applicable 
for a person who has not experienced discrimination and more applicable for someone 
who has. For the latter person, the stimulus might also activate this past experience when 
referring to the concept of discrimination. 
However, unlike accessibility, applicability is not necessarily an unconscious process 
of knowledge activation and usage. A person can be conscious of whether a stimulus (or 
stimulus feature) fits with her or his knowledge structure (i.e., “perceived applicability,” see 
Higgins, 1996, p. 136). Furthermore, like accessibility, applicability is not only a static (or 
better: chronic) characteristic of a person’s information processing behavior, but can also 
be influenced by stimuli. A stimulus feature can add new connections to a person’s 
knowledge structure and thus increase the applicability of the frame with the other 
information contained in a stimulus (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). For example, a person who 
has not been racially profiled by the police can learn via a stimulus that the police check 
some groups of persons more often than others, and can subsequently relate police controls 
with the concept of discrimination. 
Translating the concept of applicability effects to emphasis framing effects, scholars 
such as Cacciatore et al. (2016) and D. A. Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) argue that the 
effects of emphasis frames work by increasing the applicability of the emphasized frame in 
interpreting the issue. In other words, through emphasis framing, citizens build a cognitive 
connection between the issue and the more salient frame, which differs from an 
accessibility-based effect in three important ways. First, applicability effects can be more 
stable than accessibility effects, as they are not tied to a temporary increase in the cognitive 
accessibility of the frame that can diminish soon after exposure to a stimulus, but actually 
connect the frame with the issue. This connection can then be stored in the memory and 
more easily reactivated by spreading activation in subsequent situations of exposure to 
information on the issue (Price & Tewksbury, 1997⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). 
Second, applicability effects can be more conscious than accessibility effects, as persons 
judge the perceived applicability of the frame for the issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007a). 
Third and closely related to the previous point, because applicability judgments can be more 
conscious and depend on citizens’ general knowledge structure, which also influences what 
aspects are judged as applicable besides those suggested by a frame, the strength of 
emphasis framing effects can differ between citizens with different backgrounds. In 
contrast, framing effects based on accessibility unrealistically assume that emphasis frames 
affect every person equally. In this case, attitudes will only be based on an easily manipulated 
increase in the temporary accessibility of the frame, which is then unconsciously employed 
for interpreting the issue, regardless of whether the frame fits an individual’s general 
knowledge and preferences (Cacciatore et al., 2016). Given these important differences 
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between effects based on accessibility and applicability, authors such as D. A. Scheufele 
and Tewksbury (2007) and Cacciatore et al. (2016) conclude that emphasis framing effects 
work differently from the accessibility-based effects of priming and second-level agenda 
setting, and are exclusively the result of an applicability effect. 
The empirical literature does not provide much evidence of the mediation of 
emphasis framing effects via changes in the accessibility of an emphasized frame, whereas 
conscious changes in applicability judgments based on emphasis frames have been 
demonstrated several times as a mediator of emphasis framing effects (e.g., de Vreese et al., 
2011⁠; Druckman, 2001b⁠; Matthes & Schemer, 2012⁠; Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997). 
However, accessibility is less frequently analyzed than applicability in empirical research on 
emphasis framing effects, which has much to do with the more complex measurement of 
unconscious temporary cognitive accessibility (de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012). In fact, the 
often cited conclusion that accessibility has no role in emphasis framing effects is based 
only on a single study by Nelson, Clawson et al. (1997). They explicitly measured the 
temporary cognitive accessibility of emphasis frames using a reaction time task, revealing 
that emphasis framing did not affect the accessibility of certain frames. Specifically, when a 
planned rally by the Ku Klux Klan was framed with a “free speech” or “public order” 
frame, the accessibility of the respective frame was independent of exposure to one of these 
frames. In contrast, exposure to the frames changed how applicable citizens judged the 
frame to be in interpreting the issue (Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997). However, based on a 
single study, it is probably inappropriate to entirely reject the relevance of cognitive 
accessibility as a mediator of emphasis framing effects. Moreover, one should also question 
whether applicability and accessibility are actually two antagonistic mediators, of which only 
one is the “true” mediator of emphasis framing effects, as debated in the literature by the 
described different schools of thought. 
 
Accessibility and applicability as complementary mediators 
Rather than understanding accessibility and applicability as two incompatible mechanisms 
of emphasis framing effects, Chong and Druckman (2007c⁠, 2007a ⁠, 2007b) synthesize both 
to model the mediation processes underlying emphasis framing effects. In their view, 
attitude formation takes place based on the available beliefs citizens have stored in their 
long-term memory. When forming an attitude, some of these beliefs are either more 
chronically accessible because of citizens’ frequent retrieval thereof in the past, or 
temporarily more accessible because of exposure to a stimulus pushing the accessibility of 
a certain belief over others. Sometimes, citizens unconsciously base their attitude on more 
accessible beliefs without further reasoning (especially when they are less motivated to 
engage in conscious attitude formation, see Chong & Druckman, 2007c⁠, 2007b). In other 
situations, the higher accessibility of a specific consideration is in itself not sufficient to 
influence citizens’ attitudes but citizens consciously judge whether the accessible 
consideration is also applicable to form the suggested attitude. 
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According to Chong and Druckman (2007b), emphasis frames can work on all three 
levels of the attitude formation process. Thus, the three levels should be interpreted as 
complementary mediation processes (see also Baden & Lecheler, 2012). Such frames can a) 
make new beliefs available by adding them to a person’s knowledge structure or changing 
existing beliefs; b) increase the temporary accessibility of a certain belief already available 
in citizens’ long-term memory; and c) strengthen the perceived applicability of the frame, 
i.e., the perceived appropriateness to judge the issue based on a certain frame. Here, 
accessibility is not ruled out as a mechanism of emphasis frames, but represents one way in 
which frames can influence citizens. Sometimes, increased accessibility is already sufficient 
to exert attitudinal effects. At other times, increased accessibility alone does not lead to an 
emphasis framing effect. However, even in the latter case, it is at least an “intermediary 
mechanism” (de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012, p. 297), because even if framing effects 
ultimately depends on increased applicability, this can only happen for accessible 
considerations activated in the working memory (Baden, 2010). 
Despite that the theoretical relevance of accessibility changes for the mediation 
processes underlying emphasis framing effects should not be ruled out, the often replicated 
empirical result that changes in the conscious judgment of applicability mediate the 
attitudinal effects of frames cannot be ignored (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2011⁠; Druckman 
& Nelson, 2003 ⁠; Nelson, 2004). This implies that changes in accessibility are often not 
sufficient to ensure that an emphasis frame affects citizens’ issue attitudes because if 
accessibility were the decisive mediator, the result that emphasis frames are finally mediated 
via changes in the perceived applicability of a frame would not be obtained. However, thus 
far, which type of considerations emphasis frames make more applicable remains unclear. 
Hence, next Subchapter 2.3.2 offers deeper insight into the components of an attitude 
expected to obtain a higher degree of applicability because of emphasis framing, through 
which these frames ultimately affect citizens’ issue attitudes. 
2.3.2 The theory of belief importance change vs. belief content change 
Subchapter 2.3.1 established that emphasis framing effects mainly work by increasing the 
applicability (i.e., the appropriateness) of certain considerations in interpreting an issue. 
Now, it is important to clarify what components of an attitude display increased 
applicability because of emphasis framing. The most prominent theoretical answers to this 
open question is provided by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997). They draw on a formalized 
conception of attitudes introduced by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) that enables distinguishing 
the attitude components emphasis frames might affect. According to Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980), an attitude can be understood as the summarized evaluation A that is on one hand 
based on the beliefs about the attitude object (vi, where v is the value of this belief and i the 
individual beliefs with a specific valence). On the other, the summarized evaluation is the 
result of how important these beliefs are weighted in forming the attitude (i.e., vi multiplied 
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by wi, where w is the weight given to vi individual beliefs with a specific valence). This leads 
to the following (idealized) formula of specific attitude A: 
     A = ∑viw i 
When forming an attitude toward genetically modified crop plants (A), for example, 
a person might have five beliefs (vi) regarding this topic activated in the working memory 
(i.e., accessible for attitude formation). One belief is that such plants are more resistant to 
heat and drought, enabling their efficient use in poor countries experiencing hunger and 
climate change. This is a positively valenced belief toward genetically modified plants (v1+). 
Another belief is negatively valenced, namely that genetically modified plants reduce 
biodiversity (v2-). The third belief also has a negative valence, as it is concerned with the 
problem that changes in the genes of plants could be irreversible, which might have 
unforeseeable long-term consequences for nature (v3-). The person’s fourth belief is that 
genetically modified plants are a typical American thing, which is for the exemplary person 
rather negatively connoted (v4-). In contrast, the last belief is positively valenced, namely 
that consumer prices for food in industrialized countries can decrease when this food is 
based on genetically modified plants and not on non-modified plants (v5+). However, the 
person does not weight all beliefs as equally important, i.e., not all beliefs contribute equally 
strongly to the person’s overall attitude. For instance, the person weights the fourth (v4-w4-) 
and fifth (v5+w5-) beliefs as rather unimportant beliefs, but judges the first three beliefs as 
equally important for the attitude (v1+w1+, v2-w2+, v3-w3+). As two of these three beliefs are 
negatively valenced, the person’s summarized attitude toward genetically modified crop 
plants would be rather negative overall, i.e., rather against such plants. 
Following Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997), messages can influence (idealized) equations 
of attitudes via two routes. First, a message can add new beliefs or alter the content of existing beliefs 
(i.e., belief content change) toward the attitude object, thereby altering the equations of an 
attitude (e.g., a newly added positively valenced belief makes the overall attitude more 
positive). Second, a message can alter the importance of the beliefs (i.e., belief importance change) 
already contained in a person’s attitude equation toward the attitude object (e.g., higher 
importance of a positively valenced belief leads to a more positive summarized attitude). 
According to the authors, classic persuasion changes citizens’ beliefs toward the attitude 
object by providing new information that either changes the content of existing beliefs or 
adds new beliefs. In this way, a message convinces a person that the attitude object 
“possesses certain good or bad attributes” (Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997, p. 225). In contrast, 
the authors contend that emphasis framing effects work exclusively by changing the 
importance of beliefs, as they explain to citizens “what an issue is about” (Z. Pan & Kosicki, 
1993, p. 55) and which consideration is actually important, thus becoming the standard of 
reference for interpreting the issue. As such, emphasis frames increase the applicability of 
considerations of relevance and importance but do not change the beliefs themselves or 
their valence (Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). Thus, the mediating mechanism proposed by 
Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997) rules out the idea that emphasis framing effects also work by 
making new beliefs available, which Chong and Druckman (2007b) consider a cognitive 
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mediator of emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.3.1). However, Chong and 
Druckman (2007a) also consider the increased applicability of the frame (i.e., belief 
importance change) as most relevant mediator. Empirical evidence is described in 
Subchapter 2.3.3 regarding which of the two mechanisms (belief content change / 
availability vs. belief importance change / applicability) predominates. Before then, it is 
helpful to illustrate the difference between these two mechanisms using again the example 
of a summarized attitude toward genetically modified crop plants. 
Persuasion based on providing new information in a message can add the new belief 
to the person’s attitude that allowing genetically modified plants ensures high-tech jobs are 
retained in the country, while prohibiting such plants would drive an exodus of expert 
knowledge to other countries where the genetic modification of plants is allowed (v6+). We 
now assume that the person autonomously attaches high importance to this new belief (i.e., 
without additional message features that also increase the importance of this belief). As this 
new belief has a positive valence toward such plants (v6+w6+), the person would have six 
beliefs activated in mind when forming her or his attitude. Two beliefs are judged as less 
important (v4-w4-, v5+w5-), and four beliefs in the attitude equation are considered equally 
important. Of these four, two are positively valenced and two negatively valenced. Thus, 
because the new and positively valenced belief was added by a message containing this new 
persuasive information, the person created an adjusted attitude no longer (slightly) against 
genetically modified plants, but somewhat more supportive and in sum ambivalent 
regarding the issue. 
According to Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997), the effect of an emphasis frame works 
differently. Such frames contained in a message do not add new beliefs to the attitude 
equation. Thus, the content of beliefs regarding genetically modified plants remains 
unchanged and still contains the same five beliefs with an unchanged valence. This is 
because they were already present before exposure to a message with the frame. However, 
the emphasis frame “humanitarianism” would highlight in the message the importance of 
the already existing belief that genetically modified plants are more resistant to heat and 
drought, allowing the more efficient use of these plants in poor countries experiencing 
hunger and climate change (v1). For instance, the frame would explicitly emphasize how 
important it is to not restrict the use of genetically modified plants, as they are such a 
powerful tool with which to fight hunger in the world. This increases the importance the 
person attributes to this positively valenced belief so strongly that its importance becomes 
higher (v1+w1+++) than the importance that the person attaches to the other somewhat 
important negatively valenced beliefs in the attitude equation (v2-w2+, v3-w3+). Subsequently, 
the overall attitude equation is different compared to the situation before without emphasis 
framing. The person’s overall attitude is now rather in favor of genetically modified crop 
plants, because the importance of beliefs changed, not the content thereof. 
However, the proposition by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997) that the applicability 
mechanism of belief importance change is the central mediator of emphasis framing effects 
without working also through belief content change is so far only theoretical. Next, 
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Subchapter 2.3.3 describes how well this proposition is underlined by empirical results for 
these two mediators. 
2.3.3 Empirical results on belief importance change and belief content 
change 
Studies investigating only belief importance change 
The empirical studies in the literature that tested the competing mediators of belief 
importance change and belief content change for the effects of emphasis frames on citizens’ 
issue attitude can be distinguish as those that only tested belief importance change as a 
mediator and other studies that tested both mediators simultaneously. The goal of the 
former type of studies was to show that belief importance change plays a role as a mediator 
at all, which is relevant in establishing it as a mediator in the first place. However, the latter 
studies conducted more rigorous tests of belief importance change as the only relevant 
mediator of emphasis framing effects. In these studies, this mechanism was tested in 
competition with the mechanism of belief content change, which according to the theory 
by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997), should not mediate the effects, as explained above in 
Subchapter 2.3.2. 
The first study to investigate the mediator of belief importance change without also 
examining belief content change was conducted by Nelson and his colleagues. They 
performed two experiments, both dealing with the topic of a planned Ku Klux Klan rally 
(Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997). In both experiments, participants were either exposed to a 
“free speech” frame highlighting the importance of the civil liberty of freedom of 
expression or a “public order” frame emphasizing the relevance of security that would be 
threatened by approval of the rally (see also Subchapter 2.2.1). In addition to measuring 
participants’ issue attitude as the final dependent variable, Nelson, Clawson et al. (1997) in 
both experiments asked participants after frame exposure how important they judged the 
considerations of free speech and public order in interpreting the issue. They also measured 
the cognitive accessibility of both constructs in the first experiment. In the first experiment, 
cognitive accessibility did not differ depending on frame exposure and thus did not mediate 
the emphasis framing effect. In contrast, the results of both experiments revealed that the 
public order frame significantly increased the importance participants attached to this 
consideration, which significantly reduced their support for approval of the rally. That is, 
as postulated by the theory, belief importance mediated the effect of the emphasis frame 
on issue attitude. However, the free speech frame did not increase the belief importance of 
this consideration, although higher cognitive importance of this aspect significantly 
increased support for the rally. Here, the proposed mediation effect of the free speech 
frame was not supported. Overall, however, the study showed for the first time that 
cognitive accessibility did not play a relevant role, but that belief importance change can be 
a relevant mediator of emphasis framing effects, triggering further studies to investigate this 
mechanism. 
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 For example, Hartman and Weber (2009) conducted an extended replication of the 
aforementioned study that dealt with the same issue, manipulating both the emphasis 
frames and source cues, in other words, which political actor offered the frame to the 
audience. The interaction effects between source cues and frames explored in this study 
and what this means for the moderation of emphasis framing effects are elaborated later in 
Subchapter 2.4.2. Here, we focus only on the results on the mediation of the main effect 
of emphasis frames via belief importance change. As in the study by Nelson, Clawson et al. 
(1997), Hartman and Weber (2009) did not confirm the mediation of the effects of the free 
speech frame on participants’ support for the rally via belief importance change. However, 
they also found that the effect of the public order frame was mediated through the increased 
importance respondents’ attached to the consideration of security, which decreased their 
support for the rally. 
In an experiment using possible Turkish membership in the European Union as the 
issue, de Vreese et al. (2011) investigated belief importance change as a mediator of the 
effects of emphasis frames on Dutch citizens’ support for Turkish membership without 
considering belief content changes. When exposed to a “cultural threat” emphasis frame 
highlighting that Turkey’s membership would increase Turkish immigration to the 
Netherlands, through which Christian culture could be undermined by Muslim culture, 
respondents rated the importance of culture as significantly more relevant, which 
significantly decreased their support for Turkish membership. In addition, the effect of the 
“security” frame emphasizing possible consequences of Turkish membership for the 
security of the Netherlands was significantly mediated via the increased importance of 
security considerations, which reduced support for membership. However, no significant 
result was found for the mediation of an “economic” frame of the issue via belief 
importance changes.  
The last study that tested only the indirect effects of emphasis frames via belief 
importance changes was conducted by Matthes and Schemer (2012). In contrast to the 
aforementioned studies, this one did not use an experimental setting, but employed a 
linkage analysis bringing together citizens’ actual media usage, the (framed) content of the 
used media, and citizens’ issue attitude toward stricter naturalization processes for 
immigrants in Switzerland. The results indicated that exposure to a “mass naturalization” 
emphasis frame stressing that a large number of immigrants would be naturalized increased 
the importance citizens attached to the consideration of too many foreigners in the country, 
which increased their support for stricter naturalization processes. However, this mediation 
effect of the emphasis frame on issue attitude via belief importance change was only 
significant for citizens with low attitude certainty regarding the issue (again, Chapter 2.4 
explores in depth moderated emphasis framing effects). 
While these studies produced much empirical evidence of the relevant role of belief 
importance change as a mediator of emphasis framing effects on citizens’ issue attitude, it 
is important to briefly discuss how these studies measured belief importance. In fact, all 
mentioned studies (and the mediation studies discussed below) measured the general 
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importance of the emphasized frame, i.e., the general importance of the standard of 
reference suggested by the emphasis frame. While this is not wrong, one can question 
whether this entirely fits with the effects of emphasis frames on the attitude equation 
introduced in Subchapter 2.3.2. Specifically, the theory by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997) 
contends that a frame increases the importance of a very specific belief contained in the 
attitude equation. For instance, when the belief content is that a new tax on carbon dioxide 
will reduce the country’s emission by 50%, a more rigorous test of belief importance change 
would be that an environmental frame changes the individual importance of this specific 
belief (i.e., “it is important that the new tax reduces emissions by 50%”) and not the general 
importance of the frame (i.e., “it is important to protect the environment”). However, as 
the general importance of the frame is the standard for how studies operationalized belief 
importance change, this book also adopts this term and its operationalization. Nevertheless, 
noteworthy is that the measured belief importance changes are, in fact, frame importance 
changes, not changes in the importance of a single belief as expected when seriously 
considering the (formalized and idealized) attitude equation. 
Despite this small shortcoming, it can still be concluded that emphasis framing 
effects are mediated via importance changes, which is already strong support for the theory 
by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997). However, the studies discussed thus far only looked at belief 
importance changes as a mediator of emphasis framing effects without controlling for 
possible simultaneous mediation via belief content changes, which should not occur 
according to the theory. Fortunately, the studies presented next tested both mediators in 
competition. 
 
Studies investigating belief importance change and belief content change 
Druckman and Nelson (2003) conducted an experiment on a campaign finance reform that 
aimed to restrict the ability of national parties to collect and spend money contributed by 
corporations, unions, and individuals to finance their campaigns. Participants were exposed 
either to a “special interest” emphasis frame describing the reform as necessary in reducing 
the influence of rich interest groups and other powerful lobbies not acting for the common 
good, or exposed to a “free speech” frame highlighting that not allowing corporations and 
unions to finance campaigns violates their right of freedom of expression and 
representation of their interests. After exposure, the authors measured the importance 
citizens attached to free speech and to the restriction of the influence of special interests 
on the government, and their overall attitude toward the reform. They also measured 
respondents’ belief content by asking them whether they believed the campaign finance 
reform would affect the right of free speech positively or negatively and their beliefs 
regarding limiting the influence of special interests. A path analysis integrating the measures 
of belief importance and belief content simultaneously revealed that the emphasis frames 
affected the importance of free speech and of limiting the influence of special interest, 
which both influenced participants’ support for the campaign finance reform. In contrast, 
only the free speech frame increased the belief content that the reform would negatively 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 35 
affect free speech, whereas the belief content about the impact of the reform on limiting 
the influence of special interests was unaffected by both frames. Moreover, both belief 
content measures did not influence citizens’ overall attitude. That is, the emphasis framing 
effects were only mediated via belief importance changes, not via a change in the content 
of beliefs, as postulated by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997). 
Furthermore, the study by Nelson (2004) already described in Subchapter 2.2.1 
investigated both mediators in three experiments. The first experiment dealt with an 
adoption reform that would allow adopted children to obtain information about their 
biological parents. This was framed either as a question of “children’s rights” or “parents’ 
rights.” According to a mediation analysis, the effect of emphasis framing on citizens’ issue 
attitude was fully mediated via belief importance changes, but not via belief content 
changes. The second experiment focused on affirmative action at universities using 
“excellence” or “opportunity” frames. Again, the frames did not affect belief content about 
affirmative action, but did affect the importance of frame-related beliefs that partially 
mediated the emphasis framing effect on issue attitude. In the third experiment on school 
vouchers, the attitudinal effect of emphasis frames was as in the first experiment, fully 
mediated via belief importance change, but not via belief content change. Thus, all three 
experiments seem to indicate again that only belief importance change, not belief content 
change, is the decisive mediator of emphasis framing effects. 
However, the majority of studies that tested both mediators in competition revealed 
that emphasis framing effects are also mediated via belief content changes, although belief 
importance change remained a relevant (partial) mediator of these effects. For instance, 
Baden (2010) conducted an experiment using two different issues, one dealing with the 
Euro currency and the other with the enlargement of the European Union. First, he found 
that the effects of an “identity” emphasis frame and “economy” frame on citizens’ issue 
attitudes were only partially mediated for both issues. Moreover, this partial mediation 
occurred not only via significant belief importance changes, but also via significant changes 
in (the valence of) several belief contents. 
This simultaneous mediation via belief importance change and belief content change 
was also found in a study by Nelson and Oxley (1999). As explained in Subchapter 2.2.1, 
this study comprised two experiments. The first experiment was about a land development 
project in Florida using the emphasis frames “economic benefits” and “environmental 
threat.” The second experiment was about financial cuts in social welfare for children using 
the frames “threat to children” and “personal responsibility.” In both experiments, the 
emphasis frames significantly changed the importance of citizens’ frame-related beliefs and 
belief contents. Then, both mediators significantly influenced citizens’ issue attitude, while 
the direct effect of the frames disappeared. This means that the framing effect was fully 
mediated via these two mediators. 
 Druckman (2001b) also investigated the mediation of emphasis framing effects via 
belief importance change and belief content change in competition through an experiment 
on a political proposal dealing with financial aid from the government for the poor. 
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Participants read either a “humanitarianism” frame or “government expenditure” frame for 
this issue. The former emphasized the importance of helping the poor, while the latter 
focused on the financial costs for the government when providing such aid. It was found 
that the effects of these emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude were significantly 
mediated via both changes in the importance of beliefs (e.g., how important it is to care 
about the well-being of the poor) and in the content of beliefs (e.g., the effect the program 
would have on the situation of the poor). However, belief importance change was the more 
prominent mediator, especially when a credible source offered the frame.   
In contrast, in a study by Lecheler et al. (2009) dealing with international trade 
policies perceived in a pretest as a “low-importance issue” in general, belief content change 
was the more prominent mediator of emphasis framing effects than belief importance 
change, although the latter also significantly mediated the framing effect on issue attitude. 
Last, in two independent studies, Igartua and colleagues found that emphasis frames 
affected the importance of beliefs and belief content in addition to overall attitude. Note 
though that the authors did not test this in a rigorous mediational approach, but as single 
dependent variables (Igartua & Cheng, 2009 ⁠; Igartua, Moral-Toranzo, & Fernández, 2011). 
In sum, studies that tested the mediators of belief importance change and belief 
content change in competition revealed two relevant insights. First, in all studies, belief 
importance mediated emphasis framing effects when controlling for belief content changes. 
This consistent result strongly corroborates the theory proposed by Nelson, Oxley et al. 
(1997) in so far that belief importance is a relevant mediator of emphasis framing effects. 
Second, however, the majority of studies provided less support for the second assumption 
of this theory, as changes in belief content also mediated framing effects. That is, belief 
importance has not been confirmed as the only and exclusive mediator of emphasis framing 
effects. This speaks for the argument of Chong and Druckman (2007a ⁠, 2007b) already 
presented in Subchapter 2.3.1. They proposed that emphasis framing effects not only work 
via applicability effects (i.e., changes in the importance of frame-related beliefs), but also 
via availability effects (i.e., added or changed beliefs). However, Slothuus (2008) proposed 
a theory that explains in a more sophisticated manner when emphasis framing effects work 
via which mediational process. This theory is elaborated next. 
 
The moderated mediation of emphasis framing effects via belief importance change 
and belief content change by citizens’ political knowledge 
Given the conflicting result that emphasis framing effects can work via changes in the 
importance of beliefs and in the content of beliefs, Slothuus (2008) offered an explanation 
of when it is more likely that one of the mediators is the more relevant of these effects. He 
proposed a moderated mediation process influenced by citizens’ prior political knowledge. 
While moderation describes how the effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable is conditioned by another (moderator) variable, which is decisive for the magnitude 
of the effect, the term moderated mediation is used when a moderating variable conditions 
whether and via which paths (i.e., mediator) an independent variable affects the dependent 
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variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Slothuus (2008) argued that citizens with little political 
knowledge do not possess enough available considerations to understand emphasis frames 
through which they are unlikely affected by frames at all. When citizens possess some 
political knowledge, they are able to understand a frame, but may still not have many 
available considerations regarding political issues. This makes it more likely that an 
emphasis frame contains new information for them, which increases the probability that 
the frame will affect their belief content. Therefore, the effect of an emphasis frame on 
issue attitude should also be mediated via belief content changes, when citizens have 
moderate political knowledge. In contrast, citizens possessing much political knowledge 
generally have more considerations available regarding political issues. For them, it is less 
likely that an emphasis frame contains new information, which makes it less likely that the 
frame will change their belief content already established prior to frame exposure. Thus, 
for them, emphasis framing effects should not work via belief content change. However, 
such frames should still be able to affect citizens with more political knowledge by changing 
the importance of their (prior) belief content. Therefore, the relevant mediator of emphasis 
framing effects should be belief importance change when political knowledge is high. 
 Slothuus (2008) tested his refined theory in an experimental study that employed the 
topic of a new bill on social welfare that aimed to cut back welfare benefits for unemployed 
persons after a period of six months of unemployment (also see Subchapter 2.2.1). About 
a week before the experiment, participants had to answer test questions on their general 
political knowledge. The experiment exposed respondents to one of the following two 
frames (or a control group dealing with a different issue). The “poor” emphasis frame 
highlighted that the new bill would increase the number of poor people in the country, not 
fight poverty. In contrast, the “job” frame emphasized that the bill would serve as an 
economic incentive motivating those unemployed to search harder for employment, 
through which they would find it easier to find a new job. 
Testing for the mediation process of emphasis framing effects on citizens’ issue 
attitude without considering their political knowledge indicated that the effects were 
mediated via both belief importance changes and belief content changes, consistent with 
the results of other studies testing both mediators in competition (see above). However, 
examining the mediation processes by level of political knowledge, Slothuus (2008) found 
as per his prediction that emphasis frames did not affect issue attitude or both mediators 
for persons with very little political knowledge. When citizens possessed moderate political 
knowledge, the frames influenced how they judged the belief content that unemployment 
is one’s own responsibility, which affected their issue attitude. In addition, the emphasis 
frames changed the importance of citizens’ beliefs that incentives to work are relevant and 
that government expenditure should not be too high, which subsequently influenced their 
overall attitude. That is, for citizens with moderate political knowledge, emphasis framing 
effects were mediated via both belief content and belief importance changes. In contrast, 
when citizens possessed high political knowledge, the emphasis frames did not affect their 
belief content, only the importance of their belief. As such, emphasis framing effects seem 
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to work differently depending on citizens’ political knowledge, and at least when political 
knowledge is high, the only relevant mediator is belief importance change. Thus, for this 
subgroup, Slothuus (2008) demonstrated the accuracy of the theory by Nelson, Oxley et al. 
(1997).  
In a further study, Lecheler and de Vreese (2012) tried to replicate the finding of the 
moderated mediation of emphasis framing effects by citizens’ political knowledge. They 
conducted an experiment dealing with economic development in Bulgaria and Romania, 
the two newest member states of the European Union when the study took place. The 
topic was framed for participants either as opportunities for the economic development of 
the countries or highlighted the potential economic risks. Again, testing the mediational 
processes underlying the framing effects revealed that both belief importance and belief 
content changes (partially) mediated the frame effect on issue attitude when tested in 
competition and without considering citizens’ political knowledge. Moreover, the effects 
via belief content change were significantly stronger than via belief importance change 
according to a series of contrast tests. Next, Lecheler and de Vreese (2012) tested whether 
the mediation was moderated by citizens’ political knowledge using the levels of low, 
moderate, and high political knowledge. In contrast to the results in the study by Slothuus 
(2008), higher knowledge led to a stronger mediation of framing effects via both belief 
importance change and belief content change.  
That is, there is only mixed support for the refined theory proposed by Slothuus 
(2008) to explain when emphasis framing effects work via which psychological mechanism, 
and therefore also for the theory of Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997). However, there might be 
another explanation for why belief content change has been empirically shown to mediate 
emphasis framing effects in contrast to the expectation claimed in this theory, which states 
that only belief importance change is a relevant mediator of these effects. To understand 
this explanation, offered in Subchapter 2.8.4, and the empirical test thereof in Chapter 
5.2, many other relevant aspects of emphasis framing effects are first clarified in the next 
chapters. First, Subchapter 2.3.4 summarizes what studies have thus far revealed regarding 
the mediating cognitive mechanisms of emphasis framing effects. 
2.3.4 Summary and implications for citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
The previous three subchapters clarified that no clear consensus exists in the literature on 
the cognitive mechanisms that mediate the effects of emphasis frames on citizens’ issue 
attitude. Some authors expected that the higher salience of an emphasis frame in a message 
would increase the cognitive accessibility of this frame in citizens’ working memory, and 
that citizens base their attitude on the issue perspective with higher temporary cognitive 
accessibility (e.g., McCombs & Ghanem, 2001). Other authors criticize this expectation as 
being too close to the mechanisms explaining priming and (second level) agenda setting 
from which the mechanisms of framing should differ (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016⁠; Price, 
Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997⁠; D. A. Scheufele, 2000⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). 
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In their view, emphasis frames increase the applicability of certain frame-related 
considerations, i.e., emphasis frames build a cognitive connection between the issue and 
the frame, and increase the perceived appropriateness of this frame in interpreting the issue. 
Other authors believe that emphasis frames can also add and change the availability of 
certain beliefs (Chong & Druckman, 2007a ⁠, 2007b). Moreover, these authors stress there is 
not one unique mediator of emphasis framing effects; rather availability, accessibility, and 
applicability are complementary psychological processes underlying these effects (e.g., 
Baden & Lecheler, 2012 ⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007b). In contrast, some scholars propose 
applicability as a unique mediator of emphasis framing effects, and that such frames only 
increase the applicability of a particular component of an issue attitude, namely changes in 
the importance of frame-related beliefs (e.g., Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997 ⁠; Nelson, Oxley 
et al., 1997). 
Empirical studies on these concurring theoretical ideas provide only limited 
evidence that emphasis framing effects are mediated via simple changes in the temporary 
cognitive accessibility of a frame. (For an overview of all empirical results regarding 
mediating processes, see Table 1.) In contrast, the applicability-based mechanism of belief 
importance changes has been shown to mediate the effects of emphasis frames in all 
empirical studies testing this mediator (again, see Table 1). However, unlike that proposed 
by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997), most of these studies revealed that belief content changes 
also mediated the frame effect, i.e., that emphasis frames also added and/or changed 
available beliefs (see Table 1). Based on these empirical findings, it can be concluded first 
that emphasis framing effects can be explained by affecting cognitive processes, and 
second, that belief importance change and belief content change are the most relevant 
cognitive mechanisms underlying emphasis framing effects. However, the second is 
preliminary, as a theoretically problematic reason may exist for why emphasis frames also 
affect belief contents and not only their importance. This is discussed later when 
responding to recent criticism on the emphasis framing approach (see Subchapter 2.8.4). 
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Table 1. Summary of empirical results for the cognitive mediators underlying emphasis 







No accessibility change Mediation tested  




et al. (1997) 
Belief importance change (applicability) Mediation tested 
alone 






Belief importance change (applicability) Mediation tested  
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Nelson, Clawson 
et al. (1997) 
Belief importance change (applicability) Mediation tested  
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Belief importance change (applicability) and 
belief content change (availability) 
Not tested as 





Igartua et al. 
(2011) 
Belief importance change (applicability) and 
belief content change (availability) 
Mediation tested  





et al. (2009); 
Nelson and Oxley 
(1999) 
Belief importance change (applicability) and 
belief content change (availability) moderated  
by political knowledge (high knowledge via  
belief importance, low knowledge via belief 
content) 
Moderated  
mediation tested in 
competition with  
each other and by 
political knowledge 
Slothuus (2008) 
Belief importance change (applicability) and 
belief content change (availability) moderated  
by political knowledge (both paths generally 
stronger for high knowledge, but both paths  
also significant for low knowledge) 
Moderated 
mediation tested in 
competition with  
each other and by 
political knowledge 
Lecheler and de 
Vreese (2012) 
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Last, the empirical results in the literature for mediational processes are potentially 
consequential for assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation. First, emphasis 
framing effects do not seem to work via simple changes in temporary cognitive accessibility, 
implying that these effects do not work fully unconsciously or without any reasoning. That 
is, framing effects do not take advantage of citizens as “cognitive misers” (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991) who base their attitude on whatever emphasis frame is top of mind, which would 
otherwise be the clearest indicator for irrational and unsubstantiated attitude formation 
because of framing. Second, as emphasis framing effects also work via adding and changing 
the availability and content of beliefs, one could interpret framing effects not as the 
irrational result of basing one’s attitude on the salience of a frame, but as the rational result 
of learning based on new information contained in the frame (cf. Chong & Druckman, 
2007b). Third, even the changed importance of beliefs could indicate that emphasis framing 
effects are less irrational, as citizens seem to have a reason they follow the valence of the 
emphasis frame in their attitude formation. 
Thus, it seems the mediation processes underlying emphasis framing effects suggest 
that attitudinal differences based on exposure to different emphasis frames are not 
irrational. However, in particular, belief importance changes could also indicate a form of 
seeming rationality that is actually irrational, because citizens may simply attach higher 
cognitive importance to any frame more salient, i.e., their reasoning switches unreasonably 
depending on the frame. Thus far, it is too early to draw any final conclusions regarding 
this, as a fundamental problem of the presented studies has not yet been discussed (see 
Subchapter 2.8.4). Furthermore, new empirical results on the mediators without this 
problem must still be presented (see Chapter 5.2). Before that, this book continues by 
examining potential moderators of emphasis framing effects in the next Chapter 2.4. This 
chapter questions much more seriously the preliminary conclusion that emphasis frames 
lead to irrational attitude formation provided in Subchapter 2.2.2, which was based solely 
on the results for simple emphasis framing effects in Subchapter 2.2.1. 
2.4 Moderators of emphasis framing effects 
2.4.1 Empirical results for moderators at the individual level 
To better understand how effective emphasis framing effects work for different citizens 
and contexts, it is important to investigate whether these effects work uniformly or depend 
on other variables. Put differently, to assess the strength of emphasis framing effects, one 
must answer the question of whether these effects are moderated or not. Moderating variables 
are third variables that influence the magnitude (and sometimes even the direction) of the 
effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Such 
moderators can affect the relation between an independent variable and a dependent 
variable in various ways. 
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First, moderators can simply have no influence, and the effect of an independent 
variable on a dependent variable is entirely independent of the moderator, i.e., the effect 
does not vary by the level of a moderator variable. For example, exposure to a highly 
compelling political fact might always influence citizens’ issue attitude in the direction of 
the fact, and the magnitude of this effect is the same regardless of whether a person likes 
or dislikes the politician who mentioned the fact. Second, the effect of an independent on 
a dependent variable can be stronger when the moderator variable has a specific level than 
when it has a different level. For instance, a compelling fact might always influence an issue 
attitude in the direction of the fact. However, this effect might be stronger when the source 
mentioning the fact is a credible speaker than when the speaker is less credible. Third, the 
level of a moderator variable can be decisive regarding whether an effect occurs at all, and 
the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is only present when the 
moderator is at a certain level, but there is no effect when the moderator variable is at a 
different level. For example, a moderately compelling fact might only influence issue 
attitude in the direction of the fact when aligned with a person’s prior political values but 
might have no effect when it is not aligned with prior values. Fourth, the effect of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable can point to conflicting directions depending 
on the level of a moderator variable. For instance, a weakly compelling fact might affect 
issue attitude in the direction of the fact when the fact matches prior political values. 
However, when the same weakly compelling fact counters a person’s prior values, this 
might lead to an attitude against the direction of the fact (i.e., a contrast effect). As these 
brief examples illustrate, investigating moderators enables specifying phenomena of effects, 
providing a more fine-grained answer regarding how total and unlimited an effect is across 
various additional conditions. 
Thus, in empirical research on emphasis framing effects, the question of moderated 
effects has received considerable attention (cf. Borah, 2011a ⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007b⁠; 
de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012 ⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2018). Following de Vreese and 
Lecheler (2012), two different types of moderating variables can be broadly distinguished 
in the literature on emphasis framing effects. On one hand, studies investigated the 
influence of moderators located at the level of the context. These studies explored the influence 
of other message features on the effects of simple emphasis frames, such as whether 
emphasis framing effects work the same for different issues (e.g., Lecheler et al., 2009), 
when they are accompanied with different partisan source cues about the speaker 
mentioning the frame (e.g., Hartman & Weber, 2009), when the speaker is credible or less 
credible (e.g., Druckman, 2001b), or when citizens are exposed to the simultaneous 
presentation of competing emphasis frames in the same message (e.g., Sniderman 
& Theriault, 2004). 
On the other hand, empirical research has also tested the moderating influences of 
variables located at the level of the individual, i.e., whether characteristics of the individual 
exposed to an emphasis frame condition the effects of these frames. Examples here include 
whether emphasis framing effects exert uniform effects regardless of whether persons are 
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generally open-minded or not (Nisbet et al., 2013), possess a high or low need to evaluate 
(Druckman & Nelson, 2003), have different levels of political knowledge (Lecheler & de 
Vreese, 2012), or share or do not share the political value highlighted by an emphasis frame 
(e.g., Shen & Edwards, 2005). This subchapter focuses on the latter, the individual-level 
moderators, while Subchapter 2.4.2 discusses empirical results regarding the contextual 
moderators of emphasis framing effects. However, important is that the presentation of 
moderators is limited to empirical studies that investigated emphasis framing effects as 
defined in Subchapter 2.1.2, i.e., (moderated) effects of political emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitudes. In addition, this chapter focuses only on the moderators relevant 
for conditioning emphasis framing effects at a single point in time (t1). Further moderators 
relevant for framing effects over time are introduced in Chapter 2.6. 
 
Personality variables as individual-level moderators of emphasis framing effects 
Regarding individual-level moderators (at t1), personality variables and political variables can be 
further differentiated. Three personality variables have been analyzed as possible 
moderators of emphasis framing effects. First, Druckman and Nelson (2003) investigated 
whether citizens’ need to evaluate moderates emphasis framing effects. The need to evaluate 
is a psychological trait variable and describes a person’s stable and general tendency to 
engage constantly across issues and situations in the psychological evaluation of objects 
(Jarvis & Petty, 1996). This need differs between individuals, and while some permanently 
evaluate their (social and physical) surroundings, others have a lower tendency to engage in 
constant evaluation. As persons with a higher need to evaluate constantly rate objects of all 
kinds, they tend to have more attitudes than do citizens with a lower need to evaluate (Bizer 
et al., 2004). Thus, according to Druckman and Nelson (2003), individuals with a high need 
to evaluate are more likely to have an attitude toward the issue prior to exposure to an 
emphasis frame highlighting a certain aspect of this issue. In turn, this prior attitude 
weakens the influence of a single exposure to an emphasis frame on issue attitude, as the 
frame has to compete against an already formed attitude. Thus, the authors contend that 
emphasis framing effects are stronger when citizens’ need to evaluate is low compared to 
when it is high. 
To test this contention, Druckman and Nelson (2003) conducted the experiment 
already described in Subchapter 2.3.3, which dealt with a campaign finance reform and 
exposed participants to either a “free speech” or “special interests” emphasis frame. 
Depending on the exposure, participants formed significantly different issue attitudes. 
When integrating citizens’ need to evaluate as a moderator of this emphasis framing effect, 
the results showed a significant interaction between the framing condition and need to 
evaluate. Specifically, the framing effect was stronger for individuals with a low need to 
evaluate than those with a high need to evaluate, underlining the theoretical expectations 
of Druckman and Nelson (2003). Hence, this study offers initial insights that emphasis 
framing effects do not work uniformly for different individuals, but are moderated by 
citizens’ need to evaluate. However, a high need to evaluate did not prevent a frame effect. 
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That is, even though the study demonstrated a moderation effect, the emphasis framing 
effect did not rely exclusively on a specific degree of citizens’ need to evaluate, but also had 
a general attitudinal effect. 
Second, Tewksbury et al. (2000) tested whether citizens’ need for cognition moderates 
emphasis framing effects. Like the need to evaluate, need for cognition is a personal trait 
variable that differs between individuals but describes how much persons engage in and 
enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The authors expected that the emphasis framing 
effect found in their experimental study on large-scale hog farms framed in various ways 
would be less pronounced for citizens with a high need for cognition than for those with a 
low need for cognition. The reasoning was that individuals with a high need for cognition 
elaborate messages more deeply and are thus “less willing to accept the first frame they 
encounter” (Tewksbury et al., 2000, p. 810). However, the results showed no moderation 
effect, and the strength of the existing emphasis framing effect did not differ across the 
levels of need for cognition. Thus, the study rather suggests that emphasis framing effects 
work uniformly across individuals. 
Third, Nisbet et al. (2013) analyzed open-/closed-mindedness as a potential moderator 
of emphasis framing effects. This variable is a sub-dimension of the personality trait need 
for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993 ⁠; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
It indicates how strongly a person tends to consult different opinions of an issue and tries 
to understand why different sides could be right. On one side of this dimension, closed-
minded individuals tend to avoid different viewpoints on an issue and are unwilling to deal 
with alternative or inconsistent evidence. On the other side, open-minded persons show a 
strong motivation to consider and weight different information. Thus, the authors expected 
that emphasis framing effects in an experiment on the topic of mitigation policies for 
climate change (for which prior opinions tend to be crystallized before frame exposure) 
would be more likely to affect open-minded citizens, whereas closed-minded individuals 
would be unlikely to change their attitude based on emphasis frames. 
The results of this experiment first revealed no main effect of emphasis frames and 
that it made no difference whether the policy on climate change mitigation was framed as 
a policy to prevent “environmental disaster,” as a policy that enhances “national security” 
because of increased independence from oil-producing countries, or as a policy with 
“economic costs” that are too high. Moreover, open-mindedness did also not boost the 
(insignificant) emphasis framing effect. However, when participants were exposed to 
different emphasis frames in simultaneous competition, not to only one frame (for a longer 
discussion on the influence of frame competition on emphasis framing effects, see next 
Subchapter 2.4.2), open-/closed-mindedness moderated the framing effect. While no 
main effect of frames presented in competition was found, the environmental disaster 
emphasis frame affected open-minded participants more than it did a control group without 
frame exposure, even when the economic costs counter-frame accompanied the 
environmental frame. In contrast, again, no emphasis framing effect emerged for closed-
minded citizens. That is, the study by Nisbet et al. (2013) suggests that emphasis framing 
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effects can be more complex and only work when additional conditions are met, such as 
that citizens are open-minded to change their attitude based on exposure to emphasis 
frames. 
 
Political variables as individual-level moderators of emphasis framing effects 
Besides the aforementioned personality variables, empirical studies have also investigated 
whether individual-level political variables moderate emphasis framing effects. Among 
these variables, citizens’ political knowledge (i.e., how much a person knows about politics) 
has received much attention. Not less than ten empirical studies have tested the moderating 
influence of this variable. These studies can be divided into two different camps proposing 
(and finding) contradicting influences of political knowledge on the framing effect. One 
camp proposes that emphasis framing effects tend to be stronger when citizens’ political 
knowledge is low, because such persons demonstrate a) a lower probability to have already 
established prior opinions that can otherwise dampen framing effects and b) a higher 
probability that an emphasis frame provides new information on an issue. Thus, such 
persons are more likely to accommodate their attitude based on the new information (e.g., 
Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Bechtel et al., 2015⁠; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001⁠; Schuck & de 
Vreese, 2006). In contrast, the other camp proposes that the effects of emphasis frames are 
more pronounced when a person has more political knowledge, as this increases the 
likelihood that they understand these emphasis frames and can integrate the salience thereof 
in their attitude formation (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2011 ⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Nelson, 
Oxley et al., 1997 ⁠; Slothuus, 2008). Both hypotheses are empirically support. 
First, regarding studies showing that less political knowledge increases the strength 
of emphasis framing effects, the results of a study by Bechtel et al. (2015) revealed that 
these effects (sometimes accompanied by partisan source cues, see next Subchapter 2.4.2) 
only occurred when citizens possessed lower knowledge. Specifically, the emphasis frames 
“crime reduction” and “humanitarianism” for the issue of an initiative calling for the 
deportation of criminal foreigners demonstrated no attitudinal effects on average across all 
participants, and only affected respondents who were less knowledgeable. Haider-Markel 
and Joslyn (2001) tested the moderating influence of political knowledge in their experiment 
on the emphasis framing of a new handgun law. They exposed participants to either a 
“public safety” or “civil rights” emphasis frame. In contrast to the aforementioned study, 
the authors found a main effect of emphasis frames. However, examining this effect by 
political knowledge, the effect was conditioned by the level of political knowledge and only 
occurred when respondents’ knowledge was low. 
The same pattern was observed by Schuck and de Vreese (2006) in an experimental 
study on public support for the enlargement of the European Union, which was framed 
either as an opportunity to spread democratic values across the continent or as a risk of 
importing problems of new member states to old ones. Again, the authors found a 
significant main effect of emphasis framing. However, when decomposing this effect by 
political knowledge, the frame effect was limited to participants with low knowledge. The 
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last study that seems to empirically support the idea of stronger emphasis framing effects 
when political knowledge is low was conducted by Beattie and Milojevich (2017). In their 
experiment on the military conflict between the Ukraine and Russian-speaking separatists, 
the authors employed four different emphasis frames. When respondents were exposed to 
one of these frames, three of the four emphasis frames significantly shifted participants’ 
opinions regarding the conflict. However, knowledge “had a weak dampening effect on 
opinion change” (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017, p. 15). In other words, the emphasis framing 
effects were more pronounced when respondents’ political knowledge was low. 
Despite that these studies suggest that the moderation of emphasis framing effects 
takes place in the form of stronger framing effects when citizens have lower political 
knowledge, a similar number of empirical studies reveal exactly the opposite, namely that 
the effects are stronger when knowledge is high. For example, de Vreese et al. (2011) 
analyzed in their experiment on Turkish membership in the European Union (also see 
Subchapter 2.3.3) whether political knowledge moderated the found main effect of the 
five different emphasis frames they manipulated. For some single frame effects, political 
knowledge did not condition the effectiveness of the frame, and the frames equally strongly 
affected respondents with low and a high political knowledge. For other frames, knowledge 
moderated the frame effect, but the emphasis frames influenced more strongly those with 
more politically awareness, not the less politically sophisticated as in the studies described 
above. For generally compelling emphasis frames exerting a main effect on citizens’ issue 
attitude, an experimental study by Chong and Druckman (2007a) dealing with an urban 
growth project also showed that the effects of some frames were stronger when 
participants’ political knowledge was high. However, when examining other compelling 
frames, the significant emphasis framing effect did not differ by respondents’ political 
knowledge. 
A comparable result was obtained in the previously mentioned study by Lecheler 
and de Vreese (2012), who investigated emphasis framing effects for the issue of the 
enlargement of the European Union (see Subchapter 2.3.3). Again, they first found a 
general main effect of frame manipulation. Decomposing this effect by participants’ 
political knowledge, the results indicated that the emphasis framing effect was present for 
respondents with low, moderate, and high political knowledge. However, the size of the 
effect increased as political knowledge increased, and participants with more knowledge 
were more affected than those with moderate knowledge, who were more susceptible to 
emphasis framing effects than those with low political knowledge. 
Likewise, Slothuus (2008) showed in his experimental study, already described in 
Subchapter 2.2.1, that emphasis frames had a general main effect on citizens’ issue attitude. 
However, investigating this effect by political knowledge, the frames did not influence those 
with the lowest political knowledge. In contrast, exposure to different emphasis frames only 
affected participants with moderate or high political knowledge. That is, while the two 
studies before found that emphasis frames affected citizens with lower political knowledge 
less strongly but still significantly, the study by Slothuus (2008) suggests that having at least 
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moderate political knowledge is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of emphasis 
frames. This result is corroborated by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997), who in their experiment 
on social welfare attitudes found no main effect of emphasis frames, but only an interaction 
effect between frames and citizens’ prior attitudes when respondents possessed sufficient 
knowledge about this political topic. The frame emphasis could not encourage participants 
to form a significantly different attitude when they had only limited knowledge. 
Based on the presented results for political knowledge as a moderator of emphasis 
framing effects, it can be concluded that the exact role of this moderator remains unclear, 
except regarding the fact that political knowledge moderates somehow the framing effect. 
However, Druckman and Nelson (2003) offer a compelling reason for why studies found 
that political knowledge sometimes increases and other times decreases the effectiveness of 
emphasis frames. The authors explain these contradictory findings through the problem of 
confounded measurements of citizens’ political knowledge. They argue that measures of 
political knowledge are often correlated with the strength of citizens’ prior opinions on an 
issue. Bechtel et al. (2015) and Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) also note that when 
someone has high political knowledge, this person will also more likely have more 
established political attitudes, which can dampen emphasis framing effects. Hence, 
Druckman and Nelson (2003) assumed that the “true” influence of political knowledge can 
only be observed when controlling for the existence of prior attitudes. When controlling 
for prior attitude strength, higher knowledge should reinforce emphasis framing effects, as 
higher knowledge contributes to better understanding the relevance of a certain 
consideration emphasized by a frame. 
To test this assumption, the authors measured in their experiment on a campaign 
finance reform (see above) participants’ political knowledge and need to evaluate, the latter 
as a proxy for prior opinions. They then integrated both variables as moderators in a 
multivariate regression model testing for the found main effect of emphasis frames. The 
results revealed that controlling the need to evaluate led to the expected moderating 
influence of political knowledge, and the emphasis framing effect was stronger when 
political knowledge was high than when it was low. However, even though this is a 
compelling explanation for why other studies on the moderating influence of political 
knowledge revealed contradictory findings, the study by Druckman and Nelson (2003) has 
thus for not been replicated. Thus, it is unclear whether the explanation holds true. 
Therefore, based on all results on political knowledge as an individual-moderator of 
emphasis framing effects, it is concluded that the exact role of this moderator remains 
unclear, despite the fact that political knowledge is a moderator that sometimes decreases 
(or even inhibits) and other times increases the effectiveness of emphasis frames. 
However, political knowledge is not the only individual-level political variable tested 
as a moderator of emphasis framing effects. For instance, Shen (2004b) analyzed the 
moderating influence of a close relative of political knowledge: citizens’ issue schemas. Such 
schemas are specific cognitive structures representing knowledge about an issue or type of 
stimulus (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and as such, are sometimes also referred to as “frames in 
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thought” (Druckman, 2001a). Issue schemas guide information processing and according 
to Shen (2004b) emphasis frames are more effective when they match citizens’ issue 
schemas, because they resonate more strongly with the organizing cognitive frameworks 
already established in a person’s memory. However, in both of his experiments (see 
Subchapter 2.2.1 for more detail on the experimental setting), the author only found the 
moderating influence of participants’ issue schemas on their issue thoughts. For instance, 
when exposed to an ethical frame for the issue of stem cell research, respondents with 
ethical issue schemas were more likely to express ethical thoughts regarding the issue than 
those with stronger medical benefit issue schemas. For citizens’ issue attitude, Shen (2004b) 
only found two independent main effects of emphasis frames and of respondents’ issue 
schemas, but no interaction between both variables. That is, while persons with ethical issue 
schemas were generally more likely to oppose stem cell research, an ethical frame did not 
affect these participants more strongly than those with issue schemas focusing on medical 
benefits. Essentially, the emphasis framing effect was not moderated by certain individual 
issue schemas, but the frames exerted a uniform attitudinal effect across various levels of 
participants’ issue schemas. 
This uniform emphasis framing effect across different individuals was also found in 
an experiment by Lecheler et al. (2009). The authors tested whether perceived personal issue 
importance moderates the framing effect, which they tested for a political issue perceived on 
aggregate as less important, but that still produced sufficient variance between individuals 
who judged the personal importance of this (generally low-importance) issue as either high 
or low. The issue pertained to international trade agreements, and the experiment exposed 
participants to either an economic benefits of trade agreements emphasis frame or one 
highlighting the economic costs of trade agreements. The authors expected emphasis 
framing effects to be stronger when persons judge the political issue as personally less 
important, because in such cases, citizens have less available prior attitudes to the issue and 
less knowledge about it that could otherwise dampen frame effects. However, while the 
results revealed that respondents formed significantly different issue attitudes depending 
on frame exposure, personal issue importance did not moderate this effect. The strength 
of the emphasis framing effect was the same for persons who judged the issue as important 
and those who did not. 
Another moderator examined empirically is citizens’ partisanship, i.e., whether 
emphasis framing effects differ by party preference. For instance, in two experiments, 
Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) investigated whether emphasis frames are only effective 
when highlighting issue aspects that match the general views of supporters of a specific 
party, whereas the frames often employed by oppositional parties would be ineffective, as 
they draw on considerations less applicable to the individual. In the first experiment, 
respondents were exposed to the issue of a new handgun law framed in terms of either 
“civil rights” or “public safety” (also see above). While they found a main effect of frame 
exposure on participants’ issue attitude, decomposing this effect by respondents’ 
partisanship revealed that Democrat supporters were not affected by the frames and 
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strongly opposed the carrying of concealed guns, regardless of the frame. In contrast, the 
civil rights frame significantly increased Republican supporters’ support for this policy than 
did the public safety emphasis frame, because the civil rights frame resonated better with 
the general views of Republican voters. That is, a specific partisanship was a necessary 
condition for the effectiveness of emphasis frames (even though parties were not 
mentioned as the sources of the frames, but see next Subchapter 2.4.2 for partisan source 
cues as a moderator of emphasis framing effects). Moreover, Haider-Markel and Joslyn 
(2001) replicated this moderating influence in their second experiment, in which they also 
first found a main effect of emphasis frames. Compared to the control group, the frame 
“blame guns” for the topic of school shootings affected supporters of the Democratic Party 
but not those favoring the Republicans. In contrast, Republican supporters were susceptible 
to the frame “blame violence in the media,” whereas this frame was ineffective for 
Democrat voters. 
 In addition, Bechtel et al. (2015) analyzed the moderating influence of partisanship 
in their experiment, mentioned earlier. They did not find a general emphasis framing effect. 
However, the “humanitarianism” emphasis frame affected those who identified with the 
Swiss Social Democratic Party (SP) more than the control group without frames. In 
contrast, neither the humanitarianism nor the “crime reduction” emphasis frames 
influenced Swiss People’s Party (SVP) supporters. Thus, the results for the moderating 
influence of partisanship suggest that emphasis framing effects mainly occur when they 
employ issue aspects that match partisan views, but that such frames are rather ineffective 
when deviating from these views. This undoubtedly questions the general persuasive 
strength of emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.4.3 for a longer discussion on the 
implications of moderated emphasis framing effects). 
Another moderator variable related to partisanship seems to condition emphasis 
framing effects, namely citizens’ political value preferences. As political values play an 
extraordinary role in the construction of emphasis frames and as a moderator of emphasis 
framing effects, the entire Chapter 2.5 focuses in detail on this variable. It is only 
mentioned here as a further moderator for completeness. Before delving into political 
values more extensively, a summary on the presented individual-level moderators follows. 
In addition, the next subchapters examine moderators on the contextual level (see 
Subchapter 2.4.2) and discuss the implications of moderated emphasis framing effects for 




This subchapter showed that emphasis framing effects tend to be more complex than 
implied by initial studies on simple emphasis framing effects (see Chapter 2.2). These 
effects can differ between individuals, and emphasis frames do often not have uniform 
effects for all citizens. While some empirical studies revealed that individual-level variables 
such as need for cognition, personal issue importance, or issue schemas do not moderate 
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emphasis framing effects, the majority of studies displayed that framing effects differ by 
individual variables such as need to evaluate, open-/closed-mindedness, political 
knowledge, political values, and partisanship. Moreover, these variables do not only 
decrease or increase the strength of emphasis framing effects but, sometimes, specific levels 
of these variables are necessary conditions in order that an emphasis frame can exert 
attitudinal effects at all. For instance, emphasis framing effects seem not to work when they 
employ frames that stand in stark contrast to a person’s party identification. However, the 
exact role of these moderating influences is not always clear, because many of the 
moderation effects found have yet to be replicated or because replication studies provided 
contradicting empirical findings for the same moderator variable, especially citizens’ 
political knowledge. Thus, it can be concluded that individual-level moderators play a 
relevant role in emphasis framing effects even though the exact moderation influences are 
not always clear. The next Subchapter 2.4.2 expands the review of moderator variables by 
examining them at the contextual level. 
2.4.2 Empirical results for moderators at the contextual level 
In addition to the individual-level moderators discussed in Subchapter 2.4.1 before, 
empirical studies have also examined whether contextual factors moderate emphasis framing 
effects. These studies investigated whether other factors surrounding an emphasis frame in 
a political message strengthen or dampen the effectiveness of a single emphasis frame. 
Broadly, two different types of contextual moderators can be distinguished. First, studies 
examined the contextual factors of issues and cues, which are not frames, but additional 
aspects of a message. For instance, studies tested whether emphasis frames work uniformly 
for political issues of varying relevance (e.g., Lecheler et al., 2009), whether the credibility 
of an explicitly mentioned source of an emphasis frame conditions its effectiveness (e.g., 
Druckman, 2001b), or if it makes a difference which political party endorses a certain 
emphasis frame (e.g., Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). Second, empirical research investigated 
whether simultaneous frame competition moderates the effects of a specific emphasis frame (e.g., 
Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007a⁠; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). 
These studies exposed citizens not only to one emphasis frame and compared its 
effectiveness with citizens exposed to another frame with the opposite valence, as did 
research on simple emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.2.1). In contrast, these 
moderator studies (also) presented two competing emphasis frames at the same time and 
tested whether this simultaneous competition moderates the effects of each single frame. 
This subchapter describes the results for both types of contextual moderators. However, 
as in Subchapter 2.4.1, the presentation is limited to empirical studies that investigated 
citizens’ issue attitude as the central dependent variable and moderated emphasis framing 
effects at a specific point in time. Moderated emphasis framing effects over time are 
described in Chapter 2.6. 
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Issues and group cues as contextual moderators of emphasis framing effects 
One often-discussed question in research on emphasis framing effects is whether these 
effects are invariant to the framed political issue. While Subchapter 2.2.1 on simple 
emphasis framing effects provided evidence for framing effects for various topics, some 
scholars argue that (experimental) research tends to examine such effects for less relevant 
issues and thus overstate the strength thereof for salient and contested political issues in 
society (e.g., Bechtel et al., 2015). However, some studies on simple emphasis framing 
effects dealt with highly important and contested political topics such as stem cell research 
(Shen, 2004b), military interventions (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006), affirmative action (Nelson, 
2004), enlargement of the European Union (de Vreese et al., 2011), or social welfare 
(Slothuus, 2008), which to some extent limits the generality of this criticism. Nevertheless, 
most studies on emphasis framing effects only investigated one political topic, and did not 
explicitly test whether the general importance of an issue moderates the frame effect. 
The only study that formally tested this moderator was by Lecheler et al. (2009), 
partly described in Subchapter 2.4.1 before. Besides the aforementioned investigation of 
personal issue importance as an individual-level moderator, the authors also examined the 
general issue importance in society and tested emphasis framing effects for a high-
importance issue and a low-importance issue. The differentiation between high- and low-
importance issues thus differs from the degrees in personal issue importance. This is 
because it does not ask how important a single individual perceives a certain political topic 
to be, but distinguishes between low- and high-importance issues based on the average 
response of all individuals to the question of the importance of an issue. In other words, a 
high-importance issue is one that most people judge as important, and personal issue 
importance for this high-importance issue can still differ between individuals (cf. Lecheler 
et al., 2009). 
Based on participants’ average response to how personally important an issue is, 
Lecheler et al. (2009) identified the issue of privatization of care for the elderly as a high-
importance issue and that of international trade as a low-importance issue. In an 
experimental setting, the authors randomly assigned respondents to one of these topics 
framed in one of two ways. For the high-importance issue of privatization of care services, 
participants were exposed to either an emphasis frame highlighting the expected economic 
benefits of privatization for municipalities’ budget or a frame that emphasized a possible 
decrease in the quality of care after the privatization of care services. The emphasis frames 
for the low-importance issue of international trade dealt either with the economic benefits 
of trade agreements or the economic costs thereof. The authors expected that these frames 
only influence participants’ issue attitudes for the low-importance issue, for which 
participants should possess fewer (and weaker) prior attitudes than for the high-importance 
issue. The results confirmed this and that the emphasis frames were only effective for the 
low-importance issue, but indicated no framing effect for the high-importance issue. As 
such, this study showed that the general importance of an issue moderates emphasis 
framing effects, and that low-importance issues can be a necessary condition for the 
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occurrence of these effects. However, even though this study did not find emphasis framing 
effects for important and contested issues, it is unclear how relevant this moderator is, as 
only this research explicitly tested general issue importance as a moderator. Moreover, the 
other studies mentioned above revealed emphasis framing effects for issues that seem 
important, although these studies did not measure issue importance. 
Closely related to the question of whether emphasis framing effects work uniformly 
across issues of differing importance, another aspect of issues tested as a moderator of 
emphasis framing effects deals with differently stereotyped groups related to an issue. 
Igartua and colleagues (2009⁠; 2011) investigated whether the mentioning of different group 
cues within the topic of immigration influenced the strength of emphasis framing effects for 
this topic. The authors assumed that citizens possess valenced stereotypes toward certain 
social groups and that framing effects are more pronounced when the valence of additional 
group cues matches that of the emphasis frame. For instance, a positively valenced 
emphasis frame for an issue is more effective when the message contains a cue about a 
social group for which the majority of citizens possess positively valenced stereotypes. 
The authors tested this expectation with two nearly similar experimental studies (cf. 
Igartua et al., 2011⁠; Igartua & Cheng, 2009) offering replicated insights into this question 
using two different samples of Spaniards. Both experiments manipulated the same two 
message factors in the same manner. First, the authors manipulated the framing of a news 
story dealing with immigration to Spain by exposing participants to either a “crime” 
emphasis frame highlighting increased crime due to immigration or to the positively 
valenced “economic benefits” frame, which emphasized the financial contribution of 
immigrants to the national social welfare system. Second, the experiments manipulated 
group cues, namely which group of immigrants the news stories mentioned as an example 
of immigrating groups by labeling them as Latin American or Moroccan immigrants. 
According to the authors and based on the results of other surveys, Spaniards have more 
favorable (i.e., positively valenced) stereotypes of Latin American immigrants, and more 
negatively valenced stereotypes of Moroccan immigrants. 
The results of both experiments revealed a significant main effect of the factor 
emphasis frame on issue attitude. Respondents supported immigration significantly more 
strongly when exposed to the economic benefits frame than to the crime frame. In addition, 
the first experiment demonstrated a significant interaction between framing and group cues, 
indicating that group cues moderated the strength of emphasis framing effects. Specifically, 
the emphasis frames only had an effect for the positively valenced group cue of Latin 
American immigrants, but none for the negatively stereotyped Moroccan immigrant group. 
Against the authors’ expectation (and interpretation of the results), a simple effect analysis 
revealed that the reason for this differential framing effect on issue attitude was not the 
match between frame valence and stereotype valence. 
In fact, the opposite was the case. It was not the negatively valenced frame with the 
cue of Moroccan immigrants or the positively valenced frame with Latin American 
immigrants that differed from the other combinations of frames and cues, which would 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 53 
both otherwise indicate that the match between valences is decisive. In contrast, only one 
combination of frames and group cues differed from all other conditions: the negatively 
valenced crime frame decreased support for immigration only when the positively valenced 
group cue of Latin American was present. That is, valence matching did moderate the 
emphasis framing effect; rather, the negatively valenced emphasis frame changed the 
influence of the positively valenced stereotype in the direction of the frame (see the simple 
effects in Igartua & Cheng, 2009, p. 740). However, the second experiment revealed no 
significant interaction between frames and group cues on issue attitude (cf. Igartua et al., 
2011). This implies that the moderating influence of group cues on the emphasis framing 
effect could not be replicated, although the main effect of emphasis frames was significant 
again. Thus, it is empirically unclear how relevant such group cues are as contextual 
moderators of emphasis framing effects. 
 
(Partisan) Source cues as contextual moderators of emphasis framing effects 
Another contextual moderator dealing with cues as a further message characteristic is the 
credibility of the source presenting the frame in a message. Since the beginning of 
persuasion research, source credibility has been found to influence the effectiveness of political 
messages (e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951), and Druckman (2001b) tested whether less 
credible sources also dampen the effects of emphasis frames. The basic idea behind source 
credibility is that speakers can differ in how knowledgeable and trustworthy the audience 
perceives them to be, and the more credible a speaker is perceived as being, the higher is 
the probability that the audience follows their evaluations of certain attitude objects the 
speaker proposes. Put differently, messages by credible sources tend to have a greater 
persuasive influence than those by less credible sources. For this mechanism to take place, 
the source of a message or statement must typically be visible for the audience. That is, the 
effect of credibility often depends on explicit source cues that show who made a certain 
statement (e.g., “Economic scientists support offshore drilling because of its economic 
benefits”). Druckman (2001b) expected that emphasis frames only have attitudinal effects 
when the audience perceives the source that promotes a frame as credible, whereas 
emphasis frames mentioned by less credible sources are ineffective. 
He tested this assumption using two experiments. The first dealt with financial 
spending for the poor by the government. Participants received either an “expenditures” 
emphasis frame highlighting that more spending on the poor would cost the government’s 
budget more money, or a “humanitarianism” frame, which emphasized the importance of 
financially helping the poor. As a second factor, the experiment manipulated whether the 
framed stimuli appeared as originating from the personal website of Collin Powell or Jerry 
Springer. According to a pretest, Collin Powell was judged as more credible than Jerry 
Springer; thus, the former represents a credible source and the latter a less credible source 
cue. In the second experiment using a fresh sample, respondents were exposed either to 
the “public safety” or “free speech” emphasis frame, each highlighting different aspects of 
the same issue of a planned rally by an extremist group. To manipulate the source credibility 
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of the differently framed messages, participants read constructed and framed news articles 
that seemed to have been published by either the New York Times – judged as highly 
credible in a pretest – or the National Enquirer, perceived as a less credible source in the 
pretest. 
For both experiments, the results revealed clear effects of emphasis frames on 
respondents’ issue attitudes when the source was credible (i.e., Collin Powell or the New 
York Times). In contrast, exposure to different emphasis frames did not yield attitudinal 
differences when the frames seemed to originate from less credible sources (i.e., Jerry 
Springer or the National Enquirer). That is, Druckman (2001b) supported his hypothesis 
with empirical evidence. Source credibility seems to not only moderate the strength of 
emphasis framing effects, but a degree of credibility seems to be a necessary condition for 
emphasis frames to have an attitudinal effect. Thus, it seems that emphasis frames are not 
always a powerful communication tool. The strength of this tool depends on who uses it, 
which is consistent with the general results of research on persuasion (e.g., Hovland 
& Weiss, 1951). However, it is difficult to assess the exact (moderating) influence of source 
credibility for emphasis framing effects, as few other framing studies explicitly replicated 
this finding. 
Among the research on additional message cues as moderators of emphasis framing 
effects, an often-analyzed cue is partisan source cues, i.e., explicit cues that indicate for the 
audience which political party offered and supported a certain emphasis frame. These cues 
are believed to foster the influence of citizens’ partisanship as a moderator of emphasis 
framing effects (see Subchapter 2.4.1), as they explicitly indicate which issue aspect the 
preferred political party endorses as relevant for issue interpretation. Hence, emphasis 
frames should be stronger when the partisan source cue for the frame matches a person’s 
party identification, as this match can indicate for the person that adopting the frame of the 
matching partisan source is aligned with her or his political value preferences and helps to 
maintain one’s political identity (Hartman & Weber, 2009). 
For instance, the experimental study by Bechtel et al. (2015) mentioned earlier, 
which dealt with an initiative to deport criminal foreigners, not only tested the isolated 
attitudinal effects of emphasis frames but also accompanied the frames with explicit party 
cues in some additional experimental conditions. More precisely, when presenting the 
“humanitarianism” frame against the deportation initiative, the authors exposed 
participants either to this frame in isolation or to a message that not only contained this 
frame but also indicated that the SP stated this issue perspective. Likewise, the “crime 
reduction” emphasis frame appeared either in isolation or with a cue clarifying it as the issue 
interpretation of the SVP. As mentioned, Bechtel et al. (2015) did not find a main effect of 
presenting different emphasis frames on respondents’ attitude toward the deportation 
initiative, but did at least find an effect of the humanitarianism frame on citizens identifying 
with the SP (see Subchapter 2.4.1). However, the additional partisan source cues had no 
influence on the (non-)effect of the emphasis frames, implying that the match between a 
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frame explicitly sponsored by a preferred party and a person’s party identification does not 
increase the effectiveness of emphasis frames. 
In contrast, Hartman and Weber (2009) found that the match between a partisan 
source cue and an individual’s party identification increased the attitudinal effects of 
emphasis frames. Specifically, the match between party source and identification 
conditioned the main effect of emphasis frames the authors found for framing a planned 
rally of an extremist group as a question of free speech or public order (see Subchapter 
2.4.1). The frame effect only occurred when this match existed, whereas emphasis frames 
explicitly endorsed by a non-preferred party were ineffective. However, when both 
emphasis frames were presented in simultaneous competition, no attitudinal effects were 
found, and a match between party cues and party identity did not establish a framing effect 
(Hartman & Weber, 2009). 
These two studies provide inconclusive evidence for partisan source cues as a 
moderator of emphasis framing effects. However, Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) provide 
a compelling account for the question of when partisan source cues moderate the effects 
of emphasis frames more or less strongly. The authors argue that the strength of the 
influence of the match between partisan source cues and individuals’ party identification 
depends on the strength of the partisan conflict toward the framed issue. For conflict issues, 
the moderating influence of partisan source cues should be stronger, because partisan 
conflict renders personal partisan identities more salient for citizens. This fosters motivated 
reasoning, i.e., citizens follow fewer accuracy goals when processing political messages, but 
rather employ motivational goals reinforcing one’s political identity when interpreting 
emphasis frames (cf. Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009). That is, when the issue is conflicting, 
citizens tend to follow only the frame offered by their preferred party. In contrast, the 
frames of an oppositional non-preferred party do not affect them, because such frames 
stem from the political opponent that threatens one’s political identity. Thus, the frames of 
non-preferred parties are not being applicable in interpreting the issue and do not have an 
attitudinal effect. However, Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) argue that motivated reasoning 
toward emphasis frames is less pronounced for non-conflicting consensus issues between 
political parties. In such cases, defending one’s political identity by engaging in motivated 
reasoning toward frames of an oppositional party is less relevant for citizens. Thus, for 
consensus issues, emphasis frames should exert attitudinal effects regardless of which party 
offers the frame, although people might still follow more strongly the frames endorsed by 
the preferred party. 
To test this assumption, Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) conducted two experiments 
in Denmark. One dealt with the partisan consensus issue of international trade between 
China and Denmark, and varied the emphasis frames for this issue (“economic benefits” 
vs. “economic threats”) and the partisan source cue endorsing the emphasis frame (Social 
Democrats vs. Liberals). The other experiment employed the issue of privatizing healthcare 
services for the elderly, on which Denmark’s two most important political parties, the Social 
Democrats and the Liberals, disagreed strongly at the time the study was conducted. Besides 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 56 
varying the partisan source cues, the second experiment manipulated the framing of the 
issue by exposing participants to either an emphasis frame highlighting the benefits of 
privatizing healthcare services or a frame that emphasized the benefits of the opposite, 
namely public service healthcare. 
The results first revealed a main effect of emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude 
for both issues despite the simultaneous presentation of partisan source cues. However, 
this main effect was somewhat stronger for the consensus issue than for the conflict issue. 
Moreover, a decomposition of the main effect for the conflict issue revealed that the 
emphasis frames were only effective when endorsed by a preferred party, while the frames 
had no effects when the partisan source cue did not match respondents’ partisan identity. 
In contrast, for the consensus issue, emphasis frames were also effective without this 
match, although the frame effect was stronger when provided by a preferred political party. 
That is, Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) provided empirical evidence supporting their 
assumptions. In general, matching partisan source cues increased the effects of emphasis 
frames, but a match was only a necessary condition when the frames were applied to a 
partisan conflict issue. In contrast, emphasis frames explicitly endorsed by non-preferred 
parties also demonstrated (weaker) effects for consensus issues. 
The varying strength of the moderating influence of partisan source cues on the 
effectiveness of emphasis frames depending on partisan conflict was also replicated in a 
study by Druckman et al. (2013). However, they tested this through a more complex design, 
exposing participants simultaneously to two competing emphasis frames with varying 
persuasive strength and different partisan source cues. This study is described later in this 
subchapter. To enable a better understanding of this study, the concept of simultaneous 
frame competition is introduced next, which has also been shown to moderate the 
attitudinal effects of single emphasis frames. 
 
Balanced simultaneous frame competition as a contextual-level moderator 
While the contextual moderators described earlier added other message features such as 
(partisan) source cues to single emphasis frames, other studies investigated how the effects 
of a single emphasis frame change when simultaneously presenting one (or more) counter-
frame(s) with the opposite valence. The main reason for testing simultaneous frame 
competition is that it reflects with higher external validity how citizens come across 
emphasis frames in real political communication processes (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). 
At least in democratic public spheres, not one single political actor frames political issues 
for the audience with one frame. Rather, different actors using different frames compete to 
gain public support for their issue positions. As such, in reality, citizens are often exposed 
to different frames for the same issue at the same time. Thus, the question is whether 
emphasis frames are still effective when other frames are present or whether simultaneous 
exposure to competing frames cancels the effects of single emphasis frames (Sniderman 
& Theriault, 2004). For instance, studies on frame competition ask how strongly an 
environmental frame can decrease a person’s support for offshore oil drilling when this 
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person is also exposed to an economic benefits frame suggesting the opposite issue attitude. 
One can further differentiate studies examining a balanced simultaneous frame competition 
between two (or more) frames (e.g., Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Sniderman & Theriault, 
2004) and those exploring unbalanced simultaneous frame competition, where one frame is 
presented more often or as more relevant than the competing frame(s) (e.g., Chong 
& Druckman, 2007a⁠; Tewksbury et al., 2000). 
Regarding balanced competition, Beattie and Milojevich (2017) investigated in an 
experimental study dealing with the military conflict in the east of the Ukraine whether the 
attitudinal effects of four different emphasis frames are stronger when presenting only one 
of the frames compared to presenting all four frames simultaneously. Compared to 
respondents’ prior issue attitude, three of the four one-sided frame exposures changed their 
attitude when the frames were presented in isolation. In contrast, when participants saw all 
four frames simultaneously, their prior attitude did not change and all single emphasis 
frames were entirely ineffective. That is, frame competition not only moderated the effects 
of single emphasis frames but also cancelled out the effects of the single frames. This 
implies that one-sided framing is a necessary condition for emphasis framing effects. 
 Hartman and Weber (2009) found a similar result in their experimental study on a 
planned rally of an extremist political group, which was partly described earlier in this 
subchapter when presenting the moderating influence of partisan source cues. They re-
conducted the described experiment, but presented the frames in simultaneous competition 
in the same message, not one frame or the other. The results of their first experiment 
revealed that one-sided emphasis frames affected participants’ issue attitude when the 
partisan source cue matched respondents’ party identification. However, in the second 
experiment with simultaneous frame competition, no emphasis frame effects were evident, 
not even when accompanied by a matching partisan source cue. This result adds more 
evidence of the limiting influence of frame competition on the effectiveness of emphasis 
frames. 
The moderating effect of simultaneous balanced frame competition was also 
analyzed by Sniderman and Theriault (2004). They conducted two experiments in which 
participants were exposed to one of two oppositely valenced emphasis frames or to both 
competing frames simultaneously. The first experiment dealt with government spending on 
the poor and employed a “getting ahead” emphasis frame, which focused on improving 
opportunities for the poor through social welfare services, and a “higher taxes” frame, 
emphasizing that social welfare services can be expensive and offering more of these 
services might lead to higher taxes. When respondents were exposed to only one of these 
frames, the results demonstrated a clear emphasis framing effect. Participants were 
significantly more supportive of social welfare services when exposed to the getting ahead 
emphasis frame than when receiving the higher taxes frames. However, this pattern differed 
for respondents exposed to both emphasis frames simultaneously, where the effects of the 
frames were less pronounced. Moreover, exposure to both frames sometimes had no 
attitudinal effect in comparison to a control group not exposed to a frame. Sniderman and 
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Theriault (2004) fully replicated these findings in their second experiment dealing (again) 
with the framing of a planned rally of an extremist group.  
While the aforementioned three studies univocally suggest that simultaneous 
balanced frame competition moderates the effects of single emphasis frames by decreasing 
or even inhibiting their effectiveness, Nisbet et al. (2013) found that competition could also 
increase the strength of emphasis framing effects. As described in Subchapter 2.4.1, the 
authors conducted an experiment on climate change mitigation policies. The first part of 
their study revealed that exposure to one-sided emphasis frames did not affect citizens’ 
attitude toward these policies, regardless of their personality trait of open-/closed-
mindedness. On average, this was also the case for participants exposed to a pro frame 
directly followed by a con frame. However, further decomposition of the effect of 
competitive framing by open-/closed-mindedness showed that the frame emphasizing the 
relevance of climate change mitigation increased support for the policies when participants 
were open-minded rather than closed-minded. That is, for open-minded citizens that 
generally prefer being exposed to different viewpoints, competitive framing can increase 
the effectiveness of single emphasis frames. Thus, the role of simultaneous balanced frame 
competition as a moderator can be conditioned by further individual-level moderators. 
Competition does not always inhibit framing effects, although most of the literature 
suggests that in general, balanced frame competition decreases single emphasis framing 
effects. 
 
Unbalanced simultaneous frame competition as a contextual-level moderator 
Despite the higher external validity of studies employing balanced frame competition 
compared to those using simple emphasis framing, the realism of perfectly balanced 
framing situations can still be questioned. Even professional journalism adhering to norms 
of objectivity and news diversity in the sense of balanced coverage of different sides of a 
story (cf. Porto, 2007) does not always cover issues in an entirely balanced way. Editorial 
lines (e.g., Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011 ⁠; Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2019) or 
journalists’ personal interests (e.g., Brüggemann, 2014⁠; Patterson & Donsbach, 1996) may 
mean that pieces of political news can contain at least two competing frames, but with the 
emphasis of one of these frames more pronounced. Such unbalanced simultaneous frame 
competition has also been investigated in various ways as a potential moderator of the 
effectiveness of single emphasis frames. 
For example, Tewksbury et al. (2000) analyzed the effects of three types of 
competitive emphasis framing: balanced competitive framing presenting two opposing 
emphasis frames with the same prominence, unbalanced competitive framing that 
emphasizes one of the frames but still includes a counter-frame in the message, and one-
sided emphasis framing only presenting one of the two frames. The authors conducted an 
experiment employing the issue of large hog farms and the emphasis frames 
“environment,” which highlighted negative outcomes of factory farming for the 
environment, and “industry,” which emphasized the economic benefits of larger farms. 
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Under the one-sided condition, participants were exposed to only one of these frames. In 
unbalanced frame competition condition, respondents read a news article that contained 
both frames but with more emphasis on environmental aspects than on economic aspects 
or vice versa. In the balanced condition, both frames were presented in an equally 
prominent way and in clear conflict to each other. 
The results revealed a main effect of emphasis frames on respondents’ issue attitude. 
However, when decomposing this main effect, only the two one-sided framing conditions 
differed significantly from each other and from all other framing conditions including those 
with unbalanced competitive framing. In contrast, the unbalanced conditions that 
presented both frames simultaneously but with more emphasis on one of the frame did not 
differ from the condition with exactly balanced frame competition. That is, the study by 
Tewksbury et al. (2000) suggests that emphasis frames are only effective in fully one-sided 
situations, but when a competing emphasis frame is also present – no matter how 
prominently – no effects of single emphasis frames are evident. 
 Chong and Druckman (2007a) explored unbalanced simultaneous frame 
competition in a different way. First, they integrated unequal repetition of emphasis frames 
in their design to test the hypothesis that the “loudest,” i.e., the most often repeated, 
emphasis frame is also the most effective one. During the same experimental session, some 
participants received a pro frame twice and a competing con frame only once for the same 
political topic. Other respondents were exposed only once to the pro frame but twice to 
the con frame. In addition, other participants received both frames only once and some 
only one frame (i.e., either a pro or a con frame). Second, the authors manipulated as a 
second experimental factor the isolated persuasiveness of both emphasis frames (so-called 
“frame strength”) leading to a “weak” and a “strong” pro frame and to a weak and a strong 
con frame. This enabled the authors to test whether frame competition decreases the 
effectiveness of single emphasis frames in general or whether this depends on the 
persuasive strength of the counter-frame. They expected that weak counter-frames would 
not decrease the effects of strong emphasis frames, and that strong frames would rather 
increase their effectiveness when accompanied by a weak counter-frame. This means, they 
expected a contrast effect of the weak counter-frame, namely that it would make the strong 
frame even more compelling. 
To test their assumptions, Chong and Druckman (2007a) conducted an experiment 
dealing with an urban growth project that proposed limiting construction activities to the 
city center instead of building new houses at the periphery of the city. In a pretest, they 
analyzed potential emphasis frames for the final experiment by asking respondents to judge 
how compelling they found various frames for this topic when presented in isolation (i.e., 
as a one-sided frame). Based on the pretest results, the authors selected four frames for the 
final experiment. The strong pro frame “preserve open space” emphasized that supporting 
the project would protect the environment outside the city. This frame was judged as highly 
compelling. The weak pro frame “build community” highlighted that concentrating 
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housing in the city center fosters social exchange because of a higher population density. 
Respondents assessed the isolated persuasiveness of this frame as low in the pretest. 
Isolated persuasiveness also differed significantly for the selected con frames. The 
strong con frame “economic costs” focused on prices that were too high in the city center, 
making the newly built houses unaffordable for many people. The weak con frame “voter 
competence” emphasized that the planned project would demand too much initiative from 
citizens who lack the competence to participate in planning the project. Using these selected 
frames, Chong and Druckman (2007a) exposed participants in the final experiment to 1 out 
of 16 experimental conditions. Those in the control group were not exposed to any frame. 
As mentioned, the conditions varied the four frames and (repetitive) competition between 
the frames (one frame, two competing frames, two frames with the same direction plus one 
counter-frame). 
The results revealed four important aspects. First, compared to the control group, 
strong emphasis frames affected citizens’ attitude toward the urban growth project 
regardless of whether it was presented alone, in competition to a strong counter-frame, or 
in competition to a weak counter-frame. As long as emphasis frames were compelling, 
frame competition did not inhibit the effects thereof. Second, weak emphasis frames were 
generally unable to influence respondents’ issue attitude regardless of the type of frame 
competition including one-sided framing. This implies that the strength of a frame is a 
necessary condition for its effectiveness and that not all frame can be influential. Third, 
employing weak emphasis frames can backfire when they compete with a strong counter-
frame. In situations of competition between weak and strong frames with the opposite 
valence, the strong frame demonstrated greater effects than competition between opposing 
frames with the same frame strength. Fourth, the unequal repetition of frames (at t1) had 
less relevant effects. In fact, the effectiveness of repetition of a frame only increased for 
one of the four frames, while for the other three frames, repetition was ineffective. 
Taken together, in unbalanced simultaneous frame competition, the direct repetition 
of frames is less important than their quality and strength. Strong frames can withstand 
different types of competition and do not lose their power to influence citizens’ issue 
attitudes. This is an important qualification of the aforementioned studies on balanced 
frame competition. These studies revealed only minimal effects of emphasis frames when 
competing with others (see above). In fact, frame competition does not necessarily inhibit 
single emphasis framing effects as long as the frames are strong, i.e., compelling. 
In the same study, Chong and Druckman (2007a) tried to replicate these findings 
with a further experiment dealing (again) with the issue of a planned rally of an extremist 
group. However, they manipulated frame strength in a problematic way, making it too shaky 
to validly compare the results of both experiments. To vary frame strength, the authors did 
not employ different frames in their second experiment, but varied solely the credibility of 
the source cue for the same (strong) pro and con frame. That is, they did not manipulate 
frame strength but source credibility, even though the authors called this frame strength. 
However, the two experiments can be compared in terms of the results for (unequally often) 
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repetition of certain frames at a single point in time. Here, the second experiment confirmed 
the first experiment, and repetition was mainly ineffective. More important for the influence 
of unbalanced frame competition on the strength of emphasis framing effects was the 
source cue in the second experiment. Frames offered by a credible source outperformed 
those by less credible sources, regardless of whether the frames were one-sided or presented 
in balanced or unbalanced frame competition, whereas frames by less credible sources were 
ineffective. This is further evidence of the relevance of source cues as a moderator of 
emphasis framing effects discussed above. 
 
Partisan source cues in unbalanced simultaneous frame competition 
Regarding source cues, Druckman et al. (2013) investigated the interplay between 
unbalanced simultaneous frame competition and partisan source cues in a further study. 
This experimental study was briefly mentioned earlier when presenting the role of partisan 
source cues as a moderator of emphasis framing effects. With the knowledge gained of the 
relevance of frame strength in competitive framing, it is now possible to elaborate this 
research. The authors conducted an experiment dealing with the issue of offshore oil 
drilling and exposed participants simultaneously to two competing emphasis frames for the 
issue, a pro and a con frame. However, the experiment varied the frame strength as being 
weak or strong. That is, the study employed four different frames, and participants were 
exposed to a combination of a (weak or strong) pro frame and a (weak or strong) con frame. 
The strong pro frame “economic benefits” focused on the financial profits that could be 
achieved by drilling, and the weak pro frame “technological developments” highlighted that 
building oil platforms increases technological knowledge. Furthermore, the strong con 
frame “maritime life” emphasized possible damages to the environment and the weak con 
frame “regulation” focused on the high bureaucratic effort needed to realize oil platforms. 
Again, the strength of these frames was successfully tested in an independent pretest. 
As a second factor, the experiment varied partisan source cues on three levels. The 
first level contained no partisan source cues, and participants received only two competing 
emphasis frames (with varying frame strength). The second level added partisan source cues 
to the frames. The pro frame(s) were explicitly endorsed by the Republican Party, whereas 
the Democratic Party explicitly supported the con frame(s). Likewise, the third level added 
the same party cues to the frames, but in contrast to the second level, explicitly stated in 
the stimuli that the political parties differ starkly in their issue position and are highly 
polarized on the issue. 
According to the results of this experiment by Druckman et al. (2013), the relevance 
of frame strength for the effects of emphasis frames in competitive situations compared to 
a control group without framing varied substantially by the level of partisan source cues 
and participants’ party identification. Without partisan source cues, respondents that 
favored either the Republicans or Democrats demonstrated no differences in their 
susceptibility to strong emphasis frames. When a strong frame competed with a weak 
frame, the strong (pro or con) frame affected the issue attitudes of the supporters of both 
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parties. However, in contrast to the study by Chong and Druckman (2007a) mentioned 
earlier, strong frames had no effects when they competed simultaneously with a strong 
counter-frame, regardless of respondents’ partisanship. Likewise, when two opposing weak 
frames competed with each other, they were ineffective. That is, without partisan source 
cues and across citizens with opposing partisan identities, strong emphasis frames exerted 
attitudinal effects in unbalanced competition with a weak counter-frame, although 
ambivalent balanced competitive situations (weak vs. weak, strong vs. strong) inhibited the 
effects of the emphasis frames. 
When the frames were accompanied by (non-polarized) explicit partisan source cues, 
strong frames were still effective when competing with a weak counter-frame, regardless of 
whether the strong frame was endorsed by a non-preferred party and the weak frame by a 
preferred party, or the other way around. However, the additional party cues changed the 
effects of the frames in situations of balanced competition. While the frames were 
ineffective in such situations without party cues, participants employed these cues to solve 
the ambivalent competition. The frame of the preferred party exerted an effect, but no 
frame effect was evident when endorsed by a non-preferred party, regardless of frame 
strength (i.e., also for weak frames). Thus, the match between partisan identities and (non-
polarized) partisan source cues moderated the effects of single emphasis frames for 
balanced competition, but not for unbalanced competition, where strong frames remained 
a significant influence on issue attitude regardless of party cues. 
A more pronounced moderation influence of the match between partisan source 
cues and respondents’ partisan identity occurred in the condition wherein participants were 
told that the two political parties were highly polarized toward offshore oil drilling. 
Regardless of frame strength and regardless of whether the frames competed with equally 
strong/weak or differently strong/weak frames, the frames endorsed by the preferred party 
demonstrated clear effects, whereas all frames by non-preferred parties were ineffective. 
That is, the mentioned polarization between parties increased the relevance of partisan 
source cues for attitude formation so strongly that the own party’s frame was always 
effective and that by a competing party always ineffective. When parties seemed polarized, 
not even strong frames by a non-preferred party dampened the effect of a competing weak 
frame of the preferred party. 
Druckman et al. (2013) fully replicated these results in a second experiment on a 
new law allowing easier naturalization of the children of illegal immigrants (the Dream Act). 
Thus, the authors provided compelling evidence for the general importance of frame 
strength for the effectiveness of frames in unbalanced competition situations that even 
persists when offered by a non-preferred political party. Moreover, they showed that 
partisan polarization alters emphasis framing effects in a in a similar way to partisan conflict 
issues (see also the study by Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010 described above). Under 
circumstances of partisan polarization, emphasis frames still affect citizens’ issue attitudes, 
but only the frames endorsed by a preferred political party. 
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Summary 
This subchapter showed that variables at the contextual level can also moderate the effects 
of single emphasis frames. For instance, the occurrence of these effects seems to depend 
on the general importance of issues. For low-importance issues, emphasis frames exert 
effects on citizens’ issue attitudes, but do not do so for high-importance issues on which 
citizens already have (strong) prior opinions (Lecheler et al., 2009). In addition, only 
emphasis frames offered by credible sources seem effective, while those by less credible 
sources do not influence issue attitudes (Chong & Druckman, 2007a ⁠; Druckman, 2001b). 
Moreover, partisan source cues can moderate emphasis framing effects, and frame effects 
tend to be more pronounced when offered by a preferred political party (Hartman 
& Weber, 2009), especially when the framed issue contains partisan conflict (Slothuus & de 
Vreese, 2010) and polarization (Druckman et al., 2013). However, frames by non-preferred 
parties can influence citizens’ issue attitudes if the polarization of parties is low (Druckman 
et al., 2013) or when framing consensus issues (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). That is, the 
strength of the moderating influence of the match between partisan source cues and 
individuals’ party preferences on the effectiveness of emphasis frames depends on the 
relevance of partisan identity. When this identity is relevant, only frames by a preferred 
party are effective, but when partisan identity is not at stake, frames by non-preferred parties 
can also influence citizens. 
Furthermore, the balanced simultaneous presentation of competing frames seems 
to nearly always cancel out the effects of single emphasis frames, and only one-sided 
emphasis frames are effective (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). 
However, in situations of unbalanced frame competition wherein a strongly compelling 
emphasis frame competes simultaneously with a weakly compelling counter-frame, strong 
frames influence citizens’ issue attitudes, even when a non-preferred party offers the frame 
(at least in a non-polarized setting, see Druckman et al., 2013). Weak frames are mostly 
ineffective in simultaneous frame competition (Chong & Druckman, 2007a), except when 
endorsed by a preferred party in a polarized environment (Druckman et al., 2013). 
In sum, these results suggest that emphasis framing effects are more complex than 
suggested in studies on simple emphasis framing effects in one-sided situations (see 
Chapter 2.2). Contextual factors can moderate these effects so strongly that emphasis 
frames sometimes need additional conditions to affect citizens’ issue attitudes at all. Next, 
Subchapter 2.4.3 discusses the implications of moderated emphasis framing effects for 
assessing the strength of these effects and citizens’ rationality in attitude formation under 
framing conditions. 
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2.4.3 Summary and implications of moderated emphasis framing effects for 
assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
The last two subchapters (see Subchapter 2.4.1 and Subchapter 2.4.2) revealed that 
additional variables often moderate emphasis framing effects. At the individual level, 
citizens, who differ in personality variables such as need to evaluate or open-/closed-
mindedness and political variables such as political knowledge or partisanship, have 
different susceptibility to base their attitude formation on the framing of an issue or event. 
That is, emphasis framing effects do often not work uniformly among different citizens, 
and these effects are stronger for some citizens and less pronounced for others. Sometimes, 
specific personality traits or matches between the content of the frame and a person’s 
political preferences are even necessary conditions for emphasis frames to be effective at 
all in influencing citizens’ issue attitudes (see Table 2 for an overview of the different 
moderating influences of individual-level variables). 
However, empirical studies on individual-level moderators are sometimes 
contradictory, particularly on the influence of political knowledge. This makes it difficult to 
draw an exact picture of those most susceptible and those immune to emphasis framing 
effects. There are, however, good reasons to assume the strength of prior attitudes as the 
most important individual-level moderator. Strong prior attitudes are very likely to dampen 
the strength of emphasis framing effects, as such attitudes are generally more resistant to 
persuasive attempts (Krosnick & Petty, 1995), and thus, probably also to emphasis framing. 
Still, studies on this influence at a single point in time are rare, and the few that tested for 
this influence employed the rather rough measure of need to evaluate as an indicator for 
prior attitude strength (e.g., Druckman & Nelson, 2003). However, Chapter 2.6 provides 
further evidence of the prominent role of attitude strength when examining emphasis 
framing effects over time. 
Alongside variables at the individual-level, contextual variables have shown to 
moderate the strength and sometimes even the occurrence of emphasis framing effects on 
citizens’ issue attitudes (see Table 3 for an overview). When non-credible sources offer a 
certain frame interpretation and this source is visible, emphasis framing effects are often 
not evident. Only credible sources are able to influence citizens with their frames. 
Moreover, the emphasis frames provided by a preferred political party demonstrate 
stronger effects than frames provided by non-preferred parties. In addition, the 
simultaneous presentation of competing frames often cancels out the effects of single 
frames, and in general, only simple one-sided emphasis framing exerts relevant attitudinal 
influences. Last, emphasis frames themselves can differ in their effectiveness, and when 
frames with different persuasive strength compete simultaneously, only strong (i.e., 
compelling) frames influence issue attitudes, particularly when the counter-frame is weak. 
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Table 2. Summary of empirical results for individual-level moderators of emphasis framing 




Result(s) (with reference) 
Personality variables  
Need to 
evaluate 
− Stronger frame effect when need to evaluate is low (Druckman 
& Nelson, 2003) 
Need for 
cognition 
− No influence on main effect of frame (Tewksbury et al., 2000) 
Open-/closed-
mindedness 
− Frame effect only when open-mindedness is high and competing 
frames are present (Nisbet et al., 2013) 
Political variables  
Political 
knowledge 
− Only frame effect when knowledge is low (Bechtel et al., 2015 ⁠; 
Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001⁠; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006) 
− Frame effect stronger when knowledge is low (Beattie 
& Milojevich, 2017) 
− For some frames, stronger effects when knowledge is high but, no 
difference by knowledge for other frames (Chong & Druckman, 
2007a⁠; de Vreese et al., 2011) 
− Frame effect stronger when knowledge is high (Lecheler & de 
Vreese, 2012) 
− Frame effect stronger when knowledge is high and when need to 
evaluate is controlled (Druckman & Nelson, 2003) 
− Only frame effect when knowledge is moderate or high (Slothuus, 
2008) 
− Only frame effect when knowledge is high (Nelson, Oxley et al., 
1997) 





− No difference in framing effect (for generally unimportant issues) 
between participants judging the issue as personally important or 
unimportant (Lecheler et al., 2009) 
Partisanship − Only frame effect when frame content matches issue position of 
preferred party (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001) 
− No frame effect when content matches issue position of preferred 
party A, but frame effect when preferring party B and frame 
content matches issue position of this party (Bechtel et al., 2015) 
Political values − See Table 4 in Subchapter 2.5.4 
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Table 3. Summary of empirical results for contextual moderators of emphasis framing 
effects on citizens’ issue attitude (for frame exposure at t1) 
Moderator Result(s) (with reference) 
Issues and cues  
Issue importance 
(on aggregate) 
− No frame effect when issue is important in society, but frame 
effect when issue is less important (Lecheler et al., 2009) 
Group cues − Only frame effect when framed issue deals with specific 
stereotyped groups (Igartua & Cheng, 2009) 
− Frame effect independent of which stereotyped group is 
mentioned in the framed issue (Igartua et al., 2011) 





− No influence of partisan source cue on insignificant frame effect 
(Bechtel et al., 2015) 
− When one-sided framing, only frame effect when partisan source 
cue matches individuals’ party identification + when competitive 
framing, no frame effect regardless of match between party cue 
and identification (Hartman & Weber, 2009) 
− When consensus issue, frame effect stronger when partisan 
source cue matches individuals’ party identification + when 
conflicting issue, only frame effect when partisan source cue 
matches party identification (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010) 
− When no party cues, strong frames effective independent of 
individuals’ party identification despite simultaneous presentation 
of weak counter-frames, while no effects of equally strong/weak 
frames + when party cues, strong frames effective independent of 
party identification despite weak counter-frames, while effects of 
equally strong/weak frames only for frame offered by preferred 
party + when party cues and party polarization suggested, no 
general frame effects but only for frames offered by preferred 
party regardless of frame strength (Druckman et al., 2013) 





− Effect of one-sided frames, but no frame effect when competing 
frames (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Hartman & Weber, 2009) 
− Effect of one-sided frames, but no or less pronounced effect 
when competing frames (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) 
− No effect of one-sided frames, but when competition and open-






− Compared to equally strong emphasis on two competing frames, 
no effect of moderately one-sided frames, but effect of clearly 
one-sided frames (Tewksbury et al., 2000) 
− Strong frames always effective regardless of whether presented 
without competition or with strong and/or weak counter-frames 
+ weak frames ineffective + strong frames with weak counter-
frames boosts effect of strong frames + (unequal) repetition of 
frames rather ineffective (Chong & Druckman, 2007a) 
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Based on the results of the moderating influences, it can be concluded that the 
occurrence of emphasis framing effects tends to be more complicated than suggested by 
the initial studies on simple emphasis framing effects (see Chapter 2.2). Therefore, these 
results demand an adjusted assessment of the implication of emphasis framing effects for 
citizens’ rationality in attitude formation. In fact, emphasis framing effects do not work 
uniformly for all citizens. When an emphasis frame starkly contrasts a person’s political 
partisanship, political orientation, or prior attitudes, the resulting effect is often lower or 
non-existent compared to the stronger effects of frames that match citizens’ political 
predisposition. 
As outlined in Subchapter 2.2.2, rationality in attitude formation can be defined as 
the stability of preferences that should remain unchanged as long as substantive thematic 
information remains unchanged (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Thus, the effects of frames 
that match citizens’ political preferences can be interpreted as a reinforcement of prior 
preferences and therefore, as a form of the rational stability of preferences. That is, at least 
such emphasis framing effects do not indicate that citizens’ attitude formation takes place 
irrationally under framing conditions. For instance, a voter for the Democrats will rather 
unlikely be influenced by a civil rights emphasis frame that opts against regulating the 
possession of guns, as this frame does not fit the general policy of the Democratic Party 
regarding this issue. 
However, it is also too easy to judge emphasis framing effects as entirely rational. In 
fact, the attitude of the same type of person can differ significantly when there is a matching 
emphasis frame in comparison to the exposure of the same type of person to an 
oppositional counter-frame or to no explicit frame. That is, different emphasis frames still 
lead to different issue attitudes for the same type of person, violating the idea of rationality 
as the stability of an attitude that should not alter based on simple changes in the frame. 
However, it seems that this violation mostly takes place in a direction aligned with citizens’ 
political predisposition, but is less pronounced in the opposite direction, i.e., in the form of 
effects of non-matching emphasis frames. 
Furthermore, citizens do not blindly follow any emphasis frame. Inherently less 
compelling frames are rather ineffective in attitude formation, whereas only compelling and 
applicable frames can influence citizens’ issue attitudes. Moreover, when frames are 
compelling, they may even affect citizens with non-matching predispositions. This means 
that strong frames are not only capable of reinforcing existing predispositions, but the 
quality of the frame can form attitudes that overcome the biases of prior political attitudes. 
Thus, it seems that citizens mostly react rather rationally to emphasis frames and seem to 
consciously weight the quality of frames. Again, this does not speak for strong threats of 
rational attitude formation owing to emphasis framing. 
Most important, studies suggest that the simultaneous presentation of competing 
frames prevents irrationality in attitude formation. When competing emphasis frames are 
equally strong, frame effects are rarely evident, and when one frame is stronger than the 
competing one, citizens tend to follow the more compelling frame in a rational manner. If 
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there are unsubstantiated shifts in attitudes due to emphasis framing, then these shifts occur 
mainly in one-sided situations or because of additional factors not directly related to 
framing, such as polarized party cues. 
In sum, the persuasive power of emphasis frames is often limited to compelling one-
sided emphasis frames that must match citizens’ political predispositions and be provided 
by credible sources to affect citizens’ issue attitudes. Therefore, the preliminary conclusion 
based on the empirical results on simple emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.2.2) 
must be adjusted. Emphasis framing effects are often limited in their strength and 
conditioned by various individual and contextual moderators. If at all, emphasis frames 
pose a risk to rational attitude formation when presented in one-sided situations. Such 
situations are rather rare in democratic public spheres, in which various frames for an issue 
compete for attention. However, even in such one-sided situations, it seems more likely 
that those frames are effective that reinforce preexisting preferences, rather than the ones 
that offer issue interpretations that contrast prior political preferences. This implies that 
irrational preference violations can occur because of emphasis framing, but rather rarely. 
The role of prior preferences in the strength of emphasis framing effects is explored 
in more detail in the next Chapter 2.5 by examining citizens’ political value preferences 
and how they interact with value emphasis frames that employ political values to construct 
the meaning of political issues and events. Value emphasis framing is a very prominent type 
of emphasis framing employed by political actors (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010⁠; Z. Pan 
& Kosicki, 2001) and news media (B. T. Scheufele & Engelmann, 2013), and expected to 
exert relatively strong attitudinal effects (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Schemer et al., 2012⁠; 
Shen & Edwards, 2005). Thus, political values deserve particular attention when assessing 
the strength of emphasis framing effects. 
2.5 Role of political values in emphasis framing effects 
2.5.1 Defining political values and the general influence of citizens’ value 
preferences on attitude formation 
In research on emphasis framing effects, political values have a prominent role in both, the 
construction of emphasis frames by political actors and the news media (Ball-Rokeach, 
Power, Guthrie, & Waring, 1990⁠; Brewer & Gross, 2005 ⁠; B. T. Scheufele & Engelmann, 
2013), and in the explanation of framing effects on citizens who employ such values to 
interpret political issues (A. C. Andrews et al., 2017⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005). Thus, this 
chapter defines the concepts of political values and political value preferences, and explains 
how these values influence citizens’ attitude in general (see Subchapter 2.5.1). It also 
describes how political actors employ political values in their framing of issues and the 
attitudinal effect on citizens after exposure to such value frames (see Subchapter 2.5.2). 
Whether and how citizens’ political value preferences moderate the effects of value 
emphasis framing are then explored (see Subchapter 2.5.3). Finally, citizens’ rationality in 
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attitude formation considering the role of political value preferences is elaborated (see 
Subchapter 2.5.4). 
 
Definition of basic human values 
As political values can be understood as a subtype of basic human values (Piurko, Schwartz, 
& Davidov, 2011⁠; Schwartz et al., 2010⁠; Schwartz et al., 2014), these basic values must be 
defined before defining political values. Basic values describe superordinate beliefs about 
what is important in life (Schwartz, 2012). They refer to what a person judges as desirable 
terminal goals or end states of human behavior, and to desirable instrumental means to 
achieve these goals (Rokeach, 1973⁠; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). A person’s basic 
values transcend specific situations and thus, are rather stable preferences of what is 
evaluated as important in how to act in life (Schwartz, 1992). That is, basic values serve as 
standards or criteria (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1994) by which persons decide what is “good 
or bad, justified or illegitimate, [or] worth doing or avoiding” (Schwartz, 2012, p. 4). 
People do not hold only one basic value but various values (Rokeach & Ball-
Rokeach, 1989). Nevertheless, persons attach different importance to different values and 
thus, have a hierarchical order of their values (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989⁠; Schwartz, 
1992). However, this value hierarchy does not necessarily mean that a person dislikes or 
opposes values not on top of their individual hierarchy, but that there are less important 
criteria of evaluation than the values considered more important in a person’s individual 
value hierarchy (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1994). For instance, even if a person prefers the 
basic value of achievement, i.e., personal success, to the value of benevolence, i.e., helping 
others, this does not mean this person entirely rejects the importance of helping others. 
However, in case of doubt, the person will better evaluate actions and events that help 
achieve personal success than those more strongly connected to helping others. 
According to Schwartz (2012), ten different basic values located on two dimensions 
can be differentiated: self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and conservation vs. 
openness to change (also see Schwartz, 1992). Values of self-transcendence are universalism 
and benevolence, i.e., the goal of protecting the welfare of all people and nature 
(universalism) or merely of one’s in-group (benevolence). In contrast, the basic values of 
power, achievement, and hedonism relate to goals of self-enhancement. Preferring these 
values implies attributing importance to social status and dominance over people (power), 
to personal success and competence (achievement), and to pleasure for oneself (hedonism) 
in life. With the values of self-direction and stimulation, hedonism also relates to openness 
to change. These values highlight the relevance of independence and autonomy (self-
direction), and of excitement and new challenges (stimulation). Opposite to openness to 
change, security, conformity, and tradition are located as basic values of conservation. 
People who prefer conservation values favor the safety and stability of society and 
relationships (security), respect and commit to traditional ideas of culture or religion 
(tradition), and inhibit inclinations that could harm others or violate social norms 
(conformity). 
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Intra-individually, the importance attached to these basic human values are rather 
stable (Vecchione et al., 2016), although they differ considerably between individuals in 
terms of relevance (Schwartz, 2012). Some individuals prefer hedonism across situations 
and time, while others adhere to the value of conformity in a stable way. Moreover, while 
the general structure of these ten values seems to apply across different cultures, differences 
do exist in the relevance of certain values in different cultures (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & 
Luke, 2006⁠; Schwartz, 1992), although there does seem to be a “pan-cultural baseline of 
value priorities” (Schwartz, 2012, p. 14), and the values of self-direction, benevolence, and 
universalism are most important in most countries. However, despite the intra-individual 
stability of value preferences and the influence of culture on these values, aggregated value 
preferences in a certain society can change over time, rather slowly and not necessarily 
linearly, but in pendulum movements (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). For example, 
sociologists have observed that the universalistic value of egalitarianism increased in 
importance in American society, but with several backward movements in this increase over 
several decades (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). 
 
Definition of political values and their general role in citizens’ attitude formation 
While basic human values refer to all aspects in life, from the relevance of personal needs 
over various levels of the importance of relations with others and societal norms to the 
(un-)importance of welfare for all people and nature, political values are stable and superordinate 
conceptions of desirable or undesirable means and goals that relate more exclusively to the fields of politics, 
society, and public affairs (Goren, 2005 ⁠; Jacoby, 2006). Like basic human values, citizens adhere 
to political values such as liberty, equality, economic security, or social order to varying 
degrees and thus, citizens possess an individual hierarchy of political values and prefer 
certain political values over others (Jacoby, 2006). That is, citizens show rather stable political 
value preferences. 
However, again, this does not necessarily mean they oppose political values that are 
not on top of their individual value hierarchy. Empirical results have revealed that citizens 
also demonstrate a certain degree of ambivalence between different political values 
(Feldman & Zaller, 1992), implying that they recognize the relevance of values that are not 
their most preferred values, which can sometimes even reduce the certainty with which they 
hold specific political attitudes (Tetlock, 1986). For instance, even if a person prefers the 
political value of civil rights to security, it will be difficult for that person to ignore security 
as another relevant political goal that is (also but somewhat less) important to achieve. 
Likewise, when a person favors economic stability over the protection of the environment, 
environmental values will likely be recognized as important, but simply less important than 
economic stability. 
The sum of political value preferences, i.e., the entire political value hierarchy of a 
person, can be understood as its political ideology, which is located on a more abstract level 
than political values (Goren, 2005 ⁠; Hitlin & Pinkston, 2013 ⁠; Maio et al., 2006). Political 
ideologies as guiding principles by which to interpret the social and political world (Jost, 
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Federico, & Napier, 2009) consist of a person’s stance on several political values and are 
thus multidimensional (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). For instance, Jacoby (2014) showed 
that conservatives, moderates, and liberals, i.e., groups with different political ideologies in 
the US, differ substantially regarding their political value preferences for morality, social 
order, patriotism, economic security, equality, freedom, and individualism. Moreover, 
within these different ideologies, political value preferences are distributed rather equally 
across different levels of income (Ciuk et al., 2017). That is, political ideology explains 
political value preferences equally strongly for citizens with different incomes, i.e., these 
value preferences are not simply the result of a person’s income level. 
In turn, political values such as the preferences for economic-individualism, civil 
rights, or egalitarianism influence more specific political attitudes located at the least 
abstract level (Hitlin & Pinkston, 2013 ⁠; Maio et al., 2006). Citizens can potentially possess 
“as many attitudes as there are objects in the world” (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1994, p. 13), 
while the number of political values citizens use to form these attitudes is limited. That is, 
citizens employ their stance on certain political values to interpret specific political issues, 
policies, and events. These values provide guidance for judging certain political questions 
as good or bad or as right or wrong in relation to these values and thus, political values can 
serve as meaningful criteria of evaluation for complex and specific political questions. For 
instance, Feldman (1988) showed that the political core values of equality of opportunity, 
economic-individualism, and free enterprise explained citizens’ specific attitudes on 11 of 
the 14 most important political issues in the US during field time. Likewise, Conover and 
Feldman (1984) found that interpersonal-religious, individualistic-materialistic, non-
materialistic-societal, and personalistic-conduct values explained citizens’ issue position on 
10 of 11 political topics. That is, political values function as an important standard of 
reference in interpreting the political world and guide the formation of specific political 
attitudes. 
However, in addition to political values directly related to politics, basic human 
values also explain political issue attitudes. For example, Goren, Schoen, Reifler, Scotto, 
and Chittick (2016) revealed that basic values of self-transcendence (universalism and 
benevolence) and of conservation (security, conformity, and tradition) predicted citizens’ 
attitudes for economic welfare issues, racial issues, cultural issues, foreign policy, and 
unilateralism. Likewise, Schwartz et al. (2010) showed that basic human values explained 
political values (law and order, traditional morality, equality, free enterprise, civil liberties, 
blind patriotism) that then influenced citizens’ attitudes and voting behavior. 
Moreover, the relevance of citizens’ political value preferences in the formation of 
specific political attitudes seems rather independent of their political knowledge (Feldman 
& Zaller, 1992 ⁠; Goren, 2001) and economic situation (Ciuk et al., 2017). That is, political 
values seem to serve different individuals equally strongly in terms of attitude formation. 
For example, Ciuk et al. (2017) analyzed whether citizens’ income level moderated the 
relationship between citizens’ preference for the values of equality, moral tradition, and 
economic security and their support for president Obama. They found that a value 
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preference for equality and economic security increased support for Obama, while a 
preference for moral traditionalism decreased support. These relationships did not differ 
substantially across income levels. 
Furthermore, Goren (2001) showed that citizens’ stance on the political values of 
economic-individualism and equal opportunity predicted their specific attitudes on social 
welfare and that political expertise did not condition these relationships. Likewise, the 
author found that varying preferences for the political values egalitarianism and moral 
conservatism explained citizens’ attitudes toward anti-discrimination policies across 
different levels of political knowledge. That is, political values are meaningful standards of 
evaluation for politically knowledgeable citizens, but those with less political knowledge 
also employ their political core values to judge specific political issues and policies. 
However, other studies revealed that lower political knowledge can sometimes 
reduce the relevance of political value preferences in the formation of single political 
attitudes, which can happen when people who are less politically aware simply do not know 
that forming a certain attitude counters their value preferences (Jacoby, 2006). Here, the 
role of news media comes into play in terms of explaining to citizens the meaning of specific 
issues and issue positions for their political values. For example, Brewer (2003) showed that 
citizens employed their stance on egalitarianism to form an issue attitude on gay rights 
regardless of whether they were generally politically aware or not, because the news media 
extensively covered the perspective of egalitarianism when reporting on the issue. However, 
for political values with less news media coverage on the topic, the relationship between 
these values and citizens’ issue attitude was more pronounced for those with higher political 
knowledge. In contrast, citizens with less knowledge established a weaker connection 
between these political values and their attitude toward the topic. 
While the literature is rather clear about the function of political values as important 
evaluation criteria for citizens to form specific political attitudes, it is rather equivocal about 
the question of which political values are most important and actually employed by citizens 
in attitude formation. Basic human values can be located in a theoretically meaningful 
manner on different dimensions, and the quantity of and relation between different human 
values is well established (cf. Schwartz, 1992, 2012, see also above). However, many 
different enumerations of political values exist that are not well connected to each other. 
Instead, nearly all studies on citizens’ political value preferences propose different political 
values important to examine. It is not the aim of this book to solve this theoretical 
desideratum by differentiating various political values, as this task goes far beyond the 
question of value emphasis framing effects. Nevertheless, it is important to briefly overview 
the different political values proposed as relevant in the literature, as this also reveals the 
many different values political actors can employ in their emphasis frames to construct the 
meaning of an issue or event, which often represent central political cleavages in societies 
(cf. Kriesi, 2010). 
Authors have proposed additional political values other than those already 
mentioned. For example, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) contended that 
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humanitarianism is an important value to explain attitudes on social welfare (see also K. J. 
Hansen, 2019⁠; Steenbergen, 1996). Likewise, Calzada, Gomez-Garrido, Moreno, and 
Moreno-Fuentes (2014) showed that political values such as multiculturalism, 
egalitarianism, authoritarianism, gender traditionalism, and meritocratic values “lie at the 
roots of welfare attitudes” (p. 178) in 26 European countries. In their study, egalitarianism 
was the most important predictor for social welfare attitudes in the countries analyzed. 
Other relevant political values mentioned in the literature are equal opportunity, traditional 
family values, limited government, moral tolerance (all Goren, 2005), protestant ethics of 
individualism and meritocracy (Katz & Hass, 1988), right neo-liberalism vs. left neo-
Keynesianism (Schmidt, 2014), materialism vs. post-materialism (Inglehart & Abramson, 
1994⁠; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), green/alternative/libertarian vs. 
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist political values (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002), 
integration vs. demarcation (Kriesi et al., 2006), or libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian values (Bornschier, 2010). Clearly, a wide range of political values can guide 
citizens’ attitude formation for nearly any specific political issue or event. 
 
Summary 
To sum up, in this subchapter political values were defined as a subtype of basic human 
values that describe stable and superordinate conceptions of desirable or undesirable means 
and goals relating to the field of politics, society, and public affairs. Citizens adhere to 
political values to varying degrees and hierarchically structure their political value 
preferences. This general preference structure consisting of different political values can be 
understood as a person’s political ideology, which is located at the most abstract level. 
Political values serve citizens as criteria of evaluation for more specific political issues or 
events located at the least abstract level and thus, political values play an important role in 
citizens’ political attitude formation. Next, Subchapter 2.5.2 describes why and how 
political actors employ political values when constructing emphasis frames, provides 
examples of value emphasis frames in news coverage, and presents empirical findings on 
the general attitudinal effects of value emphasis frames. 
2.5.2 Value emphasis frames and empirical results for their general 
attitudinal effects 
Value framing by political actors and value emphasis frames in news coverage 
When political actors think about their communication strategies to gain public legitimacy 
for their political ideas and issue positions, they must make several choices. Besides the 
question of which audience should be addressed via which channel, the most important 
choice concerns the message itself (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012). According to Hänggli and 
Kriesi (2010), political actors face at least three important decisions regarding the selection 
of the message(s) they want to disseminate. First, they must choose which and how many 
substantive frames to present for their issue position (“substantive emphasis choice”). 
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Often, political actors limit their selection to only one substantive frame they believe to be 
compelling, as they do not want to risk confusing their audience with too many different 
frames for the same topic (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012). Second, political actors must decide 
whether to pay attention to their political competitors’ opposing frames (“oppositional 
emphasis choice”). Empirically, it seems they pay some attention to opposing frames, 
especially to attack them, but more often, political actors focus on their own frames 
(Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010⁠, 2012). Last, political actors must determine the degree to which 
they focus on the contest between different political actors (“contest emphasis choice”), 
i.e., how much they want to focus on the game of politics other than presenting their (own 
or opposing) substantive emphasis frames. 
Political values play an important role in the substantive emphasis choice. As 
political actors aim to limit their framing to one frame, this frame needs to be very 
compelling. To achieve this, reference to political values can be highly beneficial for – at 
least – three reasons. First, using political values to frame an issue can reduce complexity 
and can eliminate conflict between differently valenced considerations of an issue (Nelson, 
2004). By employing political values, a political actor can reduce issues to an easy decision. 
For instance, telling citizens that being in favor of anti-terrorist surveillance measures means 
being in favor of national security reduces the topic to the very easy question of whether 
one is in favor of or against national security. Certainly, making this decision is less complex 
for citizens than deciding about the details of the surveillance measure, such as at which 
exact point of threat to security a judge should decide on whether a certain phone-tapping 
is appropriate. 
Second, citizens already know political values and thus, do not need much explanation. 
That is, using political values to frame issues makes the issues easy to understand. Put 
differently, political values are cognitively available and easily accessible considerations, 
which are two important preconditions for the effectiveness of emphasis frames (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007b, also see Subchapter 2.3.1). 
Third, political values are highly applicable, which is the third necessary condition 
for emphasis framing effects (again, see Subchapter 2.3.1). This is because such values 
contain high cultural resonance and most citizens agree on their relevance as criteria of 
evaluation (Entman, 2004 ⁠; Z. Pan & Kosicki, 2001). That is, frames that use political values 
are not easily declinable, even though they might not be at the top of an individual’s value 
hierarchy. Probably, not many people consider security a completely unimportant criterion 
to evaluate an issue or consider freedom an entirely unnecessary goal for political decisions. 
In other words, most political values “are widely cherished among the public” (Brewer 
& Gross, 2005, p. 929), and employing such values for the emphasis framing of specific 
political topics can render such frames highly effective in influencing citizens’ issue attitudes 
than more issue-specific frames that only emphasize a highly specific aspect of an issue. 
Therefore, political values are “powerful and reliable weapons in the persuader’s arsenal” 
(Nelson & Garst, 2005, p. 490) and thus, often used by political actors in their framing 
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behavior (Brewer & Gross, 2005). Formulated differently, these actors often offer value 
emphasis frames to their audience. 
However, value emphasis frames do not only exist in the strategic communication 
of political actors, but also in news media coverage (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990). On one 
hand, this is because news media rely on the strategic communication of political actors 
when covering political events. On the other, journalists are also proactive actors in the 
framing of political issues (see Brüggemann, 2014 for the differentiation of the role of 
journalists in “frame sending” and “frame setting”). Like ordinary citizens, journalists rely 
on political values when interpreting issues and employ value frames in their coverage 
because such frames “are powerful and efficient tools for the organization and symbolic 
construction of the meaning of issues and events” (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1990, p. 256). 
Moreover, value frames help journalists explain in a brief and understandable way what an 
issue is about, which is particularly important given the space and time constraints of 
journalists in their daily work (Hoffman & Slater, 2007). 
Many studies have analyzed the occurrence of value emphasis frames in news 
coverage revealing that such frames are rather often presented. For example, Ball-Rokeach 
et al. (1990) investigated issue framing by the US media of abortion, finding that the often-
employed “pro-choice” frame connected the issue with the values of equality and freedom, 
whereas the other relevant frame (“pro-life”) used the values of salvation, obedience, and 
family security to construct the meaning of abortion. In a quantitative content analysis of 
news magazine coverage between 1950 and 1992, Kellstedt (2000) examined how often the 
media’s framing of affirmative action for discriminated ethnic groups employed references 
to the political values of egalitarianism and individualism. The results showed that the value 
emphasis frame dealing with egalitarianism was more prominent until the mid-70s, after 
which the individualism frame increased in importance and was covered as often as 
egalitarianism. 
Another quantitative content analysis dealt with news coverage on gay marriage, 
showing that the emphasis framing of conservative and liberal newspapers relied on 
different political values (P.-L. Pan, Meng, & Zhou, 2010). Conservative newspapers 
framed the issue mostly around morality and family values, whereas liberal outlets focused 
their framing on the political value of equality. B. T. Scheufele and Engelmann (2013) 
employed a slightly different angle on value frames in news coverage by analyzing not the 
media’s framing of issues, but how the news media in their news coverage related the two 
major German political parties and their party leaders to 20 different political values. In 
doing so, the authors differentiated between left values (e.g., equality, solidarity, pacifism, 
environmentalism, multiculturalism) and right values (e.g., freedom, security, neo-
liberalism, economic growth, Christian morality). The results indicated that news media 
related the mid-right party Christian Democratic Union (CDU) correctly to right political 
values and the mid-left Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) correctly to left values. 
Moreover, media outlets with different editorial lines were equally correct in relating parties 
to respective political values. This means that the value framing of the German media 
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appropriately located the political parties in the political space, which may help citizens 
decide which party best represents their political value preferences. 
 Schemer et al. (2012) performed another quantitative content analysis to detect value 
emphasis frames in news coverage on a referendum campaign in Switzerland, dealing with 
a political initiative concerning immigration. The initiative asked Swiss citizens whether the 
naturalization of individual immigrants should be based on the decision of popular votes 
in the municipalities, i.e., in the form of a direct democratic decision by the local population, 
or based on the decision of courts, which would give individual immigrants the right to sue 
an appeal process if their naturalization application is rejected. 
The authors found three relevant emphasis frames regarding this issue in the news 
coverage. Two frames were in favor of popular votes on naturalization (pro frames: “people 
final say” and “mass naturalization”), which “clearly address[ed] values of traditionalism, 
social dominance, and security” (Schemer et al., 2012, p. 339). A third frame, called “rule 
of law,” was against the popular vote but favored the decision of naturalization by courts. 
This con frame also employed references to political values such as egalitarianism and 
human rights. In sum, the two pro value frames together and the con value frame were 
nearly equally often present in news media reporting. Schemer et al. (2012) also analyzed 
the effects of citizens’ exposure to these frames by employing a linkage analysis. However, 
the authors did not only focus on the main effects of exposure to these value emphasis 
frames, but also on the moderation of these effects by citizens’ political value preferences. 
Thus, the results of this study regarding moderated value emphasis framing effects are 
described later (see Subchapter 2.5.3). Before that, it is necessary to present some empirical 
findings on the general effects of value emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude. 
 
Empirical results on the general effects of value emphasis frames on citizens’ issue 
attitudes 
Given that political actors employ value emphasis frames in their strategic communication, 
and the media cover these frames in their coverage and present their own value emphasis 
frames for political issues, studies have also investigated the general effects of citizens’ 
exposure to value emphasis frames. Like in the chapters before, the discussion of studies 
on value emphasis framing effects is limited in the following to those that examined citizens’ 
issue attitude at a single point in time as the central dependent variable. However, note that 
effects of value emphasis frames have also been found on other variables such as citizens’ 
use of value-laden language when explaining their issue position (Brewer, 2002⁠; Brewer 
& Gross, 2005), citizens’ issue interpretations (Domke et al., 1998 ⁠; Shah et al., 1996), their 
decision strategies for choosing a political candidate (Barker, 2005 ⁠; Domke et al., 1998 ⁠; 
Shah et al., 1996), relating politicians and parties to certain political values (B. T. Scheufele, 
2010⁠; B. T. Scheufele et al., 2012), and recommending certain parties to friends based on 
framed political values (B. T. Scheufele et al., 2012). 
While the aforementioned studies on other dependent variables explicitly employed 
the label “value frame” for the frames in their experimental studies, some of the research 
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on emphasis framing effects discussed in preceding chapters also used political values to 
construct their framing stimuli, but did not explicitly label them as value emphasis frame. 
That is, implicitly, the chapters before provided already some evidence of the effectiveness 
of value emphasis frames, which is now described here more explicitly as the main effects 
of value emphasis frames. Thereafter, the next Subchapter 2.5.3 discusses studies on 
moderated value emphasis framing effects. However, some of the studies on the main 
effects of emphasis frames introduced before noted at least that they employed political 
values when constructing their frames (Druckman, 2001b⁠; Nelson, 2004⁠; Nelson, Clawson 
et al., 1997⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999), while others did not refer to political values at all, even 
though the frames employed in the experiments clearly used political values (Bechtel et al., 
2015⁠; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001 ⁠; Nisbet et al., 2013). 
For instance, the three experiments in the study by Nelson (2004) reviewed in 
Subchapter 2.2.1 demonstrated clear main effects of value emphasis frames on citizens’ 
issue attitudes. The first experiment employed frames highlighting the political value of civil 
rights either for children or parents, which produced significantly different issue attitudes. 
The frames in the second experiment on affirmative action referred either to the value of 
meritocracy (the “excellence frame”) or to the value of egalitarianism (the “opportunity 
frame”), also influencing citizens’ attitudes. In the third experiment, emphasis frames were 
constructed around political values by focusing either on neo-liberal values of market 
competition in the “school quality” frame or on the value of secularism in the “church-
state” frame, which, again, led to different attitudes depending on exposure to one of these 
frames. 
The study by Druckman (2001b), mentioned in Subchapter 2.4.2, also implicitly 
provided evidence for value emphasis framing effects in two different experiments when 
the frames were presented by credible sources. In the first experiment on government’s 
spending on the poor, participants received either a frame highlighting the political value 
of humanitarianism or an “expenditures” frame that employed the political value of limited 
government (cf. Goren, 2005), which significantly affected citizens’ issue attitude. The 
frames in the second experiment also demonstrated a main effect on issue attitude when 
presented by a credible source. Both frames dealt with a planned rally of an extremist 
political group, but employed either the political value of civil rights or the value of public 
safety. The second experiment simultaneously replicated the study by Nelson, Clawson et 
al. (1997), who also found significantly different attitudes toward such rallies when 
employing one of these competing value emphasis frames (see Subchapter 2.2.1). 
Furthermore, the value emphasis frames civil rights and public safety were also 
investigated in an experiment by Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001), presented in 
Subchapter 2.4.1. The results of this study provide evidence for the effectiveness of value 
frames, as citizens formed significantly different attitudes toward a new handgun law based 
on exposure to different frames. Moreover, the effects of value emphasis frames have been 
implicitly confirmed in the two experiments by Nelson and Oxley (1999) (see Subchapter 
2.2.1). The first experiment on a land development project framed this issue either as a 
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question of economic growth or environmentalism, both fundamental political values. 
Again, citizens formed significantly different issue attitudes depending on frame exposure. 
This was also the case in the second experiment dealing with social welfare for young 
mothers. Here, the frames “threat to children” and “personal responsibility” clearly 
mirrored the competing political values of humanitarianism and economic-individualism. 
However, other studies that implicitly employed political values in their framing 
experiments found no main effects of value emphasis frames. For example, the experiment 
by Bechtel et al. (2015) already described in Subchapter 2.4.1 did not find different issue 
attitudes depending on different framing conditions, even though the frames employed 
referred to political values. The authors framed the issue of the deportation of criminal 
foreigners using either the political value of humanitarianism or public safety. Likewise, 
Nisbet et al. (2013) did not find main effects of their frames on climate change mitigation 
policies that mirrored the classic political values of environmentalism, national security, and 
economic growth (see Subchapter 2.4.1). 
Other than these studies working rather implicitly with political value frames, studies 
explicitly investigating the simple main effects of value emphasis frames on citizens’ issue 
attitudes are rare (but see next Subchapter 2.5.3 for an explicit examination of value 
emphasis framing effects moderated by citizens’ political value preferences). It seems that 
only the study by B. T. Scheufele and Gasteiger (2007) explicitly employed value emphasis 
frames and measured their main effects on issue attitude. The authors conducted a two-
factorial experiment on a fictive military intervention of the German army in a fictive 
African country in the midst of a civil war. As dependent variables, participants reported 
their attitude toward this intervention and their emotions. The first factor manipulated the 
textual value framing of a news article respondents were asked to read. One frame employed 
the political value of humanitarianism and emphasized the importance of a military 
intervention by the German army in liberating the civilian population from the war between 
different local conflict parties. The other frame focused on the military intervention as a 
political-military strategy to force the conflict parties into political negotiations. As a second 
factor, B. T. Scheufele and Gasteiger (2007) manipulated a picture in the news article that 
mirrored the two different textual value frames by displaying either children as victims 
(corresponding with the value frame of humanitarianism) or armed rebels (relating to the 
political-military frame). 
For the elicited emotions, the authors found mainly textual value framing effects. 
For instance, exposure to the humanitarian frame increased participants’ compassion and 
solidarity with the civilian victims and their contempt for the conflict parties. Regarding 
respondents’ attitude toward a military intervention by the German army, the results 
indicated two independent main effects of both the textual value framing and the visual 
framing of these values. Specifically, participants supported an intervention significantly 
more strongly when exposed to the humanitarian frame than when exposed to the political-
military frame, and more strongly when they saw the picture with children as victims than 
the visual with armed rebels. That is, value emphasis frames affected citizens’ attitude 
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formation as the authors expected, adding further evidence of the main effects of value 
emphasis frames on issue attitudes. 
 
Summary 
This subchapter showed that political actors and the news media often employ value 
emphasis frames to construct the meaning of political issues and events. Drawing on 
political values has the advantage that the resulting value emphasis frames are based on 
available, accessible, and applicable criteria of evaluation that are culturally shared. Thus, 
the audience cannot easily ignore such frames as important issue perspectives, even if the 
political value employed by an emphasis frame is not at the top of a person’s individual 
value hierarchy. Consequently, empirical studies have revealed that value emphasis frames 
exert main effects on citizens’ issue attitudes. That is, value emphasis frames seem to be the 
“powerful and reliable weapons in the persuader’s arsenal” (Nelson & Garst, 2005, p. 490) 
contended in the theory, at least in one-sided situations in which only one value emphasis 
frame is present. However, it is not yet clear whether the revealed main effects are actually 
the result of affecting all citizens equally regardless of their political value preferences or 
whether the main effects originate merely from the effects on citizens whose political value 
preferences match the political value in an emphasis frame. Thus, the next Subchapter 
2.5.3 presents studies that investigated whether value emphasis framing effects are 
moderated by citizens’ political value preferences or not. 
2.5.3 Empirical results on the moderation of value emphasis framing effects 
by citizens’ political value preferences 
The empirical results discussed in Subchapter 2.5.2 before suggest that value emphasis 
frames can effectively influence citizens’ issue attitudes. However, Subchapter 2.4.1 
already revealed that many emphasis framing effects are moderated by individual-level 
moderators and thus, such effect are less total for different citizens than a simple look at 
main effects suggests. Therefore, this subchapter presents empirical results on moderated 
(value) emphasis framing effects by exploring citizens’ political value preferences as an 
individual-level moderator to assess how total such effects are for citizens with different 
strengths of adherence to the political values employed by value emphasis frames. As in the 
chapters before, the discussion is limited to studies that investigated framing effects on 
citizens’ issue attitude at a single point in time. 
 
Value strength as a moderator 
Before exploring the moderating influence of concrete preferences for single political 
values, the more abstract level of the general moderating influence of citizens’ political value 
strength is discussed. Value strength describes how important citizens judge their political 
value preferences regardless of the direction of these preferences (Beattie & Milojevich, 
2017⁠; Slothuus, 2008). For instance, some persons might strongly favor public order over 
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civil rights, and this specific preference is highly important to them. Others might strongly 
prefer civil rights to public order, and consider this preference highly relevant. Even though 
the quality of persons’ preference differs and points in opposing directions, both groups 
are subsumed to have high value strength. In contrast, a third group of persons might hold 
only weak values, as they are less clear about their preference regarding competing values 
and this less clear preference is less important to them. 
Theoretically, citizens possessing weaker values should be more susceptible to value 
emphasis framing effects (Slothuus, 2008). Because they are less sure about their most 
important political values, they are more likely to follow the guidance offered by a frame 
telling them which relevant political value they should base their specific issue attitude on. 
In contrast, individuals possessing strong values should be less susceptible to emphasis 
framing effects, as they are already clear about their preferred values before frame exposure. 
Thus, to be effective, a value emphasis frame has to change (or reinforce) this already 
established preference, which is rather unlikely given the general stability of strongly held 
value preferences (also see Subchapter 2.5.1). 
 Slothuus (2008) empirically investigated the moderating influence of political value 
strength in his experiment, which was already partly described in Subchapter 2.2.1. About 
two weeks before the experiment, participants rated their preference on egalitarianism, and 
based on this answer, the author divided respondents into groups having strong values 
(participants located at the extremes of the scale) or weak values (respondents located in 
the middle of the scale). During the experiment, all participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental groups or a control group. Under both treatment conditions, 
respondents received a news article about a draft of a new social welfare bill proposed by 
the government. The bill aimed to reduce welfare benefits after the first six months of 
unemployment. The value emphasis frame of this article varied according to the treatment 
condition. One group was exposed to a “job frame” constructed around the political value 
of economic-individualism. The frame emphasized that the bill would function as an 
economic incentive to search for a new job, which would help unemployed citizens re-enter 
the workforce and reclaim their destiny. The other group received a “poor frame,” which 
employed the political value of egalitarianism and highlighted that the bill would be unfair 
and not help reduce unemployment, but increase the number of poor people. 
First, the results revealed a main effect of value emphasis framing. Respondents 
exposed to the job frame favored the implementation of the new bill significantly more 
strongly than those exposed to the poor frame. In addition, both framing groups differed 
significantly from those in the control condition. Second, Slothuus (2008) analyzed whether 
the framing effect worked equally for participants with weak and strong political values. It 
was found that the value emphasis frames exerted clear effects on citizens with weak values, 
but no effects on those with strong political values. That is, the value emphasis framing 
effect was conditioned by value strength and only occurred for participants with rather 
weak and unclear value preferences. 
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 In addition, Beattie and Milojevich (2017) investigated the influence of political value 
strength in their framing experiment dealing with the military conflict between the Ukraine 
and Russian-speaking separatists (also see Subchapter 2.4.1). Again, they first found a main 
effect of value emphasis frames, and three of the four frames changed citizens’ issue 
attitude. The three effective frames were “leftwing-interventionism” constructed around 
the political value of humanitarianism and favoring of foreign military interventions to 
ensure universal values everywhere; “rightwing-isolationism” using the political value of 
economic-individualism, which denied the relevance of helping others and focused on 
strengthening the economy of one’s own countries rather than intervening elsewhere; and 
“rightwing-interventionism,” which also employed economic values but opted to intervene 
in other countries to ensure the dominance of the national economy of one’s own country. 
Then, Beattie and Milojevich (2017) tested whether the strength of attitude change 
through exposure to these frames was more pronounced for citizens with weaker political 
values regarding foreign policy. The results showed that attitude change was somewhat 
stronger for citizens with weak political values, although having strong political values did 
not necessarily inhibit framing effects. Thus, the results of this study corroborate those of 
Slothuus (2008) insofar that possessing strong political values weakens value emphasis 
framing effects, but not in that such frames only work when citizens have only weak 
political values. That is, while value strength is an important moderator for the strength of 
value emphasis framing effects, it is not always a necessary condition for the effectiveness 
of such frames. 
 
Value resonance as a moderator of value emphasis framing effects 
Alongside the dampening effect of political value strength, studies have also examined the 
role of value resonance (Schemer et al., 2012), sometimes referred to as “value match” (e.g., 
Nelson & Garst, 2005), as a moderator of value emphasis framing effects. Citizens do not 
only differ in the strength of their political value preferences, but as shown in Subchapter 
2.5.1, citizens also differ in which political values they prefer over others. Therefore, when 
a value emphasis frame draws on a certain political value and emphasizes its relevance in 
interpreting the issue, this political value can match the political value preference of some 
persons and mismatch that of other persons. In the former case, the emphasis frame is 
value-resonant, and in the latter, it is non-resonant. The key question in assessing the 
strength of value emphasis framing effects (and their implications for rational attitude 
formation, see next Subchapter 2.5.4) is whether the revealed main effects of such frames 
are the result of only affecting those with matching political values or whether the effects 
are so total that even citizens with non-matching value preferences are persuaded by value 
emphasis frames. The former result would indicate that such effects only reinforce 
preexisting values, whereas the later would imply that value emphasis framing effects are 
so strong they can override otherwise highly stable political value preferences. 
According to the theory, value-resonant emphasis frames should tend to be stronger 
than non-resonant frames for at least two reasons. First, value-resonant frames rely on 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 82 
political values that are more chronically accessible to the person, who should have 
employed the contained values more often in the past to interpret specific issues and events 
than non-resonant frames (Shen, 2004a). This higher chronic accessibility should increase 
the likelihood that the value-resonant frame will be activated and then also employed in 
attitude formation in comparisons to a non-resonant frame, which aims to activate less 
chronically accessible considerations (Schemer et al., 2012⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005). 
Second, citizens do not form their attitudes based only on the accessibility of 
considerations, but also based on the perceived applicability of these considerations (see 
Subchapter 2.3.1). Political value preferences likely influence this judgment of applicability, 
as such preferences generally serve as important criteria to evaluate new incoming 
information (Blankenship & Wegener, 2011 ⁠; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Compared to 
a non-resonant frame, if an emphasis frame is value-resonant, the frame should be 
perceived as being aligned with the person’s political values and thus, the applicability of 
the frame should be judged as appropriate in evaluating the political issue framed with this 
political value. This then should increase the likelihood that the person’s attitude follows to 
a greater extent the attitude direction suggested by the valence of the value-resonant frame 
than that of a non-resonant frame (A. C. Andrews et al., 2017⁠; Brewer, 2001). 
However, it is less clear whether non-resonant value emphasis frames that do not 
match a person’s individual political value preference are entirely ineffective or merely less 
effective than value-resonant frames. On one hand, value emphasis frames should be at 
least somewhat culturally resonant (cf. Entman, 1993), as they draw on political values such 
as humanitarianism, safety, or civil rights that are widely known and cherished among the 
public. Thus, even though non-resonant value emphasis frames do not trigger the preferred 
political values at the top of a person’s individual value hierarchy, such non-resonant frames 
still refer to political values that are not easily ignored but contain a certain degree of 
applicability (also see Subchapter 2.5.2 before). Thus, non-resonant frames could be 
influential in affecting citizens’ issue attitudes, although to a lesser extent than value-
resonant emphasis frames. 
On the other hand, it is less likely that a person will form a specific issue attitude 
that contradicts political value preference, as such preferences are very stable (see 
Subchapter 2.5.1) and highly relevant for a person’s political identity (Nelson & Garst, 
2005). Thus, when assuming that citizens form attitudes that do not violate their political 
value preferences, the effects of non-resonant frames should be limited to situations in 
which citizens are unaware that forming an attitude aligned with a non-resonant value 
emphasis frame contradicts their preferred political values. This lower awareness, which 
enables effects of non-resonant frames, should be more pronounced in one-sided situations 
in which only a non-resonant frame is present. 
In contrast, the simultaneous presentation of competing frames with opposing 
valence, including a value-resonant frame, should inhibit the attitudinal effects of non-
resonant frames. This is because such situations should increase a person’s awareness that 
an attitude aligned with the non-resonant frame violates preferred political values. 
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However, thus far, these are theoretical assumptions regarding the different ways citizens’ 
political value preferences moderate the effects of value emphasis frames. Fortunately, 
some studies have empirically investigated these questions. These studies are discussed next 
to determine the exact role of this moderator. 
In their experiment dealing with the issue of social welfare, Shen and Edwards 
(2005) exposed participants to either a “public aid” or “work requirement” value emphasis 
frame. The former was constructed around the political value of humanitarianism and 
emphasized the need to provide financial aid to the poor. The latter frame employed the 
political value of economic-individualism to construct the meaning of social welfare reform 
and emphasized that welfare recipients should be required to work to gain economic 
independence. In addition, the authors measured respondents’ preference for the political 
values of humanitarianism and economic-individualism and computed a median split to 
divide participants having low vs. high preference for humanitarianism and low vs. high 
preference for economic-individualism. 
First, the results demonstrated a main effect of these value emphasis frames on two 
relevant attitudes, namely supporting strict work requirements and supporting public 
assistance for the poor and children. For citizens with different political value preferences, 
participants exposed to the public aid frame were less supportive of strict work 
requirements and more supportive of financial help for the needy. In contrast, respondents 
exposed to the work requirement frame supported stricter work requirements more 
strongly and public aid less strongly. 
Next, Shen and Edwards (2005) tested both dependent variables for whether the 
frame effect interacted with citizens’ political value preference. For the attitude toward 
public aid, no significant interaction was found, implying that the value emphasis framing 
effect was unmoderated by respondents’ preference for the political of value 
humanitarianism. That is, the value emphasis frames affected citizens equally strongly in 
their issue attitude regardless of whether the frame was value-resonant or non-resonant. 
However, for the second dependent variable, attitude toward work requirements, 
the authors found a significant interaction between frames and participants’ preference for 
economic-individualism. A closer look at the simple main effects of the frames by the 
different preferences for economic-individualism revealed that the work requirement frame 
employing the political value of economic-individualism affected citizens with a high 
preference for this value more than did the public aid frame. In contrast, this frame effect 
did not occur for respondents who did not prefer economic-individualism. That is, for the 
second dependent variable, value resonance moderated the effect of the frames. Moreover, 
value resonance was a necessary condition for the emphasis framing effect to occur, as 
there were no effects when the work requirement frame was non-resonant. Based on the 
results for both dependent variables, this study suggests that value resonance can 
sometimes be necessary for value emphasis framing effects, but non-resonant frames can 
sometimes also be equally as effective as value-resonant frames. 
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 Schemer et al. (2012) also analyzed the moderating influence of value resonance in 
their study mentioned in Subchapter 2.5.2. As explained, the authors first conducted a 
quantitative content analysis of news coverage regarding an initiative in Switzerland that 
would allow citizens of the municipalities to decide about the naturalization of individual 
foreigners who could then not sue an appeal process at the courts against the citizens’ direct 
democratic decision. The content analysis revealed three value emphasis frames: two pro 
frames in favor of the initiative (“people final say” and “mass naturalization”) that 
employed the political values of security, social dominance, and traditionalism and one con 
frame (“rule of law”) that referred to the political values of egalitarianism and 
humanitarianism. 
In a linkage analysis using a two-wave panel survey, Schemer et al. (2012) measured 
citizens’ actual exposure to these frames by asking them about their use of specific media 
outlets, and then linking this usage to the (differently framed) news content of these outlets. 
As the central dependent variable, the authors asked citizens for their voting intention on 
the initiative on a five-point Likert scale, and tested how prior exposure to the pro and con 
frames influenced this voting intention. As voting intention was measured as the degree of 
support for the initiative, and the initiative was about a single political issue, the dependent 
variable is treated here as an indicator of citizens’ issue attitude (i.e., support for people’s 
final say on the naturalization of foreigners). In addition, the authors measured 
respondents’ preference for the political value of authoritarianism, which reflects how 
strongly individuals “adhere to traditional values, tend to denigrate out-groups and 
minorities, and are submissive to authority figures” (Schemer et al., 2012, p. 341). 
Starting with the main effects without considering citizens’ political value 
preferences, Schemer et al. (2012) found that only exposure to the con frame rule of law 
significantly influenced participants’ support for the initiative. The more often they were 
exposed to this frame, the more likely they were to demonstrate decreased support for the 
initiative. In contrast, the pro frames did not have an independent main effect on citizens’ 
issue attitude. 
The authors then integrated the interactions between frame exposure and 
respondents’ preference for authoritarianism in the models to test the moderating influence 
of value resonance. They found that the main effect of the value emphasis frame against 
the initiative remained stable and was unmoderated by value (non-)resonance. Regardless 
of citizens’ political value preference for authoritarianism, increased exposure to the con 
frame decreased support for the initiative. However, the effects of exposure to the pro 
frames that constructed the meaning of the issue around the political values of security, 
social dominance, and traditionalism were significantly moderated by participants’ 
preference for authoritarianism. While the pro frames did not affect the issue attitude of 
respondents low on authoritarianism, the pro-frames clearly affected those citizens that 
adhered strongly to the value of authoritarianism. That is, for the pro value emphasis 
frames, value resonance not only moderated the frame effect but value resonance was also 
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a necessary condition for this effect, while the con frame was effective regardless of whether 
this frame was value-resonant or non-resonant. 
A. C. Andrews et al. (2017) also investigated the moderating role of value resonance. 
Unlike previous studies, they examined the effects of value emphasis frames on a specific 
group, namely domain experts more likely to actively process frames and judge the 
applicability thereof based on their political value preferences. In an experimental setting 
with a pre-/posttest design, the authors exposed professional farmers to one of three 
differently framed news articles on no-till farming, i.e., on a “crop-management system in 
which agricultural land is undisturbed between harvest and planting” (A. C. Andrews et al., 
2017, p. 265). This can prevent farming-induced soil erosion and agricultural runoffs that 
would otherwise increase environmental pollution. 
Each frame emphasized the relevance of a different political value. One group 
received a “stewardship” frame that employed the environmental value of biospherism and 
argued that no-till farming increases biodiversity, preserves the long-term productivity of 
the land, and ensures future generations can also later use the land. Another group was 
exposed to the “community” frame, which constructed the meaning of no-till farming 
around the value of environmental altruism, stating that this type of farming reduces 
environmental pollution through which the health of community members could be 
ensured. The third group received a “profit” frame that emphasized the value of economic-
individualism and focused on the positive economic impacts of no-till farming, explaining 
that this approach reduces the costs of machinery, fuel, and labor. After exposure to one 
of these value emphasis frames, the farmers rated their attitude toward no-till farming 
(posttest attitude). 
Directly before participants were exposed to the frames, they responded to this 
measure (pretest attitude) and answered questions regarding their preferences of the three 
political values employed in the emphasis frames. As the analyzed farmers were experts on 
the issue who likely possessed strong prior values, A. C. Andrews et al. (2017) expected that 
only value-resonant frames would affect their issue attitude by reinforcing their initial 
attitude, while non-resonant frames would not only be ineffective but lead to contrast 
effects also reinforcing the initial attitude, despite the opposite valence suggested by the 
non-resonant frame.  
First, the results revealed only marginal attitudinal changes between the pre- and 
posttest for the three frames. As such, the value emphasis frames did not exert a main 
effect. The authors then integrated respondents’ value preferences in the models, which 
resulted in a significant interaction between participants’ values and value frames for at least 
one of the three frames. Specifically, the effectiveness of the community frame, which 
employed the value of environmental altruism, increased the more strongly the farmers 
favored this value. While the effect of the frame was quite strong for those adhering 
strongly to the value emphasized by the frame, the community frame did not increase 
support for farmers who did not favor environmental altruism. Moreover, the authors 
observed a contrast effect for this frame, wherein the support of farmers strongly against 
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the value of environmental altruism decreased for no-till farming when exposed to the 
community frame highlighting this non-resonant value. 
Thus, at least for one of the three frames, value resonance not only moderated the 
effects of value emphasis frames but a lack of value resonance also led to a reversed framing 
effect. In other words, participants’ value preference changed the effect of the frame in the 
direction of this preference regardless of whether the frame suggested this or the opposite. 
Therefore, it seems that value preferences can override the effects of value emphasis 
frames. However, no such effects were evident for the two other frames under 
investigation. Moreover, priming political value preferences by asking them directly before 
the framing experiment likely activated these values in an unrealistically strong way, which 
could explain why following frame exposure was rather ineffective and the influence of 
value preferences very prominent (also see Verplanken & Holland, 2002 for the effects of 
prior value activation on message effects). 
 In addition, Brewer (2001) examined the moderating role of value resonance in an 
experiment with a pre-/posttest design that dealt with social welfare. The author employed 
the same humanitarian political value of compassion to frame a planned social welfare 
reform as either positive or negative (also see Nelson, Lecheler, Schuck, & de Vreese, 2015 
for framing the same value for competing political ends). The pro frame emphasized that 
toughening the welfare system and cutting back financial help for the needy “is ultimately 
the humane thing to do,” whereas the con frame likewise highlighted compassion for the 
needy but highlighted that cutting back social welfare would “take compassion out of social 
policy” (Brewer, 2001, p. 54). Before and after exposure to one of these frames, participants 
rated their issue attitude toward the social welfare reform. They also reported their value 
preference on compassion (i.e., humanitarianism) in the pretest conducted between one 
week and two months before the actual experiment. In the posttest, participants rated how 
compelling (or “strong”) they perceived the value emphasis frame they had read before. 
The results of this experiment again displayed no main effect of value emphasis 
frames and revealed citizens’ prior issue attitude as the most important predictor of their 
posttest attitude. In addition, value resonance alone did not produce significant framing 
effects, and respondents’ issue attitude remained unaffected by the frame regardless of 
whether or not they favored the value of compassion. However, Brewer (2001) did find a 
significant three-way interaction effect between the pro-frame, value preference for 
compassion, and how compelling participants judged the pro frame. Specifically, 
respondents exposed to the pro frame with the value of compassion who considered this 
frame compelling increased their support toward cutting back social welfare when these 
respondents preferred the value of compassion. However, when they judged the pro frame 
as being less compelling, the frame did not increase support for cutting back social welfare, 
regardless of whether the frame was value-resonant or not. That is, value resonance only 
increased the effectiveness of the value emphasis frame when the participants judged the 
use of this value by the frame as appropriate. Put differently, value resonance alone seems 
to be not always sufficient to reinforce framing effects. 
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Another study by Nelson and Garst (2005) even suggests that value resonance can 
hinder the occurrence of value emphasis framing effects by increasing message scrutiny 
under certain conditions. In a three-factorial experiment, participants were exposed to a 
political message that opted for the introduction of a mandatory service requirement for 
senior students to help younger students. In this message, the valence was the same for all 
conditions. One of two different value emphasis frames was applied to the message. One 
group received a “humanitarian-egalitarian” value frame emphasizing the relevance of 
helping others when older students provide services for younger students. The other group 
was exposed to the “protestant ethic” frame, which highlighted individualistic and 
meritocratic political values, stating that such mandatory services would “create individual 
opportunities for individual achievement” (Nelson & Garst, 2005, p. 497). As a second 
factor, the message referred to a study suggesting that service requirements can either have 
strong effects or weak positive effects. As such, the second factor manipulated how 
compelling the message content was for supporting the introduction of mandatory services. 
As a third factor, the authors measured a few weeks before the experiment respondents’ 
preference for protestant-ethic values and for humanitarianism-egalitarianism. The 
dependent variable was participants’ support for the introduction of mandatory services. 
The results revealed no general effect of value emphasis frames on support for the 
mandatory service, which is unsurprising given that both frames had the same valence and 
favored such services. Likewise, the general value resonance was ineffective, and 
respondents supported the mandatory service equally strongly regardless of whether it was 
framed by a political value they adhered to or not. Nevertheless, a moderating influence of 
value resonance was evident when considering how compelling the message content was. 
When respondents read about strong evidence of the positive impact of mandatory 
services, value-resonant frames increased support for such services more than did non-
resonant frames. However, when the message suggested that mandatory services improve 
the situation at universities weakly, a value-resonant frame for this message decreased 
support for the mandatory services more than did a non-resonant frame. That is, value-
resonance seems to increase the effectiveness of emphasis frames only when the rest of the 
message content is compelling and does not contradict the direction of the value-resonant 
frame. 
However, considering all empirical findings discussed thus far on the moderating 
role of value resonance in the effectiveness of value emphasis frames together, it can be 
concluded that value resonance rather reinforces framing effects. Sometimes, value 
resonance is a necessary condition for value emphasis frames to influence citizens’ issue 
attitudes at all. However, in other situations, value emphasis frames can also affect citizens 
for whom the frame is non-resonant. However, the results presented thus far only dealt 
with one-sided framing situations, although as discussed in Subchapter 2.4.2, emphasis 
framing effects are less pronounced or even non-existent when presenting competing 
frames simultaneously. Thus, the question arises as to whether value emphasis framing 
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effects entirely diminish in simultaneous frame competition, i.e., when opposing frames are 
present, regardless of whether these frames are value-resonant or non-resonant. 
 
Citizens’ political value preferences as a moderator in simultaneous frame 
competition 
In the experimental study on the military conflict between the Ukraine and Russian-
speaking separatists by Beattie and Milojevich (2017), the authors investigated both the 
moderating role of general value strength described above and the moderating effects of 
citizens’ value preferences in one-sided and competitive framing situations. Prior to frame 
exposure, the authors measured citizens’ abstract preferences for the political values 
leftwing-interventionism, leftwing-isolationism, rightwing-interventionism, and rightwing-
isolationism employed by the four different frames in the study to construct the meaning 
of the issue. Then, participants were exposed either to one of these frames or to all four 
frames simultaneously (also see Subchapter 2.4.2). After frame exposure, participants 
answered four questions on their issue attitude. Each question reflected a certain political 
action related to one of the four political values but at the concrete level of the military 
conflict. In other words, the authors constructed for each political value a measure of 
attitudinal change from respondents’ prior and abstract political value preference to a sub-
dimension of their concrete issue attitude. As such, the attitudinal change measure showed 
how strongly respondents’ general stance on a political value translated into their preference 
of this value for the concrete situation of the military conflict and whether frame exposure 
moved citizens’ concrete attitude away from their general political value preference. 
When participants were exposed to only one value emphasis frame without 
simultaneous frame competition, three of the four frames exerted main effects on 
respondents’ issue attitudes, which shifted significantly away from their abstract political 
value preferences. However, when respondents were exposed to all four frames in 
simultaneous competition, none of the frames moved citizens’ issue attitudes away from 
their prior value preferences, and the effects of competing frames cancelled each other out. 
Under competitive framing conditions, respondents’ issue attitudes mirrored their prior 
value orientations. Furthermore, the frames did not reinforce participants’ prior abstract 
values on the level of their concrete issue attitudes or shift citizens away from their initial 
political values. That is, the study by Beattie and Milojevich (2017) showed that prior 
political value preferences played a less prominent role in one-sided situations and could 
not inhibit the effects of value emphasis frames. In contrast, the influence of citizens’ 
political value preferences was much stronger when competing frames were presented 
simultaneously, which suppressed the effects of single frames. 
The two experiments by Sniderman and Theriault (2004), introduced in Subchapter 
2.4.2, also compared the moderating influence of citizens’ political value preferences on 
value emphasis framing effects in one-sided situations and those with simultaneous frame 
competition. The first experiment dealt with government spending on the poor using 
support for such government spending as the dependent variable. One group received the 
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“higher taxes” value emphasis frame, which constructed the meaning of the issue around 
the political value of economic growth. A second group was exposed to a “getting ahead” 
frame that emphasized egalitarian political values as relevant criteria to interpret the issue. 
A third group received both frames and a fourth group no frames (i.e., the control group). 
In addition, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) measured citizens political value preference on 
the dimension egalitarianism vs. economic growth, and based on respondents’ answers, the 
authors divided them into two groups for the analysis: “egalitarians” who preferred 
egalitarianism over economic growth and “economic growth proponents” who preferred 
the opposite. 
In one-sided framing situations, these value emphasis frames exerted a strong main 
effect. Respondents supported government spending on the poor significantly more 
strongly when exposed to the getting ahead frame than when exposed to the higher taxes 
frame. Moreover, this effect occurred regardless of citizens’ value preferences, and both the 
egalitarian and the economic growth proponents formed significantly different issue 
attitudes depending on their one-sided frame exposure. Furthermore, when the one-sided 
frame was value-resonant and matched citizens’ value preference, its effect tended to be 
somewhat stronger than the effect of (still significant) non-resonant frames. 
However, when participants were exposed to both frames simultaneously, there 
were either no or less pronounced effects of emphasis frames. The proponents of economic 
growth exposed to both frames did not differ from the economic growth proponents in 
the control group, who were not exposed to any frame. That is, the effects of competitive 
frames cancelled each other out. Consequently, economic growth proponents mainly 
followed their political value preference as strongly as they did without any framing, and 
rather opposed spending on the poor. However, this opposition was significantly less 
strong in competitive situations than in those in which economic growth proponents were 
exposed only to their value-resonant frame and strongly opposed spending on the poor. 
That is, competitive framing led those favoring economic growth to a more middle-of-the-
road issue attitude than did “their” one-sided value-resonant emphasis frame higher taxes, 
which strongly reinforced their initial political value preference to form an attitude against 
spending on the poor (cf. Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). 
For egalitarians, balanced frame competition had a small but significant effect, and 
these persons were less supportive of spending on the poor when exposed to both frames 
than those without frame exposure or those exposed to only their value-resonant getting 
ahead frame. Nevertheless, egalitarians exposed to both frames still supported spending on 
the poor more strongly than did the economic growth proponents. This means the 
influence of political value preferences was still strong on the issue attitude of egalitarians 
under the condition of simultaneous frame competition. However, they were not entirely 
blind toward the frame of the opposite side, and formed a somewhat more middle-of-the-
road opinion than if they had not been exposed to frames and formed an issue attitude 
based only on their prior political value preference. 
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 Sniderman and Theriault (2004) fully replicated these findings in their second 
experiment, which framed a planned hate group rally either with the political value of civil 
rights (“free speech” frame) or with the value of public order (“violent risk” frame). That 
is, the authors provided strong evidence of three important aspects of the moderating role 
of political value preferences in value emphasis framing effects. First, one-sided value 
emphasis frames influence citizens’ issue attitude regardless of whether the frame is value-
resonant or non-resonant, although one-sided value-resonant frames tend to have 
somewhat stronger attitudinal effects than non-resonant frames. Second, as one-sided 
value-resonant frames are most influential, they tend to polarize citizens the most when 
different groups of citizens with different political value preferences only receive their 
value-resonant frame. Third, when competing value emphasis frames are presented in 
simultaneous competition, the effects of the single frames mainly cancel each other out, 
and citizens form issue attitudes mainly based on their political value preferences, as they 
would do without any framing. Note though that frame competition can also lead to slightly 
more middle-of-the-road issue attitudes than when citizens form their attitudes based only 
on their political value preferences, i.e., without any frame exposure. 
While the studies by Beattie and Milojevich (2017) and by Sniderman and Theriault 
(2004) discussed earlier suggest that citizens mainly stick to their prior political value 
preferences in situations of simultaneous frame competition and that neither value-
resonant nor non-resonant frames strongly influence their issue attitudes, Chong and 
Druckman (2007a) found that value emphasis frames also exerted considerable effects 
when presented in competition to each other. Subchapter 2.4.2 already explained the 
design of their experiment, which exposed participants to news articles on an urban growth 
boundary policy that aimed to concentrate the building of new houses in the city center. 
Besides their general result that strong and compelling emphasis frames affected citizens’ 
issue attitudes not only in one-sided situations but also under conditions of simultaneous 
frame competition (see Subchapter 2.4.2), Chong and Druckman (2007a) also examined 
whether this result differed between citizens with different political value preferences. 
The authors restricted this analysis to the strong frames in their design, as weak 
frames were generally rather ineffective in influencing citizens’ issue attitude. One strong 
frame was the “preserve open space” frame, which employed the political value of 
environmentalism to construct the meaning of the issue, arguing that building new houses 
only in the city center and not its surrounding nature would protect the environment. The 
strong counter-frame of “economic costs” emphasized the relevance of economic 
considerations in interpreting the issue and highlighted that prohibiting building of new 
houses outside the city would increase land prices in the city center, making the newly built 
houses unaffordable for many people. Respondents were exposed to either the preserve 
open space frame only, the economic costs frame only, or both frames in simultaneous 
competition. In addition, Chong and Druckman (2007a) measured participants’ political 
value preference on the dimension of environmentalism vs. economic growth. Based on 
this measure, the authors divided their sample into “environmentalists” that generally 
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preferred the protection of the environment to economic growth and “economists,” who 
preferred the opposite. The dependent variable was citizens’ attitude toward restricting the 
building of new houses to the city center. 
First, the results revealed that one-sided value emphasis frames influenced 
environmentalists and economists equally strongly, regardless of whether the frame was a 
value-resonant frame or non-resonant counter-frame. That is, citizens’ political value 
preference did not moderate the effects of one-sided frames, and even the economists, who 
generally preferred economic growth to environmental protection, supported the policy 
when framed as being important in protecting the environment. Moreover, when the 
environmentalists and economists were only exposed to a non-resonant frame, they did not 
differ substantially in their issue attitude. However, the environmentalists and economists 
differed starkly when they only received their respective value-resonant frame, as these 
frames were as effective as non-resonant frames. Hence, exposure to one-sided non-
resonant frames depolarized citizens with different political value preferences, whereas 
exposure to one-sided value-resonant emphasis frames polarized their issue attitudes along 
with their prior political value preferences. 
When participants received both frames in simultaneous competition, each single 
frame influenced respondents’ support for the urban growth boundary policy, and 
participants formed a middle-of-the-road attitude. This was in contrast to exposure to only 
a value-resonant or only a non-resonant frame. This indicates that exposure to competing 
frames did not prevent framing effects and the effects were not limited to value-resonant 
frames. In fact, environmentalists supported the policy the most when exposed only to their 
value-resonant frame preserve open space, less when exposed to both frames 
simultaneously, and least when exposed only to the non-resonant frame economic costs. 
Likewise, economists opposed the policy the most when exposed only to their value-
resonant frame economic costs, less when exposed to both frames, and least when exposed 
only to their non-resonant frame preserve open space. That is, when competing frames 
were present, respondents did not simply choose their side and stay with their value-
resonant frame, but they recognized the relevance of the non-resonant frame, forming a 
middle-of-the-road attitude. 
Thus, the study by Chong and Druckman (2007a) showed that citizens’ political 
value preferences did not moderate the effects of single frames when presented in 
simultaneous competition or as a one-sided frame. Value-resonant and non-resonant 
frames exerted attitudinal effects in all these situations. That is, these results indicate rather 
strong value emphasis framing effects that can occur regardless of citizens’ political value 
preferences, even in competitive framing situations in which citizens should know that 
adjusting their issue attitude based on a non-resonant frame violates their general 
preference for the political value emphasized by a value-resonant frame. 
However, bear in mind that Beattie and Milojevich (2017) and Sniderman and 
Theriault (2004) did not find frame effects when frames were presented in simultaneous 
competition. Therefore, the study by Chong and Druckman (2007a) should be rather 
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considered as an indicator that value emphasis frames can also be effective under frame 
competition and when they are non-resonant. However, it is more likely that they are 
ineffective and citizens simply employ their prior political value preferences in attitude 
formation. Despite the somewhat inconclusive findings regarding the role of political value 
preferences that sometimes suppress frame effects in competitive situations but other times 
not, all three studies had comparable results regarding one-sided value emphasis framing, 
which was effective for both value-resonant and non-resonant frames. This again 
emphasizes that at least in one-sided situations, value emphasis frames are rather influential 
and can even affect citizens with non-matching political value preferences, although the 
effects tend to be somewhat stronger when the frames are value-resonant. 
 
Summary 
To sum up, this subchapter showed that citizens’ political value preferences can play an 
important role in the effectiveness of value emphasis framing effects. First, citizens with 
strong prior political values are less susceptible in terms of basing their attitude formation 
on the framing of an issue or event. Rather, citizens employ their prior political values to 
interpret political questions independent of its framing, which underlines the general 
relevance of political value preferences in attitude formation (also see Subchapter 2.5.1). 
However, second, citizens’ concrete political value preferences do not necessarily prevent 
value emphasis framing effects in one-sided framing situations. In most empirical studies, 
frames that employed a certain political value to construct the meaning of an issue 
influenced citizens’ issue attitudes. Moreover, such frame effects are not only explained by 
merely reinforcing the issue attitudes of citizens who generally prefer the political value 
employed in the frame. Although such value-resonant frames are often somewhat more 
effective than non-resonant frames, exposure to one-sided non-resonant frames often 
affects citizens’ issue attitudes as well. Third, this tends to change when value emphasis 
frames are presented in simultaneous competition. In such situations, frames are rather 
ineffective and citizens mainly form their issue attitude based on their prior political values. 
However, there is also some evidence that frame competition can lead to middle-of-the-
road attitudes, and citizens do not follow only their value-resonant frame when 
accompanied by a non-resonant counter-frame or stick entirely to their prior values under 
frame competition. Next, Subchapter 2.5.4 discusses the implications of these results for 
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2.5.4 Summary and implications for citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
in light of political value preferences 
The last subchapters were concerned with a specific type of emphasis frame, namely value 
emphasis frames, which employ political values such as egalitarianism, freedom, or public 
order to construct the meaning of political issues and events. Political values are stable and 
superordinate conceptions of desirable means and goals related to the fields of politics, 
society, and public affairs (Goren, 2005 ⁠; Jacoby, 2006). Citizens adhere to such values to 
varying degrees; thus, their political value preferences are ordered in a hierarchical structure. 
When forming specific attitudes, citizens often rely on their political value preference, as 
these serve as important evaluation criteria to judge political issues and events (see 
Subchapter 2.5.1). 
Likewise, political actors and the news media employ political values when 
constructing the meaning of issues, often presenting value emphasis frames to their 
audience to influence citizens’ attitude formation by suggesting that certain issue positions 
are appropriate in light of certain political values (see Subchapter 2.5.2). Drawing on 
political values to frame issues or events means drawing on available, accessible, and 
applicable evaluation criteria shared by most citizens. Thus, the audience cannot easily 
ignore such frames as important issue perspectives, even if the political value employed by 
an emphasis frame might not be at the top of a person’s individual value hierarchy. For 
instance, even if a person prefers the political value of civil rights to national security, she 
or he will likely agree that national security is also an important political goal. As value 
emphasis frames construct the meaning of issues with such widely cherished political 
values, they are thought to be particularly influential in influencing citizens’ issue attitudes. 
Empirical studies that investigated the main effects of value emphasis frames in one-
sided situations mainly support this assumption, as the majority of these studies revealed 
that such frames are effective means by which to substantially influence citizens’ issue 
attitudes (for a summary, see the first lines in Table 4). Moreover, Subchapter 2.5.3 
indicated that the main effects in one-sided framing situations did not only result from 
affecting citizens for who the value emphasis frame was value-resonant. Often, such frames 
also affected citizens with non-matching political value preferences, although value-
resonant frames had stronger effects (again, see Table 4 for a summary). However, when 
frames are presented in simultaneous frame competition, single frames are most often 
ineffective, but citizens mainly base their attitude formation on their prior political value 
preferences, in a comparable way than they do in situations without frame exposure (also 
see Subchapter 2.4.2). 
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Table 4. Summary of empirical results for the main effects of value emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude and for citizens’ political value preferences as a moderator of value 













− No main effect of frames (Bechtel et al., 2015⁠; Nisbet et al., 2013) 
− Main effect of frames (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001⁠; Nelson, 
2004⁠; Nelson, Clawson et al., 1997⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999⁠; B. T. 
Scheufele & Gasteiger, 2007) 
− Main effect of frames when source is credible (Druckman, 2001b) 
Moderation by 
value strength 
− Frame effect when weak value preferences, but no frame effect 
when strong value preferences (Slothuus, 2008) 
− Frame effects stronger when weak value preferences than when 









− No generally stronger frame effect when value-resonant + stronger 
frame effect when value-resonant and compelling message content, 
but weaker frame effect when value-resonant and less compelling 
message content (Nelson & Garst, 2005) 
− Frame effect on some attitudes stronger when value-resonant, but 
no difference in framing effect by value resonance on other 
attitudes (Shen & Edwards, 2005) 
− One frame with main effect independent of value resonance, other 
frame effect only when value-resonant (Schemer et al., 2012) 
− No main effect of frames, but one of three frames effective when 
value-resonant + for one frame contrast effect when non-resonant 
(A. C. Andrews et al., 2017) 
− No main effect of frames + no frame effect when value-resonant, 
but frame effect when value-resonant and frame perceived as 








− When one-sided frames, frame effects move citizens away from 
prior political value preferences + when balanced frame 
competition, no effects of single frames, but clear influence of 
prior political value preferences (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017) 
− When one-sided frames, frame effects somewhat stronger when 
value-resonant, but also frame effects when non-resonant + when 
balanced frame competition, no or less pronounced effects of 
single frames, but clear influence of prior political value 
preferences (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) 
− When one-sided frames, frame effects independent of value 
resonance + when balanced frame competition, single frame 
effects independent of value resonance despite general influence of 
prior political value preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007a) 
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Therefore, relying on the definition of rationality by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
which describes rationality as the stability of preferences that prevents unsubstantiated 
attitudinal shifts based on the mere emphasis on a certain frame (see Subchapter 2.2.2), 
citizens’ rationality in attitude formation differs considerably between situations with only 
one value emphasis frame and those with simultaneous frame competition. 
Exposure to different one-sided value emphasis frames can produce substantially 
different issue attitudes. Investigating this main effect by citizens’ stable political value 
preferences enables determining whether the attitudinal effects actually violate these 
preferences. If the main effect is driven by only affecting citizens for whom the respective 
frame is value-resonant, i.e., in accordance with their political value preferences, these 
effects would not indicate irrational attitude formation based on framing. For instance, if 
an environmental value emphasis frame only affects citizens who prefer the value of 
environmentalism, but not those who prefer economic growth; and if an economic growth 
frame only influence those who prefer economic growth, but not citizens who prefer 
environmental political values, then an attitudinal difference between exposure to one of 
these frames (i.e., a main effect on aggregate) would not be a strong indicator of an irrational 
attitude formation. 
Framing effects limited to value-resonant frames indicate that citizens only change 
their attitudes when the frame matches their superordinate preferences. That is, they only 
rely on value emphasis frames that help them form an attitude in accordance with their 
values. Thus, value emphasis framing would rather ensure that citizens form issue attitudes 
that do not violate general preferences and thus, such framing effects would indicate a 
rational attitudinal change to secure the stability of general value preferences. Another 
question is whether the mere reinforcement of prior values by value emphasis frames would 
also be functional in the democratic discourse. This could lead to more polarized issue 
attitudes between citizens with different political values, which might complicate 
democratic compromises and decision-making. Still, value emphasis framing would at least 
not lead to arbitrary irrational political attitudes that could distort democratic decisions even 
more strongly. 
However, as Table 4 shows, the effects of one-sided value emphasis frames are not 
limited to value-resonant frames. Rather, one-sided emphasis frames often affect the issue 
attitudes of citizens for whom the frame is a non-resonant counter-frame, although it seems 
that value-resonant frames can exert somewhat stronger effects. That is, one-sided value 
emphasis framing can lead to issue attitudes that violate citizens’ political value preferences. 
For instance, an economic growth frame can affect citizens who normally prefer the 
protection of the environment to economic growth. Thus, they form an issue attitude that 
supports policies that endanger their preference to protect the environment. Therefore, 
one-sided framing does not only lead to arbitrary attitudinal shifts based on the mere 
emphasis of a certain political value, but these shifts even occur regardless of citizens’ 
superordinate value preferences. 
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This means that one-sided framing effects twice violate rational attitude formation, 
which is defined as the stability of preferences. The first is at the level of the specific issue 
attitude, as the preference for the issue attitude itself is not stable but differs depending on 
exposure to the mere emphasis of a single frame. The second is at the level of the relation 
between the attitude direction and citizens’ superordinate value preferences. Without 
framing, the formation of specific attitudes relates strongly to citizens’ prior political value 
preferences through which this attitude contributes in a coherent and stable way to their 
general preferences. However, one-sided frames weaken the relation between value 
preferences and the specific issue attitude so that the attitude relies less strongly on stable 
value preferences. 
In contrast, in situations of simultaneous frame competition, citizens’ attitude 
formation tends to be rather rational, as single value emphasis frames are most often 
ineffective in such situations. Here, citizens rely on their prior political value preferences to 
form their issue attitude. As such, they tend to choose from the different frames the one 
that serves them best in forming an attitude aligned with their stable political value 
preferences, as they would do without frame exposure. Moreover, some evidence shows 
that this occurs without reinforcing the influence of their prior political values, as it can 
occur with one-sided value-resonant frames. Thus, in situations of simultaneous frame 
competition, citizens tend to form attitudes that reflect their prior political values in a more 
stable manner than in situations with one-sided value-resonant frames. A one-sided value-
resonant framing situation can move citizens’ issue attitudes more strongly to their 
preferred political value than they prefer this value without framing. Thus, competitive 
framing leads not only to attitudes that are more rational than the attitudes formed in one-
sided situations but also to less polarized attitudes than one-sided value-resonant framing. 
Therefore, the effects noted in the literature seem to suggest that one-sided value 
emphasis framing can lead to irrational and arbitrary issue attitudes, while the simultaneous 
presentation of competing value emphasis frames prevents citizens from forming irrational 
issue attitudes (but see Subchapter 2.8.1 for why even the effects found for non-resonant 
one-sided emphasis frames do not necessarily imply irrational attitude formation because 
of a methodological confounding in the employed stimuli). However, in reality, exposure 
to competing frames does not only occur simultaneously. Often, citizens are first exposed 
to one frame for an issue and after some time delay, to one or more opposing frames. This 
means that frame competition can also take place over time in the form of exposure to 
different one-sided emphasis frames at different points in time. Thus, an important 
remaining question is whether asynchronous frame competition likewise prevents irrational 
attitude formation or whether first being exposed to one frame and later in time to a 
counter-frame leads to arbitrary attitude formation at each single point of frame exposure. 
Thus, the next Chapter 2.6 provides the results on emphasis framing effects over time by 
examining asynchronous frame competition (see Subchapter 2.6.3) as well as the general 
durability of emphasis framing effects (Subchapter 2.6.1) and the effects of frame 
repetition over time (Subchapter 2.6.2). 
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2.6 Emphasis framing effects over time 
2.6.1 Empirical results for the durability of emphasis framing effects over 
time based on single frame exposure 
The literature has examined the variable time in the process of emphasis framing effects in 
three different ways. First, empirical studies investigated how durable or persistent such 
effects are over time when citizens are only exposed once to a one-sided emphasis frame. 
Such studies enable drawing conclusions regarding whether emphasis framing effects are 
short term and diminish a few days after frame exposure. This would render the existence 
of these effects less consequential in the long term. Furthermore, conclusions can be drawn 
regarding whether these effects lead to durable attitudinal changes that persist for longer 
periods of time, which would thus be highly consequential. Second, empirical studies 
examined whether repeated exposure to the same emphasis frame over time not only 
strengthens the durability of framing effects, but also increases their effectiveness. In reality, 
citizens’ exposure to a certain frame for a certain political issue is seldom limited to a single 
point in time, as has been the case in the experiments discussed in previous chapters. 
However, exposure to the same frame can be more frequent over time, as citizens are 
typically exposed more frequently to the news media. Thus, studies on repetitive frame 
exposure enable a more realistic look at the long-term effects of emphasis frames employed 
constantly by political actors to offer the audience certain issue interpretations (see 
Subchapter 2.5.2). Third, studies have investigated asynchronous frame competition over 
time, as it often occurs in public debates in which an actor might have the opportunity to 
set her or his frame in the debate first. However, in the following days and weeks, 
competing actors present their counter-frames to the audience as well. Such studies more 
realistically examine how exposure to different one-sided emphasis frames at different 
points in time changes (or does not change) initial emphasis framing effects. 
This subchapter presents empirical results for the general durability of emphasis 
framing effects over time based on single (one-sided) frame exposure. As mentioned, the 
presentation in this subchapter and those following is limited to empirical studies (but see 
e.g., Baden & Lecheler, 2012 for a theoretical account of emphasis framing effects over 
time and the role of citizens’ political knowledge in this process). Moreover, the subchapters 
only include studies that investigated emphasis framing effects as defined in Subchapter 
2.1.2, i.e., as effects of exposure to emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude as the main 
dependent variable. 
 
Durability of emphasis framing effects without considering individual-level 
moderators 
One of the first studies to examine the longevity of emphasis framing effects was conducted 
by Druckman and Nelson (2003), and was introduced partly in Subchapter 2.3.3. The 
authors exposed participants to one of two frames highlighting different perspectives of a 
campaign finance reform that aimed to restrict the financial influence of unions, 
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corporations, and individuals on political party campaigns. One group received a “free 
speech” emphasis frame stressing the right of corporations and unions to support parties 
that act in their interest, and the other group received a “special interests” frame 
highlighting the necessity of restricting the influence of powerful lobbies on the political 
process. Directly after frame exposure (t1), Druckman and Nelson (2003) measured 
participants’ issue attitude toward the campaign finance reform. They found that 
respondents exposed to the free speech frame opposed the reform significantly more 
strongly than did participants exposed to the special interests frame. Ten days after the 
experiment (t2), respondents were asked in a follow-up survey to express their attitude 
toward the reform again without again exposing them to one of the emphasis frames. 
The results revealed that the initial framing effect found at t1 diminished at t2. 
Respondents exposed to the free speech frame ten days before no longer opposed the 
reform significantly more strongly than participants who received the special interests frame 
ten days before. There was, however, at least a slight descriptive difference in support at t2 
based on prior frame exposure at t1. Thus, this study suggests that emphasis framing effects 
are rather short term and do not persist over longer periods of time. 
This result is corroborated by the study by Tewksbury et al. (2000) mentioned earlier 
in Subchapter 2.4.1. Again, the authors found initial effects for one-sided emphasis frames 
based on first frame exposure (but see Subchapter 2.4.2 for the non-significant frame 
effects in this study when competing frames were presented simultaneously). Specifically, 
respondents exposed to the one-sided “environment” frame emphasizing the negative 
outcomes of factory farming for the environment opposed large hog farms significantly 
more strongly directly after frame exposure (t1) than did the participants who received the 
“industry” frame, which highlighted the economic benefits of larger farms. Three weeks 
later (t2), Tewksbury et al. (2000) measured respondents’ issue attitude again without 
providing any additional frame exposure in the questionnaire. 
They found that the issue attitude of the groups exposed to the different one-sided 
emphasis frames at t1 no longer differed three weeks after frame exposure (t2). However, at 
least a still significant but substantially weaker frame effect was evident at t2 for a further 
dependent variable that did not directly measure respondents’ attitude toward larger hog 
farms, but their support for the regulation of such hog farms. That is, while the study did 
not find persistent emphasis framing effects, it showed at least that emphasis framing 
effects must not diminish entirely after three weeks. 
 Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) also examined the durability of emphasis framing effects 
by examining three points in time. Their experiment dealt with an initiative that proposed 
higher financial investments in care for the elderly. At the beginning of the study, 
participants were exposed to either a one-sided “positive” frame that emphasized how more 
investment would improve the situation of the elderly or to a one-sided “negative” frame 
highlighting unfavorable outcomes of higher investment in elderly care. Directly after frame 
exposure (t1), the authors found a significant frame effect. Respondents who received the 
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positive frame supported the initiative significantly more strongly at t1 than participants 
exposed to the negative frame. 
Two weeks later (t2), Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) again measured respondents’ issue 
attitude without any further experimental exposure to one of the frames, yielding two 
relevant results. First, the attitude of respondents exposed to the positive frame two weeks 
before was significantly weaker at t2, i.e., this initial framing effect weakened over time. 
Second, this weakened effect led to the disappearance of the framing effect at t2 between 
the two experimental groups exposed to the different frames at t1. Two weeks after frame 
exposure (t2), respondents who received the positive frame no longer supported more 
strongly higher investment in elderly care than did those exposed to the negative frame. 
Moreover, Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) investigated how the emphasis framing effect 
developed six weeks after (one-sided) frame exposure (t3). The results were similar as those 
for t2, and the initial framing effect observed at t1 was non-existent six weeks later (t3). That 
is, this study adds evidence for rather short-term framing effects that tend to disappear after 
two weeks without emerging again later in time (e.g., after six weeks) when not repeated 
(but see next Subchapter 2.6.2 for how frame repetition changed this pattern in this same 
study). 
 
Durability of emphasis framing effects when considering individual-level 
moderators 
While the aforementioned studies did not find durable emphasis framing effects over time 
based on single (one-sided) frame exposure, Chong and Druckman (2010) argue that the 
durability of such effects depends on how citizens form their issue attitude during or 
directly after frame exposure, i.e., at t1. Thus, the authors introduced the moderator type of 
attitude formation that influences the strength of the formed attitude to explain when emphasis 
framing effects are more or less persistent. 
Hastie and Park (1986) broadly distinguish two types of attitude formation. On-line 
attitude formation takes places directly during the processing of incoming information. The 
person judges single pieces of information during exposure and integrates them into his or 
her overall attitude. As the evaluation of information takes place directly, actively, and 
consciously, the formed summary attitude tends to be held with stronger attitude certainty, 
meaning that on-line attitude formation leads to rather high attitude strength (Bizer, 
Tormala, Rucker, & Petty, 2006 ⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2010). Then, this strong overall 
attitude is stored in a person’s memory, and often, the person forgets the single pieces of 
information contained in a message that formed the summary attitude. When asked to 
report his or her attitude, the person retrieves this overall attitude from memory without 
reconstructing the single pieces of information that once formed this attitude. 
In contrast, memory-based attitude formation takes place when a person is asked about 
her or his attitude, but not directly when processing incoming information. During 
exposure to a message, the person stores single pieces of information in the memory, and 
when asked about his or her attitude, the person retrieves all accessible single pieces of 
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information about the attitude object from the memory, constructing the attitude based on 
these retrieved considerations. Such memory-based attitudes tend to be weaker, as attitude 
formation rather depends on currently accessible information and is less the result of a 
conscious and active process of evaluating incoming information (Bizer et al., 2006⁠; Chong 
& Druckman, 2010). 
As attitudes of different strength are formed, Chong and Druckman (2010) 
postulated that emphasis framing effects diminish to different degrees of strength over time 
depending on how a person formed his or her attitude directly after frame exposure (i.e., at 
t1). When the issue attitude formed at t1 is an on-line attitude and thus a rather strong 
attitude, it is more likely that this attitude is stable over time and does not diminish at t2, as 
strong attitudes tend to be generally less susceptible to change. In contrast, when the 
formed attitude at t1 is memory-based and therefore weaker, it is less persistent over time. 
This is because the later recall at t2 of earlier incoming single pieces of information tends to 
be imperfect and can omit information that may have been relevant when forming a 
memory-based attitude at t1, when this information was more easily accessible (Chong 
& Druckman, 2010). 
To test these assumptions, Chong and Druckman (2010) conducted an experiment 
on the so-called Patriot Act, a new law that allowed the US government to more extensively 
surveil citizens’ communication behavior. As the dependent variable, the authors measured 
citizens’ support for the law at two points in time. First, respondents’ issue attitude was 
measured directly after frame exposure at t1 and second, ten days after frame exposure (t2) 
without any additional frame exposure (but see Subchapter 2.6.3 for how this design also 
manipulated frame competition at t2 in additional experimental groups that are not of 
interest in this subchapter but are presented later). Directly before t1, two experimental 
manipulations took place. First, respondents received either a “civil rights” value emphasis 
frame that highlighted the problematic consequences of increased surveillance for citizens’ 
right to privacy, or a “terrorism” frame emphasizing that the new law prevents terrorist 
attacks and increases citizens’ security. 
Second, Chong and Druckman (2010) manipulated the type of attitude formation 
participants employed to form their issue attitude at t1 on three levels. The first level 
prompted respondents to form an on-line attitude. They were told to evaluate each single 
statement in the stimulus separately in terms of how strongly it influenced their overall 
attitude, and that they would be asked about their overall attitude again ten days later. The 
second level did not tell participants they would be asked again for their attitude. In 
contrast, they were instructed to rate the statements by judging how dynamic and active 
their language was to distract them from forming a direct overall issue attitude during frame 
perception. This ensured they formed a memory-based attitude when asked for their issue 
attitude at t1 directly after frame exposure. The third level contained no instruction for 
respondents on how to process the information in the stimulus and thus, represented non-
manipulated attitude formation. 
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For initial emphasis framing effects at t1, Chong and Druckman (2010) found clear 
effects of one-sided emphasis frames regardless of the type of attitude formation. At t1, 
exposure to the terrorism frame always led to significantly stronger support for the 
surveillance law than did exposure to the civil rights frame, regardless of whether the 
attitude formed at t1 was memory-based, on-line, or non-manipulated. However, ten days 
later, at t2 without any further experimental frame exposure, the type of attitude formation 
at t1 moderated the stability of the initial emphasis framing effect. 
When the attitude at t1 was memory-based or non-manipulated, the initial framing 
effect found at t1 significantly decreased at t2, and attitudinal differences between 
respondents exposed to different one-sided frames at t1 diminished at t2. In other words, 
there was no durable emphasis framing effect ten days after an initially effective single (one-
sided) frame exposure when participants formed a memory-based attitude or non-
manipulated attitude during frame exposure. 
In contrast, when respondents formed an on-line attitude during frame exposure at 
t1, their issue attitude did not change ten days later (t2); thus, the initial emphasis framing 
effects for participants exposed to different frames at t1 remained stable at t2 without any 
further experimental frame exposure. Through this, Chong and Druckman (2010) 
supported their assumptions with empirical evidence, finding that emphasis framing effects 
based on single (one-sided) frame exposure are rather durable over time as long as citizens 
form an on-line issue attitude during initial frame exposure. 
The role of individual-level moderators in the general durability of emphasis framing 
effects was also examined by Lecheler and de Vreese (2011), who investigated the additional 
influence of citizens’ political knowledge. Subchapter 2.4.1 noted already that political 
knowledge can moderate the effects of initial frame exposure, although the exact 
moderating role of this variable remains unclear. Lecheler and de Vreese (2011) asked in 
their study whether the durability of emphasis framing effects based on single one-sided 
frame exposure is more pronounced when citizens possess moderate levels of political 
knowledge than low or high levels of knowledge. 
The authors argued that citizens with low knowledge are likely affected by initial 
frame exposure, but less able to integrate the offered connection between the frame and 
the issue in their long-term memory. Thus, emphasis framing effects should decrease more 
strongly over time for such citizens. Likewise, people with high political knowledge likely 
display short-term framing effects. Even though they have sufficient ability to store the 
learned connection between the frame and the issue in their mental stockpile, they “are also 
more likely to resist integration of a news frame, or to quickly relapse to their broad stock 
of available considerations” (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011, p. 966). In contrast, citizens with 
medium levels of political knowledge likely resist less the integration of the connection 
between the issue and the frame in their long-term memory, as they possess less competing 
considerations that might prevent this integration, but enough knowledge to store the 
connection in their cognitive structure in a meaningful and persisting way. Thus, the authors 
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expected the most durable emphasis framing effects for citizens with moderate levels of 
political knowledge. 
To test their assumptions, Lecheler and de Vreese (2011) conducted an experiment 
and measured citizens’ issue attitude toward enlargement of the European Union at four 
points in time. The first measurement took place immediately after exposure to a one-sided 
frame (t1): either a “pro” frame emphasizing the potential positive consequences of the 
enlargement or a “con” frame focusing on potential negative outcomes. In addition, 
respondents completed a political knowledge test, and based on the result thereof, 
participants were categorized as having low, moderate, or high political knowledge. The 
authors then re-measured respondents’ issue attitude one day (t2), one week (t3), and two 
weeks (t4) after initial frame exposure without exposing participants again to the frames at 
later points in time. 
For the participants on average without considering their different levels of political 
knowledge, the results revealed an emphasis framing effect at t1 directly after frame 
exposure. Respondents exposed to the pro frame supported the enlargement of the 
European Union significantly more strongly than those exposed to the con frame. This 
effect between the experimental groups persisted one day later (t2), one week later (t3), and 
two weeks after frame exposure (t4). In the groups, the issue attitude of respondents 
exposed to the con frame remained stable over time. In contrast, the frame effect weakened 
after one week (t3) for participants who received the pro frame at t1, but this group still 
differed significantly at t3 and t4 from the group exposed to the con frame and from the 
control group without any frame exposure. 
Next, Lecheler and de Vreese (2011) tested whether the persistence of the frame 
effect differed between citizens with different levels of knowledge. Directly after exposure 
to one of the one-sided frames at t1, political knowledge did not moderate the frame effect, 
and the effect was present regardless of whether respondents possessed low, moderate, or 
high political knowledge. This pattern persisted one day (t2) and one week (t3) after frame 
exposure. However, two weeks after frame exposure (t4), the framing effect diminished for 
participants with low knowledge, weakened when political knowledge was high, and only 
persisted at about the same magnitude when respondents had moderate political 
knowledge. That is, Lecheler and de Vreese (2011) found partial support for their 
assumption that emphasis framing effects are more persistent for citizens with moderate 
levels of political knowledge, particularly over longer time periods. However, more relevant 
seems to be that their study found generally rather durable emphasis framing effects over 
time based on single frame exposure, even for citizens with different levels of political 
knowledge. This contradicts to some degree the results of aforementioned studies that 
found less persistent effects on average. 
 
Summary 
In sum, this subchapter showed that emphasis framing effects tend to be rather short term 
when citizens are exposed only once to a one-sided emphasis frame in an experimental 
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setting. While such frames lead to substantial attitudinal effects directly after frame 
exposure, these effects often decrease over time, becoming insignificant a few days later. 
However, some studies found durable emphasis framing effects up to two weeks after 
frame exposure, especially when citizens formed their initial attitude on-line and therefore, 
with higher attitude strength, or when citizens had moderate but not overly high political 
knowledge to integrate the connection between the frame and the issue into their mental 
stockpile. Still, emphasis frames tend to be rather unstable over time when no additional 
criteria at the individual level are met. Thus, such effects seem – at an aggregate level – 
rather inconsequential over time. However, in reality, it is reasonable to assume that citizens 
are not solely exposed once to an emphasis frame for an issue, but repeatedly receive the 
same frame over time. Therefore, the next Subchapter 2.6.2 explores empirical studies 
that investigated whether frame repetition over time produces more durable emphasis 
framing effects. 
2.6.2 Empirical results for the influence of frame repetition over time on the 
durability and strength of emphasis framing effects 
In the research on general persuasion, message repetition has long been a key factor in 
explaining both the durability and the strength of attitudinal message effects. The mere 
exposure effect posits that the more often a message is repeated, the more favorable 
becomes the attitude toward the message (Zajonc, 1968) and the better is the recall of the 
message’s content (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979). This holds as long as the repetition of a 
message does not bore citizens (Bornstein, Kale, & Cornell, 1990) or leads to increased 
reactance toward the message (Miller, 1976), as this can create an inverted-U relationship 
between repetition and message favorability (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979). Given the possible 
strengthening effect of general message repetition, empirical studies have examined 
whether frame repetition, i.e., repeated exposure to the same emphasis frame over time, leads 
to stronger and more durable emphasis framing effects. 
For instance, Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) not only investigated the general durability 
of emphasis framing based on single frame exposure (see Subchapter 2.6.1 before) but 
also examined the influence of frame repetition. In doing so, the authors exposed 
participants not only once to either a “positive” or “negative” frame for the issue of elderly 
care, measuring citizens’ issue attitude directly after frame exposure (t1). For some 
participants, the authors repeated exposure to the same frame four times in total: one day 
later (t2), one week later (t3), and two weeks later (t4). Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) then re-
measured citizens’ support for financial investment in care for the elderly directly after the 
last frame exposure, i.e., two weeks after initial frame exposure (t4), and four weeks after 
the exposure, i.e., six weeks after initial frame exposure (t5). 
The results indicated an emphasis framing effect directly after initial frame exposure 
at t1 and that participants who received the positive frame supported the issue significantly 
more strongly than those exposed to the negative frame. As reported in Subchapter 2.6.1, 
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this effect entirely diminished after two weeks (t4) and after six weeks (t5) when there was 
no repeated exposure to the same frame at t2, t3, and t4. However, when there was frame 
repetition, the emphasis framing effect persisted two weeks (t4) and six weeks (t5) after initial 
frame exposure between groups exposed to the different frames. Here, at both measured 
points in time after first frame exposure, repeated exposure to the positive frame led to a 
significantly more favorable attitude toward care for the elderly than repeated exposure to 
the negative frame. This implies that frame repetition leads to durable emphasis framing 
effects over time. 
Moreover, Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) analyzed whether the framing effect 
strengthened over time by comparing the development of the effect over time in each single 
group with repeated exposure to the same frame. For the positive frame, repetition did not 
increase the initial framing effect at later points in time. While respondents exposed to the 
positive frame supported financial investment more strongly than participants exposed to 
the negative frame directly after the first frame exposure (t1), this support did not increase 
or decrease two weeks (t4) or six weeks (t5) later, despite that the positive frame was repeated 
three times (t2, t3, and t4). In contrast, the group exposed repeatedly to the negative frame 
displayed significant variation over time. Directly after the fourth exposure to the negative 
frame, i.e., two weeks (t4) after initial frame exposure, respondents opposed financial 
investment in elderly care even more strongly than directly after first frame exposure (t1). 
Thus, frame repetition reinforced the initial framing effect two weeks later. However, the 
reinforcement effect induced by frame repetition disappeared four weeks after the last 
frame exposure (t5) and no longer differed from the framing effect directly after frame 
exposure (t1). This suggests that frame repetition strengthened the effect of the negative 
frame directly after the last frame exposure, but only led to a persistent, i.e., no longer 
strengthened, framing effect four weeks after last frame exposure. 
Finally, Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) examined whether citizens’ political knowledge 
moderated the strength and/or durability of emphasis framing effects based on frame 
repetition. The results showed only limited differences between participants with different 
levels of political knowledge regarding possible strengthened initial frame effects directly 
after the last repetition of the same frame (t4). However, political knowledge moderated the 
persistence of the frame effect four weeks (t5) after the fourth and last exposure to the same 
emphasis frame. While there was a persistent framing effect at t5 on aggregate, decomposing 
this effect by political knowledge indicated that this effect stemmed from affecting citizens 
with moderate levels of political knowledge. In contrast, the initial framing effect did not 
persist at t5 when political knowledge was low or high. That is, the long-term effects of 
frame repetition depended again on some but not too much political knowledge, as was the 
case in the study by Lecheler and de Vreese (2011) who obtained the same results for the 
general durability of emphasis framing effects based on single frame exposure (see 
Subchapter 2.6.1). In sum, the study by Lecheler, Keer et al. (2015) revealed that frame 
repetition did not lead to stronger emphasis framing effects in the long term, but to more 
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durable initial framing effects over time, particularly when citizens had moderate levels of 
political knowledge. 
Using a somewhat different experimental design, Lecheler and de Vreese (2013) also 
examined the general influence of frame repetition and moderating role of political 
knowledge. Their study also considered five different points in time, but repeated exposure 
to the same frame only once. First, all participants answered questions on their political 
knowledge and were exposed either to an “opportunity” frame emphasizing the potential 
benefits of an enlargement of the European Union or to a “risk” frame, which highlighted 
the potential negative consequences thereof. Immediately after initial frame exposure (t1), 
the authors measured respondents’ attitude toward an enlargement of the European Union. 
Either 15 minutes (t2), 1 day (t3), 1 week (t4), or 2 weeks (t5) after initial frame exposure, 
participants were again exposed once to the same frame, and their issue attitude was re-
measured directly afterwards (this study also included additional conditions that 
investigated competitive framing over time, see next Subchapter 2.6.3). 
On aggregate, for all levels of citizens’ political knowledge, the results revealed a 
clear initial emphasis framing effect immediately after first frame exposure (t1). Respondents 
exposed to the opportunity frame supported the enlargement of the European Union 
significantly more strongly than those who received the risk frame. When respondents were 
again exposed to the same emphasis frame later in time, the initial framing effect did not 
change but remained persistent at the same magnitude as at t1, regardless of whether frame 
repetition took place 15 minutes (t2), 1 day (t3), 1 week (t4), or 2 weeks (t5) after initial frame 
exposure. As such, on aggregate, a durable but not strengthened emphasis framing effect 
due to frame repetition was evident. 
Next, Lecheler and de Vreese (2013) investigated whether citizens’ political 
knowledge moderated the persistence and strength of the framing effect over time. 
However, they limited their analysis to a comparison between lower and higher levels of 
political knowledge because of a sample size too low to analyze more than two knowledge 
groups. The authors found that frame repetition strengthened the initial framing effect 
when political knowledge was high, but not when it was low. However, this strengthened 
effect on participants with high knowledge only occurred when the same frame was 
repeated one day (t3) or one week (t4) after initial frame exposure but not when frame 
repetition took place two weeks after the first exposure (t5). That is, when the delay between 
first and second frame exposure was rather short, frame repetition boosted the initial 
framing effect for citizens with a high level of political knowledge, but not when there was 
a longer delay before the same frame was repeated. Thus, these results provide evidence 
comparable to the study presented before: Frame repetition prevents the decay of emphasis 
framing effects over time and leads to persistent attitudinal differences based on frame 
exposure, but without reinforcing initial framing effects in the long term. 
Using different methodology, Matthes (2008) analyzed the influence of repeated 
frame exposure over time in Germany (also see Matthes, 2007b, pp. 189–302). Unlike the 
studies mentioned previously, he did not perform an experiment, but conducted a two-
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wave linkage analysis that combined citizens’ exposure to differently framed real news 
content on the issue of unemployment with respondents’ attitude toward the government’s 
performance in fighting unemployment. To detect emphasis frames in news coverage on 
unemployment, Matthes (2008) conducted a quantitative content analysis of various news 
media over four-month period by coding single frame elements. These were then clustered 
into broader emphasis frames based on a latent class analysis, which revealed two main 
frames. The government-friendly “Hartz” frame emphasized the potential positive 
influence of the government’s labor market reform on reducing unemployment (named 
after Peter Hartz who proposed the labor market reform the German government 
implemented in the early 2000s). In contrast, the “opposition” frame highlighted that the 
reform would not reduce unemployment, and the frame made the government and its 
actions responsible for a high unemployment rate in the country. 
In addition to the content analysis, the author conducted a two-wave panel survey 
measuring respondents’ use of different media outlets in the last two months before the 
respective panel wave and participants’ attitude toward the government in terms of its 
performance in fighting unemployment. Moreover, participants reported their attitude 
strength, which was used as an indicator for whether the attitude formed toward the 
government was memory-based (i.e., held with low strength) or on-line (i.e., held with high 
strength; see Subchapter 2.6.1 for a longer explanation of different types of attitude 
formation and also see Matthes, 2007a; Matthes, Wirth, & Schemer, 2007). The second 
wave (t2) took place two months after the first wave (t1). Based on respondents’ reported 
exposure to various news media outlets, they were each assigned an impact value for each 
frame reflecting how often they were exposed to one of the two emphasis frames in the 
used news outlets in the two months prior to each panel wave (t0-t1 and t1-t2). In this way, 
the study could measure respondents’ actual frame exposure in the two months before they 
reported their attitude on the government at t1, enabling testing initial emphasis framing 
effects at t1. At t2, it could be tested whether repeated exposure to the same frame in the 
two months between t1 and t2 increased the strength of the initial effect of the same frame. 
 Matthes (2008) analyzed the emphasis framing effects at t1 and t2 separately for 
citizens who formed a memory-based attitude at t1, i.e., for respondents with weak attitude 
strength, and for participants who formed an on-line attitude at t1, i.e., for those with high 
attitude strength. He separated the analyses because he expected initial and repeated 
emphasis framing effects of different strength for the different groups. Specifically, he 
argued that respondents who formed memory-based attitudes drew on the increased 
accessibility of the emphasis frame to which they were predominantly exposed to before. 
Thus, these participants may be rather susceptible to emphasis framing effects at t1 and 
after repeated exposure to the same frame later in time at t2. In contrast, when respondents 
formed an on-line attitude, the attitude may have been less likely to change over time, as 
the initial attitude was held with high strength, leading to generally higher attitude 
persistence (cf. Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). 
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For citizens with memory-based attitude formation, the results showed a significant 
initial framing effect at t1 for a predominant exposure to the “Hartz frame” in the two 
months before (t0-t1). The more frequently participants were exposed to this frame, the 
more favorable was their attitude toward the government. Two months after t1 at t2, 
repeated exposure to the Hartz frame between t1 and t2 had an additional effect on 
participants who formed a memory-based attitude. That is, the strength of the initial 
framing effect at t1 increased at t2, and respondents who received again predominantly the 
Hartz frame prior to t2 supported the government even more strongly than at t1. However, 
predominant exposure to the opposition frame prior to t1 felt short of significantly 
influencing respondents’ attitude, although the effect size was comparable to the Hartz 
frame (although, in the opposite direction). At t2, however, repeated predominant exposure 
to the opposition frame in the two months before (t1-t2) significantly affected respondents’ 
attitude. That is, while exposure to this frame was not sufficient for a significant framing 
effect at t1, repeated predominant exposure to the frame in the following two months (t1-
t2) enabled the frame to exert a significant attitudinal influence at t2. 
Moreover, Matthes (2008) tested whether the framing effects on respondents with 
memory-based attitude formation were more pronounced when only investigating their 
short-term exposure prior to the measurement of their issue attitude, i.e., in situations where 
short-term accessibility would be rather high. However, no (or less) framing effects were 
evident at t1 or at t2 when only investigating frame exposure one week, two weeks, three 
weeks, or four weeks prior to assessing respondents’ attitude (also see Matthes, 2007b, 
pp. 284–288). Even though participants formed memory-based attitudes, they had to be 
exposed long enough (i.e., two months) to the same frame, as only this enabled the frame 
to increase its accessibility, which respondents could then use to form their attitude. 
While frame repetition over longer time periods influenced the attitudes of 
participants who formed memory-based attitudes, no effects of initial (t1) or repeated (t2) 
predominant frame exposure were found for respondents with an on-line attitude at t1. 
Thus, it seems that these participants had already formed their on-line attitude before the 
first exposure phase (t0-t1); therefore, predominant exposure to a certain frame did not 
change this attitude at t1 and neither did repeated predominant exposure to the same frame 
(t1-t2) at t2. As such, the study by Matthes (2008) showed on one hand the insignificance of 
emphasis framing when citizens’ already possess strong prior attitudes that cannot be 
changed through repeated frame exposure over four months in total. On the other, when 
citizens did not have a strong prior attitude on the issue and thus formed memory-based 
attitudes, exposure to a certain emphasis frame affected their attitude and repeated exposure 
to the same frame even strengthened the initial effect. Therefore, frame repetition can lead 
to not only durable but also strengthened emphasis framing effects over time, as long as 
such frames do not compete against strong prior on-line attitudes. 
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Summary 
Based on the results regarding the influence of long-term frame repetition, this subchapter 
showed that repeated exposure to the same frame over time can stabilize initial emphasis 
framing effects and lead to the durability of such effects of up to four weeks after the last 
frame repetition. While Subchapter 2.6.1 has revealed that emphasis frames tend to be 
short term when citizens are exposed only once to a one-sided emphasis frame, this 
subchapter provided evidence that repeated frame exposure to the same frame over time 
can produce durable attitudinal effects of emphasis frames. Thus, in situations of frame 
repetition, emphasis framing effects can be consequential in the long term and do not easily 
disappear. Moreover, frame repetition does not only stabilize initial emphasis framing 
effects but at least for some citizens, repeated frame exposure can reinforce initial framing 
effects, which strengthens these effects over time, particularly when attitude formation is 
memory-based or when a person possesses high political knowledge. This suggests that 
emphasis framing is not a communicative tool that only produces short-term effects. 
Rather, when such frames are repeated over time, persisting and sometimes even increasing 
attitudinal differences can arise for citizens repeatedly exposed to one emphasis frame and 
those citizens who frequently receive another frame. 
However, in an ideal democratic public sphere, (repeated) exposure to only one 
emphasis frame for an issue is rather unlikely. Citizens typically receive various competing 
frames for an issue from various political actors competing in the public arena. Subchapter 
2.4.2 already showed that simultaneous frame competition often cancels out emphasis 
framing effects, which implies that the power of single emphasis frames is rather limited in 
the more realistic scenario of frame competition. Still, the question remains as to whether 
frame competition also limits the effects of single emphasis frames when citizens do not 
receive competing frames simultaneously, but first a one-sided frame and after some time 
delay, a one-sided counter-frame. To address this, the next Subchapter 2.6.3 presents 
empirical results regarding asynchronous frame competition over time. 
2.6.3 Empirical results for the durability of emphasis framing effects over 
time based on asynchronous frame competition 
When political actors compete for public support for their issue positions by employing 
emphasis frames, this frame competition typically takes place over longer cascades of time 
(Entman, 2004 ⁠; Entman, Matthes, & Pellicano, 2009). When new political issues enter the 
public agenda, there is often one political camp that is able to set the first frame for an 
issue, which might influence citizens’ issue attitudes. Political opponents may need some 
time to decide how to re-frame a debate. However, after a few days or weeks, political 
opponents typically start offering their frames to the audience to influence citizens’ issue 
attitudes in the opposite direction. That is, much of the framing processes in real political 
communication take place as asynchronous frame competition, sometimes also referred to as 
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“diachronic” frame competition (e.g., Matthes & Schemer, 2012), in which citizens first 
receive one frame (t1) and later in time an opposing counter-frame (t2). 
Besides the high realism of asynchronous frame competition, empirical studies 
investigated the phenomenon because the time delay between exposures to competing 
frames might lead to different outcomes than simultaneous frame competition. As 
described in Subchapter 2.4.2, empirical results mainly suggest that simultaneous frame 
competition cancels out the effects of single emphasis frames. However, asynchronous 
frame competition implies that each single situation of frame exposure is one-sided, and 
only the situations together add up to exposure to competing frames. Thus, the outcome 
of asynchronous frame competition could be in sum the same as that in simultaneous 
competition. While the first frame might affect citizens’ issue attitude, the counter-frame 
presented later influences them to the same magnitude but in the opposing direction, 
through which the effects of the single frames cancel each other out in the long term. 
However, the outcome of asynchronous frame competition may also differ from 
that of simultaneous frame competition. On one hand, the first frame exposure could lead 
to a persistent emphasis framing effect immune to the delayed exposure to a counter-frame 
(i.e., a primacy effect), as an attitude formed once might resist later persuasive attempts (Chong 
& Druckman, 2010 ⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). On the other, Subchapter 2.6.1 showed 
that initial framing effects often diminish after a few days (especially when not repeated, 
see Subchapter 2.6.2). Thus, possibly, initial framing effects of one-sided frame exposure 
at t1 reverse in the direction of the later presented counter-frame at t2, and in sum, only the 
later frame affects citizens’ issue attitude in the form of a recency effect (Chong & Druckman, 
2010⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). Given these theoretically different outcomes, studies 
empirically investigated asynchronous frame competition and examined individual-level 
moderators that might influence whether asynchronous frame competition cancels out the 
effects of single emphasis frames, leads to primacy effects based on the first frame 
exposure, or leads to stronger effects of the emphasis frame encountered later (recency 
effects). 
 
Attitude certainty as a moderator in asynchronous frame competition 
For instance, Matthes and Schemer (2012) argue that the certainty with which an attitude 
is formed based on prior one-sided frame exposure is a decisive factor in the stability of 
initial framing effects, despite later exposure to a one-sided counter-frame. In general, 
attitude certainty determines how persistent an attitude is, and the more certain a person is 
about his or her stance toward an attitude object, the less likely it is that later persuasive 
attempts can change this attitude (Krosnick et al., 1993⁠; Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 
2007). Thus, when exposure to a first emphasis frame leads to a certain issue attitude by 
forming an on-line attitude at t1, it is unlikely that a counter-frame presented later in time 
at t2 will affect the initially formed attitude, as the later frame must compete against a strong 
prior opinion (also see Subchapter 2.4.1 for the role of strong prior attitudes that can 
inhibit emphasis framing effects). In other words, when attitude certainty is high after first 
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frame exposure, this exposure likely has a primacy effect compared to a counter-frame 
encountered later. 
In contrast, when an initial one-sided emphasis frame affects citizens’ issue attitude, 
but they form a memory-based attitude and are thus still uncertain as to whether this 
attitude is the right one, later exposure to a counter-frame should not only cancel out the 
initial framing effect, but also reverse the initial framing effect in the direction of the 
counter-frame. This way, it does not matter whether citizens were exposed to a specific 
frame before, as only the last frame exposure influences their attitude at t2. This is because 
they did not possess an on-line attitude held with certainty to retrieve from memory and 
relied only on memory-based attitudes formed on the accessible considerations evoked by 
the counter-frame (Matthes & Schemer, 2012). 
To test these assumptions, Matthes and Schemer (2012) conducted an experiment 
in which participants were first exposed to a one-sided emphasis frame (t1). Ten days later, 
they received a one-sided counter-frame with the opposite valence (t2). The stimuli dealt 
with health conditions in prisons and employed either a “personal responsibility” frame 
focusing on prisoners who do not care enough about their health themselves or a “societal” 
frame, which emphasized that society is responsible for financing better health conditions 
in prisons. As the dependent variable, respondents reported their issue attitude, which 
measured the extent to which they agreed that society is to blame for the bad health 
conditions in prisons. Participants had to answer this question directly after first exposure 
to either the personal responsibility or societal frame (t1) and again directly after exposure 
to the opposite counter-frame ten days later (t2). 
In addition, the authors manipulated whether respondents formed their issue 
attitude during first frame exposure with high or low attitude certainty using the same 
procedure as in other studies to manipulate memory-based and on-line attitude formation 
(see Subchapter 2.6.1). To create uncertain attitudes at t1, participants were told prior to 
first frame exposure to read the stimulus article focusing on the journalistic style of the 
stimulus. This was to distract them from forming an issue attitude with high certainty. The 
group expected to form a certain issue attitude was told to form a strong issue attitude and 
that they would be asked for this attitude later. A manipulation check confirmed that the 
latter group reported significantly more certain attitudes than the former group after first 
(one-sided) frame exposure (t1). Exposure to a one-sided emphasis frame at t1 led to 
significantly different issue attitudes. Respondents exposed to the societal frame supported 
significantly more strongly the idea that society is responsible for the bad health conditions 
in prisons than did participants who received the personal responsibility frame. This 
attitudinal effect at t1 was independent of whether respondents formed their attitude with 
high or low attitude certainty. 
However, the effects of exposure to a one-sided counter-frame ten days later (t2) 
differed significantly between the different levels of attitude certainty. When respondents 
formed their issue attitude with low certainty at t1, exposure to a counter-frame at t2 reversed 
the initial framing effect and participants’ attitude followed the last encountered emphasis 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 111 
frame despite prior exposure to the opposite frame (i.e., a recency effect). For instance, 
respondents who first received the societal frame at t1, and then the personal responsibility 
frame ten days later at t2, switched their attitude in the direction of personal responsibility. 
This resulted in the same attitude shown by the group who only received the personal 
responsibility frame at t1. That is, when respondents formed an attitude with weak certainty 
after first frame exposure, this prior frame exposure did not matter ten days later. Only the 
latest encountered counter-frame mattered for respondents’ issue attitude. 
However, the counter-framing effects at t2 differed for participants who formed an 
issue attitude with high certainty at t1. Note though that while exposure to a counter-frame 
ten days after initial exposure to the opposite frame significantly weakened the initial 
framing effect, the later frame did not reverse the initial framing effect. Issue attitudes at t2 
did not differ between participants exposed to the frames in a different order. This suggests 
that exposure to a counter-frame ten days later cancelled out the initial one-sided emphasis 
framing effects at t2. When participants were exposed to both frames at the end, their 
attitudes did not differ regardless of the order in which they received the frames over time. 
Thus, higher attitude certainty after an initial emphasis framing effect did not prevent an 
effect of a counter-frame encountered later, as the authors initially expected. However, 
attitudes with higher attitude strength prevented at least the recency effect of the counter-
frames received later, which the authors found for participants with less certain issue 
attitudes. 
 
Type of initial attitude formation as a moderator in asynchronous frame 
competition 
Chong and Druckman (2010⁠, 2013) investigated asynchronous frame competition trough 
two interrelated experimental studies. However, the authors did not examine attitude 
strength as a potential moderator of the persistence of initial framing effects, but focused 
on something closely related, namely type of attitude formation during initial frame 
exposure. Prior to respondents’ first exposure to a one-sided emphasis frame, Chong and 
Druckman (2010 ⁠, 2013) manipulated whether participants formed a memory-based attitude 
held with less strength, an on-line attitude with high strength, or non-manipulated attitude 
(see Subchapter 2.6.1 in which the results of the control groups of these studies were 
already described in terms of the general durability of emphasis framing effects based on 
single one-sided frame exposure). The authors assumed that counter-frames encountered 
later demonstrate weaker effects when the initial emphasis framing effect is an on-line 
attitude than when it is memory-based attitude, as on-line attitude tend to be more 
persistent over time. 
The experiment dealt with a new surveillance law that allowed the US government 
to surveil citizens’ communication behavior more extensively. The issue was framed either 
with a “terrorism” frame emphasizing that the new law prevents terrorist attacks and 
increases citizens’ security, or a “civil rights” frame, which highlighted the problematic 
consequences of increased surveillance for citizens’ right to privacy. At t1, respondents 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 112 
received one of these frames, and as the dependent variable, they reported their attitude 
toward the new law. This produced a clear initial emphasis framing effect. Participants who 
received the terrorism frame supported the new surveillance law significantly more strongly 
than did respondents exposed to the civil rights frame. Ten days later (t2), they were exposed 
to either the opposite counter-frame (Chong & Druckman, 2010) or no frame (Chong 
& Druckman, 2013), and again reported their issue attitude. Next, 14 days after t2, i.e., 24 
days after first frame exposure (t3), participants were exposed to either the same counter-
frame as at t2 again or to the counter-frame for the first time if they had not been exposed 
to it at t2 (Chong & Druckman, 2013). Again, participants reported their issue attitude at t3. 
Essentially, after initial one-sided frame exposure at t1, which produced a clear initial 
emphasis framing effect, all respondents were exposed at least once to a counter-frame over 
time and some participants even twice (i.e., repetitive counter-framing). 
Respondents whose attitude formation was not manipulated during initial one-sided 
frame exposure (t1) demonstrated a significant decrease in the initial framing effect when 
exposed to the counter-frame 14 days later (t2). After exposure to the counter-frame, their 
attitudes no longer differed according to the first frame or counter-frame to which they 
were exposed. As such, asynchronous frame competition cancelled out the effects of the 
single one-sided frame exposure at different points in time in a way comparable to situations 
with simultaneous frame competition. However, the initial framing effect reversed in the 
direction of the counter-frame when the delay between first and second frame exposure 
was 24 days (t3). That is, even though participants first received an opposite frame, the later 
encountered emphasis frame at t3 had a clear recency effect. This recency effect at t3 had 
about the same magnitude when respondents had already been exposed to the same 
counter-frame at t2. Thus, the repetition of the counter-frame (t2 and t3) did not reinforce 
the effect of the counter-frame at t3, but stabilized the effect for participants with non-
manipulated attitude formation, which is consistent with the results discussed for one-sided 
frame repetition in Subchapter 2.6.2. 
Chong and Druckman (2010⁠, 2013) observed even stronger recency effects of the 
later presented counter-frame for participants who formed a memory-based attitude during 
initial one-sided frame exposure (t1). First, there was a recency effect of the counter-frame 
for such respondents when the counter-frame was presented 14 days (t2) after initial frame 
exposure. Moreover, this recency effect significantly increased and participants followed 
the counter-frame even more strongly when the counter-frame was presented 24 days (t3) 
after first frame exposure or when the counter-frame was repeated at t2 and t3. That is, 
memory-based initial emphasis framing effects seem highly vulnerable to the asynchronous 
presentation of counter-frames, which seem to easily reverse the initial effects into their 
attitudinal direction even when there is only a shorter delay of 14 days between exposure 
to the different one-sided frames and even more so if the delay is longer (24 days). 
However, a different scenario emerged for participants who formed an on-line issue 
attitude during initial exposure to a one-sided emphasis frame. As expected by Chong and 
Druckman (2010 ⁠, 2013), the initial framing effect demonstrated higher persistence for such 
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respondents. In fact, exposure to a counter-frame 14 days later (t2) did not change the initial 
framing effect, but a clear primacy effect was evident. Even after exposure to the civil rights 
counter-frame, participants who received the terrorism frame 14 days earlier still supported 
the new surveillance law at t2 at the same magnitude as at t1. They also supported the law 
significantly more strongly at t2 than respondents exposed to the civil rights frame first (t1), 
who likewise demonstrated a persistent initial framing effect when exposed 14 days later 
(t2) to their counter-frame (i.e., the terrorism frame). Moreover, not even repetitive 
exposure to a counter-frame changed the initial one-sided emphasis framing effect. 
Participants who formed an on-line attitude and received the civil rights frame at t1 opposed 
the new surveillance law at the same magnitude 24 days later (t3) after exposure to the 
terrorism frame once 14 days after initial frame exposure and a second time 10 days later. 
However, even for respondents who formed an online-attitude at t1, Chong and 
Druckman (2013) also found some recency effects of the counter-frames encountered later. 
When the time delay between initial frame exposure and participants’ first exposure to a 
counter-frame was 24 days (t3 without repetition), initial framing effects weakened 
substantially and respondents’ issue attitude followed the counter-frame. That is, the 
counter-frame produced a recency effect, because the time span without any frame 
exposure was too long, meaning participants may have forgotten their on-line attitude and 
could not re-activate it from memory. 
In sum, the results by Chong and Druckman (2010⁠, 2013) imply the superiority of 
frames encountered later in asynchronous frame competition. Note though that these 
recency effects are limited by the degree to which citizens possess on-line attitudes through 
which initial framing effects rather persist (i.e., primacy effects) if the time delay between 
frame exposure is not too long. Moreover, the results did not reveal many situations in 
which the effects of single emphasis frames cancel out over time, as is often the case in 
situations of simultaneous frame competition (see Subchapter 2.4.2). That is, 
asynchronous competition often does not prevent emphasis framing effects. Rather, 
citizens arbitrarily change their issue attitude based on the emphasis frame currently more 
salient, even though they formed a different issue attitude when another frame was more 
salient before. 
 
Need to evaluate as a moderator in asynchronous frame competition 
The results for the moderating role of attitude certainty and type of attitude formation 
described earlier imply that the strength of prior attitudes can be decisive regarding whether 
initial framing effects persist when citizens are exposed later in time to a counter-frame. 
The role of prior attitude strength was also observed in another experiment by Chong and 
Druckman (2010), in which attitude strength was operationalized by measuring citizens’ 
need to evaluate. As noted in Subchapter 2.4.1, the need to evaluate is a psychological trait 
variable that describes how frequently a person engages in the psychological evaluation of 
all types of objects. The higher individuals’ need to evaluate, the more likely it is they already 
possess (strong) prior attitudes toward political issues. At a single point in time, a high need 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 114 
to evaluate can prevent the occurrence of one-sided emphasis framing effects (cf. 
Druckman & Nelson, 2003). In particular, this is the case when the political issue framed 
has already gained some public attention and persons with a high need to evaluate already 
had the opportunity to form an initial attitude toward the issue before frame exposure. 
However, Chong and Druckman (2010) assumed that need to evaluate could also 
be an individual-level moderator of single emphasis framing effects in asynchronous frame 
competition over time. If initial frame exposure at t1 is the first time a person is exposed to 
the political topic, the effects of one-sided emphasis frames and of strong frames when 
simultaneously accompanied by a weak counter-frame likely occur independently from 
citizens’ need to evaluate. However, the type (not the direction) of attitude that citizens 
form after initial frame exposure may differ according to need to evaluate. As persons with 
a high need to evaluate tend to form clearer judgments, the attitude formed after initial 
frame exposure at t1 should have higher attitude strength. This may then make it less likely 
that subsequent exposure to a one-sided counter-frame at t2 changes the initially formed 
attitude. Rather, the attitude formed at t1 will likely persist after delayed counter-framing. 
Essentially, in asynchronous frame competition, a primacy effect of initial frame exposure 
should be evident when need to evaluate is high (Chong & Druckman, 2010). 
In contrast, persons with a low need to evaluate are less likely to form strong 
attitudes based on initial frame exposure at t1, as they generally engage less in forming clear 
judgments. Subsequently, exposure to a one-sided counter-frame later in time at t2 should 
be influential and should reverse the initial emphasis framing effect into the direction of 
the counter-frame encountered later. That is, a recency effect should be evident in 
asynchronous frame competition when citizens have a low need to evaluate (Chong 
& Druckman, 2010). 
To test these assumptions, Chong and Druckman (2010) partly relied on their 
experimental study on an urban growth project (cf. Chong & Druckman, 2007a) already 
described in Subchapter 2.4.2. However, the authors added a second frame exposure three 
weeks after (t2) initial frame exposure (t1). At t1, respondents were exposed to either a one-
sided frame or to competing frames simultaneously. Moreover, the strength of the emphasis 
frames also varied. As such, the experiment contained a strongly and a weakly compelling 
emphasis frame valenced against the urban growth project and a strongly and a weakly 
compelling frame in favor of the project. Some participants were exposed only to one of 
these frames, and others received to two or even three of these frames in simultaneous 
frame competition at t1. As noted in Subchapter 2.4.2, directly after initial frame exposure, 
the results revealed that simultaneously competing strong frames cancelled out the effects 
of each single frame, but when strong frames were presented as one-sided or in 
simultaneous competition to a weak counter-frame, the strong frames exerted clear 
attitudinal effects. In contrast, weak frames were mostly ineffective. These results regarding 
initial frame exposure at t1 were independent of respondents’ need to evaluate. 
Three weeks later at t2, participants received either a strong or a weak one-sided 
counter-frame and again reported their issue attitude. To ensure that the frame presented 
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at t2 was a counter-frame to the initial framing situation at t1, Chong and Druckman (2010) 
exposed respondents to the frame that was either underrepresented at t1 or that countered 
a balanced competing situation at t1. For instance, when participants were exposed only to 
the strong pro frame at t1, they received as a counter-frame at t2 a strong con frame. When 
respondents received a strong con and weak pro frame at t1, the counter-frame at t2 was a 
strong pro frame. When the initial frame exposure at t1 was a strong con frame, participants’ 
counter-frame three weeks later at t2 was a weak pro frame, and so on. To examine the 
recency effects of the counter-frame presented at t2, the authors tested at t2 any change in 
the initial attitude respondents formed after first frame exposure at t1. 
First, without considering citizens’ need to evaluate, participants on aggregate 
demonstrated consistent recency effects of the counter-frame presented three weeks (t2) 
after initial frame exposure (t1) when the counter-frame was a strong frame, but only few 
and weaker recency effects when the counter-frame at t2 was weak. For instance, 
respondents first exposed to the strong pro frame strongly favored the urban growth 
project (t1). However, exposure to the strong con frame three weeks later (t2) significantly 
reduced participants’ support for the project. Likewise, respondents receiving 
simultaneously at t1 a strong con and only a weak pro frame first opposed the project, but 
when exposed to the strong pro frame as a counter-frame at t2, participants supported the 
project significantly more strongly. In contrast, when respondents received a strong con 
frame with a weak pro frame first (t1), counter-framing with a weak pro frame was 
ineffective at t2 and participants were opposed to the project at the same magnitude as after 
initial frame exposure at t1. Thus, on aggregate, strong counter-frames presented in 
asynchronous frame competition changed initial issue attitudes, whereas the weak counter-
frame did not (or less). This suggests that counter-framing three weeks later does not 
reverse per se initial emphasis framing effects but the persuasiveness of the presented 
counter-frame is decisive for recency effects through delayed counter-framing. 
Next, Chong and Druckman (2010) investigated whether respondents’ need to 
evaluate moderated the strength of the counter-framing effects. They found that the change 
in participants’ issue attitude between initial frame exposure (t1) and exposure to the one-
sided counter-frame three weeks later (t2) occurred at different strengths in the direction of 
the counter-frame depending on respondents’ need to evaluate. The lower a person’s need 
to evaluate, the more strongly the initial framing effect changed in the direction of the 
counter-frame encountered three weeks later. In contrast, a very strong need to evaluate 
prevented relevant attitudinal shifts based on the counter-frame, but led to persistent initial 
framing effects over time. 
Moreover, this moderating mechanism of need to evaluate occurred for both strong 
and weak counter-frames. Respondents with a low need to evaluate demonstrated clear 
recency effects of the counter-frame presented later when the counter-frame was strong or 
weak, although with a somewhat smaller effect size when weak. This indicates that 
participants with a low need to evaluate who formed weaker issue attitudes during initial 
frame exposure were highly susceptible to the recency effects evoked by the presentation 
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of counter-frames in asynchronous frame competition. In contrast, a high need to evaluate 
fostered the stability of initial emphasis framing effects over time. Thus, this study adds 
further evidence that the strength of prior attitudes can be decisive for whether initial 
framing effects persist or reverse when citizens are later exposed to a one-sided counter-
frame. 
 
Political knowledge as a moderator in asynchronous frame competition 
Besides prior attitude strength, citizens’ political knowledge has also received attention as a 
potential moderator of the persistence of initial emphasis framing effects in asynchronous 
frame competition in an experimental study by Lecheler and de Vreese (2013). The authors 
hypothesized that the most recently encountered frame would influence citizens’ issue 
attitudes the most, as the considerations made salient by the last frame received tend to be 
more easily accessible than the considerations highlighted by the opposing frame 
encountered earlier in time. Moreover, Lecheler and de Vreese (2013) assumed that the 
strength of such recency effects of the counter-frame presented later increases when the 
time delay is longer between exposure to the initial one-sided frame exposure and the one-
sided counter-frame. 
In addition to these assumptions, the authors expected that recency effects would 
be less pronounced when citizens possess high political knowledge. They reasoned that 
such citizens would have a greater ability to integrate the offered connection between the 
frame and the issue into their long-term memory when exposed to a one-sided frame first 
(t1). When these citizens later receive a counter-frame (e.g., t2), it is more likely that the 
frame connection learned during prior frame exposure is still available and can be activated. 
This re-activated opposing first frame can then serve to counter-argue the later counter-
frame, through which the recency effects of the counter-frame should be less pronounced 
(Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). 
In contrast, citizens with low political knowledge would be less likely to store the 
connection between the first frame and the issue in their long-term memory after initial 
frame exposure (t1). The reason is that it is generally more difficult for them to integrate 
new aspects into their memory because of fewer cognitive points of references to help them 
store these new aspects in their mental stockpile. Thus, when citizens with low political 
knowledge are later exposed to a one-sided counter-frame (t2), they are less likely to easily 
remember the frame they received earlier at t1 and thus, less likely to counter-argue the 
counter-frame received last. As a result, recency effects of counter-frames presented later 
in time should be more pronounced when citizens have low political knowledge (Lecheler 
& de Vreese, 2013). 
Parts of the experimental design employed to test these assumptions were already 
described in Subchapter 2.6.2 before when presenting the conditions that dealt exclusively 
with repetitive framing over time. However, this study also included conditions that 
explored the role of political knowledge in asynchronous frame competition. After the 
authors measured respondents’ political knowledge, participants received at t1 a one-sided 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 117 
emphasis frame that offered a certain issue interpretation concerning the enlargement of 
the European Union. Some respondents received a positively valenced “opportunity” 
frame and others read a negative “risk” frame. They then reported their issue attitude 
immediately after the first one-sided frame exposure, revealing a significant emphasis 
framing effect at t1. Either 15 minutes (t2), 1 day (t3), 1 week (t4), or 2 weeks (t5) after initial 
frame exposure, participants received once a one-sided counter-frame and again answered 
questions on their issue attitude. That is, respondents who read the opportunity frame at t1, 
were later exposed to the risk counter-frame once at one of the mentioned later points in 
time, and participants who received first the risk frame were later exposed once to the 
opportunity counter-frame. 
Without considering citizens’ level of political knowledge, Lecheler and de Vreese 
(2013) found that the initial framing effect based on the first one-sided frame exposure (t1) 
reversed in the direction of the counter-frame presented later. When the counter-frame was 
the opportunity frame, the recency effect of this frame occurred at all respective time points 
at which the study varied exposure to the counter-frame, be that 15 minutes (t2), 1 day (t3), 
1 week (t4), or 2 weeks (t5) after initial frame exposure. However, when the counter-frame 
was the risk frame, a recency effect of this frame was only evident when presenting the 
counter-frame one week (t4) or two weeks (t5) later, i.e., when the delay between initial frame 
exposure and exposure to the counter-frame was longer. Still, this result suggests again that 
the last encountered emphasis frame tends to be the most effective frame in asynchronous 
frame competition, not the frame citizens are exposed to first. 
Next, Lecheler and de Vreese (2013) tested whether the recency effects of counter-
framing differed according to respondents’ political knowledge. They found that 
participants with low political knowledge changed their attitude more strongly based on the 
counter-frame received later than did respondents with high political knowledge. However, 
this differential recency effect was limited to situations in which the counter-frame was 
presented shortly after initial frame exposure, namely 15 minutes later (t2) or 1 day later (t3). 
In the long run, citizens with high political knowledge were not less susceptible to the 
recency effects of the counter-frame received last. That is, political knowledge can lead to 
somewhat more persistent initial emphasis framing effects. However, overall, the results of 
this study also suggested relatively clear counter-framing effects in asynchronous frame 
competition. This implies that initial emphasis framing effects are not durable when 
contested by competing frames later in time. 
 
Summary 
This subchapter presented empirical results on the durability of the attitudinal effects of 
single emphasis frames in asynchronous frame competition over time, i.e., in situations in 
which citizens receive first a (one-sided) emphasis frame and later in time (e.g., two weeks 
later) a one-sided counter-frame with the opposite valence than the first frame. Although 
the studies found consistent emphasis framing effects on citizens’ issue attitude after initial 
frame exposure, these effects often did not persist over time when citizens were later 
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exposed to a counter-frame. Moreover, the attitudinal effects of exposure to the counter-
frame were often so strong they not only cancelled out the initial emphasis framing effects, 
as in simultaneous frame competition (see Subchapter 2.4.2), but the asynchronous 
counter-frame reversed the initial framing effects in the opposite direction, i.e., in the 
direction of the counter-frame. This suggests that in asynchronous frame competition, 
while the frames presented initially and those presented later are effective, ultimately, there 
are consistently stronger recency effects of later exposure to a counter-frame through which 
the last encountered frame usually surpasses the initial framing effect. The one-sided 
emphasis frame citizens receive last in asynchronous frame competition matters most in 
their attitude formation. 
However, some moderating variables influence whether and how strongly recency 
effects occur. The effects of counter-frames presented later in time tend to be more 
pronounced when the initial attitude formed after initial frame exposure is less strong, 
memory-based, held with low certainty, when citizens have a low need to evaluate, or 
possess a lower level of political knowledge. In contrast, when initial issue attitudes are 
formed with high certainty, on-line, or citizens have a high need to evaluate, initial emphasis 
framing effects can persist and do not change over time through later exposure to a counter-
frame. That is, at least citizens with strong prior attitudes resist counter-framing, although 
delayed counter-framing reverses initial emphasis framing effects on average. 
Still, the question remains as to the implications of the empirical results regarding 
emphasis framing effects over time for assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
under framing conditions. To address this, the following Subchapter 2.6.4 first 
summarizes the most relevant results for the general durability of emphasis framing effects 
over time, the influence of frame repetition for the persistence of these effects, and the role 
of asynchronous frame competition for the durability of emphasis framing effects. Next, it 
discusses the implications of these results for rational attitude formation. 
2.6.4 Summary and further implications for assessing citizens’ rationality in 
attitude formation 
The last subchapters focused on the durability of emphasis framing effects over time to 
assess better their long-term consequences. Subchapter 2.6.1 provided empirical results 
on the general durability of emphasis framing effects based on single one-sided frame 
exposure, i.e., without any further exposure to the same or another emphasis frame for the 
same political issue. The majority of studies revealed that such effects decrease rather soon 
over time and weaken or even diminish as soon as ten days after frame exposure (see Table 
5). However, when citizens form strong on-line issue attitudes during frame exposure, initial 
emphasis framing effects tend to be more persistent and do not diminish entirely. Still, 
single one-sided frame exposure does not seem very consequential in the long term. Even 
if different citizens receive different emphasis frames, they soon forget these and revert to 
their default issue attitude as if frame exposure had not occurred a few days or weeks before. 
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Table 5. Summary of empirical results for the durability of emphasis framing effects over 
time and the role of frame repetition 
Investigated 











− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + no effect 
ten days after frame exposure (t2) (Druckman & Nelson, 2003) 
− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + no or 
weaker effect three weeks after frame exposure (t2) (Tewksbury et al., 
2000) 
− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + no effect 
two weeks (t2) or six weeks after frame exposure (t3) (Lecheler, Keer et 
al., 2015) 
− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 independent 
of type of attitude formation (memory-based, on-line, non-manipulated) 
+ no effect ten days after frame exposure (t2) when memory-based or 
non-manipulated type of attitude formation at t1 + when on-line attitude 
formation at t1, initial framing effects persist at t2 (Chong & Druckman, 
2010) 
− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + frame 
effect persists one day after frame exposure (t2) + frame effect persists 
one week after frame exposure (t3), but is weaker than at t1 and t2 + 
frame effect persists two weeks after frame exposure (t4),  but is weaker 
than at t1 and t2 + durability of frame effect over time somewhat 
stronger for moderate level of political knowledge than for low/high 






− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + when 
exposure to the same frame repeated three times (t2: one day later, t3: one 
week later, t4: two weeks later) initial frame effect mainly persists at the 
same magnitude two weeks (t4) and six weeks (t5) after initial frame 
exposure + initial framing effect at t5 only when moderate political 
knowledge, but not when low or high (Lecheler, Keer et al., 2015) 
− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + when 
exposure to the same frame repeated once (t2: 15 minutes later, or t3: 1 
day later, or t4: 1 week later, or t5: 2 weeks later) initial frame effect 
persists at the same magnitude at all respective time points (t2-t5) + 
sometimes somewhat stronger repetitive frame effect when high political 
knowledge than when low political knowledge (Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2013) 
− Initial framing effect at t1 after two months (t0-t1) of predominant 
exposure to a certain frame when attitude formation at t1 is memory-
based, but not when on-line attitude formation + additional effects at t2 
of predominant exposure to the same frame in a further period of two 
months (t1-t2) when memory-based, but not when on-line attitude 
formation at t1 + no or less effects of predominant frame exposure for 
shorter time spans (Matthes, 2007b⁠, 2008) 
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However, the short-term nature of emphasis framing effects based on single one-
sided frame exposure also indicates the lower rationality of these effects, although only 
temporarily. Citizens form an issue attitude in an arbitrary manner based on which frame is 
currently more salient. However, a few days later, this influenced attitude reverts to the 
initial state prior to any frame exposure. On one hand, this implies that preferences stabilize 
again rather soon after exposure to a one-sided emphasis frame. As rationality can be 
defined as the stability of attitudes that should not change based on the mere emphasis of 
a certain frame when available substantive information remains unchanged (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981, also see Subchapter 2.2.2), single frame exposure often does not 
threaten rationality in the long term. 
On the other hand, the interim occurrence of the emphasis framing effect, which 
reverts after a few days, indicates that the stability of preferences is violated for some time. 
The mere increased salience of the frame alters citizens’ issue attitude, and when the salience 
disappears after frame exposure, the effect also disappears soon, implying that the effect is 
labile and itself not substantiated. Thus, emphasis framing poses at least a temporary risk 
to rational attitude formation. Moreover, arbitrary attitudinal differences based on a single 
frame exposure can sometimes persist over time, in particular when citizens form on-line 
attitudes during initial frame exposure. In such cases, they arbitrarily rely on the salient 
frame, form a strong issue attitude based on this salience, and store the attitude in their 
mental stockpile through which the arbitrary attitude becomes more persistent over time. 
Next, Subchapter 2.6.2 revealed that repeated exposure to the same emphasis over 
time can increase the persistence and sometimes even the strength of initial emphasis 
framing effects (also see Table 5 for a summary). That is, even though emphasis framing 
effects tend to be short term and thus less consequential in the long term, frame repetition 
can stabilize the effects of emphasis frames up to four weeks after last frame exposure. 
Hence, persisting attitudinal differences can arise between citizens repeatedly exposed to 
the same emphasis frame and citizens who frequently receive another frame, which might 
increase polarization in societies and distort democratic decision-making (see Chapter 6.2 
for a longer discussion on the potential societal consequences of emphasis framing). Given 
that already the initial emphasis framing effect implies arbitrary attitudinal differences based 
only on which frame a person was exposed to for a political issue, the persistence of this 
effect due to frame repetition indicates that this less rationally formed attitude can stabilize 
over time. That is, frame repetition seems to increase the stability of irrational and 
unsubstantiated issue attitudes in the long term. 
However, the strongest indication for citizens’ irrationality in attitude formation 
under framing conditions, discussed in Subchapter 2.6.3, is asynchronous frame 
competition. Whereas simultaneous frame competition often cancels out the attitudinal 
effects of single emphasis frames, and citizens show stable attitudes not affected by frames 
(see Subchapter 2.4.2), this changes considerably when citizens are first exposed to a one-
sided emphasis frame and after some delay in time, to a counter-frame with the opposite 
valence. 
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In such situations, initial exposure to one-sided emphasis frames yield consistently 
clear attitudinal effects, but later exposure to a counter-frame often reverses these initial 
effects in the opposite direction, i.e., in the direction of the counter-frame (see Table 6). 
That is, each single emphasis frame is effective, but the last received frame is so influential 
it overrides initial effects and citizens base their issue attitude on the last frame, even though 
they were exposed earlier to a competing frame. These recency effects emerged in the 
majority of empirical studies, especially when the initially formed issue attitude based on 
first frame exposure was memory-based, held with less certainty, citizens had a low need to 
evaluate, or the counter-frame was a strong frame. 
This implies even twice an irrational attitude formation under the realistic condition 
of asynchronous frame competition. First, citizens arbitrarily base their initial attitude on 
the frame they received first, indicating already at the onset of asynchronous frame 
competition an unsubstantiated attitudinal effect triggered by nothing but the more salient 
frame for the same issue. Second, the stability of preferences as the defining criterion of 
rationality is violated again when citizens receive a counter-frame a few days later. The 
initial, unsubstantiated attitudinal effect does not simply disappear when exposed to the 
counter-frame, as happens in simultaneous frame competition through which the final 
attitudes remain unaffected by framing and thus in a rational state (see Subchapter 2.4.2). 
In contrast, the delayed, asynchronous counter-frame overrides the initial effect and 
the attitude switches in the direction of the counter-frame. This means that issue attitudes 
tend to vary arbitrarily between each single framing step in asynchronous frame 
competition and it is difficult to observe stable preferences over time for a certain attitude. 
Moreover, when citizens form their attitude after the delayed counter-framing, they seem 
to forget entirely the former frame with the opposite valence that was decisive in their 
earlier attitude formation. In fact, they do not really consider the former frame in their 
attitude formation, but mainly the latter frame, despite that they would not be affected by 
any frame had they been exposed to them simultaneously. That is, arbitrary attitudinal 
differences also emerge when comparing simultaneous and asynchronous frame exposure 
to competing frames, although citizens ultimately received exactly the same frames. Thus, 
exposure to emphasis frames in asynchronous frame competition over time can lead to 
irrational attitude formation based on the salience of the emphasis frame encountered last. 
However, when citizens have a high need to evaluate and form strong on-line issue 
attitudes with high certainty during initial frame exposure, they are less susceptible to 
subsequent strong attitudinal changes based on exposure to a counter-frame later in time 
(see Table 6). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that such citizens form rational 
issue attitudes. In the case of the primacy effects of first frame exposure that persist at 
about the same magnitude after delayed counter-framing, the initially formed issue attitude 
still relies arbitrarily and irrationally on the emphasis frame presented first. However, the 
attitude then resists further arbitrary change in the direction of the counter-frame. That is, 
the subsequent persistence of the initial irrational attitude does not imply that the final 
attitude is rational; it is still biased by initial frame exposure. 
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Table 6. Summary of empirical results for the durability of emphasis framing effects over 












− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 independent 
of attitude certainty + when ten days later (t2) exposed once to a one-
sided counter-frame, initial framing effect disappears at t2 when high 
attitude certainty at t1 (cancelling out effect), but initial framing effect 
reverses in the direction of the received counter-frame at t2 when low 







− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 independent 
of type of attitude formation (memory-based, on-line, non-
manipulated) + ten days later (t2) exposed once to a one-sided counter-
frame (cf. Chong & Druckman, 2010) and/or 24 days later (t3) exposed 
(again) to the (same) counter-frame (cf. Chong & Druckman, 2013) + 
when non-manipulated type of attitude formation at t1, initial framing 
effect disappears when receiving a counter-frame at t2 (cancelling-out 
effect) and reverses when exposed again to the counter-frame at t3 
(recency effect) or when solely exposed to the counter-frame at t3 but 
not at t2 (recency effect) + when memory-based attitude at t1, initial 
frame effect reverses in the direction of the received counter-frame at t2 
(recency effect) and even more so when exposed again to the counter-
frame at t3 (increased recency effect) or when solely exposed to the 
counter-frame at t3 but not at t2 (increased recency effect) + when on-
line attitude at t1, initial framing effect persists despite exposure to 
counter-frame at t2 (primacy effect) and despite repeated exposure to 
this counter-frame at t3 (primacy effect), but when solely exposed to the 
counter-frame at t3 and not at t2, initial framing effect reverses (recency 






− When simultaneous competition between differently valenced frames at 
t1, competing strong frames cancel out each other but strong frames 
effective when competing frame is weak, whereas weak frames 
ineffective + three weeks later exposed once to a strong or weak 
counter-frame (t2) + when strong frame at t2, initial framing effect 
reverses (recency effect) + when weak frame at t2, initial framing effect 
mainly persists (primacy effect) + high need to evaluate fosters primacy 
effects, but low need to evaluate fosters recency effects regardless of 






− Initial effect of one-sided frames after frame exposure at t1 + when 
later exposed once to a one-sided counter-frame (t2: 15 minutes later or 
t3: 1 day later or t4: 1 week later or t5: 2 weeks later), initial frame effect 
reverses in the direction of the counter-frame at all points in time for 
counter-frame A (t2-t5), but solely at later points in time for counter-
frame B (t4 & t5) + recency effects sometimes (t2 & t3) stronger when 
political knowledge low than when high (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013) 
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In some empirical studies, however, exposure to a counter-frame was slightly 
effective and canceled out the initial framing effect. If this outcome occurs – which seems 
rare – asynchronous frame competition can lead to rational attitude formation after 
counter-framing in which no frame is effective in the end and thus, no arbitrary attitudinal 
differences are evident based on the temporal sequence of the frames over time. Then, the 
final issue attitudes are comparable to situations of simultaneous frame competition in 
which the emphasis on various frames prevents irrational frame effects. Furthermore, when 
the counter-frame is a weak and less compelling frame, it is ineffective and does not further 
threaten citizens’ rationality in attitude formation. However, most studies demonstrated the 
clear recency effects of the counter-frame received last, implying in general a rather strong 
tendency for irrational attitude formation in situations of asynchronous frame competition 
over time. 
Again, however, this is thus far a preliminary conclusion on an irrational attitude 
formation due to emphasis framing. Chapter 2.8 discusses important recent critiques on 
the empirical paradigm of researching emphasis framing effects, which (also) questions 
whether the constructed emphasis frames described in the literature can imply irrational 
attitudinal changes at all. Before presenting this criticism and the solution this book 
proposes to tackle it, Chapter 2.7 offers a summarizing interim conclusion on what most 
of the (criticized) literature suggests regarding the effects of emphasis frames on citizens’ 
attitude formation. 
2.7 Interim conclusion: The (ir-)relevance of emphasis 
frames in attitude formation 
The last chapters provided an extensive overview of prior scientific literature on emphasis 
framing effects. Chapter 2.1 defined these as the effects of salient, content-related, and 
valenced issue perspectives in political messages on the formation of citizens’ issue 
attitudes. Chapter 2.2 then provided a large volume of empirical evidence on simple 
emphasis framing effects. When citizens receive a one-sided emphasis frame highlighting a 
certain perspective of a political issue or event, they form – on average – significantly 
different issue attitudes than when exposed to another differently valenced frame 
emphasizing another perspective or when exposed to no frame. As such, citizens’ attitude 
formation relies on the emphasis frame salient in a message, but if a different frame is more 
salient, they form a different issue attitude. This result, which has been often replicated, 
implies that emphasis framing can be a powerful tool for political actors to influence the 
electorate, but seems to question citizens’ rationality in attitude formation, which should 
resist unstable attitudinal preferences based on the mere emphasis of a certain issue aspect. 
Although the same political issue is framed, citizens arbitrarily rely on the more salient 
aspect of the issue and show unstable attitudinal preferences that seem to change only 
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because of what is emphasized in a political message as most important, not because of the 
substance of an issue. 
Next, Chapter 2.3 “zoomed” into these effects to explore the explaining 
psychological mechanisms that mediate emphasis framing effects. However, the empirical 
studies on cognitive mediators reviewed produced no evidence that such effects are the 
mere result of simply increasing the temporary accessibility of a certain frame in a person’s 
working memory, which citizens then unconsciously employ in their attitude formation. In 
contrast, empirical studies suggest that emphasis frames rather work consciously and 
strengthen how appropriate (i.e., applicable) citizens judge the highlighted issue perspective 
in interpreting the issue. However, it remains empirically unclear whether emphasis framing 
rather fosters the applicability of the frame itself (belief importance) or also adds or changes 
certain content-related beliefs about the issue (belief content). At a first glance, the 
conscious increase in applicability judgments might be interpreted as rational shifts in 
citizens’ attitude formation by learning what is important about an issue. However, this 
might be rather a form of seeming rationality, as also these conscious applicability 
judgments often shift arbitrarily depending on frame exposure. 
Chapter 2.4 then revealed that emphasis framing effects tend to be more complex 
than suggested in the studies on simple emphasis framing. In fact, such effects do not 
always work uniformly for all citizens. The effects can also be moderated by additional 
variables at the individual level. In particular, emphasis framing effects tend to be stronger 
when aligned with citizen’s prior political attitudes, while strong prior attitudes that contrast 
the emphasized frame rather prevent the occurrence of such effects. However, matching 
individual characteristics are not always necessary conditions for an emphasis frame to 
influence a person’s issue attitude. Possibly, emphasis frames also affect citizens who are 
less susceptible, although to a lower extent. Still, the relevance of individual-level 
moderators suggests that not everyone is affected by any frame, but that citizens often only 
follow the frames they individually judge as appropriate. This suggests that emphasis 
framing effects are less arbitrary and thus less irrational attitudinal shifts than suggested 
when only examining the main effects of frames. 
Moreover, Chapter 2.4 showed that the occurrence of other message characteristics 
such as source credibility or party cues often reduce the strength of emphasis framing 
effects. Most important is that when political messages emphasize simultaneously 
competing frames for the same issue, framing effects are limited and the effects of the single 
frames often cancel each other out. That is, in more realistic scenarios of frame competition, 
citizens’ rationality in attitude formation is not much threatened, as the presence of various 
frame emphases mostly prevents that citizens arbitrarily base their attitude on a single 
emphasis frame. 
However, Chapter 2.5 introduced value emphasis frames as a specific type of 
emphasis frame that construct the meaning of issues based on fundamental and widely 
cherished political values. Empirical studies revealed that such frames exert relatively strong 
attitudinal effects when presented in a one-sided way. Even though value emphasis framing 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 125 
effects are more pronounced when they match citizens’ political value preferences, i.e., 
when they are value-resonant, they can also influence citizens with non-matching values, 
because such frames draw on issue aspects that are difficult to neglect even if they are not 
at the top of individuals’ value hierarchies. That is, value emphasis frames have the capacity 
to influence citizens to form issue attitudes aligned with non-preferred political values, 
violating their otherwise highly stable political value preferences. Thus, value emphasis 
framing can lead to irrational attitudes that shift arbitrarily based on the emphasized frame 
and are not aligned with citizens’ deeply held political stances, at least when value emphasis 
frames are presented as one-sided frames. 
The strongest evidence for citizens’ susceptibility to irrational attitude formation 
under framing conditions was provided by empirical studies that investigated emphasis 
framing effects over time (see Chapter 2.6). The short-term nature of emphasis framing 
effects that decrease soon after single one-sided frame exposure, for example, suggests that 
citizens’ issue attitudes are temporarily unstable and revert to a default position. This 
underlines how unsubstantiated the arbitrary interim attitudinal shifts induced by emphasis 
framing are. While citizens regain a state of stable attitudes soon after frame exposure, and 
thus return to rational attitudes later unaffected by framing, the repetition of the same frame 
over time often increases the persistence of initial emphasis framing effects, making these 
arbitrary attitudes consequential in the long term. 
Moreover, in the realistic setting of asynchronous frame competition over time, in 
which citizens first receive a one-sided frame and later in time a counter-frame with the 
opposite valence, issue attitudes oscillate between the different frame directions when 
strong attitudes are not formed during initial frame exposure. That is, even though citizens 
have been exposed to a competing frame before and thus should know the relevance of a 
different issue perspective, the one-sided counter-framing presented later often shifts 
initially formed issue attitudes to the opposite direction. In asynchronous frame 
competition, each single emphasis frame is effective and reverses prior framing effects. 
Thus, citizens’ final issue attitude depends in many cases on the temporal sequence of frame 
exposure, which does not confirm rational attitude formation under framing conditions 
over time. 
Therefore, the empirical literature on emphasis framing effects in general seems to 
suggest three main results regarding when and how strongly frames influence citizens’ issue 
attitudes in an irrational manner. First, the presentation of one-sided emphasis frames 
produces often arbitrary and irrational attitudinal differences, especially when employing 
political values in the frames. However, not everyone is equally susceptible to any frame, 
and individual characteristics can moderate and dampen emphasis framing effects in a 
rational manner. Second, the simultaneous presentation of frames mostly prevents the 
occurrence of single emphasis framing effects. In such situations, citizens form rational 
attitudes that are not affected by the mere emphasis on certain aspects of an issue. Third, 
however, when exposure to competing frames takes place sequentially with some delay in 
time between single (one-sided) frame exposures, frame competition does often not 
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prevent emphasis framing effects. In fact, citizens often form their attitude based on the 
last frame encountered, reversing initial attitudinal effects. Thus, when emphasis frames are 
presented one-sided – regardless of whether it is the first time a person receives a frame for 
the issue or was already exposed to a competing frame earlier in time – such frames tend 
to threaten rational attitude formation. 
2.8 A response to recent criticism on emphasis framing 
effects 
2.8.1 The confounding of thematic information and emphasis frames in 
empirical research and its implications 
The last chapters showed that empirical studies on emphasis framing effects in political 
communication produced much evidence of citizens’ susceptibility to (one-sided) emphasis 
frames. However, the current empirical paradigm of researching emphasis framing effects 
has received important criticism questioning the existence of emphasis framing effects, 
even in one-sided situations. The main argument of these is that emphasis frames are 
wrongly designed in (experimental) studies and confound the manipulation of frames with 
the additional manipulation of substantive issue-specific information and persuasive 
arguments (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). In other words, 
frame manipulations not only vary how a topic is presented, but also what is presented 
regarding the topic (Cacciatore et al., 2016). What does this mean and what are the 
consequences of such confounding when assessing emphasis framing effects? 
 
Determining what is confounding 
Beginning with the first question, Leeper and Slothuus (2017) provide an instructive 
example of the confounded manipulation of the framing of a new law (the so-called “Patriot 
Act”) in the study by Druckman and Leeper (2012). One experimental group received the 
“civil rights” emphasis frame, which highlighted that the new law is problematic from a 
civil rights perspective. The other group was exposed to a “security” frame emphasizing 
the importance of the law in preventing terrorist attacks. However, the stimulus material 
not only varied the frame emphasis but also substantive thematic information together with 
the framing condition (see Figure 2). When the law was framed from a civil rights 
perspective, participants read the additional information that “the government has access 
to citizens’ confidential information from telephone and e-mail communications” 
(Druckman & Leeper, 2012, p. 892). In contrast, the condition with the security frame did 
not mention this policy-relevant information, but changed it to “the government has more 
resources for counterterrorism, surveillance, border protection, and other security policies” 
(Druckman & Leeper, 2012, p. 892). 
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Thus, the conditions not only varied regarding the framing of thematic information 
(i.e., the suggestion of with which standard of evaluation the issue should be interpreted) 
but also the thematic information itself. Therefore, respondents in the different groups did 
simply not form an attitude toward the same policy measure, but rated their opinion on 
very different topics in addition to different emphasis frames – a law giving the government 
the means to surveil terrorists and a law for surveilling citizens’ confidential communication. 
Thus, it is unclear whether differences according to the framing condition actually derived 
from the different frames or not simply from the different thematic information. 
Unfortunately, this is not a unique example of confounded emphasis framing effects 
in the literature. Leeper and Slothuus (2017) reviewed more than 100 experimental studies 
on emphasis framing effects, concluding that “most, if not all, framing studies” (p. 3) show 
this confounding between frames and substantive information. D. A. Scheufele and Iyengar 
(2017) agree, offering an abstract criticism of the current emphasis framing research using 
the metaphor that confounded studies not only change the frame of a painting, but also the 
painting itself by mixing emphasis frames with varying thematic information. Although 
many studies seem to follow the relevant distinction between constant thematic core 
elements and varying frame-carrying elements (Price et al., 1997) when constructing frames 
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of emphasis frames confounded with varying thematic 
information 
Thematic information A: New law 
gives government access to citizens’ 
confidential communication 
Emphasis frame A: Law weakens the 
protection of civil liberties 
Emphasis frame B: Law increases 
protection against terrorism 
Thematic information B: New law gives 
government more resources for 
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for experimental research (de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012, also see Subchapter 2.2.1), the 
frame-carrying elements often not only carry the frame itself but also different substantive 
issue-specific information. However, this substantive information should be part of the 
constant thematic core elements to not confound frames and the substantive content of an 
issue or event (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). 
The consequences of this confounding are twofold: First, it can be interpreted as a 
mismatch between the theory that differentiates information-based persuasion effects by 
offering new information and framing-based persuasion as the emphasis on how this 
information should be weighted (cf. Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997), and the empirical paradigm 
confounding both aspects. Second, if the reason for effects between different framing 
conditions is only the varying issue-specific information and not the emphasis frame, 
citizens’ susceptibility to framing effects could be overstated in the literature, because it 
might imply that a simple shift in the frame does not change attitudes; rather, the 
persuasiveness of new and substantive thematic information does (Leeper & Slothuus, 
2017). 
 
Mismatch between theory of framing and empirical paradigm 
First, to elaborate the criticism on the theoretical level, the confounding of frames and 
thematic information in the empirical paradigm have “morphed” emphasis frames into 
messages (D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017, p. 622), rendering emphasis frames 
indistinguishable from other means of persuasion such as providing new information or a 
mix between frames and new information. If thematic information is also a frame, 
everything becomes a frame and every message can be investigated under the label “frame.” 
This threatens the theoretical distinctiveness of the framing approach from other models 
of media effects and transforms the term framing into a “catch-all phrase” (Cacciatore et 
al., 2016, p. 20) that inhibits a meaningful investigation of the underlying psychological 
mechanisms of different message features. 
This is most evident when revisiting the fundamental differentiation between 
information-based persuasion and framing proposed by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997) and 
based on Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) expectancy-value model of attitudes (see Subchapter 
2.3.2). Formally, one can describe an attitude (A) as the sum of beliefs about an attitude 
object (vi) weighted by the importance (wi) attributed to that belief to form the attitude:       
A = ∑ viwi. While information-based persuasion aims to directly change underlying beliefs 
regarding an attitude object or add new beliefs to the equation by providing new thematic 
information on an issue or event (e.g., a new infrastructure project will provide 1,000 new 
jobs), framing – by definition – does not provide new thematic information. Rather, 
emphasis framing tries to change the importance attributed to beliefs by referring to 
evaluative standards (e.g., the creation of jobs is an important goal) that already exist in 
citizens’ knowledge structures (Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). Based on this differentiation, 
the confounding of emphasis frames with new thematic information in experimental stimuli 
inhibits a clear and separate test of the framing hypothesis (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017⁠; D. A. 
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Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). As most emphasis framing studies contain this confounding, 
the theory of framing effects has rarely been tested in accordance with its postulates (Leeper 
& Slothuus, 2017). 
 
Implications for assessing the effectiveness of frames and citizens’ rationality 
Besides this mismatch between framing theory and the empirical paradigm observed by 
critics of the emphasis framing approach (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016 ⁠; Leeper & Slothuus, 
2017⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017), the second consequence of confounding is that the 
effectiveness of frames themselves in influencing citizens’ attitudes could be exaggerated in 
the literature (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). Framing is often understood as a powerful political 
tool with minimal costs (Jacoby, 2000), because it does not necessarily need to change 
underlying beliefs, but works via changing the importance of beliefs (Nelson & Oxley, 
1999). According to the theory, emphasis framing enables altering attitudes without 
providing additional (persuasive) factual information on an issue and without changing the 
informational basis of an attitude (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). Thus, framing is often 
categorized as a subtle form of media influence (D. A. Scheufele, 2000) with potentially 
strong effects (Jacoby, 2000), because it seems “easier to change the frame of reference 
than the beliefs underlying one’s attitude” (Chong, 2000, p. 118). 
For example, if a government can gain support for prohibiting a rally of an 
oppositional political camp by simply emphasizing a security frame describing this rally as 
a threat to public order, the government would not need to also change beliefs about the 
rally and the (maybe critical) political demands behind it. In other words, because of 
emphasis framing, a complex discussion about thematic information and facts, which is 
maybe difficult for a political actor to dominate, is not needed to influence citizens’ attitudes 
in an intended direction. Therefore, framing seems an appealing political strategy often 
employed by political actors (Z. Pan & Kosicki, 2001). 
If, however, emphasis frames and the provision of new thematic information are 
confounded, as in most effect-oriented studies, it is not clear whether framing is actually 
responsible for effects on citizens’ issue attitudes or only the provision of new and 
persuasive factual arguments in the additional varying thematic information affect attitudes 
(Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). Therefore, the effectiveness of frames could be exaggerated and 
their effects may originate only from the varying new thematic information or from the 
combination of the frame emphasis with compelling (one-sided) thematic information. If 
these two alternative explanations are correct, it would be more difficult to expect emphasis 
framing effects outside the laboratory, because it would not be sufficient to emphasize only 
an aspect of an issue to alter belief importance. Instead, political actors would have to 
change thematic beliefs, which requires providing additional and compelling new thematic 
information. 
While the emphasis on a culturally well-known frame is rather easy to communicate 
(e.g., a political value frame, see Subchapter 2.5.2), the provision of new persuasive 
thematic information requires more effort (e.g., producing credible evidence through 
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scientific studies, finding experts who can provide compelling arguments regarding the 
issue). Moreover, in some situations, the opposite camp may have the better arguments and 
facts. If emphasis framing alone is effective, political actors need not fear situations with 
less compelling factual thematic information on their issue position as long as the actors 
employ an applicable frame (e.g., value emphasis frames) that attributes higher importance 
to a specific thematic consideration. In contrast, if the effectiveness of frames depends on 
substantive thematic information, emphasis framing alone will not help a political actor 
shape public opinion without additional control over this information, which is – 
fortunately – difficult to obtain in the current age of social media. 
The (thus far) obscure role of substantive thematic information in the effectiveness 
of emphasis frames is also important in assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
(Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). If “(often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an 
event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion” (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 104), 
“framing effects suggest that distributions of public preferences are arbitrary, and that 
political elites can manipulate popular preferences to serve their own interests” (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007b, p. 120). In other words, emphasis framing effects suggest at a first 
glance that citizens do not form attitudes rationally, but change their attitudes toward an 
issue based on simple shifts in frames (also see Subchapter 2.2.2, Subchapter 2.5.4, and 
Subchapter 2.6.4). 
Of course, changes in attitudes are not per se a sign of irrational attitude formation, 
but can also imply that citizens are willing to learn and adjust their attitudes when receiving 
messages (Chong & Druckman, 2007b). However, rationality depends on the aspect of the 
message citizens use to form or alter their attitudes, namely new substantive thematic 
information or emphasis frames. A defining criterion of rationality is the consistency and 
coherence of preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). More specifically, rationality 
implies that a person arrives consistently at the same result (e.g., a preference, a decision, 
or an attitude) when faced with the same substantive information. Rationality further means 
that this consistency should not be affected by changes in the frame (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), namely by how the same substantive information is presented. 
In contrast, irrationality means that people arbitrarily demonstrate different results 
when the informational situation is consistent. For instance, it is irrational to prefer policy 
A to policy B in the morning but policy B over policy A in the evening when the policy 
options remain the same. Moreover, it is irrational when citizens rely on aspects of the 
presentation of the same information for their attitude formation, such as frames or order, 
and thus do not base their preference on substantive information. For example, a person 
displays unsubstantiated, irrational preferences when preferring policy A over policy B 
when policy A is presented first, but prefers policy B over policy A when policy B is 
presented first. If, however, thematic information varies, changing preferences are not 
irrational, because this change follows a new informational situation. For instance, one can 
first prefer hypothesis A to hypothesis B based on theoretical considerations, but it can be 
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rational to later prefer hypothesis B to A when new information is presented such as new 
empirical evidence for hypothesis B. 
In short, changes in attitudes are not irrational if thematic information about the 
attitude object varies in a message, but changes in attitudes are less rational if issue-specific 
information is constant and only the emphasis frame varies. The confounding of frames 
and thematic information in most experimental studies on emphasis framing effects implies 
that different preferences based on the framing condition can be interpreted as rational 
attitude changes, because they are actually based on different thematic information (for 
such an interpretation, see e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007b). However, confounded studies 
cannot test the opposite – irrationality in attitude formation – because thematic information 
varies alongside the frame. Thus, these studies are not a valid foundation from which to 
assess the influence of framing on rational attitude formation. Therefore, it is important to 
differentiate between thematic information and emphasis frames and test the effects of 
emphasis frames when thematic information remains constant. 
 
First attempts in the literature to disentangle issue-specific information and 
emphasis frames 
Based on these fundamental insights, Leeper and Slothuus (2017) proposed that future 
studies should more carefully construct emphasis frames. Furthermore, they conducted an 
empirical research program comprising ten original experimental studies that clearly 
separated the effects of substantive new thematic information and emphasis frames using 
in total more than 5,000 participants and different political issues in the experiments (e.g., 
medical health records, hate group rallies). 
The manipulation of most of the ten experiments was as follows. According to their 
random assignment to the first factor “information,” participants received different issue-
specific information regarding the same policy to assess the influence of substantive 
thematic information on issue attitude toward this policy. For example, one condition told 
respondents that a new medical policy has high impact with low costs, and another 
condition stated that the new medical policy has low impact with high costs. Afterward, 
respondents received either a cost frame or an impact frame (second factor “frame”) that 
emphasized a specific dimension of the thematic information participants had received 
before. This frame emphasis did not add any further information about the topic to 
examine whether emphasis framing has an effect on issue attitude besides the beliefs 
generated by the manipulation of the new thematic information in the first place. The frame 
manipulation simply stated: 
 
One “should judge the proposal based on whether it is [is costly | will affect the 
health of average Americans]. Indeed, much of the debate over the proposal now 
revolves around [the question of costs | the proposal’s impact on patients’ health].” 
(Leeper & Slothuus, 2017, p. 27) 
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Here, for each level of the factor information, the design enabled testing the effect 
of the cost frame compared to the impact frame (and sometimes compared to an additional 
control group) when information was constant, while simultaneously allowing an analysis 
of whether emphasis framing is more or less effective in specific informational situations 
(i.e., levels of the factor “information”). 
In all ten experiments, Leeper and Slothuus (2017) found consistently strong 
support for the influence of new thematic information on issue attitude. For example, when 
provided the information that the new policy has high impact with low costs, participants 
supported the policy significantly more strongly than when they received the information 
that the new policy has low impact and high costs. In contrast, additional framing of the 
issue-specific information by emphasizing either the costs or the impact did not indicate 
significant effects in most informational situations in the ten experiments. In the rare case 
that emphasis frames significantly affected issue attitude, the effects were substantially 
smaller than the effects of the thematic information. Thus, the authors concluded, 
“emphasis alone is commonly an insufficient political strategy. Citizens are not so easily 
swayed” (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017, p. 55). 
However, the study had some methodological shortcomings that preferred the 
occurrence of the effect of thematic information to that of the frame effect, making it 
difficult to consider the authors’ conclusion. In the first eight experiments, the manipulation 
of issue-specific information was by far longer than of the emphasis frame, making it 
unclear whether the strong effects of information were not simply the result of longer 
exposure. Even though the last two experiments shortened the length of the manipulation 
of thematic information to improve the design, the manipulation of emphasis framing was 
still only about half as long as the manipulation of issue-specific information. As such, while 
their studies overcame the confounding of thematic information and emphasis frames, the 
authors likely introduced a new confounding through the length of the manipulation in 
their experiments, raising doubts about the ineffectiveness of emphasis frames when these 
frames do not provide new issue-specific information. 
More problematic, however, is the very narrow manipulation of emphasis frames in 
all experiments. In fact, the manipulation of emphasis frames was reduced to a short 
sentence that asked participants to think of the costs (or impact) when forming their 
attitude. In terms of external validity, such manipulation does not seem a very realistic form 
of emphasis frames in political communication processes in the real world. When a political 
actor frames an issue, he or she typically not only states “think of the costs” but also 
explains why the costs are a problem, i.e., why the cost frame is applicable for that issue 
(Nelson, 2004). 
Besides the problem of external validity, whether the narrow manipulation actually 
captures the theoretical idea of emphasis frames can also be questioned. Emphasis frames 
make “sense of relevant issues” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3); “suggest how events 
should be understood” (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, p. 641); and “diagnose, evaluate, and 
prescribe” (Entman, 1993, p. 52) the social world. In other words, frames offer meaningful 
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issue interpretations and explain how to think of an issue. While a single sentence might be 
sufficient to create a frame through powerful symbols (Entman, 1993 ⁠; Z. Pan & Kosicki, 
1993), it is unclear whether the chosen narrow manipulation created a meaningful emphasis 
frame, because the explanation for why one should base one’s attitude on this frame is 
simply missing in the manipulation. The problem remains even though Leeper and Slothuus 
(2017) provide manipulation checks for the framing manipulation, because their 
manipulation checks only measured whether participants recognized the manipulated single 
sentence, not if participants interpreted the sentence as a frame. Given this methodological 
shortcoming, it remains unclear whether emphasis frames are actually ineffective in 
influencing citizens’ opinions and only thematic information shapes their issue attitudes. 
Moreover, the only further study that separated at least to some degree the effects 
of emphasis frames and factual thematic information arrived at the opposite conclusion, 
namely that additional facts about the issue added little to the effectiveness of frames not 
containing any factual content (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). However, this study also has 
shortcomings, making it difficult to simply assume that emphasis frames without thematic 
information actually influence issue attitudes. Specifically, the construction of frames 
without additional facts is confounded with an explicit consensus endorsement stating that 
“most agree” that the respective frame is the most important implication of the issue. This 
makes it unclear whether frames were responsible for attitudinal effects or the effects 
simply originated from following the majority when forming the attitude (i.e., a bandwagon 
effect, see Nadeau, Cloutier, & Guay, 1993). 
Nevertheless, the study by Leeper and Slothuus (2017) is an important starting point 
in overcoming the confounding of substantive thematic information and emphasis frames. 
The previous pages showed how important this separation is in assessing the “true” effect 
of emphasis frames, namely a frame effect that results only from the frame and not from 
varying thematic information. Thus, the study reported in this book responds to recent 
criticism on emphasis framing effects and separates the effects of new thematic information 
and emphasis frames. To do so, a deeper theoretical discussion on externally valid emphasis 
frames that offer meaningful issue interpretations without providing new thematic 
information is elaborated next (see Subchapter 2.8.2). 
2.8.2 Introducing a new differentiation of emphasis frames: Salience 
emphasis frames vs. selection emphasis frames 
Before conceptualizing emphasis frames that are not confounded with the additional 
offering of new thematic information, it is important to state that this conception does not 
claim to be the only valid way to construct emphasis frames or how they appear in real 
political communication processes. The classic definition of emphasis framing by Entman 
(1993) is as follows: “To frame is to select [emphasis added] some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient [emphasis added] in a communicating text” (p. 52). Thus, 
it could be argued that some important frame definitions allow for the construction of 
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frames using both the selection of thematic information (e.g., a new infrastructure project 
will lead to 1,000 new jobs) and the salience of the emphasis frame (e.g., it is important to 
evaluate the new infrastructure project in light of the creation of new jobs). 
Therefore, a political actor can also construct an emphasis frame by selecting new 
factual arguments (i.e., selection emphasis framing), and not only by suggesting an 
interpretation of a given situation in a certain frame without adding new facts to the topic 
(i.e., salience emphasis framing). Thus, framing effect studies in political communication 
that confounded emphasis frames and new thematic information are not meaningless. They 
show an important aspect of emphasis framing effects: frame effects involving the addition 
of new facts, which is certainly a political tool often employed to influence attitudes 
(Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010 ⁠; Z. Pan & Kosicki, 2001). Such frames may be labeled selection 
emphasis frames, as they include a selected set of new thematic information (see Figure 3). 
However, the previous subchapter (see Subchapter 2.8.1) showed that studies 
employing such selection emphasis frames tend to overstate the effectiveness of the frame 
itself, because the effects could likewise originate from the confounding with additional 
thematic information (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). As the aim of the study discussed in this 
book is to assess citizens’ susceptibility to framing effects and its implications for citizens’ 
rationality in attitude formation as clear as possible, a type of emphasis frames that does 
not include the adding of new thematic information while being externally valid is needed. 
This type may be introduced to the literature as salience emphasis frames (again, see Figure 3). 
Frames 
Equivalency Emphasis Formal-stylistic 
Issue-specific Cross-thematic 
Selection Salience 
Figure 3. Types of frames in political messages including the differentiation between
selection emphasis frames and salience emphasis frames 
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Definition of salience emphasis frames 
Salience emphasis frames can be defined as frames that explicitly contextualize new thematic 
information by using cross-thematic concepts of interpretation such as political values to offer an evaluation 
of this thematic information without adding new or altering existing thematic information but by explaining 
the issue with already known frame-related patterns of interpretation. This definition includes several 
important aspects that need further theoretical explanation. 
First, as do most other framing definitions, the definition recognizes salience 
emphasis frames as a communicative independent variable with certain characteristics in a 
(political) message (e.g., Slothuus, 2008, also see Subchapter 2.1.2) and not as a 
psychological process or individual outcome, as some other authors define frames (e.g., 
Nelson & Oxley, 1999). 
Second, such frames are applied to new thematic information. If frames encourage 
citizens “to understand events and issues in particular ways” (Kinder, 2003, p. 359), there 
first needs to be an event or issue a frame can make sense of. New thematic information 
about these issues or events is not part of the frame, but what is framed. This can be a 
policy measure, news event or political development, for example. New thematic 
information is tied to the issue and provides substantive issue-specific information such as 
facts about what happened or is supposed to happen and this thematic information should 
remain the same regardless of the emphasis frame. The following are examples of 
substantive thematic information: A new labor market law will give employment to 10,000 
long-term unemployed persons and cost the national budget 150 million dollars; in Siberia, 
new large-scale gas deposits have been found; at the next G20 summit, China and the US 
will negotiate the withdrawal of troops from the Pacific. If this information is new to a 
person and entails “the supply of arguments and evidence” (Kinder, 2003, p. 367), it can 
be a means of persuasion. That is, a communicator can provide new thematic information 
to elicit an information-based persuasion effect in the audience in contrast to an emphasis 
framing effect that does not provide new issue-specific information (Leeper & Slothuus, 
2017⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). 
However, it must be scrutinized whether such issue-specific information sometimes 
already contains frames. Emphasis frames typically consist of different frame elements such 
as problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations, and treatment 
recommendations (Entman, 1993). Together, these frame elements construct the entire 
emphasis frame in a message, which compared to a single frame element, is a 
comprehensive pattern of interpretation (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017 ⁠, 2019⁠; 
Matthes & Kohring, 2008). That is, when looking at messages, entire frames consisting of 
several frame elements can be differentiated from single thematic information (i.e., a single 
frame element). 
Nevertheless, when looking at the effects of single frame elements and entire frame 
patterns, even a single sentence containing issue-specific information related with a frame 
can be sufficient to evoke an interpretation with the entire frame “if it comports with the 
existing schemata in a receiver’s belief systems” (Entman, 1993, p. 53). If, for example, the 
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substantive thematic information regarding the aforementioned new labor market law is 
that the law costs the national budget 150 million dollars, this can potentially lead to an 
interpretation under the superordinate “economy” value emphasis frame, because the cost 
argument is a subset of the frame. This example illustrates that even new thematic 
information and facts are not always free from frame-related patterns of interpretation 
(Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). However, even if issue-specific information can potentially 
evoke a frame-related interpretation, the difference to the proposed salience emphasis 
frame is the degree to which it explicitly sets the frame in the message, which makes not 
explicitly framed thematic information and explicit salience emphasis frames still distinguishable. This 
is most evident when examining the next aspect of the proposed definition. 
The third facet of the definition is that salience frames explicitly contextualize thematic 
information by using cross-thematic concepts of interpretation such as political values to evaluate the 
thematic information. In contrast to thematic information that simply presents basic facts 
about a specific issue or event without an explicit evaluative component (e.g., the policy 
costs 150 million dollars), salience emphasis frames explicitly “diagnose, evaluate, and 
prescribe” (Entman, 1993, p. 52) how to understand the thematic information. That is, this 
type of frame states directly what the important standard of evaluation is for the issue and 
explicitly offers a context for interpretation, which goes beyond the thematic information 
itself. It relies on cross-thematic patterns of interpretation applicable to many issues such 
as basic political values that fulfill the prerequisite of cultural resonance, which is one of 
the defining criteria of frames proposed by Entman et al. (2009) in contrast to classic 
persuasion messages based on a single argument (also see Matthes & Schemer, 2012). 
Furthermore, cross-thematic principles of interpretation enable fulfilling the last and 
most important aspect of the offered definition of salience emphasis frames: externally valid 
framing without adding new or altering existing thematic information to avoid confounding emphasis 
frames and thematic information. Here, cross-thematic concepts such as political values 
can offer a context for interpretation by explaining the issue with already known frame-related 
patterns of interpretation. Such frames do not need to add new thematic information to give 
particular meaning to the topic (e.g., adding the issue-specific information that other than 
the cost of 150 million dollars, a comparable labor measure in another country was only 
modestly effective in providing long-sustained employment), because this type of frame can 
remind people of the basic cross-thematic interpretative patterns they already know. As 
Chapter 2.5 showed, widely known political values such as safety, liberty, or civil rights can 
serve as cross-thematic patterns of interpretation, as they can be meaningfully applied to 
various political issues. Thus, political values are an important means by which salience 
emphasis frames can construct the meaning of issues without necessarily providing new 
thematic information. 
In the example of the new labor market law, the salience emphasis frame could state 
that the costs of the new policy are a problem because it endangers the goal of a debt-free 
national budget (problem definition and causal interpretation), which is highly important 
for the current and following generations (moral evaluation), and thus should not be 
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implemented (treatment recommendation). This contextualization is independent of the 
specific issue, does not provide any further facts about the issue (i.e., the labor market law), 
and can be similarly applied to many further issues (e.g., a planned space mission to Mars, 
tax reductions for citizens with a high income, subventions for green energy). 
The important difference between this conception and the approach by Leeper and 
Slothuus (2017) is that the frame not only emphasizes which dimension should be 
considered important in evaluating the issue (see Subchapter 2.8.1). The salience emphasis 
frame also explains why this dimension is important using cross-thematic and known frame-
related interpretations for potentially all four frame elements: problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation (cf. Entman, 1993). This 
should have higher external validity than the very short frame manipulations used by Leeper 
and Slothuus (2017). 
However, not adding any further issue-specific information is only one important 
feature of salience emphasis frames. The second is that the frame does not alter or drop 
thematic information to avoid confounding the frame emphasis with omitted or changed 
thematic information, as selection emphasis frames do. In other words, despite that one 
frame contextualizes a subset of the thematic information with a specific political value and 
another frame contextualizes another subset of the thematic information with another 
political value, the subset not further contextualized by a frame must be part of the thematic 
information given to the audience to have constant issue-specific information across emphasis 
frames with different salience. 
Of course, it can be argued that the salience emphasis frames proposed here are not 
completely free of information, because the explanation contains information about the 
importance of the evaluation standard (e.g., like every policy that costs money, the new 
labor market law endangers a debt-free national budget). This point is valid, but the 
important aspect of the definition is that the frames are free of new or adjusted issue-
specific information and only contain cross-thematic information already known by the 
audience. That is, such frames do not change the informational basis of the issue, and 
attitude formation relies on the same facts about the issue. The facts in the example of the 
new labor market law are the same regardless of the frame: the new law will give 
employment to 10,000 long-term unemployed persons and costs the national budget 150 
million dollars. As such, salience emphasis frames fulfill the central definition of frames 
that “supply no new information” but “organize – or better, reorganize – information that 
citizens already have in mind” (Kinder, 2003, p. 359). 
As the frames must employ known information, salience emphasis frames that do 
not provide new issue-specific information must be cross-thematic and not issue-specific, 
because the interpretation standard must be known from other topics. Therefore, they are 
categorized as a subtype of cross-thematic emphasis frames in Figure 3. Furthermore, one 
might also ask whether salience emphasis frames are the same as equivalency frames, as the 
definition of equivalency frames is also based on the idea that the same substantive thematic 
information is framed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984⁠; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
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However, the difference between both concepts is how the frames for this thematic 
information are constructed. Equivalency frames are highly subtle and free from any further 
information, but they use “different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases” 
(Druckman, 2001a, p. 228) such as a policy will lead to 95% employment vs. the same policy 
will lead to 5% unemployment. 
While such frames are present in real political communication processes (e.g., Koch 
& Peter, 2017), they apply only to few situations because political actors do often not limit 
their communication behavior to presenting logically equivalent frames without providing 
any further information (D’Angelo et al., 2019 ⁠; de Vreese & Lecheler, 2012 ⁠; Slothuus, 2008 ⁠; 
Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). In contrast, salience emphasis frames are more externally 
valid, because these frames do not restrict the provision of any further information, but 
only of further or changed substantive issue-specific information. That is, salience emphasis 
frames can provide different cross-thematic and known information that does not have to 
be logically equivalent but can emphasize different aspects. All that must be equivalent is 
what is framed, i.e., the substantive thematic information. 
Compared to selection emphasis frames, which employ different issue-specific 
information, the constant thematic information of salience emphasis frames brings the 
concept closer to equivalency framing, as demanded by critics of the emphasis framing 
approach (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). However, they still 
differ from equivalency frames. In short, equivalency framing is concerned with how exactly 
the same thematic information is presented using frames fully free of additional 
information. Salience emphasis frames explain in using already known cross-thematic 
information why one aspect of the same thematic information is more important in 
evaluating the issue or event. Finally, selection emphasis framing is about what (new) 
thematic information is selected and presented for the same topic. 
Another important aspect of the proposed definition of salience emphasis frames is 
more implicit: the relation between issue-specific information and cross-thematic frames. To ensure a 
salience emphasis frame can contextualize thematic information, this information must be 
a subset of the superordinate frame. This enables the respective salience emphasis frame to 
meaningfully contextualize this piece of information. For example, if an issue does not 
contain any information about environmental aspects (e.g., a new policy for care for the 
elderly), an environmental frame cannot contextualize the issue meaningfully because there 
is no thematic information the frame could make salient. That is, thematic information 
about an issue must consist of at least one (less explicit) frame element for a salience 
emphasis frame to establish an explicit and complete pattern of interpretation. In other 
words, a frame must be applicable to the thematic information. On a side note, this is not 
a special feature of salience emphasis frames. The same is true for selection emphasis frames 
for which topics must also “can be viewed from a variety of perspectives” (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007b, p. 104) so that different frames are applicable to the issue (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007a). 
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Last, the proposed conception of salience emphasis frames enables a more rigorous 
test of citizens’ rationality in attitude formation under framing conditions than does 
selection emphasis framing. As already outlined in Subchapter 2.8.1 before, varying 
thematic information in selection emphasis frames means that attitudinal effects based on 
exposure to different frames do not necessarily imply irrational attitudinal shifts, but may 
always be the result of learning from the new information contained in the selection 
emphasis frame. However, salience emphasis frames can test for irrational attitude 
formation. Such frames only employ already known patterns of interpretation and thus, 
citizens exposed to different salience emphasis frames that frame constant new thematic 
information do not differ in the information potentially available to them to form their 
issue attitude. If exposure to a certain salience emphasis frame still leads to a different issue 
attitude than exposure to another frame, then these differences rely in arbitrarily and 
irrationally on the more salient frame, despite that all information is constant, the new 
information, which is framed, and the already known information highlighted by the 
salience emphasis frame. 
 
Applying the definition to an example 
Figure 4 summarizes the main idea of the proposed definition of salience emphasis frames 
in comparison to selection emphasis frames using another example to show that this 
definition applies to various political issues and can disentangle the effects of new issue-
specific information and cross-thematic salience emphasis frames. We consider the plan of 
a regional government to build a new commercial area in a rural environment. Two basic 
facts are characteristic of this project (i.e., thematic information). On one hand, some of 
the few wild bee colonies of this region populate the area where the government plans to 
build the new commercial park, and the project would kill some of these bee colonies (issue-
specific information A). On the other hand, the new commercial area provides space for 
the settlement of new companies, which will create 100 new jobs in the region (issue-
specific information B). 
A message with the selection emphasis frame A “environment” only presents the 
basic thematic information related to the frame and mentions that some of the wild bee 
colonies would be killed through the project, while nothing is said about the creation of 
new jobs. Moreover, the selection frame may add additional issue-specific information such 
as the fact that many trees must be felled for the new buildings or the commercial park 
negatively impacts the groundwater for neighboring areas. Next, it would frame this 
information and define the project as a threat to the environment (problem definition and 
causal interpretation), clarify the importance of protecting the environment (moral 
evaluation), and argue that the project should not be realized (treatment recommendation). 










Salience frame A (environment): 
Project is threat to environment (problem definition) +  
but protecting environment is important (moral evaluation) + 
the project should not be built (treatment recommendation) 
Selection frame A (environment): 
The project lowers quality of groundwater for neighboring 
areas (additional issue-specific information) + but protecting environment 
is important (moral evaluation) + the project should not be built 
(treatment recommendation) 
Figure 4. Schematic illustration of thematic information and frames in messages with
selection emphasis frames and with salience emphasis frames  
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In contrast, the message with the competing selection emphasis frame B “economy” 
would not mention any of this issue-specific information, but fully rely on other thematic 
information. The frame message would mention that the project would create 100 new jobs 
for the region, that most of these jobs would be very well paid because prestigious 
companies agreed to move to the commercial area, and that local construction companies 
would do most of the construction work (additional issue-specific information). The 
message would then frame this thematic information and define the project as a boost to 
the economy (problem definition and causal interpretation), clarify the importance of 
fostering economic growth (moral evaluation), and argue that the project should be realized 
(treatment recommendation). Because of the different thematic information used in the 
two selection emphasis frame messages, it would be difficult to decide what brought about 
different attitudinal effects: the different issue-specific information (info A vs. info B) or 
differently offered frame interpretations (frame A vs. frame B). 
This problem does not occur when the new commercial area is framed with salience 
emphasis frames, because the messages with the different frames contain the same 
fundamental thematic information. Both differently framed messages would contain the 
issue-specific information that the project would kill some of the wild bee colonies currently 
populating the area (information A), and that the new commercial area will create 100 new 
jobs in the region (issue-specific information B). The message with the environmental 
salience emphasis frame (frame A), however, would then focus on information about the 
bees and explicitly contextualize it with the known and cross-thematic pattern of 
interpretation of protecting the environment without adding further issue-specific 
information about the project. Specifically, this framed message would explain that the 
expected destruction of the wild bee colonies by building the new infrastructure project is 
a threat to the environment (problem definition and causal interpretation), but protecting 
the environment is important and should be the central goal of any political action (moral 
evaluation). Thus, it would be better not to realize the commercial area (treatment 
recommendation). 
In contrast, a message with the economic frame (frame B) would make salient the 
other aspect of the thematic information (i.e., the creation of 100 new jobs) without 
concealing information about the projects’ negative effect on the environment. It would 
define the project as a boost to the economy (problem definition and causal interpretation), 
clarify the importance of fostering economic growth (moral evaluation), and argue that the 
project should be realized (treatment recommendation). 
By holding the substantive issue-specific information constant, one can estimate the 
unique effect of the environment frame compared to the economy frame (framing effect A 
vs. B) on citizens’ issue attitude toward the new commercial area. This would not be 
possible with selection emphasis frames that confound frames with issue-specific 
information. Another advantage of salience emphasis frames is that it is not only possible 
to compare the effects of two frames but also to contrast the effects of each single frame 
(framing effect A and framing effect B) with situations without explicit frames that include 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 142 
only the presentation of substantive issue-specific information (message info). As such, the 
attitudinal effects of different political tools can be compared (cf. Leeper & Slothuus, 2017): 
of persuasion through providing new thematic information and of salience emphasis frames 
through contextualizing this information. 
 
Summary 
This subchapter introduced salience emphasis frames as an externally valid type of framing 
that is not confounded with issue-specific information but uses known cross-thematic 
contextualizations such as political values to frame an issue. This allows estimating the 
unique effect of frames, which enables better assessing citizens’ susceptibility to framing 
effects and the rationality of their attitude formation. Moreover, the proposed separation 
of issue-specific information and cross-thematic frames that contextualize this thematic 
information creates further possibilities to test the effectiveness of frames in different 
settings. This is explained next in Subchapter 2.8.3. 
2.8.3 Salience emphasis frames, new thematic information with varying 
argument strength, and citizens’ political value preferences 
The last two subchapters explained the importance of the differentiation between issue-
specific information and cross-thematic frames and highlighted that testing the unique 
effects of different salience emphasis frames requires constant thematic information (see 
Subchapter 2.8.1 and Subchapter 2.8.2). Disentangling issue-specific information and 
frames on the theoretical level also creates further possibilities to better assess the influence 
of salience emphasis frames on the formation of political attitudes. Specifically, this 
differentiation enables testing the effects of the same cross-thematic frame in different issue-
specific informational settings, which can improve understanding of when – i.e., for which 
thematic information – a frame can affect issue attitudes. That is, the question of whether 
a salience emphasis frame can influence issue attitudes at all can be expanded to that of 
under what informational conditions such framing effects occur, which allows a more 
detailed examination of the effectiveness of frames. 
For example, does a civil rights frame only influence issue attitude when 
contextualizing a surveillance law that allows the government to surveil all citizens without 
suspicion and approval by a judge? In other words, when thematic information about the 
law entails a factual strong restriction of civil rights. Or does the same civil rights frame also 
influence issue attitude when contextualizing a surveillance law that only allows the 
surveillance of a citizen when a judge decides there is valid suspicion that this person plans 
a crime, i.e., when the thematic information is that the law only marginally restricts civil 
rights? 
This example illustrates that thematic information itself can contain issue-specific 
facts and arguments (surveillance of all citizens without suspicion vs. surveillance of an 
individual citizen based on the decision of a judge that valid suspicion exists) that can vary 
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in terms of how strongly it influences citizens to have a specific issue attitude. Without 
additional framing and only based on the thematic information, citizens would likely oppose 
the harsher mass surveillance more strongly than the law that only allows the government 
to surveil citizens in limited and justified situations. In other words, thematic information 
can itself have a particular issue-specific argument strength and thus varying degrees of 
persuasiveness other than the influence of an explicit salience emphasis frame. 
 
Thematic information with varying argument strength and cross-thematic frames 
The analysis of the persuasive effects of the argument strength of thematic information has 
a long tradition in social psychology, is one of the message features most commonly 
manipulated in persuasion research (Zhao, Strasser, Cappella, Lerman, & Fishbein, 2011), 
and is a key feature of the well-established elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). Issue-specific arguments can be defined as “bits of information contained in a 
communication” that allow a person to determine the “true merits of an advocated 
position” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 132). This is so because not all issue-specific 
arguments contained in thematic information are equally persuasive in generating a specific 
attitude toward the attitude object. Rather, they differ in argument strength (or quality). 
Two different theoretical approaches capture the concept of issue-specific argument 
strength. The less common normative approach tries to explain what makes a particular 
argument strong by using formal logic (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2006 ⁠; Hoeken, Timmers, & 
Schellens, 2012). According to this approach, strong arguments avoid fallacies, point out 
desirable or undesirable consequences that occur with specific probabilities, and use 
analogies. However, these rather abstract criteria, which are derived from formal logical 
equations, mainly explain what should be a strong argument based on logic, but they explain 
less what a strong argument is for those who receive the argument. 
Here, the empirical approach to argument strength comes into play (e.g., Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986 ⁠; Zhao et al., 2011). It simply defines argument strength as how 
persuasive and compelling a receiver judges a specific argument to have a specific attitude 
when this argument is presented in isolation (i.e., without any peripheral cues or additional 
information). Strong arguments are those that receivers evaluate as compelling and elicit 
more favorable thoughts to follow the direction of the argument when forming an attitude. 
In contrast, weak arguments are judged as less persuasive and generate more unfavorable 
thoughts regarding the attitude direction suggested by the argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). This empirical approach is much more common in the literature because it offers a 
testable reference for when an argument is strong (i.e., the judgment of the receivers). Thus, 
this study also follows this definition. Numerous persuasion studies applying this definition 
have shown that citizens base their attitude formation on the strength of arguments 
presented on a specific topic (e.g., Park, Levine, Kingsley Westerman, Orfgen, & Foregger, 
2007), and more so, when arguments are carefully processed, as proposed by the 
elaboration likelihood model (for a meta-analysis, see Carpenter, 2015). 
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Often, persuasion studies manipulate argument strength as the factual and inherent 
properties of an attitude object. For example, a consumer product with compelling or less 
compelling technical features (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983), an educational policy 
that is more or less effective in motivating teachers and students to invest more effort in 
their courses (Nelson & Garst, 2005), or nutrition that saves money or is rather expensive 
(Fabrigar, Priester, Petty, & Wegener, 1998). That is, argument strength is often designed 
and tested as the isolated persuasiveness of facts about an object, issue, or event. This 
means that facts about an issue or event, introduced as thematic information in the previous 
subchapter (see Subchapter 2.8.2), can be itself more or less persuasive without 
considering explicit framing of this issue-specific information. In other words, the 
argument strength of thematic information can vary for a specific issue position, termed by 
Leeper and Slothuus (2017) as the “information hypothesis” (in contrast to the “framing 
hypothesis”). For instance, a new law concerned with pensions can improve the situation 
of retired persons slightly (i.e., a thematic information with a weak issue-specific argument 
strength for supporting the law) or significantly (i.e., a strong issue-specific argument for 
supporting the law), the reduction of CO2 through a specific governmental subvention for 
green energy can be factually substantive or marginal, or the costs of building a new national 
theatre can be de facto moderate or high. 
People form different baseline attitudes depending on the argument strength of 
issue-specific information  (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). Introducing this baseline effect of 
thematic information enables better assessing when an additional cross-thematic salience 
emphasis frame is able to influence attitudes. Is this when thematic information has strong 
argument strength for the issue position of the frame or also when the argument strength 
of issue-specific information is low for this position? Introducing argument strength as a 
property of thematic information is not only important in understanding the informational 
conditions of framing effects but also helps better assess citizens’ rationality in attitude 
formation. If a salience emphasis frame can influence attitudes despite that information and 
facts about an issue only have a low argument strength for the issue position of the frame, 
then the importance citizens give to substantive thematic information (i.e., factual issue 
content) must be questioned, which is a central prerequisite for judging attitude formation 
as rational (see Subchapter 2.8.1). 
Furthermore, argument strength – here defined as the persuasiveness of thematic 
information not explicitly framed – should not be confused with “frame strength,” which 
is sometimes used in the literature to explain the different degrees of applicability of 
different (cross-thematic) frames for the same issue (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007c⁠, 
2007a). For instance, studies on frame strength ask whether an environmental frame is more 
effective in changing citizens’ attitude about a new infrastructure project than an economic 
frame, elitist frame, or security frame (see Subchapter 2.4.2). Argument strength, in 
contrast, is not about how well a cross-thematic frame contextualizes an issue, i.e., issue-
specific information. It is about how compelling thematic information is in having a specific 
issue position. A cross-thematic salience emphasis frame is not part of the conception of 
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issue-specific argument strength, but can be understood as an external factor that can 
contextualize thematic information with high or low issue-specific argument strength for 
the specific issue position suggested by the frame. 
Using the example of the new commercial area already described in detail in 
Subchapter 2.8.2, Figure 5 illustrates the idea of applying the same salience emphasis 
frame to thematic information with varying argument strength for a specific issue position. 
Assume that the regional government considers two different locations in the countryside 
to build the new commercial area. Regardless of which location the government chooses, 
building the commercial park would bring 100 new jobs to the region (thematic information 
B). However, all the region’s wild bee colonies live in one of the considered locations. These 
bees are very important for the biodiversity of the region because they pollinate the flora 
and thus ensure the survival of many other species. Building the new commercial area at 
this location would kill all bees because construction would pollute the dust that 
agglutinates the wings of the bees, which will no longer be able to fly (thematic information 
A+). That is, the thematic information countering the new commercial area contains rather 
high argument strength for opposing the new commercial area by showing that the negative 
effects on the environment are very strong (high argument strength for issue position A, 
i.e., for opposing the new commercial area). 
In contrast, the second location the government considers for the new commercial 
park houses only some venomous snakes, which are very prevalent in the whole region and 
thus not as important for biodiversity. Building the new commercial area at this location 
would displace these few snakes, but because they are a very adaptive species, experts are 
sure they would easily settle somewhere far in the countryside (thematic information A–). 
Put differently, the argument strength of this thematic information against building the new 
commercial park is rather weak, because the negative influence on the environment is rather 
low (low argument strength for issue position A). 
Now, the same cross-thematic salience emphasis frame environment (salience 
emphasis frame A) comes into play and explicitly contextualizes the two options the 
government considers for building the new commercial area (message info A+ vs. message 
info A–). In both cases, this frame does not add any further issue-specific information, but 
simply defines the project as a threat to the environment (problem definition), clarifies the 
importance of protecting the environment (moral evaluation), and concludes that the 
government should not realize the project (treatment recommendation). That is, the frame 
suggests opposing the commercial park (issue position A) when thematic information once 
has high argument strength for opposing the project and once has weak argument strength. 
This makes it possible to compare the effect of the same frame in different informational 
settings (framing effect A1 vs. framing effect A2). 
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However, introducing argument strength as a characteristic of thematic information 
not only enables testing the effectiveness of the same frame under different issue-specific 
argumentative constellations (i.e., assessing the magnitude of framing effects by issue-
specific argument strength), but also whether and how the influence of argument strength 
varies through an explicit salience emphasis frame. This is elaborated next. 
Figure 5. Schematic illustration of varying argument strength of thematic information and
its contextualization with a salience emphasis frame 
Salience emphasis frame for issue 
position A 
Thematic information with 
high argument strength for 
issue position A 
Info A+: New 
commercial area 
kills all bee 
colonies in region 
Info B 
Thematic information with 
low argument strength for 
issue position A 
Salience emphasis frame for issue 
position A 
Salience frame A 
Info B + 
Info A– 
Info B: New 
commercial area 


























Salience frame A 
Info B + 
Info A+ 
Info A–: New 
commercial area 






















Salience frame A (environment): 
Project is threat to environment (problem definition) + but 
protecting environment is important (moral evaluation) + the 
project should not be built (treatment recommendation) 
Framing effect A1 
Framing effect A2 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 147 
Motivated reasoning and issue-specific argument strength 
As explained, one defining aspect of the argument strength of issue-specific information is 
that this strength of arguments is a perceptual phenomenon. That is, a strong argument is 
strong because “the vast majority of a specifiable population” judges it as being compelling 
information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 133). However, not all citizens assess equally the 
same issue-specific argument as strong or weak, but base this on their individual preferences 
(e.g., political value preferences or party preferences), which is called biased processing or 
motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014⁠; Druckman & Bolsen, 2011 ⁠; Kunda, 
1990⁠; Taber et al., 2009⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
How strongly citizens engage in motivated reasoning when assessing the strength of 
an issue-specific argument, namely how differently different people judge the strength of 
the same argument, depends on their motivational state. For example, if the internal 
accuracy motivation of citizens is high enough to “correctly” judge argument strength, then 
the degree of motivated reasoning is low and all citizens with high accuracy motivation will 
judge argument strength rather equally despite differences in their individual (political) 
preferences (Bolsen et al., 2014⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006). If, in contrast, citizens follow 
directional goals such as reinforcing existing opinions or defending their own identity, then 
the degree of motivated reasoning is higher when assessing the strength of issue-specific 
arguments (Bolsen et al., 2014⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006). This increases the differences in the 
evaluation of the strength of the same argument depending on the persons’ preferences. 
External factors can influence how strongly people follow directional goals and thus 
engage in motivated reasoning. If issue-specific arguments are presented in an isolated way 
without additional external factors, the degree of motivated reasoning is lower, and people 
tend to follow strong rather than weak arguments when forming their attitude, while their 
individual preferences play only a minor role (Druckman et al., 2013). However, when 
additional external factors emphasize the relevance of issue-specific arguments for one’s 
own identity, citizens follow the argument related with their identity, regardless of whether 
the argument is strong or weak. If, for instance, the arguments are accompanied by explicit 
party endorsements and are about a polarizing conflict issue (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010), 
or participants are told that parties are polarized about the issue (Druckman et al., 2013), 
respondents tend to follow the argument of their preferred party, regardless of whether this 
party presents a strong or a weak argument (Druckman et al., 2013). As such, party cues 
can be a relevant external factor that induces motivated reasoning about issue-specific 
arguments by making one’s own (political) identity more relevant in the evaluation of the 
arguments (Bolsen et al., 2014).  
It can be assumed that salience emphasis frames that use political values to 
contextualize issue-specific arguments are also an external factor that increases motivated 
reasoning more than do situations with isolated arguments. This is because such frames 
emphasize the relevance of one’s own political value preferences, which is an important 
aspect of political identity (Conover & Feldman, 1984). Salience emphasis frames likely 
increase motivated reasoning when the political value emphasized in the frame matches the 
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political value preference of citizens, i.e., when the frame is value-resonant. In such value-
resonant situations, the frame makes one’s own identity explicitly salient, which increases 
the directional goal of defending prior beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006), namely of defending 
the appropriateness of this preferred political value in contextualizing issue-specific 
argument strength. Through this increased motivated reasoning triggered by a value-
resonant frame, the argument strength of thematic information is likely processed in a more 
biased way. Thematic information dissonant to one’s own value-resonant frame should be 
counter-argued and dismissed, while issue-specific information consonant with one’s own 
frame should be perceived as stronger and more compelling (i.e., motivated reasoning will 
lead to a disconfirmation bias and a prior attitude effect, see Bolsen et al., 2014). 
This will likely alter the effect of issue-specific argument strength and people will no 
longer follow the stronger argument to form their issue position, as they would do when 
no value-resonant frames but only thematic information are present. In contrast, they may 
follow “their” value-frame in the same manner, regardless of whether this frame 
contextualizes only a weak argument for an issue position in the direction of the frame or 
a strong issue-specific argument for this position. In other words, a value-resonant frame 
may increase motivated reasoning so strongly that the effects of the argument strength of 
substantive thematic information is suppressed. 
With Figure 6 that formalizes these reflections, this is illustrated by again using the 
example of the new commercial area. In situations without explicit framing, citizens’ 
attitude toward the project should differ according to the argument strength of thematic 
information, i.e., the location where the government plans to build the commercial area. 
When confronted with the issue-specific information that the new commercial area would 
lead to the destruction of all wild bee colonies in the region (thematic information A+), 
while creating 100 new jobs (thematic information B) – i.e., when they are exposed to a 
message containing thematic information with high argument strength for opposing the 
project (message info A+) – then citizens would rather oppose the government’s plan to 
build the new commercial area (attitude direction A). 
In contrast, citizens would likely support slightly the new commercial park (attitude 
B) when confronted with the thematic information that realizing the project only displaces 
some venomous snakes (thematic information A–), while creating 100 new jobs (thematic 
information B) – i.e., when the argument strength of thematic information is rather low for 
opposing the new commercial area (message info A–). As the thematic information simply 
presents isolated facts without explicit identity-relevant references, motivated reasoning 
along individual preferences should not be zero, but rather low. This suggests that people 
with different political value preferences follow argument strength in a rather similar way 
(argument effect). In other words, citizens adhering to the political value of 
environmentalism and those preferring economic values would more likely support the 
commercial area more strongly when it only leads to displacing some venomous snakes (i.e., 
when the argument strength for opposing the project is low) than when it kills all wild bee 
colonies in the region (i.e., when the argument strength for opposing the project is high). 
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When, however, the salience emphasis frame environment contextualizes the 
different thematic information about the new commercial area by explicitly defining the 
project as a threat to the environment (problem definition), highlighting the importance of 
protecting the environment (moral evaluation), and suggesting opposing the project 
(treatment recommendation), the picture would change for citizens adhering to the political 
value of environmentalism, i.e., for citizens for whom this frame is value-resonant. 
Exposure to “their” value-resonant frame should first lead to a framing effect, regardless 
of whether the frame contextualizes the thematic information that all wild bee colonies of 
the region will die when the project is realized (framing effect A1 for the strong argument 
for the issue position of the frame) or the issue-specific information that the project will 
displace some venomous snakes (framing effect A2 for the weak argument). As mentioned 
in Subchapter 2.5.3, this is because a frame that matches citizens’ preexisting political 
values will generally be considered appropriate and applicable (A. C. Andrews et al., 2017⁠; 
Schemer et al., 2012 ⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005). 
Moreover, value resonance should increase motivated reasoning about the argument 
strength of the thematic information, and citizens preferring environmentalist values will 
likely interpret this information with the directional goal of defending the appropriateness 
of their frame to contextualize the information. This will decrease the influence of the 
argument strength of the thematic information until the effect of argument strength is fully 
suppressed (no argument effect). These citizens would strongly oppose the new commercial 
area at the same magnitude when contextualizing that all bees will die (direction attitude 
AAA) and when some venomous snakes will be displaced (issue attitude AAA). This is 
because these citizens follow “their” frame to interpret the thematic information, and this 
frame clearly explains both argument strengths as a relevant threat to the environment. 
Given that these assumptions are correct and supported by empirical results, this 
would be an even stronger indicator for the effectiveness of salience emphasis frames. It 
would imply that such frames are not only effective in different informational settings (i.e., 
when contextualizing thematic information consisting of strong arguments for the position 
of the frame, but also when contextualizing weak ones), but – if value-resonant –so effective 
that the argument strength of substantive thematic information loses its importance in 
attitude formation. Only the value-resonant frame would matter, but not the issue-specific 
facts. Facts, which would matter, if no explicit frames were present. This result would be 
the strongest indicator for irrational attitude formation along ideological lines, in contrast 
to rational attitude formation based on substantive thematic information. 
However, how strongly attitude formation takes place along political value 
preferences and increased motivated reasoning should not only be influenced by whether 
thematic information is presented in an isolated way or is contextualized with a value-
resonant frame. It should also be influenced by the congruence between the salience 
emphasis frame and argument strength of thematic information in the message. This is 
discussed next in detail. Furthermore, the thus far unanswered question of what happens 
to the effect of argument strength when the frame is non-resonant is addressed. 
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Figure 6. Schematic illustration of varying argument strength of thematic information and 
its different effects in unframed situations and situations with a value-resonant frame 
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Motivated reasoning and congruence between frames and argument strength of 
thematic information 
For messages containing a salience emphasis frame that contextualizes thematic 
information with varying argument strength for the issue position of the frame, a further 
variable emerges, namely message congruence (or message ambiguity). When a frame 
contextualizes issue-specific information with high argument strength for the attitude 
suggested by the frame, messages are congruent (or unambiguous). In contrast, messages 
are incongruent (or ambiguous) when the salience emphasis frame suggests interpretation 
in a direction for which the thematic information only provides weak issue-specific 
arguments but strong information for the opposite attitude. 
In the aforementioned example, a message is congruent when the environmental 
frame suggests opposing the new commercial area, and the thematic information about this 
area is that it will kill all wild bee colonies in the region (strong issue-specific argument 
strength for opposing the project) and will create 100 new jobs (moderate argument 
strength for supporting the project). In this case, the frame and the thematic information 
congruently suggest opposing the project. In contrast, a message is incongruent when the 
environmental frame suggests opposing the project to save the environment, but the 
argument strength of thematic information rather suggests supporting the new commercial 
area because the issue-specific argument strength is weak in terms of opposing it (i.e., the 
project only displaces some highly prevalent venomous snakes) but moderate in supporting 
the project (i.e., the project will create 100 new jobs). 
Message congruence influences how strongly individual preferences guide the 
processing of thematic information. Empirical results suggest that when message features 
consistently support a specific attitude direction in a compelling manner, i.e., when the 
message is congruent (or unambiguous), biased processing along individual preferences 
(i.e., motivated reasoning) is less likely. In contrast, biased processing based on individual 
preferences increases when messages are incongruent, i.e., ambiguous (Ziegler & Diehl, 
2003⁠; Ziegler, Dobre, & Diehl, 2007 ⁠; Ziegler, Schwichow, & Diehl, 2005). Congruent 
messages do not include a strong conflict between competing considerations and thus 
should not elicit much cognitive dissonance, which otherwise must be reduced to attain a 
comfortable level of cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1962). Given that congruent 
messages are processed carefully (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994⁠; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 
1991), people should base their attitude on the persuasive strength of the message (i.e., the 
strong issue-specific argument plus the frame emphasis on this argument), regardless of 
their individual preferences. This is because the message does not contain aspects that could 
create much counter-arguing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
In other words, the persuasive strength of congruent messages inhibits counter-
arguing and the activation of individual preferences in interpreting the message. This leads 
to less biased information processing along individual preferences (Ziegler & Diehl, 2003). 
Note that message congruence as presented here is an inherent characteristic of the message 
itself and should not be confused with the consonance or dissonance between a message 
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and the preferences of the receiver of the message. A congruent message can be either 
consonant or dissonant with the receiver’s preexisting preferences. However, as long as the 
message is compelling, dissonance will be less strongly recognized and thus, the message is 
less likely to lead to motivated reasoning and counter-arguing. 
In contrast, incongruent messages are ambiguous and contain conflicting 
considerations without clear support for a specific attitude (e.g., the frame suggests the 
importance of a weak issue-specific argument despite the existence of compelling counter-
arguments in the message). This will likely increase the receiver’s cognitive dissonance, 
which motivates people to regain cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1962). To achieve this, 
citizens can use their individual preferences such as political value preferences to reinterpret 
the ambiguous message. As explained in Subchapter 2.5.1, political value preferences often 
help citizens interpret political issues and thus, they likely rely on these preferences to make 
sense of the incongruent message. 
As different citizens hold different political value preferences, they likely evaluate 
incongruent message properties differently. They likely give more weight to the message 
feature aligned with their preference (i.e., either the frame or the argument strength of 
thematic information), while counter-arguing the message feature that contradicts their 
preferences to arrive at a consistent interpretation of the message. That is, message 
incongruence likely increases motivated reasoning about the message along political value 
preferences, which can polarize attitudes toward the attitude object described in the 
message of citizens with different political values (for a comparable effect of preferences 
toward politicians by message ambiguity, see Ziegler & Diehl, 2003). 
Figure 7 illustrates the varying influence of political value preferences (i.e., of 
motivated reasoning) on attitude formation depending on message congruence. The earlier 
example of the new commercial area is again used to explain the expected effects. The 
congruent message in this example is when the environmental frame suggests opposing the 
project (frame A) and contextualizes the thematic information with high argument strength 
to oppose the new commercial area (i.e., the project would kill all wild bee colonies, 
thematic information A+). Both citizens with a high and low preference for environmental 
values would strongly oppose the project at about the same magnitude (attitude direction 
AAA), because message congruence would inhibit citizens from engaging in motivated 
reasoning. Rather, they would follow the strong issue-specific argument supported by an 
additional salience emphasis frame (no effect of value preference). 
However, when the message is incongruent and the environmental frame suggests 
opposing the project (frame A), but contextualizes the thematic information with low 
argument strength for opposing the new commercial area (i.e., when the project would only 
displace some venomous snakes, thematic information A–), citizens’ attitude would differ 
according to their political value preference. This is because they would react with 
motivated reasoning to the incongruence of the message to reduce the cognitive conflict 
elicited thereby. Citizens with a high preference for environmental values would dismiss 
the low argument strength for the issue position of “their” value-resonant frame 
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environment and still follow their frame at about the same magnitude as when the frame 
contextualized thematic information with high argument strength for the issue position of 
the frame. That is, they would strongly oppose the new commercial area (attitude direction 
AAA). This is the suppressed effect of argument strength due to a value-resonant frame, as 
explained above (no argument effect). 
In contrast, citizens with a low preference for environmental values would reduce 
the incongruence of the message by rejecting the environmental frame as an offer in the 
interpretation of the thematic information. This is because this frame is non-resonant for 
these persons and thus generally less applicable for them. Instead, they would rather follow 
the argument strength of thematic information suggesting slightly supporting the project 
(attitude direction B), because it will create 100 new jobs and building the area would only 
displace some venomous snakes (argument effect). 
That is, when the message is incongruent, citizens engage in motivated reasoning 
based on their value preferences to reduce the conflict between different message features. 
As a result citizens with a low and high preference would differ in their attitude toward the 
project (effect of value preference). In sum, citizens’ political value preferences are 
especially relevant for attitude formation when the frame and the argument strength of 
thematic information are incongruent, but less relevant when the frame and issue-specific 
argument strength are congruent. 
With the proposed effect of message congruence on motivated reasoning, it is now 
also possible to explain what happens to the effect of argument strength when framed with 
a non-resonant counter-frame that does not match citizens’ value preference. The previous 
paragraph already explained how a value-resonant frame could suppress the effect of 
argument strength. However, a different pattern of the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength for a specific issue attitude will likely emerge when the frame is non-resonant and 
suggests an attitude against the direction of the varying argument. Depending on the 
congruence between issue-specific argument strength and the non-resonant frame, two 
reactions to non-resonant frames are possible. 
First, when the issue-specific argument strength is weak for an attitude direction 
different to that suggested by the non-resonant frame (i.e., when the message congruently 
supports the non-resonant attitude direction), then motivated reasoning would be rather 
low, because even non-resonant message congruence inhibits one’s own political identity 
from being more salient. In this case, citizens will process the weak argument strength in a 
less biased way and their attitude would follow the non-resonant frame. 
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Figure 7. Schematic illustration of (in-)congruence between argument strength of thematic 
information and frame and its different effects on the influence of value preferences 
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Second, when the non-resonant frame suggests a specific attitude but the issue-
specific argument strength for the opposite attitude direction is strong, then the non-
resonant frame increases motivated reasoning because the message elicits more cognitive 
conflict. To regain cognitive consistency, citizens for whom the frame is non-resonant 
would rely more on the strong issue-specific argument aligned with their values than on the 
non-resonant frame when forming their attitude. That is, the strong issue-specific argument 
against the non-resonant frame would be effective for these citizens. 
Considering both situations together (i.e., congruent and incongruent messages with 
a non-resonant frame), the effect of argument strength of issue-specific information would 
persist when contextualized with a non-resonant frame. This is in contrast to situations 
with a value-resonant frame that suppresses the effect of argument strength (see previous 
paragraph on the varying effect of argument strength). 
 
Summary 
This subchapter expanded the differentiation between thematic information and cross-
thematic salience emphasis frames by integrating issue-specific argument strength as a 
varying factor of thematic information. This enables a better assessment of the 
informational conditions under which frames influence citizens’ attitude formation. 
Specifically, one can now test whether frames are only effective when contextualizing 
thematic information with high argument strength for the issue position suggested by the 
frame, or also when issue-specific argument strength is low for an attitude aligned with the 
frame. In addition, this conceptualization enables testing how (value-resonant) frames can 
alter the effectiveness of issue-specific argument strength, i.e., whether frames can suppress 
the effects of issue-specific facts and substantive thematic information, which would guide 
attitude formation without additional framing of this information. 
As such, integrating issue-specific argument strength as a varying factor of thematic 
information allows a more accurate assessment of whether citizens’ attitude formation takes 
place rationally based on substantive thematic information or in a way biased by frames, 
especially value-resonant frames that increase motivated reasoning about thematic 
information. Furthermore, the proposed conceptualization improves understanding of 
when motivated reasoning along political value preferences takes place by looking at 
situations in which frames and thematic information consistently suggest a specific issue 
attitude (i.e., when a message is congruent) and those in which frames and issue-specific 
argument strength are contradictory (i.e., when a message is incongruent). 
Furthermore, the differentiation between thematic information and cross-thematic 
salience emphasis frames enables a more detailed look at the psychological mediation 
processes responsible for framing effects on issue attitude and may help explain the 
contradictory findings in the literature (see Chapter 2.3). The following Subchapter 2.8.4 
discusses this in more detail. 
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2.8.4 Introducing a new mediator of salience emphasis framing effects on 
issue attitude: Belief evaluation change 
Explanation of contradictory findings in the literature regarding the mediation of 
emphasis framing effects  
As described in Chapter 2.3, there is extensive discussion in the literature on what mediates 
the effects of emphasis frames on issue attitude, especially regarding whether frames change 
the weight given to specific beliefs about the attitude object (i.e., belief importance change) 
or directly alter beliefs about the attitude object (i.e., belief content change). From a 
theoretical perspective, the mediation occurs via changes in the importance of beliefs, not 
via changes in the content of beliefs (Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). In contrast to persuasion 
based on the supply of new information that aims to directly change the basis of an attitude 
– i.e., what people know about an attitude object – emphasis frames should not alter beliefs 
about an attitude object but change how these beliefs are weighted (see Subchapter 2.8.1). 
However, the empirical results regarding the mediators of framing effects are more 
equivocal than this straightforward theoretical assumption (for an overview, see Table 1 in 
Subchapter 2.3.4). Studies analyzing only belief importance change indicated that it 
mediates framing effects on issue attitude, as expected by the theory (de Vreese et al., 2011 ⁠; 
Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). However, in contrast, studies testing belief importance change 
and belief content change in competition with each other showed that frames affect issue 
attitude through both paths (Lecheler et al., 2009⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Nelson 
& Oxley, 1999⁠; Slothuus, 2008). Only two studies confirmed that frame effects work via 
belief importance change and not belief content change (Druckman & Nelson, 2003 ⁠; 
Nelson, 2004). Thus, empirical evidence that frame effects differ in their psychological 
mechanisms from the persuasion effects of new thematic information is limited. 
Slothuus (2008) provides one explanation for the result that frames also change 
beliefs about the attitude object and not only the importance of beliefs. He showed that 
citizens’ political knowledge moderates the path via which emphasis frames affect issue 
attitude (also see Subchapter 2.3.3). If citizens possess low knowledge, framing effects are 
generally unlikely because of their limited ability to understand the frame. If citizens possess 
moderate knowledge, it is more likely the frame will add new beliefs about the issue and 
the frame effect will be mediated via belief content change. In contrast, if people have high 
political knowledge, the frame will not add beliefs about the attitude object because the 
frame does not contain new aspects for these people. Instead, the frame alters the 
importance of these already known beliefs and affects issue attitude via belief importance 
change. 
Although this is a compelling explanation, there might be another reason for the 
equivocal findings on the mediation process of emphasis framing effects that could likewise 
explain the moderated mediation proposed by Slothuus (2008). As Subchapter 2.8.1 
outlined, most framing studies confounded the construction of emphasis frames with 
additional new thematic information. Thus, unsurprisingly, the frame messages in these 
studies changed both belief content and belief importance, because the frames contained 
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new information that added new beliefs about the attitude object (leading to belief content 
change) and not only the emphasis on a specific aspect to alter the importance of this aspect 
in attitude formation (belief importance change). 
The upper part of Figure 8 illustrates this problem using again the example of 
regional government planning to build a new commercial area. The confounded message 
A with the environmental frame provides the new issue-specific information that the 
project would kill all bee colonies in the region (info A) and emphasizes the importance of 
protecting the environment (frame A). In contrast, the confounded message B with the 
economic frame contains the different information that the new commercial area would 
create 100 new jobs (info B) and highlights the importance of boosting the economy (frame 
B). Varying the thematic information according to the frame condition will likely mean that 
participants exposed to the economy frame will not only judge economic considerations as 
more important in interpreting the issue (belief importance), but also that the project’s 
positive influence on the economy is higher (belief content) than respondents exposed to 
the environment frame. This is because the thematic facts in the message with the economic 
frame contain only the factual information that there is a positive impact on the economy 
(the creation of 100 new jobs). Thus, what Slothuus (2008) considered moderated 
mediation may actually be the results of thematic information new or not new to 
participants depending on their political knowledge, not the result of the frame emphasis 
citizens were more or less familiar with. 
By separating issue-specific information and salience emphasis frames as proposed 
in Subchapter 2.8.2, the mediation processes of frame effects on issue attitude via belief 
importance change and belief content change can be more precisely tested. This separation 
enables control over what is new to participants and what is not (in contrast to broad 
political knowledge that is only an approximation of what citizens know about a specific 
topic). In an experimental setting, for example, new thematic information with varying 
argument strength is then a manipulated independent variable that should only influence 
the content of beliefs (e.g., the belief that a new surveillance law will prevent much cyber-
crime or the belief that a new governmental subvention will substantially decrease emissions 
of CO2), but not the importance given to these beliefs. Known and cross-thematic salience 
emphasis frames are a second manipulated independent variable that does not contain any 
new thematic information. It should thus influence issue attitude via changes in the 
importance of the beliefs the frame emphasizes (e.g., it is important to interpret 
governmental surveillance based on security reasons or decreasing emissions of CO2 is 
important in saving the environment), but should not change beliefs shaped by the new 
thematic information. 
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Figure 8. Mediation of frame effects on issue attitude via belief content change and belief
importance change when frames are (not) confounded with new thematic information 
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However, to determine whether the confounding with thematic information is 
responsible for the significant mediation of framing effects via belief content in previous 
studies, a mediational test that does not confound new thematic information and salience 
emphasis frame requires that the argument strength of thematic information is varied in a 
controlled setting (i.e., as an independently manipulated variable). If thematic information 
is constant, changes in belief content based on new thematic information could not be 
measured, because nothing in the thematic information could lead to differences in belief 
content. 
Translating this into the example of the new commercial area (also see lower part of 
Figure 8), new thematic information with varying argument strength for an attitude against 
the project would either tell participants that building the project will displace some 
poisonous snakes but will create 100 new jobs (info A– & B), or that the project will kill all 
wild bee colonies in the region but will create 100 new jobs (info A+ & B). It could then 
be tested whether this changes beliefs about how strong the project’s negative influence is 
on the environment (belief content). 
As a second independent variable, known salience emphasis frames would 
contextualize this new thematic information by either emphasizing the importance of 
saving the environment (frame environment) or of boosting the economy (frame 
economy). This would enable testing whether these frames influence issue attitude 
exclusively via changes in belief importance and not also via changing beliefs about the 
project itself (belief content). That is, the proposed separation of salience emphasis frames 
and new thematic information enables better testing the unique effects of frames (see 
Subchapter 2.8.2) and whether a change in belief importance is actually responsible for 
this effect, as proposed by Nelson, Oxley et al. (1997). 
 
Belief evaluation change as a further mediator of emphasis framing effects 
Separating salience emphasis frames and new thematic information with varying argument 
strength enables a clearer test of the mediators already established in the literature. 
However, it also raises the question as to whether frames not only change the importance 
of beliefs, but also change how compelling specific beliefs are judged to have a specific 
issue position. Exposure to new thematic information adds beliefs to citizens’ belief 
structure regarding an attitude object (belief content change), e.g., that a new subvention 
for green energy decreases a specific amount of emissions of CO2. As outlined in 
Subchapter 2.8.3, such issue-specific information added to citizens’ belief structure 
contain itself an inherent degree of persuasiveness (or argument strength) to have a specific 
attitude toward the attitude object. This persuasiveness is independent of the importance 
attributed to this belief. While someone attaches less importance to saving the environment, 
this person would probably agree that a subvention that substantially decreases CO2 is 
more compelling belief content to support the subvention than when the decrease is only 
marginal. 
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Thus, different beliefs should contribute differently strongly to an attitude in 
addition to the importance attached to these beliefs. This can be integrated in the 
formalized attitude equation by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) as pi. Then, this equation is 
A = ∑ vi pi wi, where A is the attitude as the sum of beliefs about the attitude object (vi), pi 
is the persuasiveness of these beliefs, and wi is the importance attributed to these beliefs. 
Based on this equation, salience emphasis frames may now work via two different paths 
without adding any new beliefs to the equation or altering existing beliefs, i.e., without 
working via belief content change. 
First, frames may alter how persuasive people judge a specific belief for a specific 
attitude direction. When the environment frame explicitly contextualizes a marginal 
decrease in CO2 through the new subvention as a first important step in saving the 
environment, this marginal decrease (i.e., the belief content induced by new thematic 
information) may become a more compelling reason to support the new subvention. That 
is, the frame could increase the argument strength of this issue-specific consideration. 
However, the content of the belief must not necessarily change through changes in its 
perceived persuasiveness. People can still be aware that the decrease in CO2 is only 
marginal, but evaluate this as a more compelling belief to support the subvention when 
framed as protecting the environment. Here, the frame can directly alter how specific 
information and beliefs are evaluated regarding its persuasiveness. This mechanism may be 
introduced into the literature as belief evaluation change. 
Second, frames can alter the importance of beliefs connected with an underlying 
political value, i.e., work via belief importance change. In this case, beliefs remain 
unchanged, but the importance of the valuation standard suggested by the frame increases. 
The environmental frame, for example, can increase the importance citizens attribute to 
protecting the environment. However, people could still be aware that the reduction of 
CO2 is only marginal (belief content) and that the marginal reduction is not very compelling 
to support the new subvention (belief evaluation). Nevertheless, the frame could increase 
support for the subvention because it increases the importance of doing something for the 
environment, regardless of what and how effective this is. In contrast to belief evaluation 
change, belief importance change does not alter how new issue-specific information is 
evaluated (e.g., the argument strength of a marginal reduction of CO2), but increases the 
general importance of the valuation standard suggested by the frame in interpreting the 
issue, e.g., political values or superordinate policy goals (cf. Nelson, 2004). 
Further explanation is needed of the newly introduced mechanism of belief 
evaluation change due to salience emphasis frames. This mechanism should be understood 
as an indicator for the biased processing and evaluation of thematic information, i.e., as a 
measure for motivated reasoning about the argument strength of new issue-specific 
information, rather than as belief importance change, which deals with the perception of 
the valuation standard suggested by the frame. As explained in Subchapter 2.8.3, increased 
motivated reasoning triggered by (value-resonant) frames or message incongruence 
between issue-specific argument strength and cross-thematic frames can lead to the 
II REFINING PRIOR RESEARCH ON EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS 161 
directional goal of evaluating information in accordance with a specific standard of 
reference (cf. Bolsen et al., 2014⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006) such as a political value mentioned 
by the frame. This can change how persuasive a specific piece of information is evaluated 
to be to maintain consistent interpretation of the message. 
Furthermore, motivated reasoning about the argument strength of issue-specific 
information is not a simple heuristic process, but an effortful evaluation of information to 
achieve the directional goal of consistency (cf. Bolsen et al., 2014). In other words, the 
proposed mechanism of belief evaluation change does not work via simple changes in the 
accessibility of issue-specific information with certain argument strength. Rather, it implies 
a conscious deliberation of argument strength, but in a biased manner (for the biased 
systematic processing of argument strength, see also Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994 ⁠; Ziegler 
& Diehl, 2003). 
After having introduced belief evaluation change as a further possible mediator of 
framing effects on issue attitude, Figure 9 illustrates the different mediation processes of 
new thematic information with varying argument strength and of salience emphasis frames 
using for the last time the example of a government’s plan to build a new commercial area 
in the countryside. As explained, new thematic information with specific argument strength 
for a specific issue attitude should independently influence citizens’ issue attitude via 
changes in belief content, because it adds new beliefs to citizens’ belief structure regarding 
the attitude object. 
People exposed to the thematic information that building this project creates 100 
new jobs (thematic information B) but displaces some venomous snakes (thematic 
information A –) add the belief content to their belief structure that the project has a weak 
negative influence on the environment. However, the thematic information that realizing 
the project would kill all wild bee colonies in the region (thematic information A+) adds 
the belief content that the project has a strong negative influence on the environment (belief 
content change). 
As this new thematic information contains specific argument strength, it should not 
only influence which issue-specific facts people know about the issue (i.e., belief content 
change), but also how compelling this information is judged in having a specific issue 
attitude (i.e., belief evaluation change due to new thematic information). Thus, people 
exposed to the thematic information that the project only displaces some venomous snakes 
would evaluate this information as a less compelling reason to oppose the project than 
people who receive the thematic information that all wild bees will die. 
However, how compelling thematic information is evaluated would also be 
influenced by salience emphasis frames. Thus, when the environment frame contextualizes 
the thematic information and explicitly defines it as a relevant threat to the environment, 
people likely evaluate the weak negative influence on the environment in a more biased way 
and as more compelling information to oppose the new commercial area than when the 
economy frame contextualizes the thematic information (i.e., belief evaluation change due 
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to salience emphasis frame). This should happen without changing the belief content itself, 
i.e., people would still agree that the negative influence on the environment is weak. 
In addition, the environmental frame would simultaneously increase the importance 
citizens give to saving the environment (belief importance change), because the frame not 
only defines the issue-specific information as a threat to the environment but also 
emphasizes that saving the environment is an important policy goal. Both increased belief 
importance and belief evaluation change then likely affect citizens’ attitude toward the new 
commercial area. 
With the introduction of belief evaluation change as a further mediator of salience 
emphasis framing effects, which captures how frames alter the persuasiveness of issue-
specific information, the last relevant aspect of the differentiation between emphasis frames 
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Figure 9. Mediation of the effects of salience emphasis frames and of new thematic 
information with varying argument strength on issue attitude via belief content change, 
belief importance change, and belief evaluation change 
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emphasis framing approach (see Subchapter 2.8.1). Before postulating testable hypotheses 
(see Part III) based on the response to this criticism presented in the last subchapters, the 
following Subchapter 2.8.5 briefly summarizes the central aspects of this response. 
2.8.5 Summary 
This chapter addressed a fundamental concern regarding the empirical paradigm of 
researching emphasis framing effects in political communication: the confounding of 
frames with additional new thematic information when testing emphasis framing effects 
(see Subchapter 2.8.1). When experimental studies investigate the effects of emphasis 
frames, the frame conditions often not only vary in the salience of a specific frame (e.g., 
highlighting the importance of civil rights vs. security) but also provide different additional 
facts about an issue or event (e.g., a new law allows surveillance of all citizens without 
suspicion vs. it allows the surveillance of terrorists after a judge approves the measure on a 
case-by-case basis). 
Critics such as Leeper and Slothuus (2017) and D. A. Scheufele and Iyengar (2017) 
argue that this confounding makes it impossible to distinguish between the unique effects 
of frames that according to the theory, should not provide new information but reorganize 
it, and of persuasive effects based on the supply of new information (Kinder, 2003). The 
consequences of this confounding are that framing effects are rarely investigated according 
to theoretical postulates (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017) and that mixing information-based 
persuasion and emphasis frames threatens the uniqueness of the framing approach and 
transforms it into a catch-all phrase indistinguishable from other types of communicative 
messages, threatening its individual explanatory power (Cacciatore et al., 2016). 
Besides this theoretical problem, the confounding has important implications for 
assessing how susceptible citizens are to emphasis framing effects and how rational citizens 
form an attitude based on substantive thematic facts and information (Leeper & Slothuus, 
2017). Possibly, only the varying thematic information led to attitudinal effects in former 
studies, not the emphasis frames themselves. Thus, the effectiveness of frames as described 
in the literature (for an overview, see Chapter 2.7) may be exaggerated. Moreover, this 
implies that citizens form their attitudes rationally based on the different issue-specific facts, 
not based on simple shifts of the salience of a specific frame, which would otherwise 
suggest a less rational attitude formation. 
Based on this criticism, this book asks the question of how susceptible citizens are 
to unique emphasis framing effects not confounded with new thematic information. 
Addressing this question enables a better assessment of how rationally citizens’ attitude 
formation takes place. As a first theoretical response to the criticism of emphasis framing 
effects, Subchapter 2.8.2 introduced the concept of salience emphasis frames as an 
externally valid type of frame not confounded with new thematic information. In contrast, 
salience emphasis frames use known and cross-thematic concepts of interpretation such as 
basic political values to contextualize new thematic information – without adding any new 
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issue-specific information or altering existing thematic information. This conception 
enables testing the unique effect of emphasis frames when thematic information is constant 
across different frame conditions.  
However, the differentiation between salience emphasis frames and thematic 
information allows further possibilities to better assess the influence of salience emphasis 
frames on citizens’ political attitude formation. Specifically, how the same cross-thematic 
salience emphasis frame affects attitudes when the issue-specific informational setting 
varies in a controlled setting can be tested (see Subchapter 2.8.3). Thematic information 
can contain in itself a specific argument strength (or persuasiveness) for a specific attitude 
direction (cf. Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). Without additional framing, the thematic 
information that a new law allows surveilling all citizens without suspicion will likely lead 
to stronger opposition against this law than when the thematic information is that the new 
law only allows the government to surveil individual persons after a judge has decided there 
is sufficient suspicion that this person plans a criminal act. 
By separating issue-specific argument strength from cross-thematic frames, one can 
test whether the same frame is only effective when contextualizing thematic information 
with high argument strength for the position of the frame or also when argument strength 
of the issue-specific information is weak for this position. The latter would be a stronger 
indicator for the effectiveness of frames, as it would imply they are effective despite the 
absence of thematic facts that strongly support the contextualization of the frame. 
Moreover, disentangling salience emphasis frames and thematic information with 
varying argument strength enables testing whether such frames –when value-resonant – can 
suppress the effects of argument strength on issue attitude. That is, whether citizens simply 
follow “their” frame (i.e., the frame that employs a political value to contextualize the 
information preferred by a person) in the same way regardless of the argument strength of 
thematic information on which these attitudes are based when thematic information is not 
explicitly contextualized with their value-resonant frame. This result would be the strongest 
indicator for more biased and thus less rational processing of the argument strength of 
thematic information (i.e., of basic issue-specific facts) due to explicit value-resonant 
framing. 
Besides these possibilities to better assess when and how strongly salience emphasis 
frames influence attitudes, the differentiation between thematic information and frames 
also helps in understanding the equivocal results regarding the mediating psychological 
mechanisms responsible for framing effects (see Subchapter 2.8.4). Most studies focused 
on whether changes in belief content (i.e., a person’s beliefs about an attitude object) or in 
belief importance (i.e., higher importance of the valuation standard suggested by the frame, 
e.g., the environment or economy) mediate framing effects revealed that both mechanisms 
are effective (Lecheler et al., 2009⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999⁠; 
Slothuus, 2008), although basic framing theory suggests that emphasis frames only work 
via belief importance (Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). 
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The reason for these contradictory findings could be that confounded frames 
containing new thematic information led to changes in belief content because the frames 
provided new information citizens could add to their belief structure regarding the framed 
issue or event. In contrast, the proposed conception of salience emphasis frames that are 
not confounded and do not contain any additional new issue-specific information enables 
testing more precisely the classic theory that emphasis frames only work via belief 
importance changes, not via changes in belief content. 
However, belief importance may not be the only mediator that explains the effects 
of salience emphasis frames. Such frames may also directly affect citizens’ evaluation of the 
argument strength of new thematic information. To capture this biased processing of the 
persuasiveness of new thematic information, Subchapter 2.8.4 introduced the concept of 
belief evaluation change as a possible further mediator of salience emphasis framing effects 
in addition to changes in belief importance. 
In sum, this chapter responded to the criticism of confounded framing effects in 
previous studies and provided an adjusted theoretical approach allowing a more precise test 
of the unique effects of non-confounded salience emphasis frames compared to the effects 
of new thematic information. This can better answer the question of how susceptible 
citizens are to framing effects and the rationality of their attitude formation under framing 
conditions. Based on this adjusted theoretical approach to emphasis framing effects, the 
next part derives concrete and testable hypotheses (see Part III) before describing the 
method employed to challenge these hypotheses (see Part IV) and presenting empirical 
results on the existence of salience emphasis framing effects (see Part V). 
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As a response to the recent criticism on the empirical paradigm of researching emphasis 
framing effects (e.g., Leeper & Slothuus, 2017 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017), the 
previous chapter proposed salience emphasis frames as a frame conception not confounded 
with new thematic information (see Chapter 2.8). This conception is expected to more 
precisely test the unique effects of frames on citizens’ attitude formation and thus better 
answer the question of how rational citizens form their political attitudes under framing 
conditions. Thus, the superordinate research question of this study is whether empirical 
support exists for the existence of salience emphasis framing effects and how strong these 
effects are. 
 
Superordinate research question: How susceptible are citizens to salience 
emphasis framing effects and how rational is their attitude formation under framing 
conditions? 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion in the theory section, this superordinate research 
question can be delineated into a series of specific hypotheses and research questions that 
test the effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude step-by-step in increasing detail 
(also see Kaiser, 2019a for a short summary of some of these hypotheses and research 
questions). This enables determining how persistent such framing effects are when 
situations become increasingly challenging for their occurrence. However, the first 
hypothesis, H1, is not concerned with the effects of frames, but with the effects of thematic 
information with varying argument strength for a specific issue attitude. As discussed in 
Subchapter 2.8.3, new thematic information about an issue or event contains itself a 
specific degree of persuasiveness to adopt a specific attitude. To better understand, how 
frames influence attitudes when considering different informational settings, it is thus 
important to first explore the influence of the argument strength of issue-specific 
information. 
In addition, this enables a later comparison of the effects of frames with the effects 
of new thematic information (for a comparable approach, see Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). 
Given the long tradition of research on persuasion based on the supply of new issue-
specific information with varying argument strength, it is expected that argument strength 
exerts an independent main effect on issue attitude across all conditions (i.e., when 
aggregating situations with and without salience emphasis framing). Strong arguments are 
perceived as more appropriate in evaluating a certain issue because they provoke more 
positive thoughts and less counter-arguing than weak arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
Numerous persuasion studies have shown that citizens form their attitudes based on the 
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strength of presented arguments (e.g., Park et al., 2007), even more so when arguments are 
processed carefully as proposed by the elaboration likelihood model (for a meta-analysis, 
see Carpenter, 2015). 
Thus, aligned with the findings of Leeper and Slothuus (2017), who questioned the 
effects of emphasis frames and mainly found support for the effects of issue-specific 
information, hypothesis H1 predicts that citizens’ issue attitude will be influenced by the 
strength of the argument contained in new information about an issue or event. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): New thematic information containing high argument strength 
for a specific issue position moves citizens’ issue attitude in the direction of this issue 
position in comparison to thematic information containing low argument strength 
for this position. (main effect of issue-specific argument strength) 
 
However, citizens’ attitude formation should not only be influenced by the argument 
strength of new thematic information, but also by salience emphasis frames that 
contextualize this information with known cross-thematic patterns of interpretation such 
as political values, but without adding any further issue-specific information. As noted in 
Chapter 2.5, value emphasis frames activate pre-existing, available, accessible, and 
applicable considerations (Chong & Druckman, 2007c) that are deeply rooted in society 
and have cultural resonance (Entman, 1993). This should influence the importance citizens 
attribute to the political value mentioned by the frame when they interpret new thematic 
information (Nelson, 2004 ⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). 
As Subchapter 2.5.2 and Subchapter 2.5.3 outlined, numerous studies have shown 
that value emphasis frames can finally affect issue attitudes, especially in one-sided 
situations in which citizens are exposed to only one frame (e.g., Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; 
Chong & Druckman, 2007a⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005). This effect of one-sided framing 
conditions should also occur when salience emphasis frames employ political values to 
explain the thematic information, even though such frames do not add further thematic 
information. Salience emphasis frames explicitly explain why thematic information should 
be interpreted in light of a specific political value and thereby, what attitude is appropriate 
given the thematic information (see Subchapter 2.8.2). As political values are well-known 
by citizens and are generally highly applicable to various issues, citizens’ issue attitude 
should follow the direction suggested by the frame. 
The differentiation between issue-specific information and salience emphasis frames 
allows testing this proposed effect twice for the same salience frame. First, a salience 
emphasis frame contextualizing new thematic information likely influences issue attitudes 
in comparison to presenting only new thematic information without explicit framing (see 
hypothesis H2). Second, a salience emphasis frame should be effective compared to 
situations in which a different salience emphasis counter-frame with the opposite valence 
contextualizes the thematic information and suggests the opposite attitude direction (see 
hypothesis H3). That is, both hypotheses expect an independent main effect of the same 
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salience emphasis frame compared to different situations, but without considering the 
varying argument strength of the thematic information the frame contextualizes, i.e., 
aggregated over both argument strengths (for a graphic representation of these hypotheses, 
see the two effect arrows for H2 and H3 in Figure 10). 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A salience emphasis frame moves citizens’ issue attitude in the 
direction of the issue position of the frame in comparison to situations with only 
new thematic information without explicit framing. (main effect salience emphasis frame 
compared to no frame) 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): A salience emphasis frame moves citizens’ issue attitude in the 
direction of the issue position of the frame in comparison to situations with an 
opposite counter-frame. (main effect salience emphasis frame compared to counter-frame) 
 
However, the proposed main effects of salience emphasis frames can be delineated 
by the different argument strength of the issue-specific information the frame 
contextualizes. This enables determining how effective the same frame is when the 
informational setting varies. Specifically, one can test whether a salience emphasis frame 
only influences issue attitude when it contextualizes thematic information containing high 
argument strength for the issue position suggested by the frame or also when issue-specific 
argument strength is low for the issue position of the frame, i.e., when the substantive 
thematic information is against the direction of the frame (see Subchapter 2.8.3). 
If salience emphasis frames also affect issue attitudes in the latter case, then this is 
an even stronger indicator for citizens’ susceptibility to framing effects. It would mean that 
frames are effective when contextualizing a weak issue-specific argument for the attitude 
direction suggested by the frame, in other words, when there is no compelling thematic 
information to follow the suggested frame interpretation. 
Again, this question can be examined twice. First, one can test whether a frame 
likewise affects issue attitude when contextualizing strong and weak issue-specific 
arguments for its issue position in comparison to situations without frames. Second, one 
can test whether this occurs for both issue-specific argument strengths in comparison to 
situations in which a counter-frame contextualizes the thematic information (see the four 
effect arrows in Figure 10 concerned with research question RQ1). However, research 
question RQ1 addresses more broadly the independence of the salience emphasis framing 
effects from the issue-specific argument strength the frame contextualizes: 
 
Research question 1 (RQ1): Does a salience emphasis frame move citizens’ issue 
attitude in the direction of the issue position of the frame only when the thematic 
information contains high argument strength for the issue position of the frame or 
also when the thematic information contains weak argument strength for this issue 
position? (independence of frame effect from argument strength of thematic information) 
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The hypotheses and research questions proposed thus far only considered the 
variables of argument strength of thematic information and salience emphasis frames and 
expected effects on citizens on aggregate. However, as discussed in Subchapter 2.4.1, an 
ongoing question in research on framing effects is whether framing effects work uniformly 
for different citizens or are moderated by citizens’ political-psychological characteristics 
(Borah, 2011a). As salience emphasis frames employ political values to contextualize new 
thematic information, and are thus a specific type of value frame, an important moderator 
to consider is citizens’ political value preference (A. C. Andrews et al., 2017 ⁠; Schemer et al., 
2012⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005). 
Figure 10. Schematic illustration of H1 to H3 and of RQ1 
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Chapter 2.5 defined core political values such as egalitarianism, civil rights, and 
safety as stable, abstract, and superordinate conceptions of desirable or undesirable goals 
concerned with humanity, society, and public affairs (Goren, 2001⁠, 2005 ⁠; Jacoby, 2006). 
Citizens adhere to such values to varying degrees and hold a hierarchical order of values, 
meaning they have specific political value preferences (Jacoby, 2006). When forming 
attitudes about concrete political events, candidates, policies, or issues, citizens rely on their 
political value preferences, which allow them to evaluate these aspects under the umbrella 
of their core beliefs (Ciuk et al., 2017 ⁠; Feldman, 1988⁠; Jacoby, 2006). Thus, hypothesis H4 
first postulates a general and independent main effect of citizens’ value preference on issue 
attitudes aggregated over frame conditions and issue-specific argument strength. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Citizens differ in their issue attitudes according to their political 
value preference. (main effect political value preference) 
 
However, value preferences not only directly affect the interpretation of issues, but 
they also influence how value emphasis frames in political messages are interpreted, 
suggesting they can moderate the effects of frames (see Subchapter 2.5.3). If citizens hold 
values congruent with the frame – i.e., when the media frame is value-resonant – framing 
effects tend to be significantly stronger (A. C. Andrews et al., 2017 ⁠; Schemer et al., 2012⁠; 
Shen & Edwards, 2005). If frames are value-resonant, they rely on considerations 
chronically accessible to the receiver, and therefore, a value-resonant media frame can 
activate these existing cognitions more easily. This increases the likelihood that the frame 
will be used for attitude formation compared to a non-resonant frame, which tries to 
activate considerations that are less chronically accessible (Schemer et al., 2012 ⁠; Shen 
& Edwards, 2005). In addition, receivers judge the applicability of a frame based on their 
political value preferences. If the frame is value-resonant, it is perceived as being aligned 
with the person’s values and judged as more appropriate in evaluating the topic. This 
increases the likelihood that the attitude will follow this frame compared to a non-resonant 
frame (A. C. Andrews et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that salience emphasis frames working with 
political values only have effects when they match citizens’ preexisting value preferences. 
Such frames build on political core beliefs such as humanitarianism or safety, which are not 
easily declinable even if they are not at the top of an individual’s value hierarchy. Such 
values are well-known and in the stock of cultural frames (Entman, 1993). Thus, value 
frames use available and applicable considerations that fulfill an important precondition for 
the effectiveness of frames (Chong & Druckman, 2007c), even for citizens for whom the 
mentioned value is not the most important. Nobody can seriously state that the value of 
security is completely unimportant and meaningless, especially when achieving security 
does not restrict other political values. Subchapter 2.5.3 highlighted that some studies have 
confirmed the effects of value frames even for citizens with competing values, in particular 
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when frames are one-sided (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017), strong (Chong & Druckman, 
2007a), or presented in a non-polarized environment (Druckman et al., 2013). 
That is, value framing effects moderated by political value preferences do not 
necessarily imply that salience emphasis frames are only effective when the value employed 
by the frame matches citizens’ value preference. Likewise, the moderation can imply an 
effect of non-resonant value frames, although the frame effect is significantly stronger when 
the frame is value-resonant. Thus, research question RQ2 asks whether a salience emphasis 
frame employing a political value to contextualize new thematic information only is 
effective when this frame is value-resonant or also when it is non-resonant. 
Regarding the question of citizens’ rationality when forming attitudes, the latter 
effect would be more problematic, as it implies that salience emphasis frames can even 
influence attitudes when the employed value of this frame is not aligned with citizens’ 
preferences (see Subchapter 2.5.4). Again, the effects of value-resonant and non-resonant 
frames addressed in research question RQ2 can be analyzed twice, once compared to 
situations without frames and once compared to an opposite counter-frame (see the four 
effect arrows in Figure 11 concerned with RQ2). However, for a more straightforward 
formulation, research question RQ2 is simplified as follows: 
 
Research question 2 (RQ2): Does a salience emphasis frame move citizens’ issue 
attitude in the direction of the issue position of the frame only when the frame is 
resonant with citizens’ value preference or also when the frame is non-resonant? 
(effect of salience emphasis frame for different political value preferences) 
 
Even if salience emphasis frames affect citizens with different value preferences, 
value resonance between the frame and citizens’ preferences should play a decisive role 
when examining the effects of issue-specific argument strength under framing conditions. 
When only new thematic information and no explicit frames are present, namely when 
issue-specific argument strength is presented in isolation, citizens’ degree of motivated 
reasoning – i.e., processing the strength of arguments in a biased way along individual 
preferences (Bolsen et al., 2014 ⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006) – should be rather low, because no 
external factors trigger the motivation for achieving directional goals, such as the 
reinforcement of existing opinions or defense of one’s own identity when processing 
information (see Subchapter 2.8.3). 
In such situations, people should tend to follow the strong rather than the weak 
issue-specific argument when forming their attitude, and their individual preferences play 
only a minor role (Druckman et al., 2013). Therefore, the first part of hypothesis H5 
proposes that issue-specific argument strength influences citizens’ issue attitude regardless 
of their value preferences when only new thematic information and no explicit frames are 
offered (in Figure 11, see on the left the two proposed effect arrows for H5 for high and 
low preference for a specific political value when comparing the effect of argument strength 
when no frames are present). 
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However, external factors can increase the degree of motivated reasoning about 
issue-specific argument strength when these factors make one’s own identity more salient 
in the evaluation of argument strength. If, for example, explicit party endorsements 
accompany the arguments and participants are told that parties are polarized about the 
issue, then people tend to follow the argument of their preferred party, regardless of 
whether the party presents a strong or weak argument (Druckman et al., 2013). The same 
mechanism should apply to value-resonant frames, because these frames also increase the 
salience of one’s political identity by explicitly contextualizing the argument strength of 
thematic information with a preferred political value. This should then increase motivated 
reasoning about argument strength. 
This likely alters the effect of issue-specific argument strength, and people no longer 
follow the stronger argument to form their issue attitude as they would do when no 
additional frames contextualize the thematic information. In contrast, they should follow 
“their” value-frame in the same manner, regardless of whether this frame contextualizes 
only a weak or a strong issue-specific argument for an issue attitude in the direction of the 
preferred frame (see Subchapter 2.8.3). As such, a value-resonant frame should suppress 
the effect of issue-specific argument strength (see the black arcs for H5 in Figure 11 
indicating no effects of argument strength when the frame is value-resonant). Thus, 
hypothesis H5 formally states: 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Compared to situations without frames in which citizens move 
their issue attitude more in the direction of the strong argument than of the weak 
argument contained in thematic information, the argument strength of issue-specific 
information loses its effectiveness when the salience emphasis frame is value-
resonant. Then, citizens move their issue attitude in the direction of their frame 
regardless of argument strength. (suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength 
through value-resonant frame compared to no frame) 
 
Whereas a value-resonant salience emphasis frame likely suppresses the attitudinal 
effects of issue-specific argument strength, a different pattern of the argument effect should 
emerge when a non-resonant frame contextualizes thematic information with varying 
argument strength against the issue attitude suggested by this non-resonant frame. In this 
case, the effect of argument strength should persist, because the incongruence between 
high argument strength for an issue-attitude aligned with one’s values and a non-resonant 
counter-frame in the message should increase motivated reasoning and thereby, counter-
arguing against the non-resonant emphasis frame. This will likely increase the effectiveness 
of the strong issue-specific argument against the non-resonant frame. 
In contrast, motivated reasoning should be less pronounced when argument 
strength is weak for an attitude opposite to the one suggested by the non-resonant frame, 
because this congruence in the message inhibits cognitive conflict that could activate 
motivated reasoning and thereby inhibit a more biased processing of the weak issue-specific 
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argument (for a longer discussion, see Subchapter 2.8.3). Thus, the effect between a strong 
and a weak issue-specific argument for an issue attitude aligned with one’s values should 
persist when framed with a non-resonant counter-frame (see the effect arrows for 
hypothesis H6 in Figure 11). 
In addition, the persistence of the effect of thematic argument strength when 
contextualized with a non-resonant frame would ensure that the suppression of the effect 
of argument strength through value-resonant framing is not the simple result of distracting 
people from issue-specific arguments by adding any frame. A persisting effect of issue-
specific argument strength in non-resonant framing situations implies that suppressing this 
effect in value-resonant framing situations is the actual result of motivated reasoning and a 
systematic biased evaluation of the issue-specific argument strength elicited by a value-
resonant frame (see Subchapter 2.8.4). If in one case, a (value-resonant) frame suppresses 
the effects of argument strength and in another case, a (non-resonant) frame does not 
suppress this effect, the suppression cannot be the effect of simple distraction from the 
issue-specific arguments by adding a frame. Rather, it must be the result of motivated 
reasoning triggered by a value-resonant frame. Thus, hypothesis H6 expects: 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Compared to situations with a non-resonant counter-frame in 
which citizens move their issue attitude more in the direction of the strong issue-
specific argument than of the weak argument, the argument strength in the thematic 
information loses its effectiveness when the salience emphasis frame is value-
resonant. Citizens then move their issue attitude in the direction of their frame 
regardless of argument strength. (suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength 
through value-resonant frame compared to counter-frame) 
 
If H5 and H6 are empirically supported, they would be the strongest indicators for 
citizens’ susceptibility to framing effects, indicating that frames could increase motivated 
reasoning so strongly that citizens blindly follow their frame and ignore the strength of the 
issue-specific argument for the attitude suggested by their frame. However, the explanation 
for H6 already noted that in some situations, salience emphasis frames may not lead to 
increased motivated reasoning and an evaluation of issue-specific arguments in light of 
individual political value preferences. Especially, this should be the case in situations in 
which salience emphasis frames and issue-specific argument strength point in the same 
direction, i.e., when messages are congruent (see Subchapter 2.8.3). This deserves more 
attention and a more general hypothesis H7. 





Figure 11. Schematic illustration of H4 to H7 and of RQ2 
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When different message features consistently support a specific attitude direction in 
a compelling manner (e.g., a strong issue-specific argument for a specific attitude and a 
frame suggesting the same attitude), the persuasive strength of congruent messages should 
inhibit counter-arguing and the activation of individual preferences in interpreting the 
message, regardless of whether the frame is value-resonant or not. This should lead to less 
biased information processing aligned with individual preferences (Ziegler & Diehl, 2003), 
and citizens’ political value preference should not substantially affect issue attitudes (see the 
black arcs for H7 in Figure 11 indicating no effects of citizens’ value preference when 
messages are congruent). 
In contrast, if messages are incongruent, they are conflictive and do not clearly 
support a specific attitude (e.g., the frame suggests the importance of a weak issue-specific 
argument despite the existence of compelling counter-arguments in the message). To 
resolve this cognitive conflict, citizens likely employ their political value preferences as a 
helpful tool in interpreting the message meaningfully and they should engage in motivated 
reasoning along their preferences (see Subchapter 2.8.3). As a result, attitudes should 
become more polarized between citizens with different political values because of the 
incongruence between issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames (see 
the effect arrows for H7 on the right side in Figure 11). Hence, hypothesis H7 proposes: 
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): There is no substantial effect of citizens’ political value 
preferences on issue attitude when the direction of a salience emphasis frame is 
congruent with the direction of the argument strength of thematic information. In 
contrast, there is an effect of value preference when the issue-specific argument 
strength is incongruent with the salience emphasis frame. (varying influence of political 
value preference by message congruence) 
 
Thus far, the hypotheses and research questions have addressed the direct main and 
interaction effects of the three variables of issue-specific argument strength, salience 
emphasis frames, and political value preferences on citizens’ issue attitude. The next 
hypotheses “zoom” into the main effects of the argument strength of thematic information 
and of salience emphasis frames to investigate the psychological mediation processes 
responsible for these effects. In the literature, the theoretical assumption is that the effects 
of frames on issue attitude are mediated via changes in the importance of values suggested 
by the frame in interpreting an issue (belief importance change), but not via changing beliefs 
about the attitude object (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997). However, 
previous studies on the mediation of framing effects reviewed in Chapter 2.3 found that 
framing effects often work via both paths (e.g., Lecheler et al., 2009 ⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2012⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999). 
As mentioned in Subchapter 2.8.4, the reason for these unexpected results could 
be that the studies confounded emphasis frames with new thematic information in their 
stimuli. This means it could be that the frame did not change beliefs about the issue; rather, 
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the new thematic information did. By differentiating new thematic information with varying 
argument strength and salience emphasis frames, and treating both aspects as separate 
independent variables, the classic theory that the mediation of framing effects only works 
via belief importance change without changing beliefs about the issue can be tested more 
precisely. In contrast, exposure to new thematic information should influence issue 
attitudes only via belief content changes without also changing the importance of a specific 
valuation standard (i.e., without belief importance change, also see Figure 12 for a graphical 
representation of hypothesis H8 and hypothesis H9). Thus, H8 and H9 postulate: 
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The effect of argument strength of new thematic information 
on citizens’ issue attitude is mediated via changes in the belief content about the 
issue, but not via changes in the belief importance of a specific valuation standard. 
(effect of issue-specific argument via belief content change) 
 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): The effect of a salience emphasis frame on citizens’ issue 
attitude is mediated via changes in the belief importance of the political value 
emphasized by the frame as valuation standard, but not via changes in the belief 
content about the issue. (effect of salience emphasis frame via belief importance change) 
However, Subchapter 2.8.4 not only proposed disentangling the variables of 
thematic information and salience emphasis frames to analyze more precisely the mediation 
process of framing effects. It also introduced a further mediator that could be responsible 
for the effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitudes, namely belief evaluation 
change. This mechanism captures how compelling (or persuasive) citizens evaluate the 
argument strength of new thematic information to be to have a specific issue attitude 









Figure 12. Schematic illustration of H8 and H9 and of RQ3 
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aspect of thematic information (see Subchapter 2.8.3), the persuasiveness of beliefs should 
be, of course, influenced by the thematic information citizens receive about an issue (see 
grey path in Figure 12). 
However, salience emphasis frames may also affect the evaluation of the 
persuasiveness of issue-specific arguments (i.e., belief evaluation change). This is because 
such frames explicitly explain how to interpret thematic information and thus, could lead 
to more biased processing of issue-specific information and its persuasiveness, not only 
increase the importance of a specific valuation standard (i.e., besides belief importance 
change). Thus, the last research question RQ3 asks whether this newly introduced mediator 
can explain the effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude (see mediation paths 
for RQ3 in Figure 12): 
 
Research question 3 (RQ3): Is the effect of a salience emphasis frame on citizens’ 
issue attitude mediated via changes in the evaluation of the persuasiveness of beliefs 
about the issue? (effect of salience emphasis frame via belief evaluation change) 
 
Taken together, testing the proposed hypotheses and research questions will 
contribute toward comprehensively answering the superordinate research question of how 
susceptible citizens are to form their issue attitudes based on unique framing effects and 
why such possible effects occur. The next part of this book explains the methodological 
approach employed to challenge the occurrence of salience emphasis framing effects (see 
Part IV). Thereafter, Part V provides the empirical results for the hypotheses and research 
questions.
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IV METHOD 
4.1 Structure of the methods section 
The quality and generalizability of empirical scientific results depend on how they were 
generated. The aim of this methods section is to substantiate the methodological approach 
of this study in a detailed way and to explain and reflect intensively on the decisions made 
to obtain the database for the results. 
Many reasons (e.g., questionable research practices, see Matthes et al., 2015) underlie 
the current replication crisis in social sciences in general and in psychological science in 
particular (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). However, one important problem is that 
researchers do not always provide enough methodological information (LeBel, McCarthy, 
Earp, Elson, & Vanpaemel, 2018). This is often the result of limited space in scientific 
journals and not necessarily of questionable research practices. Still, the lack of information 
makes exact replications difficult and conceptual replications that differ from the original 
experiment have the disadvantage that they are hardly comparable with the original study 
(LeBel et al., 2018). 
Thus, an important aspect of overcoming the replication crisis is transparency 
regarding the methods and data of a study (LeBel et al., 2018). This ensures the provision 
of sufficient information for exact replications and enables other researchers to evaluate 
the methodological quality of the study and therewith, its general relevance in providing 
credible scientific results. Therefore, this methods chapter is relatively exhaustive and 
covers all methodological aspects of this study in detail in the following subchapters. 
After this introduction, a brief epistemological rationale is provided for why this 
study employed an experimental approach to test the hypotheses and research questions 
(Subchapter 4.2.1). Next, the conceptual experimental design of the study is introduced 
and the appropriateness of the chosen factorial structure of the experiment in challenging 
the hypotheses credibly and strongly is substantiated (Subchapter 4.2.2). The following 
Subchapter 4.2.3 justifies the selection of the political issue for the experiment and 
presents its (dis-)advantages in terms of generalizing the results to other political topics. 
Subsequently, the operationalization of the experimental manipulations is explained and 
stimuli are displayed (Subchapter 4.2.4). 
Thereafter, Subchapter 4.3.1 provides an overview of the quasi-representative 
interlocked quota sample of citizens who participated in the experiment, and it contrasts 
the basic demographic sample statistics with the population of German-speaking 
Switzerland to evaluate the generalizability of the results beyond the sample. A discussion 
on all political-psychological measures follows (Subchapter 4.3.2). Thereafter, the choice 
of conducting the experiment online, the procedure of the experiment, the order of the 
questions, and the data cleansing criteria are introduced and their potential implications for 
the internal validity are discussed (Subchapter 4.3.3). Next, Subchapter 4.3.4 provides 
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the results of a simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate how well the measures 
captured the underlying political-psychological concepts, followed by an overview of the 
descriptive statistics to better understand the sample (Subchapter 4.3.5). 
Following this, formal tests are described of the internal validity of the experiment 
to secure the important theoretical advantage of the relatively high internal validity of 
experiments has translated into the specific design of this study in terms of successful 
randomization (Subchapter 4.4.1). Subchapter 4.4.2 then examines whether the 
participants recognized the manipulations in the experimental stimuli and perceived them 
as intended. However, it is not sufficient that participants perceive the manipulations as 
intended. It must also be ensured that the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength 
yielded different baseline attitudes. This is tested in Subchapter 4.4.3. Even if this study 
fulfilled all these requirements for internal validity, the interpretation of the results could 
still be misleading because of problems in statistical power. Therefore, the subsequent 
chapter describes the results of a power analysis (Subchapter 4.4.4). 
The last chapter summarizes the method used in this study (Chapter 4.5). This 
subchapter provides enough detail to understand the results without delving into previous 
in-depth subchapters of the methods section, and it is comparable to the methods sections 
in scientific journals with limited space. Beyond the methodological information presented 
here, the supplementary online material available via https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-
1013-1 provides additional resources such as the original questionnaire in German including 
all experimental stimuli, the raw dataset of the study, the statistical power analysis, and the 
entire R-script documenting the preparation of the data and the statistical analyses (see 
Kaiser, 2019b). 
4.2 Experimental approach 
4.2.1 Choice of method 
Adhering to the scientific paradigm of critical rationalism introduced by Karl Popper 
(1934/2002), the goal of this study was to try to falsify the postulated hypotheses (see Part 
III) through strong methodology and credible empirical data. The first aspect of a strong 
methodological approach is selecting an appropriate research design that enables accurately 
testing the hypotheses. Thus, before selecting a specific method from the toolbox of the 
empirical social sciences, the type of hypotheses postulated should be considered, as this 
implies which methodological approaches can serve as a strong attempt of falsification. 
The proposed hypotheses and research questions have in common that they expect 
or ask for effects of a certain cause (i.e., communication of issue-specific argument strength 
and salience emphasis frames) on a specific outcome (e.g., on individual issue attitudes). As 
such, this study postulates causal hypotheses and research questions on communication 
effects. 
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A causal relation between two variables is defined with three criteria (cf. Shadish, Cook, 
& Campbell, 2002, pp. 3–12): 
 
(1) Relation: There should be a relation between the two variables in the sense of that 
changes in one variable go along with changes in the other variable. 
(2) Chronology: The cause variable needs to precede the effect variable. 
(3) Exclusiveness: There should be no plausible competing explanations for the 
occurrence of the effect other than the cause. 
 
To challenge causal hypotheses appropriately, the experimental approach offers many 
advantages compared to correlational studies, because it not only enables measuring a 
relation between two variables but it can also potentially fulfill the two other preconditions 
of testing a causal relation: the occurrence of the cause before the occurrence of the effect 
and the elimination of competing causes for the effect (cf. Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 3–12). 
The experimental approach enables this through four basic elements (cf. Gravetter & 
Forzano, 2018, pp. 157–183): 
 
(1) Manipulation: The researcher can manipulate the causing independent variable by 
changing its value to obtain at least two treatment conditions. 
(2) Measurement: The influenced dependent variable can be measured. 
(3) Comparison: The scores of the dependent variable can be compared between 
treatment conditions. Differences between these conditions indicate that the 
causing manipulated independent variable is responsible for these differences. 
(4) Control: All other variables that could (co-)influence the causal relation are 
controlled. 
 
By exclusively manipulating the cause between experimental groups while holding 
constant between the groups any other known and unknown variable, differences in the 
outcome variable between the groups can exclusively be induced by the only other variable 
that varies between groups, and this is the manipulated independent variable. To ensure 
that other variables do not systematically co-vary with the manipulated variable, two 
principles are fundamental. First, when manipulating the independent variable of interest, 
it is necessary that another (confounding) variable is not unintentionally manipulated with 
the independent variable. Second, by randomly assigning the subjects to the experimental 
groups, all extraneous variables (e.g., personality traits) should be distributed equally in the 
groups. That is, these variables cannot have a systematic relation with the independent 
variable and therewith, competing causes for changes in the dependent variable can be ruled 
out (cf. Gravetter & Forzano, 2018, pp. 157–183). 
If these criteria are met, experiments have high internal validity in testing causal 
hypotheses. Furthermore, they are superior to correlational studies in which only the 
influences of known and measured extraneous variables can be controlled and the direction 
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of causation between two variables is often unclear (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 
2011⁠; Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 3–12). Therefore, this study uses the experimental approach 
to challenge the causal hypotheses. It will systematically manipulate the communication of 
issue-specific argument strength and of salience emphasis frames in a controlled setting and 
it will analyze the attitudinal effects of these manipulations. 
However, even if experiments are able to draw conclusions about causality, 
generalizations of the revealed causal relationships remain non-deterministic but make 
claims regarding the probability of the occurrence of an effect (cf. Eells, 1991⁠; Shadish et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, the validity and generalizability of these probabilistic results 
depends on the empirical operationalization of an experiment. The next subchapters 
elaborate this operationalization: first, on a more abstract level by explaining the 
construction of the experimental design and factorial treatment structure to challenge the 
hypotheses credibly and strongly (see Subchapter 4.2.2); and second, by explaining in 
further subchapters how this design was empirically implemented and whether this 
implementation was successful (see Subchapter 4.2.3 to Subchapter 4.4.4). 
4.2.2 Experimental design 
To have the hypotheses in mind (see Part III) is not only necessary for the choice of 
method (see Subchapter 4.2.1) but also to select an adequate experimental design, because 
they should guide the factorial treatment structure of the design. The hypotheses propose 
main effects of three independent variables: issue-specific argument strength (H1), salience 
emphasis frames (H2-H3), and citizens’ political value preferences (H4). Thus, to test their 
influence, the experimental design should consist of these three variables as independent 
factors. Furthermore, these factors must be clearly separated by the manipulation to avoid 
any confounding, most importantly between thematic information with varying argument 
strength and different salience emphasis frames (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele 
& Iyengar, 2017), as outlined in Subchapter 2.8.1 and Subchapter 2.8.2. 
To achieve this, two different communicative stimulus elements are necessary. One 
element should exclusively consist of new factual information about the topic under 
investigation, and have varying argument strength but no explicit frame contextualization. 
This informational element allows an independent test of the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength. The other element needs to explicitly contextualize the former element with 
different salience emphasis frames but without adding any further factual information about 
the topic. This framing element enables testing the independent effect of salience emphasis 
frames. The next question deals with how many levels these two factors – thematic 
argument strength in the informational element and salience emphasis frames in the 
framing element – should be manipulated to test the hypotheses in an appropriate way. 
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(Randomized) factor #1: Issue-specific argument strength 
The factor issue-specific argument strength should have at least two levels: low and high 
argument strength for supporting a specific attitude on the topic. However, simply 
presenting an isolated issue-specific argument with varying strength for only one issue 
position has many disadvantages. First, it is unrealistic in public discourse that thematic 
information (not framing) for a topic is completely one-sided and only contains factual 
information that exclusively supports one side. 
Second, some hypotheses and research questions are concerned with comparisons 
between different one-sided salience emphasis frames (e.g., H3). This requires that at least 
two different frames can be applied to the thematic information. However, this can only 
work appropriately when thematic information can be contextualized by a frame, which is 
only the case for one frame if the information is completely one-sided. The other frame 
would simply not have a thematic informational reference to contextualize, which is, again, 
unrealistic (see Subchapter 2.8.2 for a discussion on the relation between salience emphasis 
frames and issue-specific arguments). 
Third, it is probably more complicated for participants to understand and evaluate 
the strength of a single issue-specific argument when it is presented in isolation than when 
it is accompanied by a counter-argument, as this allows a relative assessment of argument 
strength (Rucker, Petty, & Briñol, 2008). 
Fourth and most important, presenting only thematic information for one side, 
albeit with varying argument strength, favors the occurrence of effects of additional 
congruent frames and is thus a biased test of the hypotheses. This is because there would 
simply be no competing information – neither cross-thematic information in the frame nor 
issue-specific information in the (constant) informational element – when additional 
framing also emphasizes an attitude aligned with the direction of the presented issue-
specific argument (Allen, 1991). Thus, this study exposed participants to two-sided thematic 
information in the informational element. This enabled a more rigorous test of salience 
emphasis framing effects, because the occurrence of a framing effect in such a situation 
implies that the additional frame contextualization is effective despite presenting issue-
specific information that counters the frame. 
However, there are different options for constructing two-sided thematic 
information in terms of its varying argument strength. The most comprehensive approach 
is to vary the argument strength for both sides: the issue-specific information that can be 
contextualized by the salience emphasis frame A and information that can be contextualized 
by counter-frame B (see again Subchapter 2.8.2 on how frames and arguments are related). 
The factor argument strength would then comprise four levels (weak argument A + weak 
argument B; strong argument A + weak argument B; weak argument A + strong argument 
B; and strong argument A + strong argument B), and the hypotheses regarding the 
suppression of issue-specific arguments through salience emphasis frames (H5 and H6) 
could be tested for both frames. 
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Unfortunately, this study did not have infinite resources. Furthermore, two more 
factors had to be considered (salience emphasis frames and political value preference), 
further increasing the number of experimental groups. Thus, this study varied issue-specific 
argument strength on only two levels and presented thematic information with varying 
argument strength only for issue position A (weak and strong). The counter-argument 
related to issue position B was held constant (see the second column in Table 7). This still 
enabled testing all hypotheses. However, the suppression effect of issue-specific argument 
strength through value-resonant frames (H5 and H6) could only be examined for one 
salience emphasis frame, because the respective argument strength varied for only one 
frame (i.e., frame A). 
To ensure the test for the general framing hypotheses (H2 and H3) for frame A was 
as rigorous as possible, the constant counter-argument (adhering to issue position B) should 
be strong rather than weak, because the occurrence of a framing effect would be more 
convincing if the effect exists amid strong counter-arguments suggesting that citizens 
should not follow the frame. In contrast, using a weak constant counter-argument could 
have a backfire effect that would strengthen the applicability of frame A (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007a), which would imply inadequate favoring of the framing hypothesis by 
the design. Thus, the most appropriate way to test the hypotheses meaningfully, while 
simultaneously not increasing the number of experimental groups too much, was to 
manipulate the factor issue-specific argument strength in the informational element on two 
levels and randomly assign participants to one of these levels: first, weak argument A vs. 
strong argument B and second, strong argument A vs. strong argument B. 
(Randomized) factor #2: Salience emphasis frame 
The next question was how many levels the second factor “salience emphasis frame” should 
be manipulated on to test the hypotheses in an appropriate way. The hypotheses and 
research questions are interested in both the effect of frames compared to situations 
without explicit framing and compared to situations with an opposite counter-frame (H2 
and H3). Thus, the factor salience emphasis frame must have three levels (see also Table 
7). 
Table 7. 2x3x2 (quasi-)experimental between-subjects design with 12 groups 






Factor salience emphasis frame 
(3 levels) 
No frame Frame A Frame B 
High preference for value A Weak A vs. strong B I V IX 
Strong A vs. strong B II VI X 
Low preference for value A Weak A vs. strong B III VII XI 
Strong A vs. strong B IV VIII XII 
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First, there should be a level without explicit frames. This is important for using this 
level as a reference group to compare the effectiveness of frames and no frames. The level 
without frames also serves as the baseline for the effects of issue-specific argument strength 
that should later be suppressed by a value-resonant salience emphasis frame (H5). In fact, 
the design had to ensure a significant effect of thematic argument strength when not 
explicitly contextualized through frames. If no argument effect emerged without salience 
emphasis frames, whether additional frames suppress the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength could not be analyzed. Moreover, the explanation could not be ruled out that a 
non-effect of argument strength under framing conditions is not the result of salience 
emphasis framing but is simply the consequence of a missing issue-specific argument effect 
in general. Of course, the isolated effect of argument strength without additional framing 
could also be examined in an independent pretest, instead of integrating this as a baseline 
“frame” level in the experiment. However, integrating this level in the design and testing 
the isolated issue-specific argument effect with a randomly selected subsample of the final 
sample has the advantage of ruling out population differences between an independent 
pretest and the final experiment. 
The second level consisted of the salience emphasis frame A contextualizing the 
thematic information with the political value A, therewith suggesting an issue attitude in 
direction A. As the factor issue-specific argument strength only varies for attitudinal 
direction A (see above), the salience emphasis frame is the focus when testing the frame 
effects. Nevertheless, integrating only this frame in the design is insufficient to test all 
hypotheses. 
As some hypotheses are interested in frame effects compared to one-sided exposure 
to a counter-frame, the factor salience emphasis frame needed a third level in which 
counter-frame B contextualizes the thematic information. Integrating this third level is not 
only important as an additional reference group to compare the general effect of salience 
emphasis frame A (H3), but integrating frame B also helps to test the suppression of issue-
specific argument effects through frame A (H5 and H6) in a more convincing way. 
The rationale for this hypothesis was that if a salience emphasis frame is value-
resonant (frame A), the frame will increase motivated reasoning and suppress the effects of 
thematic argument strength (see Part III). The problem with testing this assumption only 
through comparisons with the baseline level without explicit frames is that the possibility 
could not be ruled out that the suppression simply resulted from distracting participants 
from the issue-specific arguments by adding additional frame A, and thus the suppression 
is not the actual result of motivated reasoning. Therefore, hypothesis H6 proposed 
examining the suppression effect of frame A compared to a non-resonant counter-frame 
B. If the issue-specific argument effect persists when framed with the non-resonant frame, 
a general effect of distraction from the arguments due to general framing can be ruled out. 
Thus, it was worth integrating frame B as the third level of the factor frame. Essentially, 
the second factor of the design should be the factor salience emphasis frame with three 
levels randomly assigned to the participants: no frame, frame A, and counter-frame B. 
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(Non-randomized quasi-) factor #3: Citizens’ political value preference 
In addition to issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames, the design 
included citizens’ political value preference as a third factor. This was necessary to test the 
general independent effect of this variable as proposed by hypothesis H4 and for all 
hypotheses and research questions concerned with the value resonance of frames (RQ2, 
H5, and H6). To obtain value resonance (or dissonance), citizens’ value preferences were 
included in the design to generate (mis-)matches with the salience emphasis frames used in 
the stimuli. As explained, the core frame of the design is only one frame (frame A), because 
only here does the issue-specific argument strength of the thematic information vary. Thus, 
the design did not integrate the entire hierarchy of citizens’ political value preferences, but 
the preference for value A, the same value frame A employs to contextualize thematic 
information. 
However, citizens’ political value preferences are stable political-psychological traits 
(Feldman, 1988 ⁠; Goren, 2005⁠; Jacoby, 2006) that cannot be easily manipulated in an 
experiment. In addition, participants cannot be randomly assigned to having either a high 
or low preference for a specific political value. Thus, testing its influence is limited to a role 
as a quasi-experimental factor without random assignment but by integrating citizens’ actual 
preferences as further measured variable (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 104–106). The validity of 
a quasi-factor, which is statistically a moderator variable, depends on its independence of 
the other manipulated factors (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Because political value preferences 
are stable traits, the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength or a salience emphasis 
frame in a single experiment will likely not affect these preferences, which makes value 
preferences a theoretically suitable quasi-factor. A formal test of the independence of the 
implemented quasi-factor showed that this criterion was met empirically (see Subchapter 
4.4.1). 
The next question was on how many levels to analyze the preference for political 
value A. In terms of statistical validity, the best would be to not restrict the number of 
levels, but simply use the levels of the metric measurement of value preference (Cohen, 
1983). However, theoretically, two levels are sufficient to generate the necessary value 
resonance with salience emphasis frame A to test the hypotheses: a high preference for 
political value A and a low preference for value A (see also Table 7). The former serves to 
analyze the situation when frame A is value-resonant, and the latter when frame A is non-
resonant. 
Of course, it can be argued that a medium preference for political value A be used 
as a third level, enabling an analysis of value resonance and non-resonance while excluding 
citizens that do not clearly support or oppose the value. However, this would again increase 
the number of (quasi-)experimental groups, requiring an even larger sample to analyze the 
hypotheses with enough statistical power. Thus, in this study, only two levels were used for 
the factor political value preference by dichotomizing the measured metric variable for 
value preference (for further details, see Subchapter 4.3.5). This also rendered the 
comprehensibility of the results of the rather complex design more parsimonious than if 
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more levels were used or the metric quasi-factor integrated. To ensure high statistical 
validity, the results were subject to robustness checks for which the metric measurement 
for citizens’ political value preference served as a quasi-factor (e.g., see Subchapter 5.1.6). 
 
Summary 
Based on theoretical considerations regarding internal validity and a credible test of the 
hypotheses, this study employed a 2x3x2 between-subjects (quasi-)experimental design (see 
also Table 7) with the randomly assigned and experimentally manipulated factor issue-specific 
argument strength (weak A vs. strong B, and strong A vs. strong B), the randomly assigned 
and experimentally manipulated factor salience emphasis frame (no frame, frame A, and counter-
frame B), and the non-manipulated quasi-factor political value preference (low vs. high for value 
A). Thus far, the design has been explained on an abstract level to clarify how it would 
appropriately test the hypotheses. The following subchapters describe the exact 
operationalization of this design, starting with an in-depth discussion of the political issue 
used for the experiment (see Subchapter 4.2.3). 
4.2.3 Issue selection 
Criteria for issue selection 
After selecting an experimental design and factorial treatment structure, the next important 
question to address is how to operationalize the design. Here, selecting the issue for the 
experimental stimuli is highly important for both the internal and external validity of an 
experiment. As the aim of this book is to investigate emphasis framing effects in political 
communication, the stimuli had to deal with a political topic. In addition, the political issue 
had to be relevant to society and personally important to allow the generalization of possible 
framing effects for this topic to other politically relevant topics. However, prior empirical 
results suggest that emphasis framing effects mainly occur when issue importance is low 
(Lecheler et al., 2009). That is, using an important topic for the experiment not only enables 
the more relevant generalization compared to side issues, but also makes it the more 
difficult and therewith the better test of the hypotheses. 
Next, at least two different and well-known salience emphasis frames should be 
equally applicable for the issue with a comparable degree of realism and persuasive strength 
(often referred to as frame strength, cf. Aarøe, 2011; Chong & Druckman, 2007a). Citizens 
should know both salience emphasis frames so that the contextualization with these frames 
can be achieved without adding new thematic information to the selected topic. Preferably, 
the frames reflect competing ends of a political value conflict to ensure that generated value 
resonance is tied to only one frame, and the other is clearly a competing frame to that value. 
To obtain a suitable quasi-factor that delineates the participants with high and low political 
value preference into two equally sized groups, the distribution of the respective political 
value should also not be skewed too starkly in the population. 
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Furthermore, this study examined attitude formation, not attitude change. This 
required that the topic under investigation was new to participants, enabling the formation 
of a new and unique issue attitude based on the presented new thematic information with 
varying argument strength. Using a subtopic new to the participants has the additional 
advantages that opinions are not crystallized and a single experimental treatment is 
potentially sufficient to generate attitudinal effects (Chong & Druckman, 2010⁠; Druckman 
et al., 2013). In addition, the topic had to be part of a broader policy field for which the 
connection with the chosen salience emphasis frames was established in the public 
discourse to ensure not only the general applicability of frames but also the applicability in 
the chosen thematic context. 
 
Medical approval as a relevant political and societal issue 
With these criteria in mind, this study employed a specific topic in the broader field of 
health politics for the experimental stimuli: a fictive approval procedure for a new cancer 
therapy to be available in the health system of Switzerland, the country in which this study 
was conducted. As in other countries, new medicaments need to be approved by the 
regulatory state authorities before being introduced into the market. These approval 
procedures evaluate the quality, safety, and effectiveness of new medical products (Swiss 
Agency for Therapeutic Products, 2018). They are very important for sick persons in 
ensuring the latest qualitative medical care, and relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, 
because product approval provides the opportunity to compel health insurance companies 
to cover the expenses of the new medicament in the basic health system. These new 
therapies can be very expensive, costing up to CHF 160,000 (equivalent to around $160,000 
at the time of this study) per patient and year (Hehli, 2018). Thus, product approval can 
lead to high additional expenditures for health insurance companies. 
Paying basic health insurance is compulsory for every person residing in Switzerland, 
and an increase in the expenditures of health insurance companies leads to higher insurance 
rates per capita. Between 1990 and 2015, the share of health costs of the national gross 
domestic product (GDP) increased from about 8% to 12% (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
2017b), and between 1996 and 2016, the average yearly insurance fees per capita in the basic 
health system more than doubled from about CHF 1,800 to nearly CHF 4,000 (Swiss 
Federal Health Office, 2018). Current projections expect that this increase will not stop, 
and a yearly growth of health costs of 3.5% to 3.9% is predicted until 2019 (Köthenbürger 
& Sandqvist, 2018), while average inflation per year is projected at only about 1% (State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO, 2018). As such, the introduction of new cancer 
therapies can be a double-edged sword. On one hand, the basic idea of a health insurance 
is to provide the best means to cure diseases and help those suffering from serious illnesses 
such as cancer. On the other, approvals for new and very expensive therapies can 
overstretch the budget of the national health system in general and of individual 
households. 
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Therefore, medical approvals constantly receive media coverage in Switzerland and 
are not a topic exclusive to experts. Even without presenting a quantitative content analysis, 
some anecdotal evidence for media coverage in important Swiss newspapers such as Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung (e.g., Furger & Voigt, 2018 ⁠; Hehli, 2018⁠; Wise, 2016) and Tagesanzeiger (e.g., 
Flubacher, 2016) and by the national public broadcaster SRG (e.g., Schwerzmann, 2018 ⁠; 
Woodtli, 2017) illustrates the ongoing public discussion on the approval of new 
medicaments in Switzerland. 
Of course, political parties also participate in this discourse. For example, a few 
weeks after this study was conducted, namely in March 2018, the Swiss government decided 
to not approve a new medicament against cystic fibrosis, arguing that the price thereof was 
too high given its medical effectiveness (Hehli, 2018). This decision was criticized by 
members of parliament of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP). Consequently, 
in September 2018, the SP chose a different way to tackle the problem of increasing health 
insurance rates without denying the approval of new and potentially lifesaving 
medicaments. The party published a press release announcing that they plan a referendum 
initiative that aims to restrict the fee for the basic health insurance to not more than 10% 
of a household’s income by granting more publically financed price reductions for 
individual insurance fees (SP Schweiz, 2018). These few examples substantiate that the topic 
chosen for the experiment clearly fulfills the criteria for selecting a relevant political and 
societal issue. 
 
Medical approvals and further criteria for issue selection 
Moreover, the topic of medical approvals is suitable in terms of other criteria mentioned at 
the beginning of this subchapter (see also Table 8). First, as individual insurance rates can 
subsequently increase through expensive approvals, the topic should have some personal 
importance for the participants, as every Swiss resident can be financially affected by the 
approval decision. Compared to most other political topics, this is rather unique and an 
advantage of the issue selected. Usually, political decisions do not affect all citizens in the 
same way, as in the case with the increasing costs in Switzerland’s health system. Rather, 
they focus on specific subgroups (e.g., statutory minimum wage for precariously employed, 
mineral oil tax for car owners). However, there might be some variation in wealthier people 
perceive the financial impact of increased personal insurance rates compared to poorer 
citizens. Therefore, this study controlled for income among many other control variables 
(see Subchapter 4.3.2). 
Second, different salience emphasis frames with comparable applicability can be 
employed to contextualize medical approvals. Essentially, the topic is a typical direct aid 
policy in the framework of redistributive social welfare policies. Sick persons who need the 
aid of a new medical therapy do not have to cover high curation costs individually. Rather, 
healthy people pay the same basic health insurance fees to help those suffering from a 
serious illness. That is, medical approval is a form of direct assistance policy for the needy. 
The extent to which citizens agree with such welfare measures depends on their political 
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value preferences for humanitarianism and economic-individualism (Feldman 
& Steenbergen, 2001 ⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005), which mirror the classic socioeconomic 
political conflict line between redistributive “left” and market-driven “right” ideologies. 
While a humanitarian view interprets social welfare as relevant and unconditional solidarity 
with the needy, economic-individualism typically argues with the goal of low community 
spending, emphasizing individual financial responsibility for using social services (Böcken 
& Altenhöner, 2011). 
While not the only conflict line of political values shaping ideologies, the 
socioeconomic one is still a core political cleavage in modern western societies (Feldman 
& Johnston, 2014⁠; Jost et al., 2009⁠; Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2019⁠; Kriesi et al., 
2006). Both value orientations are well established in the political discourse and nearly all 
citizens know the fundamental interpretative patterns underlying these values. Thus, both 
political values have high applicability, and salience emphasis frames can employ these 
applicable values to contextualize the topic of medical approval without necessarily 
introducing additional new thematic information on the specific topic. 
Third, compared to all other European countries, social welfare attitudes in 
Switzerland are much less skewed in the direction of humanitarianism and state 
interventionism. According to data of the European Social Survey (ESS), Swiss citizens 
score lowest in Europe regarding the acceptance of social benefits for the sick, the old, the 
unemployed, childcare, and labor law. The ESS measures social welfare attitudes with six 
items on an 11-point scale from 0 = “it should not be governments’ responsibility at all” 
to 10 = “it should be entirely governments’ responsibility.” Swiss respondents scored the 
lowest average value at 6.42, i.e., relatively close to the scale midpoint of 5 (Baslevent & 
Kirmanoglu, 2011). In contrast, the average in most other European countries ranges from 
7.50 to 8.29 in Spain and 8.30 in Hungary (i.e., starkly skewed in the direction of state 
interventionism). 
Thus, employing a social welfare issue in an experiment in Switzerland such as the 
selected topic of medical approvals ensures the sample will consist of two approximately 
equally sized groups of citizens with different positions regarding the political values of 
humanitarianism and economic-individualism. This will enable employing value 
preferences as a quasi-factor in the experimental design without encountering the problem 
that group sizes are either unbalanced (e.g., 80% show a low value preference for economic-
individualism) or that the cut-off value to divide the sample (e.g., the median) is too far 
from an appropriate theoretical value (e.g., the scale midpoint). 
Fourth, to ensure the specific issue is new to participants and attitude formation can 
be examined, this study used a fictive new therapy against bowel cancer and thus, a fictive 
application for medical approval, even though as mentioned, the topic is based on the 
general procedure of approvals for real medicaments in Switzerland. A further advantage 
of a fictive approval procedure is that it gives the experiment maximum control over the 
“factual” thematic information citizens have about the specific subtopic, because all 
thematic information about the therapy can be experimentally induced (see next 
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Subchapter 4.2.4). This ensures the manipulation of the baseline effect of issue-specific 
argument strength, which is the precondition to investigate how salience emphasis framing 
alters this argument effect. Furthermore, the decision for fictive therapy against bowel 
cancer, rather than another form of cancer, is not arbitrary. Bowel cancer is one of the most 
prevalent cancers in Switzerland for both men and women (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
2016), making the topic of the experiment relevant. Moreover, choosing this type of cancer 
is important for the realism that a single new therapy can increase insurance fees, as the 
new therapy would be applied to many patients. 
 
Summary 
Taken together (see also Table 8 for a short summary), the approval procedure for a fictive 
new cancer therapy in Switzerland meets the mentioned criteria for the selection of an 
experimental issue. The topic is political in the broader field of health politics and social 
welfare; it is of societal relevance, both ethically and economically; it provides some degree 
of personal importance, as every Swiss resident can be financially affected by the approval; 
two equally applicable salience emphasis frames (humanitarianism and economic-
individualism) at the heart of political conflict lines in Western democracies can 
contextualize the issue in competing ways; the distribution of these values in Switzerland is 
relatively balanced, facilitating the creation of a valid quasi-factor for citizens’ political value 
preference; and using a fictive approval procedure ensures the investigation of attitude 
formation based on new issue-specific information and already known salience emphasis 
frames. 
However, the generalizability of the results for this issue to other political topics 
depends on how prototypical it is for politics in general (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 66–68). 
While medical approvals are not the most urgent political topic in Switzerland, the 
preceding pages have hopefully shown that the issue fulfills some of the methodological 
criteria for a well-designed experiment and is a relevant political topic with a clear value 
conflict. However, its generalizability to very broad, highly polarized, and highly salient 
issues such as immigration or international conflicts is maybe limited. Instead, the topic is 
prototypical for subordinate, more specialized issues in broader policy fields such as the 
introduction of new laws, work in commission, or legislative proposals; in other words, the 
daily business of policy-oriented politics in parliamentary democracies. This is not a bad 
precondition for testing the broader research question of citizens’ irrationality in attitude 
formation through salience emphasis framing. Presumably, it is a harder and thus better 
test for irrationality than employing a highly emotionalized issue where facts and thematic 
argument strength play anyway a less relevant role. 
After discussing the issue selection in detail here, the following Subchapter 4.2.4 
describes the specific experimental manipulations and explains how the two factors of 
issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames were implemented in a 
stimulus for the chosen topic of medical approvals and how citizens’ political value 
preference was integrated as a third (quasi-)factor in the study. 
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4.2.4 Experimental manipulation 
Thus far, the previous subchapters discussed how the factorial treatment structure of the 
experimental design should look on an abstract level (see Subchapter 4.2.2) and which 
specific political issue is appropriate to fit the proposed experimental design (see 
Subchapter 4.2.3). Next, the operationalization in this study of the exact manipulations 
for the chosen political issue of medical approvals is explained. 
 
Stimulus 
The first question to address in terms of operationalization is what kind of stimulus or 
treatment should contain the manipulations of issue-specific argument strength and 
salience emphasis frames. As this study is concerned with communicative effects, the 
stimuli should be any type of communication to which participants can be exposed. The 







Reason for criterion 
 
Fulfillment of criterion by selected 
issue (approval of new cancer therapy) 
Political issue To investigate framing 
effects in political 
communication 
Yes (in social welfare politics, political 
parties involved in public discourse on 
medical approvals) 
Societal relevance Generalizability to other 
relevant topics, more 
difficult test of hypotheses 
Yes (constant media coverage, ethical 
question of how to deal with the sick 
and ill in society, high expenditures of 
health system) 
Personal importance Generalizability to other 
relevant topics, more 
difficult test of hypotheses 
Yes (approval would lead to increase in 





To generate value 
resonance/dissonance, 
comparable effectiveness 
of frames for value conflict 
Yes (humanitarianism and economic-
individualism as strong and relevant 
political values) 
Balanced distribution 
of political values 
To obtain useful quasi-
factor 
Yes (attitudes of Swiss citizens on 
social welfare more equally distributed 
than in any other country in Europe) 
Novelty of 
information 
To investigate attitude 
formation, experimental 
control 
Yes (general approval procedure not 
new, but specific inspection of 
application is new) 
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easiest way would have been to show participants thematic arguments with varying strength 
in single written sentences (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006), and subsequently present a further 
written sentence containing the frame contextualization of these arguments (e.g., Leeper 
& Slothuus, 2017). However, this is problematic from an internal and external validity 
perspective. 
Regarding internal validity, exposing participants to the treatments of interests 
without any context increases the risk of demand characteristics, i.e., participants could 
guess too easily the hypotheses of the investigation and respond differently than they would 
without knowing the researcher’s intention (Weber & Cook, 1972). A compelling cover 
story that deceives participants about the true goal of the study may reduce this risk. 
However, it is questionable as to how effective a cover story can be for distraction if the 
stimuli are single sentences containing the manipulated factors. In terms of external validity, 
written isolated single sentences without any source or media environment are also not a 
common form of the exchange of arguments and frames in real political communication 
processes. 
Therefore, this study did not employ as a stimulus single sentences but a mock-up 
online news article about the aforementioned approval procedure for the new therapy and 
manipulated the experimental factors in the article. Online news is a widespread way 
through which citizens get involved with politics. Around 70% of the Swiss residential 
population use online news articles at least occasionally (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
2017c). Thus, employing such articles in an experiment implies relatively high external 
validity for political communication processes. In addition, it is rather easy to professionally 
manipulate the content of online news articles compared to audiovisual news material, for 
example. 
Furthermore, online news articles as stimuli allow relatively convincing cover stories 
to deceive participants about the true intentions of the study, because they are information 
rich enough to tell participants the study focuses on aspects they then also see in the stimuli. 
This suggests they will not be immediately skeptical of the cover story. For instance, a 
common cover story for experiments with news articles is that the study is about the 
journalistic quality of articles, which can relatively effectively divert participants’ focus of 
attention from the persuasive character of the message and avoids strong forms of 
reactance (for a general discussion on the relevance of reactance in persuasion research, see 
Dillard & Shen, 2005⁠; Silvia, 2006). This cover story is also employed in this study (see 
Subchapter 4.3.3). 
To ensure valid and non-confounded manipulations of the factors of issue-specific 
argument strength and salience emphasis frames (see Subchapter 4.2.2) in the stimulus, 
the online news article consisted of four parts: 
(1) Headline: A headline varying according to the framing conditions. 
(2) Picture: A constant neutral picture of the main building of the Federal Office of 
Public Health (FOPH), which is politically responsible for medical approval 
procedures. The picture was included to increase the realism of the news article, 
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because online news articles usually employ at least one picture in the article. Of 
course, it would also have been possible to vary the picture in line with the respective 
framing condition. However, this can be dangerous in terms of internal validity, as 
visual and textual frames can contribute differently to attitudinal and behavioral 
effects (Powell, Boomgaarden, Swert, & de Vreese, 2015). Furthermore, pictures can 
confound the displaying of emphasis frames with the displaying of other factors 
(e.g., emotions), and visuals that only show a rather abstract frame such as 
economic-individualism in a valid way are difficult to find. Thus, this study used a 
neutral visual and displayed only a picture of the Health Ministry to profit from 
higher realism for the online article by adding a picture without threatening internal 
validity. 
(3) Informational paragraph: An informational paragraph that introduced substantive 
information about the topic including the factor issue-specific argument strength. 
This paragraph avoided any explicit frame contextualization but simply told the 
participants the basic facts about the approval procedure for the new cancer therapy 
in order to ensure that information (with varying argument strength) and salience 
emphasis frames were not confounded. 
(4) Framing paragraph: A framing paragraph in which according to the framing condition 
a specific salience emphasis frame contextualized the information presented in the 
informational paragraph before. This paragraph avoided the adding of any further 
information about the topic but exclusively used well-known value frame 
contextualization and explained the information under the umbrella of this frame. 
 
Figure 13 shows how the study implemented these four elements into the final 
stimulus. To ensure the layout of the online news article was as realistic as possible, the real 
online layout of one of the country’s most important newspapers (tagensanzeiger.ch) was 
employed. This was possible using Firefox’s inspector, a web developer tool provided in 
the Mozilla Firefox browser. This tool allows accessing the html code of any webpage and 
enables changing the original website, such as by inserting a different text or picture. The 
manipulated website can then be saved on a local computer and implemented in a survey. 
While this leads to highly realistic mock-up articles for experimental purposes, a 
disadvantage is that the media source could interfere or moderate the effects of the 
experimental factors of interest. To avoid this, while simultaneously ensuring a realistic 
layout, any direct references to tagesanzeiger.ch such as the brand logo were deleted. 
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Note. Left figure displays strong issue-specific argument against approval with salience 
emphasis frame economic-individualism in the last paragraph, right figure shows weak issue-
specific argument against approval with salience emphasis frame humanitarianism in the last 
paragraph, see https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for all original stimuli 
Figure 13. Examples of original stimuli in German 
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Manipulation of issue-specific argument strength in the informational paragraph 
Regarding the specific manipulation of the experimental factors in the online news article, 
the first relevant aspect is which issue-specific arguments, salience emphasis frames, and 
political values the stimuli should contain. As Subchapter 4.2.3 explained, the political 
values of economic-individualism and humanitarianism are well qualified to contextualize 
the issue of a new approval procedure for a cancer therapy. Thus, these values were used 
together with a no-frame condition for the three-level factor salience emphasis frame (see 
Table 9). 
However, for which of these frames should issue-specific argument strength vary in 
the informational part (see Subchapter 4.2.2 for a discussion on why argument strength 
should vary for only one issue position)? For the purposes of this study, it was decided to 
vary the thematic argument strength for opposing the approval of the new therapy and 
therewith, the issue-specific argument strength connected to the salience emphasis frame 
employing the political value of economic-individualism. The issue-specific argument 
strength for supporting the approval was held constant, even though it would have been 
similarly possible to manipulate the issue-specific argument strength for supporting the 
approval, while holding constant the thematic argument strength against the approval. 
Table 9. Employed issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis frames, and 
citizens’ political value preference for 2x3x2 (quasi-) experimental between-subjects design 
Quasi-factor political 




Factor issue-specific argument 
strength against approval 










High preference for 
economic-
individualism 
Weak argument against 
approval (CHF 10 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
I V IX 
Strong argument against 
approval (CHF 300 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
II VI X 
Low preference for 
economic-
individualism 
Weak argument against 
approval (CHF 10 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
III VII XI 
Strong argument against 
approval (CHF 300 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
IV VIII XII 
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What did the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength look like? As 
mentioned, argument strength was manipulated without naming an explicit frame 
contextualization in the informational paragraph that presented basic information about 
the approval procedure and the new therapy that sought approval. In the experimental 
condition with weak issue-specific argument strength for opposing the approval, 
participants read that the new therapy would be only slightly more expensive than existing 
medicaments for bowel cancer and only cost the basic health insurance system a few million 
francs in total (see Table 10 for the exact wording of all experimental conditions). This 
would lead to a very small increase of the yearly personal insurance fee of about CHF 10 
for everyone in the country, while the therapy would increase the chances for curation from 
20% to 30% (constant strong issue-specific argument for supporting the approval). In a 
country such as Switzerland, which has a yearly personal median income of about 
CHF 78,000 (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2018a), paying CHF 10 more per year to 
support people suffering from cancer seems a weak issue-specific argument for opposing a 
more effective therapy. 
In contrast, the experimental condition with high thematic argument strength for 
opposing the approval also told participants that the new therapy increases the chances for 
curation from 20% to 30%, but this therapy would be considerably more expensive than 
existing medicaments, leading to additional costs of some 100 million of francs for the basic 
health system. This would increase the personal insurance fee by CHF 300. Compared to 
the roughly CHF 40 Swiss households (not individuals) donate overall per year (Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office, 2017a), this CHF 300 increase in insurance fees is rather high, 
and should be a much more compelling issue-specific argument to oppose the approval of 
the new therapy than the condition with the weak argument (CHF 10). Both manipulations 
were the same length in the stimulus. The exact wording of the informational paragraph is 
shown in Table 10. 
In terms of realism, the increase of CHF 300 per person per year should still be 
credible for the introduction of a new bowel cancer therapy, despite sounding like a rather 
high amount. The average yearly insurance fee in Switzerland is about CHF 4,000 per 
person and thus, the CHF 300 more per year equates to a 7.5% increase in insurance rates. 
This is comparable to the real yearly increase of insurance fees of about 3% in the last 15 
years in Switzerland up to 7.3% between 2009 and 2010 (Swiss Federal Health Office, 
2018). Thus, participants should be familiar with the increase noted in the stimuli, because 
a similar amount is reflected in their real insurance invoices. As part of the treatment checks, 
this study also evaluated the perceived realism of both issue-specific cost arguments 
(CHF 10 / CHF 300) and the constant issue-specific argument of increased opportunities 
for curation, revealing that participants did not perceive the thematic arguments as 
implausible (for an in-depth analysis, see Subchapter 4.4.2). 
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Table 10. Translated manipulations of issue-specific argument strength and salience 




Economic-individualism No frame Humanitarianism 
Headline New cancer therapy would 




New cancer therapy could 




Main building of health ministry 
Informational 
paragraph 





The federal health ministry (BAG) announced yesterday that it is inspecting the application 
for a new bowel cancer therapy. The approval procedure is concerned with the question of 
whether the new therapy could be employed in the basic health insurance that must be 
financed by all citizens. 
Inspection of the application has commenced 
According to a report by the BAG, initial clinical studies have shown that the new therapy 
can tackle the tumor more directly through an improved but more expensive procedure. 
Thereby, the tumor can be fought with fewer side effects on the adjacent, healthy tissue. By 
applying this method, the new therapy can somewhat increase the chances of a cure for 
patients affected by bowel cancer in an advanced stage. Compared to medicaments already 
used, the chances of a cure increase from 20% to at least 30%. However, the BAG also 
pointed out that the new therapy costs [considerably more / a little more] than the 
medicaments employed so far. This would lead to additional expenditures of [many hundred 
million / a few million] francs for the health insurances of the basic health system, if the 
therapy is approved. According to calculations of the BAG, approval would entail for each 
insured person an increase of the yearly insurance rate of ca. [10 / 300] francs. 
Framing 
paragraph 
Funding of the health system 
endangered 
The BAG would impose an 
additional cost-pusher in the basic 
health system and therewith continue 
to increase the burden of social 
security contributions if the new 
bowel cancer therapy is approved. It 
is alarming that one single therapy 
could lead to such an increase of the 
yearly insurance rates. Furthermore, 
the approval would take a completely 
wrong stand and again legitimize 
additional expenditures for 
medicaments. The already high costs 
in the basic health insurance will keep 
increasing if the BAG does not 
rethink its policy and continues to 
approve more expensive 
medicaments, especially when there 
are already effective medicaments for 
bowel cancer that are considerably 
cheaper. Instead, the BAG should 
consider economic aspects such as 
the increasing additional 
expenditures when making such 
decisions. If not, the burden of dues 
for the insured will never stop 
increasing and the funding of the 














Ensure solidarity for the 
weakest 
The BAG would add an 
important aid in the basic health 
system and therewith ensure 
solidarity with sick persons if the 
new bowel cancer therapy is 
approved. It is important to 
provide sick persons with a new 
opportunity to cure bowel cancer, 
especially when it is considerably 
more effective than existing 
medicaments. Furthermore, 
approval would take a stand and 
guarantee the solidary assignment 
of the basic health insurance. The 
BAG should focus on the well-
being of sick persons when 
deciding about approvals to 
maintain the high quality of care 
in the health system. After all, it is 
the essence of a solidarity group 
to always ensure the best possible 
medical treatments for persons 
sick through no fault of their 
own. It would be good if the 
BAG approves more effective 
therapies for the basic health 
insurance. Otherwise, solidarity in 
the health system will collapse in 
the medium term. 
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Furthermore, the selection of the issue-specific argument strengths finally employed 
was based on various pretests to ensure they would lead to different attitudinal effects, 
which is the precondition for the successful implementation of the experimental design (see 
Subchapter 4.2.2). Briefly, these pretests revealed two important insights. 
First, when participants were exposed to the isolated thematic argument of increased 
costs through the new therapy without presenting the counter-argument of its effectiveness 
in the first pretest with undergraduate students, respondents struggled to estimate the 
strength of the issue-specific argument because of the lack of a comparison standard. This 
led to many missing values. Furthermore, participants’ open answers at the end of the 
questionnaire indicated that they were unable to decide whether the amount of costs is a 
strong or weak argument to oppose approval, because they could not compare it to further 
issue-specific information. This can be partly explained by the sample of undergraduate 
students, as their parents likely pay the insurance fees. Thus, they are less familiar with the 
costs of their health insurance. However, it also revealed that the manipulation of issue-
specific argument strength would work better by introducing a standard of comparison, i.e., 
by adding the counter-argument of the effectiveness of the new therapy. 
Second, a further pretest that included this counter-argument besides the varying 
cost argument and used a quasi-representative interlocked quota sample revealed that a 
spread between the weak (CHF 18) and the strong argument (CHF 216) to oppose the 
approval of the new therapy of around 12 times was not sufficient to effectively manipulate 
the issue attitude. At least, it led to differences in the perception of issue-specific argument 
strength in the baseline groups without frames. 
A third and final pretest, again with a quasi-representative interlocked quota sample, 
increased this spread to 30 times (weak costs: CHF 10 vs. strong costs: CHF 300), while 
again integrating the constant counter-argument of increased effectiveness (chances of 
curation from 20% to 30%). This led to the expected differences in issue attitude based on 
issue-specific argument strength without additional framing. Therefore, this manipulation 
was used for the main study. Subchapter 4.4.3 reports extensively that the thematic 
argument strengths finally implemented were as effective as intended. 
 
Manipulation of salience emphasis frames in the framing paragraph 
In addition to the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength, Table 10 also shows 
the exact wording for the manipulation of salience emphasis frames as the second 
experimental factor of the design. As mentioned, this factor contained three levels. The 
first level comprised stimuli with varying issue-specific argument strength but without any 
explicit frame contextualization. This level served as control groups for assessing the 
isolated influence of thematic argument strength. It was obtained by showing only the 
informational paragraph as a stimulus and not also the framing paragraph. In addition, the 
headline avoided any direct frame references and was highly descriptive, simply naming the 
issue of the news article (“New cancer therapy for approval”). 
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In contrast, the other two levels presented a dedicated additional framing paragraph 
and used different political values to contextualize the initial informational paragraph 
without adding any further information about the topic. Rather, well-known salience 
emphasis frames were used to explain and evaluate the information presented before. One 
level used the political value of economic-individualism for contextualization, and the other 
level applied the value of humanitarianism (cf. Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001 ⁠; Shen 
& Edwards, 2005). Both values were likewise appropriate to frame the issue of medical 
approvals, because they draw on competing, equally applicable political values to give 
meaning to the issue (for a longer explanation, see Subchapter 4.2.3). 
The economic-individualism salience emphasis frame highlighted the additional 
expenses that would result from approval of the therapy, which was mentioned before in 
the informational paragraph. It used an individualistic, market-oriented ideology to explain 
the issue. The frame argued that an approval would be a further example of seriously 
threatening the financial stability of the basic health care system, which would reinforce the 
ongoing increase of health insurance rates for everyone – ill or not. Furthermore, the 
economic-individualism frame stated that the politically responsible Federal Office of 
Public Health should finally stop this increase by not approving the new, more expensive 
therapy. 
In contrast, the humanitarianism salience emphasis frame did not refer to the 
additional expenditures, but highlighted the increased opportunities for curation provided 
by the new therapy. It was a similar length to the other framing condition. The frame’s 
viewpoint centered on the duty of solidarity and humanitarianism fundamental for the 
functioning of the basic health care system. From this view, each new and more effective 
medical treatment should be available through basic health insurance to ensure the best 
medical care for everyone. To maintain the idea of a humanitarian health system, the 
Federal Office of Public Health should always approve new therapies, as long as these are 
more effective, a requirement met by the new bowel cancer therapy (again, see Table 10 
for the exact wording of the frames). 
As the description of the salience emphasis frames shows, both frames 
contextualized the given information under the umbrella of a specific political value and 
used common interpretative patterns to give meaning to the information presented before. 
However, the frames simultaneously avoided adding any new topical information about the 
approval procedure or the therapy. As such, the informational situation was the same in all 
framing conditions (except for the varying argument strength). Besides the construction of 
the salience emphasis frames in the framing paragraph, the headline also varied according 
to the framing condition (“New cancer therapy would strongly raise insurance rates” vs. 
“New cancer therapy could help sick people substantially”), again without adding new 
information. 
To avoid the favoring of either the framing effect or the effect of argument strength, 
both paragraphs – the informational paragraph and the framing paragraph – were the same 
length. In addition, both paragraphs seemed to be written by the same (fictive) journalist 
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without an ideological affiliation. This journalist based his article on information by the 
non-partisan Federal Office of Public Health. The construction of the stimuli intentionally 
avoided the use of politicians or experts with a political stance. This is highly important in 
avoiding the problem of confounding salience emphasis frames and partisan cues of the 
speaking source. Empirical research suggests that partisan cues can influence motivated 
reasoning and perception of argument strength (Druckman et al., 2013 ⁠; Slothuus & de 
Vreese, 2010). Therefore, if such cues are integrated in the stimuli, it would be unclear 
whether “frame effects” actually derive from the salience emphasis frames or not simply 
from the partisan cues. 
 
Quasi-experimental factor value preference for economic-individualism 
In addition to the factors of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames, 
the design integrated the last factor of citizens’ political value preference as a two-level 
quasi-experimental factor. This was because these preferences are difficult to manipulate, 
but stable traits (for further details, see Subchapter 4.2.2). As argument strength only 
varied for opposing the approval and therewith for the contextualization with the 
economic-individualism frame, the value preference for economic-individualism is most 
important in analyzing the suppression of issue-specific argument effects through value-
resonant framing (H5 and H6). Thus, citizens’ preference regarding this political value 
builds the quasi-experimental factor with the levels of low and high preference for 
economic-individualism (see Table 9). 
Subchapter 4.3.5 explains how participants were delineated according to their 
political value preference. Before then, Subchapter 4.3.1 provides an overview of the 
sample of citizens that participated in the experiment, explaining who was grouped based 
on their political values. 
4.3 Sample, measures, and procedure 
4.3.1 Sample 
The experimental treatments shown in Subchapter 4.2.4 were analyzed with a sample of 
residents of Switzerland. As noted, conducting the experiment in Switzerland has the 
methodological advantage that the distribution of social welfare attitudes and 
socioeconomic political values is potentially more balanced than in all other European 
countries, enabling a better integration of citizens’ political value preference as a quasi-
factor in the experimental design (see Subchapter 4.2.3). However, Switzerland has four 
different official languages dividing the country into four language regions (German, 
French, Italian, and Romansh). This complicates the implementation of nationwide studies 
in terms of accurate sampling and regarding treatment and measurement invariance 
between the language regions. Thus, this study only focused on the biggest language region, 
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the German-speaking part of Switzerland in which 70.9% of the Swiss residential 
population lives (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2018d). 
To ensure the generalizability of the experimental results to the population of 
German-speaking Switzerland, the online access panel by Respondi AG was used in this 
study to randomly recruit participants. The panel consists of approximately 20,000 Swiss 
residents. Around 90% of those are located in German-speaking Switzerland (Respondi 
AG, 2018). The panel is not fully representative but covers most sociodemographic 
variables approximately representative such as occupation, income level, education, and 
age. However, it does not perfectly cover sex, because men are over-represented at 63.5% 
(Respondi AG, 2018). 
From this panel, an interlocked quota sample was drawn from the Swiss residential 
population representative for sex and aged between 18 and 69 years. To ensure enough 
statistical power, the sample size was set to N = 833 (see Subchapter 4.4.4 for further 
details on the calculation), and participants received vouchers after completing the survey. 
As Table 11 shows, the final sample consisted of n = 420 women (50.4%) and n = 413 men 
(49.6%), which matches exactly the distribution of sex in the Swiss population (see Table 
12). In addition, the distribution of age groups is approximately comparable between the 
drawn sample and Swiss residents aged between 18 and 69 years. Furthermore, Table 11 
shows that age and sex were not only represented correctly on aggregate, but also within 
respective subgroups (e.g., the share of men and women for people aged between 18 and 
29 years approximately matched its share in the population). As such, the interlocked quota 
sampling worked well. 
The average age in the sample was M = 42.92 years with a standard deviation of 
SD = 14.41 (see Table 13), which is close to the average age of the Swiss residential 
population of M = 42.1 (see Table 14). In terms of education, the sample was slightly better 
educated than the population. While about 53% (n = 440) of the sample reported having 
obtained at least a high school degree, in the Swiss population, only 39.6% of residents have 
obtained at least a high school degree (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2018b). In contrast, 
the income of the sample approximately matched that of the population. Income was 
roughly measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = “less than CHF 25,000” 
to 7 = “more than CHF 150,000,” where each scale point indicates an increase of 
CHF 25,000 (Subchapter 4.3.2 provides more information on the measurement of income 
and all other variables). The median was Mdn = 3, equating to an income of between 
CHF 50,000 and CHF 74,999, and the exact mean was slightly higher at M = 3.14 (see 
Table 13). That is, the average income of the sample is probably somewhat but not much 
higher than CHF 75,000, which is close to the median income of the Swiss population of 
CHF 78,024 (see Table 14). 





Table 11. Interlocked quota sample (N = 833) 
 
Sex 
Age group  





































Note. Displayed is n with percentages in parentheses for self-defined interlocked quotas 
Table 12. Distribution of sex by age group of the Swiss residential population in 2017 
 
Sex 
Age group  
Total 0-19 years 20-39 years 40-64 years 65-79 years 80+ years 
Women 9.7 13.2 17.4 7.0 3.1 50.4 
Men 10.3 13.5 17.6 6.2 2 49.6 
Total 20.0 26.7 35.0 13.2 5.1 100 
Note. Displayed are percentages; data and age grouping based on the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office (2018c) 













Age  42.92 43.00 14.41 833 
Sex nwomen = 420 (50.4%), nmen = 413 (49.6%)    833 
Education nlow (less than high school) = 390 (47.0%), 
nhigh (at least high school) = 440 (53.0%) 
   830 
Income  3.14 3.00 1.55 698 
Note. Income measured from 1 = “less than CHF 25,000” to 7 = “more than CHF 150,000” 
and each scale point indicates an increase of CHF 25,000 









Age  42.1  
Sex Women = 50.4%, men = 49.6%   
Education Less than high school = 60.4%, 
At least high school = 39.6% 
  
Income   CHF 78,024 
Note. Data based on the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2018a ⁠, 2018b⁠, 2018c) 
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Summary 
In sum, the interlocked quota sample well represents the residential population of German-
speaking Switzerland in terms of key demographic variables. Thus, the sample fulfills an 
important prerequisite for drawing statistical conclusions regarding residents of German-
speaking Switzerland, strengthening the external validity of the experiment (Shadish et al., 
2002, pp. 91–93). However, people agreeing to participate in online access panels might be 
a systematic group in terms of variables other than socio-demographics, which can limit 
statistical inference. In particular, personality traits such as extraversion and openness to 
experience seem to predict participation in online access panels leading to the problem that 
both traits are more prevalent in these samples than in the population (Brüggen & Dholakia, 
2010). In contrast, regarding key political variables such as political ideology, which are also 
important in this study, online access panels do not seem strongly biased (Clifford, Jewell, 
& Waggoner, 2015). 
Thus, the drawn sample is an imperfect but robust foundation from which to 
generalize the experimental results beyond the narrow sample to German-speaking 
Switzerland. Generalizations to other countries are, of course, more uncertain, but not 
impossible, because the political value preferences and salience emphasis frames employed 
in the experiment are also a central socioeconomic political conflict line in other Western 
democracies (see Subchapter 4.2.3). Next, Subchapter 4.3.2 describes the variables 
measured among the sample. 
4.3.2 Measures 
This subchapter provides an overview of the item wordings of the measures employed in 
the questionnaire for the experiment. The overview is structured according to the analytical 
role of the variables in the process of emphasis framing effects starting with the dependent 
variables. The order of these measurements in the questionnaire is outlined in Subchapter 
4.3.3 and the psychometric properties of the variables are reported in Subchapter 4.3.4 
and Subchapter 4.3.5. 
 
Dependent variables 
Given the hypotheses and topic of the stimulus article (see Subchapter 4.2.3), the main 
dependent variable measured was participants’ issue attitude toward the approval of the new 
therapy. Because the issue under investigation is new and connected to the specific therapy 
mentioned in the stimuli, it was not possible to measure issue attitude with an established 
scale. Thus, three self-constructed items were employed in the study to measure how 
strongly citizens opposed (1) or supported (6) the approval of the new cancer therapy for 
basic health insurance (for the exact wording, see Table 15). As such, a six-point scale 
without a midpoint was employed. 
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While there is scientific consensus that rating scales should consist of five to seven 
scale points, there is lively scientific debate on whether the scales should incorporate a scale 
midpoint (Menold & Bogner, 2016). This study weighted the concern of satisficing 
respondents as more important than the potential benefits of integrating a scale midpoint 
such as using the midpoint as an implicit “don’t know” option. Satisficing respondents are 
participants who are not fully motivated to participate in surveys and use the middle 
category as a cognitive shortcut, which allows them to not ponder the question and simply 
reply with an indifferent answer (Menold & Bogner, 2016). 
In particular, this problem arises when participants receive vouchers to complete a 
survey, which provides them with extrinsic motivation to quickly complete the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, participants get to know something about the experimental 
issue after reading the stimulus. Thus, they should at least to some extent have an opinion 
compared to pure survey research in which there might be questions for which participants 
Table 15. Translated wording of all items for the dependent variables 
(Latent) variable Item wording Answer format 
Issue attitude #1 “In my opinion, the new therapy should 
definitely be approved” 
1 = “do not agree 
at all” to 6 = 
“completely agree,” 
items rotated 
#2 “I consider the approval of the new 
therapy completely appropriate” 
#3 “I believe the approval of the new 
therapy is fully right” 
Attitude importance 
(first two items by 
Haddock, Rothman, 
Reber, & Schwarz, 
1999) 
#1 “My opinion regarding approval of the 
cancer therapy means a lot to me” 
1 = “do not agree 
at all” to 6 = 
“completely agree,” 
items rotated 
#2 “My attitude regarding approval of the 
cancer therapy is important to me” 
#3 “My stance on approval of the cancer 
therapy is important to me” 
Attitude certainty 
(slightly adapted 
subscale certainty of 
attitude correctness by 
Petrocelli et al., 2007) 
#1 “How certain are you that your opinion 
regarding approval of the therapy is the right 
opinion on that topic?” 
1 = “very 
uncertain” to 6 = 
“very certain,” 
items rotated #2 “How sure are you that only your 
opinion can be the correct one when looking 
at the facts regarding the therapy?” 
#3 “How certain are you that among all 
possible opinions regarding approval of the 
therapy your opinion is the right one?” 
Paying intention #1 “How much more francs are you willing 
to pay for your basic health insurance fee per 
year?” 
open answer in 
CHF 
Note. See https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
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are completely indifferent because they never considered the questioned topic before. Thus, 
for important questions such as the dependent variable or the mediator variables, this study 
employed a six-point scale without a midpoint (for further actions to improve data quality, 
see Subchapter 4.3.3). 
In addition to the main dependent variable for the hypotheses, the questionnaire 
included three further dependent variables that are not part of the analyses in the results 
section of this book (see Part V). They are reported here for reasons of transparency as 
measured variables: attitude importance, attitude certainty, and paying intention (see Table 15). As 
these three additional variables were measured after the main dependent variable of issue 
attitude (see Subchapter 4.3.3), spillover effects of the additional variables on the main 
dependent variable can be ruled out. Thus, measurement of these variables should not 
contaminate the main dependent variable. 
When conceptualizing the study, the idea was to analyze in a small side project 
whether frames can also influence these dependent variables. However, this goes beyond 
the scope of this book, which is concerned with the classic and most important outcome 
of framing effects, namely effects on issue attitude (see Subchapter 2.1.2). Nevertheless, 
the R-script available via https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 reports for reasons 
of transparency a series of statistical models that consistently revealed null findings 
regarding the additional dependent variables. 
 
Mediator variables 
Previous research on the mediation of emphasis framing effects has employed self-
constructed items to measure belief content and belief importance (e.g., Druckman 
& Nelson, 2003 ⁠; Lecheler et al., 2009⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 
1997⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999⁠; Slothuus, 2008). No common scales exist for these constructs, 
because they have always been connected to the specific stimulus of the experiment. To 
measure belief content, for example, items must ask for specific topical information in the 
stimulus and cannot simply use a generic scale. In contrast, for the belief importance of 
political values for the specific topic, it would have been possible to employ an existing 
scale because value emphasis frames are applicable to various issues. However, while the 
effects of the economic-individualism and humanitarianism frames have already been 
analyzed in empirical research (e.g., Shen & Edwards, 2005), these studies did not 
investigate the mediation of these effects via belief importance; thus, no established scale 
is available. Furthermore, for the third mediator of belief evaluation, an established scale 
cannot exist, as this study is the first to introduce the concept (see Subchapter 2.8.4). 
Therefore, all three mediators were measured with self-constructed scales inspired by 
previous research (see Table 16). 
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Table 16. Translated wording of all items for mediators 





#1 “I find it important that new therapies only receive 
approval when the financial costs are not too high” 
1 = “do not 




#2 “It is important to me that approval for therapies is 
only given if these therapies are not too expensive” 
#3 “For me, it is important there is only approval for 






#1 “The new therapy is very expensive” 1 = “do not 




#2 “The new therapy causes very high costs” 






#1 “The amount of costs of the new therapy is a strong 
argument to refuse approval of the medicament” 
1 = “not agree 
at all” to 6 = 
“completely 
agree” 
#2 “The price of the new therapy is a compelling 
reason to not approve the medicament” 
#3 “The financial expenses for the new therapy are a 





#1 “I find it important that the community always 
enables the best possible medical care for sick persons” 
1 = “do not 




#2 “It is important to me that society shows solidarity 
with sick persons and provides all available therapies for 
them” 
#3 “For me, it is important that a community of 
solidarity does everything to improve the situation of 




#1 “The new therapy is very effective” 1 = “do not 




#2 “The new therapy helps sick persons very well” 





#1 “The increase in the chance of recovery through the 
new therapy is a strong argument to support approval 
of the medicament” 
1 = “do not 




#2 “The increased chance of recovery through the new 
therapy is a compelling reason to approve the 
medicament” 
#3 “The increased chance of recovery is a convincing 
justification to support approval of the medicament” 
# awareness check: “Please check box number two to 
show you read this question” 
Note. See https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
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This study measured all three mediators (belief importance, belief content, and belief 
evaluation) twice: once for economic-individualism and once for humanitarianism. Three 
items on six-point scales were used for each variable, as it was already done for the 
dependent variables. Table 16 provides the exact wording of all items. The measure for 
belief importance of economic-individualism asked participants how important it is to them in 
general that approvals for new therapies are not too expensive, while for belief content of 
economic-individualism, participants had to rate how expensive the new therapy was in their 
opinion. The items measuring participants’ belief evaluation of economic-individualism asked them 
to judge whether the increase in costs is a compelling reason to oppose the approval of the 
new therapy, and how they evaluated the specific information about the therapy (not the 
general applicability of the emphasis frame economic-individualism as asked by the measure 
for belief importance). 
The study also measured belief importance, belief content, and belief evaluation for 
the competing information in the stimulus regarding humanitarianism (again, see Table 
16). However, the later data analyses for the mediation processes do not include these three 
variables, because issue-specific argument strength in the stimuli was constant for 
humanitarianism, varying only for economic-individualism (for a detailed explanation, see 
Subchapter 4.2.2). As Table 16 shows, the last item of the measure for belief evaluation 
of humanitarianism was an instructed response item (“Please check box number two to 
show that you read this question”). This served to assess participants’ awareness when 
answering the items (Meade & Craig, 2012). Information on how the instructed response 
items contributed to the process of data cleansing is elaborated in Subchapter 4.3.3. 
 
Quasi-factor value preference 
Regarding participants’ political value preferences, this study measured two different 
political values. The preference for economic-individualism was the quasi-factor of interest 
(for a detailed discussion, see Subchapter 4.2.4), while the value preference for 
humanitarianism was measured to test the validity of the relevant preference for economic-
individualism by comparing it with this counter-value (the formal tests of convergent 
validity are elaborated in Subchapter 4.3.5). 
The literature includes various scales to measure both value preferences. The 
reliability of these scales is often at the lower limit of acceptable reliability: α = .60 (Goren, 
2001), α = .65 (Feldman, 1988), α = .66 (Shen & Edwards, 2005), and α = .71 (Barker & 
Carman, 2000) for economic-individualism, and only slightly better for humanitarianism at 
α = .80 (Steenbergen, 1996), α = .76 (Shen & Edwards, 2005), and α = .69 (Feldman 
& Steenbergen, 2001). This is unsurprising given the complex nature of political value 
preferences. However, low reliability can increase the problem of measurement error, which 
can lead to more biased estimates of statistical significance and effect sizes (Loken & 
Gelman, 2017). 
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Thus, this study relied on self-constructed measures for both values and did not 
employ an existing scale (see Table 17). To achieve rather high reliability and an exact 
match with the salience emphasis frames presented in the stimuli (see Subchapter 4.2.4), 
the items directly asked about the ideological core of both political values in a narrow sense 
rather than for the broader multifaceted value concept, as the other scales mentioned often 
do. 
This narrow sense is the political conflict line in social welfare attitudes between 
humanitarianism as unconditional and solidary help to individuals by society on one hand 
and on the other, economic-individualism that represents favoring individual responsibility 
for one’s own wealth and of a small government that should not spend too much money 
on aid to individuals (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001). Thus, the four items for measuring 
the political value preference for economic-individualism simply asked participants how much 
financial considerations should constrain the aid given to individuals by society in their 
opinion (see Table 17). In contrast, the four items for value preference for humanitarianism 
included statements for the opposite stance. Participants had to evaluate how strongly they 
support societal aid to individuals regardless of its financial costs. 
 
 











#1 “Our society should not risk its wealth by constantly 
spending money on aid to individuals” 
1 = “do not 





#2 “The financial costs must not be too high when 
society helps individuals” 
#3 “A developed society implies that it has an eye on 
financial expenses instead of supporting individuals 
with money” 
#4 “Financial solidity is crucial for society and cannot 




#1 “Aid to individuals should be granted by society 
without constantly looking at the financial costs” 
1 = “do not 





#2 “The financial costs should not play any role when 
society helps individuals” 
#3 “A developed society implies that it supports 
individuals without always prioritizing concerns about 
financial costs” 
#4 “Solidarity is crucial for society and cannot be a 
question of related financial costs” 
Note. https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
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Treatment check variables 
The study also contained several treatment checks to test whether participants perceived 
the experimental stimuli as intended (for the formal tests, see Subchapter 4.4.2). While the 
preceding measurements consisted of several items to measure the relevant constructs as 
reliably as possible, the treatment check variables were only measured with single items to 
save valuable time in completing the questionnaire (see Table 18). Two independent single-
choice items asked respondents questions about the content of the news article to measure 
whether they read it. The first asked about the type of cancer the new therapy would address 
(article awareness #1), which the article mentioned five times and was rather easy to answer. 
The second was slightly more difficult, asking about which health system the new therapy 
sought approval from (article awareness #2). For later data cleansing, only the first and easier 
question was used (for more details, see Subchapter 4.3.3). 
Two further single-choice questions asked whether participants correctly 
remembered the exact amount of the increase in health insurance fees due to the new 
therapy and the increased efficacy of the new therapy. This tested whether they recognized 
the central manipulation of issue-specific argument strength (variables recognition costs and 
recognition efficacy). 
Furthermore, participants rated the realism of the mentioned costs and efficacy on 
two seven-point scales ranging from 1 = “completely unrealistic” to 7 = “completely 
realistic” (variables perceived realism of costs and perceived realism of efficacy). Three additional 
seven-point rating scales measured whether participants perceived the manipulation of the 
salience emphasis frames as intended. First, participants had to rate whether the article 
opposed (-3) or supported (+3) the approval of the new therapy or whether they perceived 
the article as balanced (0) (perceived article direction). Second, participants assessed whether the 
article emphasized the costs (-3) of the therapy or its benefits (+3), or whether the article 
was balanced (0) (perceived article frame). Both items were rescaled to scales ranging from 1 
to 7. Third, the variable perceived article contextualization asked participants how strongly the 
article contextualized the issue of the approval of the new therapy on a scale ranging 
from 1 = “not contextualized at all” to 7 = “extensively contextualized.” 
Last, participants rated the overall quality of the online news article serving as the 
experimental stimulus (variable article evaluation). This variable employed six items to 
measure the construct, not only one as did the other treatment check variables. The main 
reason was that this variable also served to maintain the realism of the cover story. 
Therefore, it was necessary that at least a few questions pertained to the journalistic quality 
of the article (see Subchapter 4.3.3). Three of the six items (realistic, credible, and 
coherent) originated from a measure for article evaluation used in emphasis framing effects 
research by Matthes and Schemer (2012), the other three items were self-constructed. 
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Table 18. Translated wording of all items for treatment checks 
(Latent) variable Item wording Answer format 
Article 
awareness #1 
“Please select the topic of the 
previously shown article. Approval of a 
therapy against…” 
“blood cancer” / “skin cancer” 
/ “lung cancer” / “bowel 
cancer” / “do not know” 
Article 
awareness #2 
“Please select for which system the 
approval is considered.” 
“basic health insurance” / 
“individual supplementary 
insurance” / “private hospitals” 
/ “individual payment by 
patients” / “do not know” 
Recognition 
costs 
“The article described how much the 
personal insurance fee per year would 
increase with approval of the new 
therapy. Please select how much this 
was.” 
“10 francs per year” / “300 
francs per year” 
Recognition 
efficacy 
“The article described the increased 
chance of recovery offered by the new 
therapy. Please select what the chance 
is for recovery offered by the therapy.” 
“ca. 30% chance of recovery” / 




“How realistic do you rate that a new 
and more effective cancer therapy 
increases the personal insurance fee 
per year, as mentioned in the article?” 
1 = “completely unrealistic” to 




“How realistic do you rate that a new 
and more expensive cancer therapy 
increases the chance of recovery, as 
mentioned in the article?” 
1 = “completely unrealistic” to 
7 = “very realistic” 
Perceived article 
direction 
“Did the article rather support or 
oppose approval of the new therapy or 
was it rather balanced?” 
-3 “strongly opposed” to 0 = 
“balanced” to 3 = “strongly 
supported” (rescaled as 1 to 7) 
Perceived article 
frame 
“Did the article rather emphasize the 
costs or the benefits of the new 
therapy or was it rather balanced?” 
-3 “strongly emphasized the 
costs” to 0 = “balanced” to 3 = 
“strongly emphasized the 
benefits” (rescaled as 1 to 7) 
Perceived article 
contextualization 
“How much did the article 
contextualize approval of the new 
therapy within a bigger context?” 
1 = “not contextualized at all” 






& Schemer, 2012) 
#1 “The article is professional” 1 = “do not agree at all” to 7 = 
“completely agree,” items 
rotated 
#2 “The article is coherent” 
#3 “The article is well written” 
#4 “The article is realistic” 
#5 “The article is credible” 
#6 “The article is comprehensible” 
Note. See https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
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Control variables 
This study also included numerous control variables for the purposes of data cleansing (see 
Subchapter 4.3.3), quota sampling (see Subchapter 4.3.1), or to later employ in the 
robustness checks of the hypotheses tests (see Part V). Three variables were used later for 
data cleansing (see Table 19 for exact wording). First, the device participants used to access 
the online experiment was measured unobtrusively via a php code that collected this 
information when participants accessed the online questionnaire (for more information on 
why the experiment was conducted online, see Subchapter 4.3.3). Second, at the end of 
the questionnaire, a question asked participants whether they answered honestly during the 
interview or not (variable seriousness). Third, also at the end of the questionnaire, participants 
could leave a comment about the study. 
To ensure correct quota sampling, three variables were employed (see Table 19). 
First, participants answered in which region of the German-speaking part of Switzerland 
they lived. If they did not live in 1 of the 19 German-speaking cantons, they received a 
screen out to ensure that only residents of German-speaking Switzerland were included in 
the sample (variable region). Second, age was measured in years on an open-ended question. 
Third, participants answered a single-choice question about their sex. Besides these 
demographic variables relevant for sampling, the study collected information on two 
further demographic variables (also, see Table 19). The first variable was education measured 
on a fully labeled ordinal scale and later dichotomized into low education below a high 
school degree or high education with at least a high school degree. The second variable was 
yearly gross income, again fully labeled but measured on a seven-point interval scale ranging 
from 1 = “less than CHF 25,000” to 7 = “more than CHF 150,000.” Each scale point 
indicated an increase of CHF 25,000 (e.g., 2 = “between CHF 25,000 and CHF 49,999”). 
These demographic variables also served as control variables for the robustness 
checks for the hypotheses tests together with more substantial control variables concerned 
with the specific issue of the news article and variables typically used in persuasion and 
emphasis framing effects research to control for the stability of communicative effects. For 
instance, research on emphasis framing effects showed that high personal issue importance 
can inhibit framing effects (Lecheler et al., 2009). Given the issue used in the stimuli, one 
aspect of personal importance is, of course, whether participants are somewhat affected by 
cancer. Thus, three single-choice questions measured whether participants do suffer or have 
suffered from cancer or another serious illness themselves (variable affectedness by serious illness 
– self), whether they know someone in their close network who does or did so (variable 
affectedness by serious illness – strong ties), and whether they know someone from their distant 
network who suffers or did suffer from cancer (variable affectedness by serious illness – weak 
ties). The exact wording of these three variables is provided in the last rows of Table 19. 
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Table 19. Translated wording of all items for control variables (Part A) 
(Latent) variable Item wording Answer format 
Device Device used by the participant to 
access the online questionnaire 
unobtrusively via php 
Seriousness “As scientists, we rely on honest 
participation in surveys so that our 
data reflect what you actually think 
so as not to draw wrong 
conclusions from our study. If you 
are honest, can we use your 
answers with clear conscience?” 
“no, better not” / “yes, I 
participated honestly” 
Comment “You have reached the end of the 
questionnaire. Below you can leave 
a comment about this study.” 
open answer 
Region  “In which canton of German-
speaking Switzerland do you live?” 
selection of 1 of the 19 cantons / “I 
do not live in German-speaking 
Switzerland” 
Age “How old are you?” open answer in years 
Sex “What is your sex?” “female”/ “male”/ “prefer not to 
say” 
Education  “What is the highest level of 
education diploma you obtained?”  
“none” / “mandatory school” / 
“apprenticeship” / “high school” / 
“higher apprenticeship” / 
“professional school” / “college” / 
“university” / “prefer not to say” 
Income  “What is your yearly gross income 
before taxes and social security 
fees?” 
1 = “less than CHF 25,000” to 7 = 
“more than CHF 150,000” (each 
scale point indicates an increase of 
CHF 25,000) / “prefer not to say” 
Affectedness by 
serious illness – 
self 
“Do or have you suffered from 
cancer or another serious illness?” 
“yes” / “no” / “prefer not to say” 
Affectedness by 
serious illness – 
strong ties 
“Do you know someone in your 
close network (e.g., friends or 
family) that did or does suffer 
from cancer or another serious 
illness?” 
“yes” / “no” / “prefer not to say” 
Affectedness by 
serious illness – 
weak ties 
“Do you know someone in your 
distant network (e.g., acquaintance, 
neighbor, colleague) that did or 
does suffer from cancer or another 
serious illness?” 
“yes” / “no” / “prefer not to say” 
Note. See https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
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Another relevant control variable in persuasion research is issue involvement (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1979), i.e., participants’ interest in the specific topic of the experiment. Thus, 
this variable was also measured in this study using a single item on a six-point scale on the 
interest in health insurances (variable topic interest). The item was hidden in a larger item 
battery asking about participants’ interest in various health-related topics to maintain the 
realism of the cover story at the beginning of the questionnaire (see Table 20). 
Intentionally, the question broadly asked about health insurances, not directly about 
healthcare politics or insurance fees to avoid strong priming of the relevant issue prior to 
the stimulus (see Subchapter 4.3.3 for why this was necessary). 
Exclusively for the cover story, the questionnaire included another multiple-choice 
question asking participants to select from a list of media products concerned with health 
those they know (variable media see Table 20). The queried magazines and programs did 
not cover the question of healthcare politics. Thus, they were uninformative for the 
hypotheses, only included for distraction, and were not used in later data analyses. 
As the issue under investigation is political, the study also included three political 
control variables (again, see Table 20). First, as outlined in Subchapter 2.4.1, political 
knowledge is among the variables most often investigated in research on emphasis framing 
effects (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007a⁠; Druckman & Nelson, 2003 ⁠; Lecheler & de 
Vreese, 2011 ⁠, 2012⁠, 2013 ⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997⁠; Slothuus, 2008 ⁠; Slothuus & de Vreese, 
2010). It has been shown to sometimes reinforce and other times mitigate the effectiveness 
of emphasis frames. Thus, it was important in this study to control for the influence of 
political knowledge. For this, participants had to rate how much they know about politics 
on a single item measured on a seven-point scale (variable political knowledge). 
Second, participants’ political leaning was measured on a left-right scale with 11 scale 
points, which is a typical measure in German-speaking countries to capture citizens’ 
political ideology in a broad sense (Kroh, 2007). Including political leaning as a control 
variable has several advantages. It not only allows testing the convergent validity of the self-
constructed measurement of participants’ political value preferences (for the formal test, 
see Subchapter 4.3.5) but also enables a separate test of the influences of specific political 
values and the broader ideology of left and right (see Part V). 
Third, participants rated how central their fundamental social welfare attitudes such 
as the previously probed political values were to them (variable centrality of social welfare 
attitudes). Some measures to assess value centrality exist in the literature. However, these 
measures only ask about one specific value (e.g., Verplanken & Holland, 2002). As this 
study included two competing values, four self-constructed items were used to measure 
participants’ general centrality of superordinate social welfare attitudes, rather than 
measuring the centrality of single political values (see Table 20). 
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Table 20. Translated wording of all items for control variables (Part B) 
(Latent) variable Item wording Answer format 
Topic interest “How interested are you in the following health 
topics?: Nutrition and diet, fitness and sports 
medicine, medical prevention and treatments, 
psychology and well-being, alternative medicine 
and homeopathy, health insurances” 
1 = “not interested 
at all” to 6 = “very 
interested,” items 
rotated 
Media “Here you see a list of media products 
concerned with health topics. Please choose all 
products you have heard of.” 
selection from a list 
of ten media 
products 
Political knowledge “How much do you know about politics?” 1 = “very little” to 
7 = “very much” 
Political leaning 
(Kroh, 2007) 
“Many people use the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ to 
classify differences in political attitudes. When 
you think of yourself, how would you classify 
your own attitude on a scale from left to right?”  
1 = “left” to 11 = 
“right” 
Centrality of social 
welfare attitudes 
#1 “My political convictions regarding social 
welfare are markedly important to me” 
1 = “do not agree 
at all” to 6 = 
“completely agree,” 
items rotated 
#2 “My basic attitudes on social welfare mean a 
lot to me” 
#3 “My views regarding social welfare are an 
essential aspect of my political opinion” 
#4 “My general notion of social welfare is of 
high importance for my worldview” 
# awareness check “Please check box number 
three to show that you read this question” 
Numeracy (subscale 
cognitive numeracy 
abilities by Fagerlin 
et al., 2007) 
#1 “How good are you at working with 
fractions?” 
1 = “not good at 
all” to 7 = “very 
good,” items 
rotated 
#2 “How good are you at working with 
percentages?” 
#3 “How good are you at calculating a 15% 
tip?” 
#4 “How good are you at figuring out how 
much a shirt will cost if it is 25% off?” 
Need for cognition 
(two items by 
Beißert, Köhler, 
Rempel, & Beierlein, 
2014) 
#1 “I like it when my life is full of tricky tasks 
that I have to solve” 
1 = “do not agree 
at all” to 6 = 
“completely agree,” 
items rotated 
#2 “I find it particularly satisfying to finish an 
important task that required much thinking and 
intellectual effort” 
#3 “It is fun for me to find new solutions for 
problems” 
#4 “I like tasks that require much thinking and 
intellectual effort” 
Note. See https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
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Table 21. Translated wording of all items for control variables (Part C) 
(Latent) variable Item wording Answer format 
Need for closure 
(Roets & van Hiel, 
2011) 
#1 “I don’t like situations that are uncertain” 1 = “does not 
apply to me at 
all” to 6 = “fully 
applies to me,” 
items rotated 
#2 “I dislike questions which could be answered in 
many different ways” 
#3 “I find that a well ordered life with regular 
hours suits my temperament” 
#4 “I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand 
the reason why an event occurred in my life” 
#5 “I feel irritated when one person disagrees with 
what everyone else in a group believes” 
#6 “I don’t like to go into a situation without 
knowing what I can expect from it” 
#7 “When I have made a decision, I feel relieved” 
#8 “When I am confronted with a problem, I’m 
dying to reach a solution very quickly” 
#9 “I would quickly become impatient and irritated 
if I would not find a solution to a problem 
immediately” 
#10 “I don’t like to be with people who are capable 
of unexpected actions” 
#11 “I dislike it when a person’s statement could 
mean many different things” 
#12 “I find that establishing a consistent routine 
enables me to enjoy life more” 
#13 “I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of 
life” 
#15 “I dislike unpredictable situations” 
# awareness check “Please check box number five 
to show that you read this question” 
Involvement in 
reading (items 
selected from the 
scale by J. C. 
Andrews & Shimp, 
1990) 
#1 “While reading, I was concentrated on the 
content” 
1 = “do not 




#2 “While reading, I was focused on the written 
text” 
#3 “I was reading attentively” 
#4 “I was reading carefully” 
Involvement in 
thinking 
#1 “I made my own thoughts about the topic of 
the article while reading it” 
1 = “do not 




#2 “While reading, additional aspects regarding the 
topic came to mind” 
#3 “I thought about further things around the 
topic while reading” 
#4 “While reading more about the topic came to 
mind” 
Note. See https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the original questionnaire 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 216 
 
As the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength dealt with numbers (see 
Subchapter 4.2.4), the questionnaire contained a four-item measure to control for 
participants’ numeracy (see Table 20) using the cognitive numeracy abilities subscale by 
Fagerlin et al. (2007). In addition, three further variables typically employed in persuasion 
research were measured: Need for cognition, a variable indicating how much people like to 
make cognitive efforts that can subsequently influence the effect of persuasive messages 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), was collected using four items. Two items were taken from 
Beißert et al. (2014) to measure the subfactor joy in thinking. The other two items were 
self-constructed and also measured this subfactor. For need for cognitive closure (see Table 21), 
which indicates people’s desire for obtaining (fast and easy) answers on topics (Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994), the study employed the scale by Roets and van Hiel (2011). 
Last, process involvement is a relevant aspect in persuasion research (J. C. Andrews, 
Durvasula, & Akhter, 1990). This construct differs from prior issue involvement (i.e., the 
variable of topic interest presented earlier) because it is more concerned with situational 
involvement in current message processing. In this study, the concept was divided into two 
subscales: First, involvement in reading the message was measured using four items from a 
longer scale by J. C. Andrews and Shimp (1990), and second, involvement in thinking about 
the topic was measured. This second variable was obtained using four self-constructed 
items (see Table 21). 
Now that all measures employed in this study have been introduced, Subchapter 
4.3.3 explains how all the measures mentioned were implemented and arranged in the 
online questionnaire. 
4.3.3 Procedure 
Having described the measurements in Subchapter 4.3.2, this subchapter shows how the 
questions were implemented in an online questionnaire using the web tool by SoSci Survey. 
Furthermore, the order in which the questions were arranged to avoid order effects and 
inappropriate priming of relevant concepts prior to the stimulus, which could limit the 
validity of the online experiment, is justified. 
Conducting the experiment online offered several advantages compared to 
laboratory experiments. First, administration and execution are less time consuming and 
require less economic resources (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). Second, it is easier to 
reach a diverse sample using online access panels from which participants can be directed 
to the online experiment (Berinsky et al., 2012). Third, respondents can participate in the 
study in their natural environment (e.g., at home) rather than in a lab, which can reduce the 
possible effects of having an investigator present that might treat participants differently 
(Rosenthal, 2004). 
However, one potential disadvantage of online experiments compared to laboratory 
experiments is a lower degree of experimental control, as the investigator cannot directly 
observe how participants take part in the study (e.g., while listening to music, while brushing 
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teeth) and whether they participated seriously. The random assignment to experimental 
groups should ensure that such inattentive behaviors are at least equally distributed in all 
conditions and do not co-occur systematically with a specific treatment (see Subchapter 
4.2.1). Still, this can add statistical noise to the data, leading to the risk that an online 
experiment cannot uncover meaningful relations between variables even if they would be 
there when respondents participate attentively (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014). To 
avoid this problem while simultaneously benefiting from the advantages of online 
experiments, this study employed several actions to enable meaningful and transparent data 
cleansing, described at the end of this chapter. Before then, data collection and the order 
of the questions in the questionnaire are elaborated. 
 
Data collection in two rounds 
After receiving approval for this study from the ethical commission of the Faculty of Arts 
and Social Sciences at the University of Zurich (approval number 17.12.9), data was 
collected in two rounds from February 6 to February 20, 2018 using in both rounds exactly 
the same procedure explained later in this subchapter. The recruitment of participants was 
also exactly the same in both rounds, using the online access panel of Respondi AG with 
the quota-sampling described in Subchapter 4.3.1. 
The first round collected n = 130 respondents who completed the questionnaire 
from February 6 to February 8. This round was simultaneously the final pretest of the 
effects of issue-specific argument strength, and participants were only (randomly) assigned 
to the two experimental conditions without salience emphasis frames: weak issue-specific 
argument strength without frames or strong thematic argument strength without frames. 
This was necessary to ensure that the chosen manipulation for argument strength produced 
significant attitudinal effects before running the entire experiment with all conditions, as 
this was the prerequisite for successful implementation of the design (see Subchapter 
4.2.2). After data collection, the data of the first round were analyzed. They showed the 
desired effect of issue-specific argument strength in the baseline groups without frames. 
This enabled continuing with the second round of data collection without any adjustments 
to the experimental procedure. 
The second round from February 13 to February 20 recruited n = 703 additional 
participants who finished the experiment. The only difference from round one was that 
round two randomly assigned participants to all six experimental groups, not only to the 
groups without salience emphasis frames. To ensure equally sized groups for all six 
conditions when summarizing the dataset of round one and round two, the randomization 
procedure in round two used a simple weighting factor to account for the fact that 130 
participants were already randomly assigned to the groups without frames in the first round 
of data collection. Specifically, the probability that participants in round two would be 
randomly assigned to one of the conditions without frames was 50% lower than of being 
randomly assigned to one of the four other conditions with frames. 
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This led to fairly equally sized experimental groups after merging dataset one and 
dataset two to obtain the final dataset (N = 833). The merging of the datasets was possible 
because during the field time of two weeks, no relevant news events occurred that could 
have elicited different responses between the first and the second round of data collection. 
In addition, several statistical tests showed that the two datasets could be merged without 
concerns for internal validity (for the formal tests, see Subchapter 4.4.1). Thus, the two 
datasets are treated as one dataset throughout this book. 
 
Order of questions in the questionnaire 
Next, the procedure and order of questions, which were completely identical in both rounds 
of data collection, are explained. As mentioned, this study used the online access panel by 
Respondi AG to recruit participants (see Subchapter 4.3.1). Based on the pre-defined 
quotas for sex and age, Respondi AG invited respondents to participate in the study by 
sending them a link to the online experiment. If participants followed the link, they arrived 
at the first page of the online experiment (see Table 22 for an overview of the order of all 
variables in the experiment). This page provided participants with basic information about 
the study, and introduced a cover story to deceive them about the actual goal of the 
research. Respondents read that the study was about “media and health,” and that they 
were required to answer questions on this topic and evaluate a media piece on the issue of 
health. 
In addition, the first page informed participants that they could not use their 
smartphone, but have to participate using a Mac, PC, or notebook. There were two reasons 
smartphones were not allowed. First, it enhanced somewhat control over the situation in 
which respondents participated in the study. Using a smartphone is possible nearly 
everywhere, which may motivate people to participate even in noisy situations such as on 
the metro or while waiting in a queue at the checkout counter. Using a Mac, PC, or 
notebook at least requires that people sit somewhere at a fixed location such as a desk at 
home. Second, not allowing smartphones ensured the readability of the online news article 
that served as the experimental stimulus by ensuring participants accessed the experiment 
via devices with bigger screens.  
The next page asked respondents for their informed consent to participate in the 
study and informed them that the University of Zurich would store and analyze their data. 
The next page was not visible to participants, and measured unobtrusively the accessing 
device used by employing a simple php code provided by SoSci Survey. This was followed 
by a page asking participants about the three variables important for the quota sampling 
procedure (age, sex, and residency) described in Subchapter 4.3.1. Next, respondents 
answered questions on their formal education and their income. The following two pages were 
concerned with questions important in terms of maintaining the realism of the cover story. 
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Table 22. Order of variables in the questionnaire 
Page Variable 
#1 Information about the study (topic “media and health”, no access via smartphone) 
#2 Informed consent for participation in the study and anonymous analysis of data 
#3 Unobtrusive measure of CV accessing device 
#4 Screen out if accessed via smartphone 
#5 CV age, CV sex, CV region 
#6 Screen out if quota full or not living in German-speaking Switzerland 
#7 CV education, CV income 
#8 CV topic interest and distraction 
#9 Knowing media products for distraction and unobtrusive randomization to experimental group 
#10-11 Announcement news article and unobtrusive filtering of correct article depending on experimental group 
#12-23 Displaying news article stimulus depending on experimental group and screen out pages if time spent on 
stimulus page < 20 seconds 
#24 TC article awareness #1 and #2  
#25 DV issue attitude and screen out if article awareness #1 not correct 
#26 DV paying intention 
#27 DV attitude importance 
#28 DV attitude certainty 
#29 TC article evaluation 
#30 Filtering order of mediators 
#31 MED belief importance economic-individualism, MED belief content economic-individualism, MED 
belief evaluation economic-individualism (only groups with no frame or economic-individualism frame) 
#32 MED belief importance humanitarianism, MED belief content humanitarianism, MED belief evaluation 
humanitarianism (only groups with no frame or economic-individualism frame) 
#33 MED belief importance humanitarianism, MED belief content humanitarianism, MED belief evaluation 
humanitarianism (only groups with humanitarianism frame) 
#34 MED belief importance economic-individualism, MED belief content economic-individualism, MED 
belief evaluation economic-individualism (only groups with humanitarianism frame) 
#35 TC recognition costs, TC recognition efficacy, and screen out if instructed response item in scale belief 
evaluation humanitarianism was answered incorrectly 
#36 TC perceived realism of costs, TC perceived realism of efficacy 
#37 TC perceived article direction, TC perceived article frame, TC perceived article contextualization 
#38 CV involvement in reading, CV involvement in thinking 
#39 CV numeracy 
#40 CV need for closure 
#41 CV need for cognition and screen out if instructed response item in scale need for closure was answered 
incorrectly 
#42 QF value preference for economic-individualism 
#43 QF value preference for humanitarianism 
#44 CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 
#45 CV political leaning, CV political knowledge, and screen out if instructed response item in scale centrality 
of social welfare attitudes was answered incorrectly 
#46 CV affectedness by serious illness – self, CV affectedness by serious illness – strong ties, CV affectedness 
by serious illness – weak ties 
#47 CV comment 
#48 CV seriousness  
#49 Debriefing, contact information for further details, and screen out if seriousness was denied 
#50 Redirect to online access panel provider 
Note. CV = control variable, TC = treatment check variable, DV = dependent variable, 
MED = mediator variable, QF = quasi-factor, see https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-
1013-1 for the original questionnaire in German 
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The first question asked participants about their interest in six different health 
topics. Among these issues was an item about health insurances, which was the control 
variable topic interest. Even though asking this item prior to the stimulus increased the risk 
of priming related thoughts before the stimulus, it had to be asked here. If the study 
measured topic interest after the stimulus, the measure could have been biased through 
exposure to the issue in the stimulus, which could even differ depending on the 
experimental condition. It can be speculated that topic interest increases more strongly in 
conditions with high issue-specific argument strength, because the amount of additional 
insurance fees makes the topic more relevant than the very low amount mentioned in the 
conditions with the weak argument. This would have made the variable useless as a control 
variable compared to asking it before the stimulus. To not prime the issue of health 
insurance too extensively, the item was hidden among the other items on health issues, and 
appeared as part of the broader cover story. To make the cover story more realistic, a 
second question followed asking respondents to select which health-related media products 
they already knew about. 
The subsequent page announced that participants would see next an online news 
article about health on which they have to answer some questions afterward (again, see 
Table 22). Respondents were then randomly assigned to one of the six experimental 
conditions, and were exposed to the respective stimulus containing the factors of issue-
specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames in the online news article. After 
reading the article, participants answered the two questions on the article’s content to test 
their awareness. Given that these questions were asked directly after exposure to the stimulus, 
this was a rather easy task. 
Next, the dependent variables were measured on respective single pages starting 
with issue attitude via paying intention to attitude importance and attitude certainty. On the following 
page, participants answered the first treatment check with the variable article evaluation. This 
variable was included here to not only measure the relevant treatment check but also to 
maintain the cover story of evaluating the media piece before reaching the following pages, 
which included measures for the mediator variables. 
The order of the mediator variables depended on the experimental condition to 
avoid question effects on the salience of the frames, as these frames were mentioned in the 
questions on the mediators. Respondents in the conditions with the economic-
individualism salience emphasis frame or without an explicit frame first answered questions 
on the mediators for economic-individualism (belief content, belief importance, and belief evaluation 
of economic-individualism) before they answered those on the mediators for humanitarianism 
(belief content, belief importance, and belief evaluation of humanitarianism) on the next page. In 
contrast, participants in the conditions with the humanitarianism frame first answered the 
mediators concerned with humanitarianism and on the following page, those on the 
mediators for economic-individualism. In so doing, the counter-frame to the frame 
displayed in the stimulus appeared last in the questions and could not bias the measurement 
of the mediators for the salience emphasis frame presented in the stimulus. 
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Subsequently, the questionnaire measured the treatment check variables (see Table 
22). To ensure internal validity, this was the best position for asking these questions. 
Including the treatment check directly after the stimulus and before the dependent variables 
and mediators would have led to the problem of boosting the effects of the manipulations 
(Kidd, 1976). Participants’ attention would be guided to the stimulus features of interest, 
making the manipulations more salient than they were in the stimulus. However, including 
treatment checks too late in the questionnaire could also be problematic, because 
remembering the stimulus correctly becomes more complicated over time and could be 
affected by other questions asked between the stimulus and the treatment check variables. 
Thus, the position of the treatment checks directly after the last variables that should be 
affected by the stimulus without additional biases through question effects (i.e., the 
mediator variables) seemed most appropriate. 
First, participants answered questions about the exact amount of the increase in 
individual insurance fees and in efficacy due to the new therapy (recognition costs and recognition 
efficacy). Second, they rated the realism of both on the next page (perceived realism of costs and 
perceived realism of efficacy). Third, the questionnaire asked on a single page about participants’ 
perceived direction of the article, the perceived frame of the article, and the perceived degree of article 
contextualization. 
The last part of the questionnaire included the control variables and measurements 
for political value preferences (see Table 22). First, participants’ involvement in reading and 
thinking about the news article was measured. On the next page, respondents answered 
questions about their numeracy followed by the measurements for need for closure and need for 
cognition. Then, the measurement for participants’ political value preference followed in the 
order value preference for economic-individualism and on a subsequent page, value preference for 
humanitarianism. 
Important was that questions on political value preferences were asked after the 
stimulus, not before. Asking about these variables before the stimulus would have primed 
participants’ values through the questionnaire and thus, would have manipulated the 
cognitive accessibility of these values. This can alter respondents’ processing of the stimulus 
(Blankenship & Wegener, 2011). That is, priming the values before would possibly 
confound the framing manipulation, as one would not be able to differentiate whether 
motivated reasoning was the result of the stimulus’ salience emphasis frame highlighting 
the political value or of the earlier priming of values in the questionnaire. Thus, the 
measurement for value preferences was included after the stimulus. 
However, this decision potentially increased another risk for internal validity. 
Political value preference served as a quasi-factor in the design, implying the necessity that 
the value preference is not affected by the manipulations of the stimulus (i.e., the 
independence of the moderator variable from the independent variables, see Baron 
& Kenny, 1986). However, even if the stimuli contained political values, it was rather 
unlikely that single exposure to these frames influenced participants’ value preferences, 
because they are highly stable political-psychological traits (Feldman, 1988 ⁠; Goren, 2005 ⁠; 
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Jacoby, 2006), as discussed in Subchapter 2.5.1. Thus, the risk of affecting the quasi-factor 
value preference by asking about the variable after the stimulus was rather small, and a 
formal test showed that the quasi-factor was actually independent from the experimental 
manipulations (for further details, see Subchapter 4.4.1). This substantiates the decision to 
measure political value preference after the stimulus to avoid priming these values while 
simultaneously ensuring the independence of the quasi-experimental factor. 
After the value preferences, the questionnaire moved to the political control 
variables centrality of social welfare attitudes, political leaning, and political knowledge. Again, these 
variables were measured after the stimulus to avoid priming respondents’ political 
characteristics, which could foster motivated reasoning prior to the stimulus. The following 
page included the three control variables regarding participants’ affectedness by a serious illness, 
after which respondents could leave a comment about the study and answered the last 
question about their seriousness in participating in the study. 
Finally, the questionnaire ended with a debriefing about the real goals of the study, 
and participants were redirected to the online access panel provider. The average time taken 
to complete the experiment was M = 17.09 minutes (SD = 5.65 minutes, Mdn = 16.17 
minutes). This time frame should be relatively unproblematic in terms of bringing about 




As for all surveys and online experiments, data cleansing was needed to filter out 
respondents who did not participate seriously. The literature suggests different approaches 
for data cleansing (Meade & Craig, 2012). Most of these have in common that the data is 
cleaned after data collection. The problem with such approaches is that the researcher has 
much freedom in deciding afterward which of the planned criteria for data cleansing are 
actually applied and to what extent. In addition, these criteria are rarely reported in scientific 
journals, rendering the process of data cleansing highly opaque and doubtful (Matthes et 
al., 2015). 
Thus, a different approach was selected for this study, namely a-priori data cleansing 
directly during data collection without any additional influence of the researcher after the 
criteria were defined before the data were collected. For this, a set of criteria for attentive 
participation was defined. If a respondent did not meet any of the criteria during the 
interview, she or he was directly filtered out and could not finish the experiment. In 
contrast, everyone who met all the criteria and finished the experiment were included in the 
final dataset, and only this dataset was used for all analyses without any further data 
cleansing. In this way, the freedom of the researcher in data cleansing was completely 
restricted after defining a-priori the criteria for cleansing. 
To measure the quality of respondents’ participation correctly, it is important to use 
multiple indicators (Berinsky et al., 2014 ⁠; Meade & Craig, 2012). In total, 13 criteria were 
used to exclude participants during data collection. Of these, six served to exclude 
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respondents who did not fit the predefined quotas for the sample, six were for screening 
out participants based on inattentive participation, and one used to exclude respondents 
using a smartphone as the access device (see Table 23). In total, 1,843 respondents started 
the survey. 
If participants accessed the questionnaire via a smartphone, they received a message 
stating that they had done so, that this was not possible for the purposes of this study, and 
that they should access the link again via a Mac, PC, or notebook. These participants were 
then screened out of the questionnaire. This was rarely done (n = 22), because the online 
access panel provider already stated this information when inviting participants. In addition, 
Respondi AG invited only respondents in the relevant age group, namely those aged 
between 18 and 69 years living in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. However, some 
participants did not indicate their age (n = 3) or their sex (n = 7), were too old (n = 2), too 
young (n = 7), did not live in the German-speaking part of Switzerland (n = 56), or the 
quota for their sex and age group had already been fulfilled (n = 106). These respondents 
were directly screened out, could not move on with the questionnaire, and did not appear 
in the final dataset. 
The first test of participants’ attention during the experiment was the time they spent 
on the page with the online news article. As this was the experimental stimulus, it was 
important to ensure that respondents read the article and were exposed to the 
manipulations. To choose an appropriate time limit indicating that participants had read 
the stimulus, different people read the article during the conception of the study, indicating 
that one needed about 50 seconds to read the shorter stimuli of the condition without 
salience emphasis frames (i.e., with only the informational paragraph). 
However, excluding everyone who needed less than 50 seconds would have implied 
that only those who carefully read the entire article would have been included in the final 
sample, while excluding people with lower involvement in the stimulus. Thus, this study 
chose a lower limit of 20 seconds for the time spent, expecting that this limit would be able 
to exclude people who did obviously not read the article, but without excluding those who 
only scanned it and had been at least somewhat exposed to the manipulations (for the 
stimulus see Table 10 in Subchapter 4.2.4). That is, participants who spent less than 20 
seconds on the stimulus page received a notification that the questionnaire was finished. 
Accordingly, their data were not included in the final dataset. Among the six tests for 
participation quality, the criterion of time spent led to the most exclusions from the 
experiment (n = 499). 
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The second most exclusions based on the criteria for participation quality originated 
from incorrectly answering the question on the topic of the news article (variable article 
awareness #1), which was asked directly after the stimulus was displayed (n = 109). In 
addition, three instructed response items (e.g., “Please check box number five to show that 
you read this question”) were hidden among longer item batteries. If respondents did not 
choose the instructed answer, they were also excluded (n = 105). The last criterion was 
participants’ self-assessment of how seriously they participated in the study. If they said 
they did not answer seriously, they were excluded (n = 6). 
Besides these criteria for exclusions during the interview, some respondents 
voluntary terminated their participation (n = 88). This left the study with the planned 
sample size of N = 833 completed questionnaires with acceptable participation quality. 
Given that 1,843 people started the questionnaire, the completion rate for this study was 
45.2%. Unfortunately, Respondi AG could not provide the exact number of invitations 
sent out for the study, making it impossible to calculate the response rate. However, 
comparing the completion rate to other studies that used instructed response items, it is 
not unusual to lose around half the respondents. Usually, approximately one third to half 
the respondents of representative surveys fail to answer instructed response items correctly 
(Berinsky et al., 2014). 
Having clarified how the final sample was reached, the questions respondents 
answered, and the order in which these questions appeared in the questionnaire, 
Subchapter 4.3.4 now provides insights into the quality of the measurements employed. 







Interview started 1843 100% 
Screen out smartphone -22 98.8% 
Screen out age missing -3 98.6% 
Screen out age below 18 years -7 98.3% 
Screen out age above 69 years -2 98.2% 
Screen out sex missing -7 97.8% 
Screen out residency not German-speaking Switzerland -56 94.7% 
Screen out quota full -106 89.0% 
Screen out time spent on stimulus < 20 seconds -499 61.9% 
Screen out wrong recognition of article topic -109 56.0% 
Screen out instructed response item #1 -95 50.8% 
Screen out instructed response item #2 -6 50.5% 
Screen out instructed response item #3 -4 50.3% 
Screen out seriousness check -6 50.0% 
Exit during interview -88 45.2% 
Interview completed 833 45.2% 
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4.3.4 Confirmatory factor analysis 
As is typical in survey research, many measures in the study used several manifest items to 
correctly capture the underlying concept of a variable (Bollen, 2002⁠; Bollen & Lennox, 
1991). Thus, this subchapter presents the results of a simultaneous confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) to evaluate whether the political-psychological concepts were measured 
appropriately and could be summarized empirically as (reflective) latent variables, as 
intended before from a theoretical perspective. 
The simultaneous CFA contained all variables described in Subchapter 4.3.2 that 
consisted of more than a single item: issue attitude (3 items), attitude importance (3 items), 
attitude certainty (3 items), belief importance economic-individualism (3 items), belief 
content economic-individualism (3 items), belief evaluation economic-individualism 
(3 items), belief importance humanitarianism (3 items), belief content humanitarianism 
(3 items), belief evaluation humanitarianism (3 items), value preference for economic-
individualism (4 items), value preference for humanitarianism (4 items), centrality of social 
welfare attitudes (4 items), need for cognitive closure (15 items), need for cognition 
(4 items), involvement reading (4 items), involvement thinking (4 items), numeracy 
(4 items), and article evaluation (6 items), totaling 76 items. 
The simultaneous CFA tested in a reflective model whether the respective items 
could be explained by the respective underlying latent factor. The analysis did not allow for 
cross-loadings of items with a factor other than the one theoretically expected to ensure 
that the study measured distinct concepts (Brown, 2015, pp. 37–40). In addition, 
correlations between residuals were restricted for the same reason (Brown, 2015, pp. 157–
162). However, correlations between latent factors were not restricted, because some 
underlying concepts are theoretically connected (e.g., someone with a higher need for 
cognition likely engages more in thinking about the topic of the news article). To estimate 
the CFA model without the statistical requirement of perfectly distributed variables, the 
robust maximum likelihood estimator (MLR) was used (Brown, 2015, pp. 62–65). The 
model was run in R using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). 
Table 24 summarizes the model fit information for the computed CFA model with 
all items. Most of the fit indices demonstrated good model fit: the robust comparative fit 
index (CFI) was > .95, the robust root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) < .06, and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) was < .08 (for 
cut-off criteria, see Hu & Bentler, 1999). However, while the significance of the Chi-Square 
test is not a problem for the model as this test is highly sensitive to sample size and no 
longer considered a relevant cut-off criterion for the applied CFA (Brown, 2015, pp. 67–
70 ⁠; Hu & Bentler, 1999 ⁠; West, Taylor, & Wu, 2012), the value of the Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI) was slightly below the cut-off criterion of > .95, indicating improvements were 
needed for the measurement model. 
 
 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 226 
 
A deeper analysis of the explained variance and factor loadings revealed that three 
out of the 15 items for need for cognitive closure had very low factor loadings and the 
latent factor could not explain them sufficiently (see Table 25). In addition, the first item 
for the variable “involvement in thinking” demonstrated much lower explained variance 
than the other items for this concept, as did one of the six items used to measure 





Table 24. Model fit information for the simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis of the 





Number of observations (n) 833 
Minimum function test statistic (χ2) 4676.12 
Degrees of freedom (df) 2621 
P-value of Chi-square test (p) < .001 
Robust Comparative Fit Index (CFI) .953 
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) .949 
Robust Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) .033 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) .041 
Note. Values are based on using the robust maximum likelihood (MLR) estimator, 
correlations between latent factors not restricted, n = 833  








Need for closure #7 (“When I have made a decision, I feel 
relieved”) 
.088 .296 
Need for closure #8 (“When I am confronted with a problem, 
I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly”) 
.117 .341 
Need for closure #14 (“I do not usually consult many different 
opinions before forming my own view”) 
.045 .211 
Involvement in thinking #1 (“I made my own thoughts about the 
topic of the article”) 
.368 .607 
Article evaluation item #6 (“The article is comprehensible”) .296 .544 
Note. R2 = variance in item explained by latent factor, r = standardized factor loading of 
item on latent factor, n = 833 
IV METHOD 227 
Thus, a second and slightly adjusted simultaneous CFA was computed without these 
five of the initial 76 items. Except for the deletion of these items, the CFA was identical to 
the previous one. It again used the MLR estimator and did not restrict correlations between 
factors. It did again not allow for cross-loadings or residual correlations. Table 26 shows 
that the previously problematic value for TLI increased to .960 and all other relevant model 
fit indices met the criteria for a valid CFA, even better than did the initial measurement 
model. 
In addition, the latent factors significantly explained their respective items (all, 
p < .001) with high values for R2 of between .48 and .95 (see Table 27). The only exception 
was need for cognitive closure, which had remarkably lower R2 values between .21 and .64. 
However, this is still within an acceptable range, and the latent factor could significantly 
explain all items theoretically related to the factor. For reliability, the measurement model 
also showed satisfying results. Reliability ranged from α = .85 for the variable value 
preference for economic-individualism to α = .97 for the variable issue attitude (again, see 
Table 27). 






Number of observations (n) 833 
Minimum function test statistic (χ2) 3822.41 
Degrees of freedom (df) 2261 
P-value of Chi-square test (p) < .001 
Robust Comparative Fit Index (CFI) .963 
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) .960 
Robust Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) .031 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) .035 
Note. Values are based on using the robust maximum likelihood (MLR) estimator, 
correlations between latent factors not restricted, five of 76 measured items excluded 
compared to initial measurement model (one of four items for article evaluation, one of 
four items for involvement in reflecting, three out 15 items for need for closure), n = 833 
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Table 27. Reliability, factor loadings, and explained variance of final measurement model 
Latent factor Item R2 r p 
DV issue attitude (α = .97, ω = .97) #1 .886 .941 < .001 #2 .919 .959 < .001 
#3 .924 .961 < .001 
DV attitude importance (α = .95, ω = .95) #1 .824 .945 <.001 #2 .730 .933 <.001 
#3 .874 .924 <.001 
DV attitude certainty (α = .93, ω = .93) #1 .893 .908 <.001 #2 .871 .854 <.001 
#3 .853 .935 <.001 
MED belief importance economic-individualism (α = .96, ω = .96) #1 .817 .904 < .001 #2 .900 .949 < .001 
#3 .938 .969 < .001 
MED belief content economic-individualism (α = .94, ω = .94) #1 .828 .910 <.001 #2 .951 .975 <.001 
#3 .761 .873 <.001 
MED belief evaluation economic-individualism (α = .95, ω = .95) #1 .828 .910 <.001 #2 .893 .945 <.001 
#3 .876 .936 <.001 
MED belief importance humanitarianism (α = .89, ω = .89) #1 .637 .798 < .001 #2 .797 .893 < .001 
#3 .744 .862 < .001 
MED belief content humanitarianism (α = .95, ω = .95) #1 .836 .914 <.001 #2 .923 .961 <.001 
#3 .834 .913 <.001 
MED belief evaluation humanitarianism (α = .96, ω = .96) #1 .889 .943 <.001 #2 .926 .963 <.001 
#3 .861 .928 <.001 
QF value preference for economic-individualism (α = .85, ω = .85) #1 .712 .844 < .001 #2 .589 .768 < .001 
#3 .502 .708 < .001 
#4 .554 .744 <.001 
QF value preference for humanitarianism (α = .90, ω = .90) #1 .704 .839 <.001 #2 .735 .858 <.001 
#3 .627 .792 <.001 
#4 .680 .825 <.001 
CV need for closure (α = .88, ω = .88) #1 .626 .791 <.001 #2 .287 .536 <.001 
#3 .378 .615 <.001 
#4 .323 .569 < .001 
#5 .213 .462 < .001 
#6 .616 .785 < .001 
#9 .207 .455 <.001 
#10 .385 .620 <.001 
#11 .223 .472 <.001 
#12 .397 .630 <.001 
#13 .405 .636 <.001 
#15 .640 .800 <.001 
CV need for cognition (α = .85, ω = .86) #1 .545 .738 < .001 #2 .501 .708 < .001 
#3 .609 .781 < .001 
#4 .759 .871 <.001 
CV involvement in reading (α = .93, ω = .94) #1 .814 .902 <.001 #2 .705 .840 <.001 
#3 .855 .925 <.001 
#4 .784 .886 <.001 
CV involvement in thinking (α = .92, ω = .92) #2 .771 .878 <.001 #3 .851 .923 < .001 
#4 .788 .888 < .001 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes (α = .92, ω = .93) #1 .816 .903 <.001 #2 .804 .897 <.001 
#3 .706 .841 <.001 
#4 .697 .835 <.001 
CV numeracy (α = .89, ω = .90) #1 .643 .802 <.001 #2 .803 .896 <.001 
#3 .575 .758 <.001 
#4 .701 .837 <.001 
TC article evaluation (α = .88, ω = .88) #1 .652 .807 <.001 #2 .485 .696 <.001 
#3 .574 .758 <.001 
#4 .627 .792 <.001 
#5 .674 .821 <.001 
Note. R2 = variance in item explained by latent factor, r = standardized factor loading, 
DV = dependent variable, MED = mediator, QF = quasi-factor, CV = control variable, 
TC = treatment check variable, n = 833 
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Summary 
Taken together, the final measurement model worked well in terms of psychometric criteria. 
This underlines that the chosen and partly self-constructed items reasonably measured the 
constructs of interest, which is an important prerequisite for testing the hypotheses. The 
good model fit also enabled using the latent variables rather than composite indices in all 
further analyses, which is done throughout this book if not stated differently. This is a 
strong advantage, as statistical estimates of significance and effect sizes are no longer biased 
through measurement error, as is the case for composite indices, because the measurement 
error of latent variables can be separated from multivariate statistical test estimates (Brown, 
2015, pp. 42–46). 
However, reliability is not the only criterion psychological measurements need to 
fulfill. Thus, the following subchapter (see Subchapter 4.3.5) examines the distribution of 
the variables and provides further checks of the validity of the obtained measures. 
4.3.5 Descriptive statistics and median split 
After presenting the measures of the study (see Subchapter 4.3.2), their order in the 
questionnaire (see Subchapter 4.3.3), and their factorial structure (see Subchapter 4.3.4), 
this subchapter reports the empirical univariate distribution of these measures on aggregate. 
This allows evaluating whether there is variance in the variables that can be explained by 
other variables, whether undesirable ceiling or floor effects exists, and to obtain further 
insights about the participants of the study. In addition, the subchapter describes the 
validity tests of the relevant measures for respondents’ political value preference. 
Subsequently it shows how the quasi-experimental factor was computed based on this 
variable (see Subchapter 4.2.2 and Subchapter 4.2.4 for why political value preference 
for economic-individualism served as a two-level factor in the experiment). 
 
Distribution of control variables and treatment check variables 
Table 28 gives an overview of the distribution of all control variables and treatment check 
variables. In addition to the aforementioned demographic characteristics of the sample (see 
Subchapter 4.3.1), most people are (or were) not affected by a serious illness such as cancer 
(about 85%). Nevertheless, participants demonstrated somewhat high interest in the topic 
of health insurances and therefore, in the issue under investigation (M = 4.58, SD = 1.57 
on a scale ranging from 1 to 6). This emphasizes that the topic selected for the experiment 
was – as expected (see Subchapter 4.2.3) – important to the participants and not an 
irrelevant side issue. 
When examining the political control variables, this assessment is corroborated by 
the mean for participants’ centrality of social welfare attitudes. The mean of the composite 
scale was noticeably above the midpoint of the original scale (M = 3.97, SD = 1.16 on a 
scale ranging from 1 to 6), indicating that not only was the specific issue important to the 
participants, but also their social welfare attitudes, from which the experiment derived 
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applicable salience emphasis frames employing political values. Alongside the mean for the 
originally measured scale for centrality of social welfare attitudes, Table 28 provides the 
mean and standard deviation for the latent variable for the centrality of social welfare 
attitudes and for all other latent variables derived from the simultaneous confirmatory 
factor analysis (see Subchapter 4.3.4). As is evident, all latent variables are standardized 
and have a mean of zero with values in the minus range indicating values below the overall 
mean, and values in the plus range indicating values above the grand mean. Later, the 
hypotheses tests employed these latent variables based on their advantages in terms of 
measurement error, rather than composite indices (again, see Subchapter 4.3.4). However, 
for the presentation of the univariate statistics in this chapter, the composite indices are 
focused on because they enable better interpretation of absolute values. 
With centrality of social welfare attitudes, the questionnaire included two further 
political control variables: political knowledge and political leaning. According to the mean 
of political knowledge (M = 4.22, SD = 1.50 on a scale ranging from 1 to 7), the sample on 
average had a medium awareness of politics, but with relatively high variance, which is likely 
also so in the population of all citizens. 
In addition, participants’ political leaning was distributed in a fairly balanced way 
with a mean close to the scale midpoint (M = 5.98, SD = 2.33 on a scale ranging from 1 
to 11). This result supports the expectation articulated in Subchapter 4.2.3 that an 
investigation of the issue of medical approvals with a sample of Swiss citizens has the 
advantage that political leaning and political value preferences are less skewed in the 
direction of “left” humanitarianism than in all other European countries. 
Regarding the other control variables, Table 28 highlights another important aspect: 
The slightly higher formal education of the sample (see Subchapter 4.3.1) seems to 
translate into more specific control variables such as numeracy, need for cognition, and the 
two measures for involvement with the online news article, as the mean values for these 
variables were considerably higher in the sample than the midpoint of the scales. However, 
this should not be considered a disadvantage for testing the hypotheses using this sample. 
In fact, the hypotheses are concerned with irrationality in attitude formation due to salience 
emphasis framing. If the study revealed the proposed effects among participants who are 
better educated, demonstrated a rather high need for cognition, and were involved in 
reading the stimulus and thinking about it – i.e., people who are in general more resistant 
to (non-substantive) persuasive attempts (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983 ⁠; Haugtvedt & 
Petty, 1992) – this would be a stronger indicator than finding the proposed salience frame 
effects with a more susceptible sample. 
Table 28 also provides the univariate descriptive statistics for the treatment check 
variables. The formal test for the treatment checks are described later (see Subchapter 
4.4.2); however, the table offers first insights. The substantial majority (more than 80%) of 
participants remembered correctly the manipulated costs and efficacy of the new therapy 
described in the stimuli, indicating that they recognized the manipulation of argument 
strength. 
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CV age  42.92 14.41 833 
CV sex (0/1) nwomen = 420 (50.4%), 
nmen = 413 (49.6%) 
  833 
CV education (0/1) nlow = 390 (47.0%), 
nhigh = 440 (53.0%) 
  830 
CV income (1-7)  3.14 1.55 698 
CV affectedness by serious illness – self 
(0/1) 
nno = 684 (84.8%), 
nyes = 123 (15.2%) 
  807 
CV affectedness by serious illness – strong 
ties (0/1) 
nno = 157 (19.2%), 
nyes = 662 (80.8%) 
  819 
CV affectedness by serious illness – weak 
ties (0/1) 
nno = 108 (13.2%), 
nyes = 712 (86.8%) 
  820 
CV topic interest (1-6)  4.58 1.57 833 
CV political knowledge (1-7)  4.22 1.50 833 
CV political leaning (1-11)  5.98 2.33 831 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 
(latent) 
 0.00 1.15 833 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 
(composite 1-6) 
 3.97 1.16 833 
CV numeracy (latent)  0.00 1.25 833 
CV numeracy (composite 1-7)  5.69 1.22 833 
CV need for closure (latent)  0.00 1.01 833 
CV need for closure (composite 1-6)  3.65 0.89 833 
CV need for cognition (latent)  0.00 1.02 833 
CV need for cognition (composite 1-7)  5.10 1.12 833 
CV involvement in reading (latent)  0.00 0.98 833 
CV involvement in reading (composite 1-7)  5.64 1.12 833 
CV involvement in thinking (latent)  0.00 1.54 833 
CV involvement in thinking (composite 1-7)  4.74 1.72 833 
TC recognition costs (0/1) nincorrect = 157 (18.8%), 
ncorrect = 676 (81.2%) 
  833 
TC recognition efficacy (0/1) nincorrect = 128 (15.4%), 
ncorrect = 705 (84.6%) 
  833 
TC perceived realism of costs (1-7)  3.87 1.85 833 
TC perceived realism of efficacy (1-7)  4.80 1.44 833 
TC perceived article direction (1-7)  4.46 1.53 833 
TC perceived article frame (1-7)  3.94 1.53 833 
TC perceived article contextualization (1-7)  4.10 1.35 833 
TC article evaluation (latent)  0.00 1.03 833 
TC article evaluation (composite 1-7)  4.95 1.16 833 
Note. CV = control variable, TC = treatment check variable, measurement scale in 
parentheses 
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Furthermore, participants’ answers regarding the metric treatment check variables 
demonstrated rather high variance (SD between 1.35 and 1.85 on the various 7-point 
scales), which could be cautiously interpreted as a first sign that the different treatments led 
to different answers and thus, to this variance. The only treatment check variable that 
showed rather low variance was participants’ evaluation of the article (SD = 1.16) with a 
mean of the composite index clearly above the midpoint of the scale (M = 4.95). However, 
this is also a rather good sign, because it is a first indicator that the different manipulations 
in the stimuli did not produce much variance, but that participants perceived all online news 
articles as rather credible. 
 
Distribution of dependent variables, mediators, and value preference 
Regarding the dependent variables and mediators, Table 29 shows rather high variances 
for most variables. That is, something is occurring in the variables, which may be explained 
by the experimental manipulations. Unsurprisingly, the only variables with a standard 
deviation below 1.20 on the original six-point scales were the mediators for 
humanitarianism, for which the issue-specific argument strength was constant in all 
experimental conditions. 
In terms of the means of the composite dependent variables, the average attitude in 
the sample was considerably skewed in the direction of supporting approval for the new 
cancer therapy (M = 4.28). However, there is still space at the end of the scale at 6, and the 
standard deviation was rather high (SD = 1.48). Thus, even though the variable is skewed, 
no clear ceiling effect exists. 
Furthermore, Table 29 shows the univariate distribution of participants’ political 
value preference for economic-individualism and for humanitarianism. The composite 
indices display that the mean of both values was close to the scale midpoint 
(Meconomic-individualism = 3.73, Mhumanitarianism = 3.74, on a scale ranging from 1 to 6). Again, this 
highlights that the selected topic and salience emphasis frames for the experiment were a 
good choice, because the balanced distribution allows for a meaningful median split of the 
quasi-factor political value preference for economic-individualism. 
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Validity of measurement of political value preference and median split 
To assess whether the measure for citizens’ political value preference for economic-
individualism not only fulfilled the psychometric criteria but also demonstrated high 
construct validity, its convergent validity with two other political variables was examined. 
As explained, adhering to the value of economic-individualism is part of the market-
oriented ideology of “right” social welfare attitudes (see Subchapter 4.2.3). Thus, if the 
value preference was measured correctly, it should positively correlate with the control 
variable political leaning, which measured participants’ self-identification on a political left-
right scale. 
Table 30 shows that this was the case with a significant (p < .001) correlation of 
r = .46. In addition, if the political values economic-individualism and humanitarianism are 
competing ends of a political value conflict, as noted in Subchapter 4.2.3, then these values 
should correlate negatively with each other, meaning that being in favor of one value goes 
alongside opposing the other value. Table 30 reveals a significant (p < .001) negative 










DV attitude (latent) 0.00 1.45 833 
DV attitude (composite 1-6) 4.28 1.48 833 
DV attitude importance (latent) 0.00 1.24 833 
DV attitude importance (composite 1-6) 4.24 1.27 833 
DV attitude certainty (latent) 0.00 1.15 833 
DV attitude certainty (composite 1-6) 3.76 1.25 833 
DV paying intention 224.00 738.82 825 
MED belief importance economic-individualism (latent) 0.00 1.43 833 
MED belief importance economic-individualism (composite 1-6) 3.54 1.52 833 
MED belief content economic-individualism (latent) 0.00 1.15 833 
MED belief content economic-individualism (composite 1-6) 4.61 1.21 833 
MED belief evaluation economic-individualism (latent) 0.00 1.45 833 
MED belief evaluation economic-individualism (composite 1-6) 3.05 1.54 833 
MED belief importance humanitarianism (latent) 0.00 0.79 833 
MED belief importance humanitarianism (composite 1-6) 4.94 0.96 833 
MED belief content humanitarianism (latent) 0.00 1.06 833 
MED belief content humanitarianism (composite 1-6) 3.73 1.16 833 
MED belief evaluation humanitarianism (latent) 0.00 1.29 833 
MED belief evaluation humanitarianism (composite 1-6) 4.28 1.32 833 
QF value preference for economic-individualism (latent) 0.00 1.10 833 
QF value preference for economic-individualism (composite 1-6) 3.73 1.13 833 
QF value preference for humanitarianism (latent) 0.00 1.07 833 
QF value preference for humanitarianism (composite 1-6) 3.74 1.16 833 
Note. DV = dependent variable, MED = mediator, QF = quasi-factor, measurement scale 
in parentheses 
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correlation between the two values of r = -.56, indicating again that the employed measure 
well captured the underlying concept of citizens’ political value preference for economic-
individualism. 
To obtain the necessary two-level quasi-experimental factor for value preference for 
economic-individualism, which allows testing the hypotheses concerned with value 
resonance (see Part III and Subchapter 4.2.4), the sample was split into two subgroups 
based on the median of the latent variable. As Table 31 shows, the median was Mdn = .01, 
equating to about 3.74 on the composite index. As such, the median was relatively close to 
the midpoint of the scale of 3.5 and thus, is a theoretically meaningful value by which to 
divide the sample. 
All participants with values not higher than the median were assigned as having a 
low preference for economic-individualism. This was the case for half the sample (n = 416, 
49.9%). In contrast, the other half were respondents with values higher than the median, 
who were assigned to the second level of the quasi-factor, i.e., treated as having a high 
preference for economic-individualism (n = 417, 50.1%). 
Of course, within each subgroup is still some variation in how strongly each 
respondent supports or opposes the value of economic-individualism. However, the 
standard deviation in the subgroups is not that high with SDlow = 0.68 and SDhigh = 0.78. 
Furthermore, the means of the subgroups differ from each other in the range of nearly two 
Table 30. Convergent validity of measure for value preference for economic-individualism 
  
 Value preference for economic-individualism 
Variable t df r 95% CI p n 
Value preference for 
humanitarianism 
-19.55 831 -.56 [-.61, -.51] < .001*** 833 
Political leaning 14.90 829 .46 [.40, .51] < .001*** 831 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for Pearson’s r, *** p < .001 
Table 31. Median split of value preference for economic-individualism for quasi-
experimental factor 
 









Low preference for economic-individualism -0.74 -.89 0.68 416 (49.9%) 
High preference for economic-individualism 0.78 .89 0.78 417 (50.1%) 
Overall 0.01 0.00 1.10 833 (100%) 
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standard deviations (see Table 31). That is, both groups demonstrate a very different 
preference for economic-individualism. Nevertheless, hypotheses tests described in the 
results section later not only included the median split variable but also robustness checks 
with the metric latent variable of economic-individualism (see Subchapter 5.1.6). This 
allowed an even more fine-grained investigation of the influence of this variable. 
 
Correlations between mediators 
The last table in this subchapter (see Table 32) is concerned with the question of how 
strongly the mediators of interest correlate with each other. This is necessary to ensure that 
these important variables were not only different latent factors according to the 
confirmatory factor analysis (see Subchapter 4.3.4), but also statistically differed enough 
from each other to ensure no problem of multicollinearity when analyzing the different 
mediators simultaneously in a mediation model. 
While belief importance and belief content correlated only modestly (r = .38, 
p < .001), belief evaluation correlated rather strongly with belief importance (r = .67, 
p < .001) and belief content (r = .56, p < .001). However, even high correlations between 
multiple mediators are not a statistical problem in a mediation analysis, as long as 
multicollinearity is not too high (Hayes, 2018, pp. 183–186). 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) when predicting issue attitude in a regression of all three 
mediators simultaneously ranged between 1.47 and 2.28, which is clearly below the critical 
value of 10 (Miles, 2005). Thus the three mediators can later be examined simultaneously 
without strong concerns about multicollinearity (see Chapter 5.2). 
Table 32. Bivariate correlations between mediators 
 Belief content economic-
individualism (n = 833) 
Belief evaluation economic-
individualism (n = 833) 
Belief importance economic-
individualism (n = 833) 
  
Pearson’s r .38 .67 
95% Confidence interval [.32, .44] [.63, .70] 
p-value < .001*** < .001*** 
Belief content economic-
individualism (n = 833) 
  
Pearson’s r  .56 
95% Confidence interval  [.52, .61] 
p-value  < .001*** 
Note. *** p < .001 
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Summary 
The last subchapters showed how this study measured the variables of interest (see 
Subchapter 4.3.2 and Subchapter 4.3.3), confirming the success thereof in terms of 
psychometric criteria (see Subchapter 4.3.4) and regarding the distribution of variables 
(this subchapter). However, the construct validity of the measures is only one aspect of an 
experiment’s validity to enable the generalization of its findings (Shadish et al., 2002, 
pp. 64–68). The second relevant aspect is internal validity, i.e., whether the experiment 
appropriately tested causality and whether competing explanations for possible effects can 
be ruled out (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 53–63). Thus, the next subchapters discuss several 
formal tests to assess the internal validity of this experiment starting with the test for 
successful randomization (see Subchapter 4.4.1). 
4.4 Tests of experimental validity 
4.4.1 Randomization checks 
The core advantage of an experiment in analyzing the causality proposed in the hypotheses 
(see Part III) is the principle of randomization, through which known and unknown 
variables can be ruled out as competing explanations for differences between treatment 
groups (Gravetter & Forzano, 2018, pp. 164–174). However, first, this is a theoretical 
advantage that must translate into a specific experiment where empirical problems such as 
attrition can endanger the balanced distribution of confounding third variables in the 
treatment conditions and thus, threaten internal validity (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 53–63). 
Therefore, this subchapter describes some formal tests of whether randomized assignment 
to the treatment groups of the experiment was unbiased and successful. 
 
Attrition by randomized group assignment 
The term attrition refers to the problem that the loss of participants during an experiment 
can be systematically related to their random assignment to a specific treatment condition 
(Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 323–324). If one (or more) treatment(s) lead(s) to more dropouts 
than other treatments, and participants who drop out are a systematic group, then the 
experimental conditions not only differ regarding the treatment but also regarding the 
variables that caused the dropout as well as all variables related to this causing variable. 
Thus, the aforementioned advantage of randomization before the treatment can get lost, as 
some variables are no longer equally distributed in all conditions in addition to the 
treatment, meaning that variables other than the treatment may explain the outcome 
differences between experimental conditions. 
For example, in a short thought experiment, it could be considered that the 
conditions with salience emphasis frames would generate more boredom than the 
conditions without frames, because the stimuli with frames are longer than the stimuli 
without frames, which contained only the informational paragraph with the factor issue-
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specific argument strength. Then, this boredom would provoke more dropouts in the 
framing conditions than in the conditions without frames, because some people do not like 
to expose themselves to boring news and would no longer participate in the experiment. 
This would imply that fewer respondents with low tolerance for boredom remain in the 
groups with salience emphasis frames, whereas the groups without frames will still consist 
of participants with a higher and lower tolerance for boredom. Possibly, tolerance for 
boredom is related to other personal characteristics such as need for cognition and thus, 
fewer people with a high need for cognition will remain in the groups with frames than in 
the groups without frames. Next, a high need for cognition could reduce susceptibility to 
salience emphasis framing effects, but enhance the effects of issue-specific argument 
strength. If the results of a comparison of treatment conditions then indicate that the 
framing conditions exerted strong effects, which suppressed the effect of issue-specific 
argument strength that simultaneously persisted in the conditions without frames, it could 
be incorrectly concluded that exposure to salience emphasis frames was responsible for the 
lower effect of issue-specific argument strength when not considering attrition. 
In contrast, when considering the problem of attrition, it could be correctly 
concluded that it was not the salience emphasis frames that caused the effects, but perhaps 
the need for cognition, which varied with the treatment conditions in a way that a lower 
need for cognition in the framing conditions decreased the effects of issue-specific 
argument strength. However, it would not be certain which of the two variables, the 
treatment or need for cognition, was responsible for the effect. Moreover, a third 
unmeasured and thus unknown variable could be responsible for the effect, rendering the 
experimental results highly uncertain. Hopefully, this small example has illustrated how 
attrition can lead to very poor internal validity for the results of an experiment and why it 
is important to check for attrition when testing internal validity. 
Leaving the thought experiment and returning to the real experiment in this study, 
Table 33 reports a formal test on whether the dropout rate during the experiment was the 
same in all experimental conditions. As seen, the completion rate after group assignment 
was fairly similar, ranging between 47.5% and 56.3% in the respective groups. A Chi-
squared-test revealed no significant systematic relation between dropouts and the 
assignment to a specific group (p = .139). That is, no treatment condition had a significantly 
higher dropout rate than other conditions. 
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Randomization of control variables and value preference 
Even though attrition was balanced in all experimental groups, there was a noticeable 
number of losses during the experiment, mostly because of the data cleansing procedure 
that prevented respondents with low participation quality from completing the study, (see 
Subchapter 4.3.3). Therefore, it is theoretically possible that participants with different 
characteristics got lost in the different groups, despite that the number of losses was the 
same in all groups. 
Thus, Table 34 reports several tests on whether the measured control variables were 
equally distributed in the six experimental groups. The tests treated the experimental 
conditions as independent variables and the control variables as dependent variables to 
check whether belonging to a specific treatment condition explained the distribution of 
control variables. This would imply a systematic relation between the treatment groups and 
the control variables. According to the level of measurement, the analyses used Chi-
squared-tests for categorical control variables and one-way ANOVAs for metric variables. 
As shown, the experimental groups did not explain any of the measured control 
variables with all p-values far from being statistically significant, even though the n of the 
analyses and thus, its statistical power to detect differences was rather high. That is, the 
theoretical advantage of randomization translated to the specific experiment in this study, 
implying rather strong internal validity for testing the hypotheses. Of course, it is not 
completely certain whether this also holds true for all other unknown variables that were 
not measured. However, given that attrition and all measured control variables were equally 















































































Sum 254 254 276 277 278 277 1616 
Note. Displayed is n with percentages in parentheses, χ2(df = 5) = 8.338, p = .139. Cramer’s 
V = .07, n is lower than the number of started questionnaires because 227 cases left the 
questionnaire before being assigned to the experimental groups on questionnaire page #9 
(see Table 22 and Table 23 in Subchapter 4.3.3) 
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distributed in all six experimental groups, the probability is rather high that the 
randomization procedure also led to equal distributions of non-measured third variables. 
Alongside the distribution of control variables, Table 34 also shows that this study 
achieved another important aspect of internal validity. The last two rows show the relation 
between respondents’ political value preferences and the experimental conditions. As 
explained, the preference for economic-individualism served as a quasi-experimental factor 
in the experiment (see Subchapter 4.2.2 and Subchapter 4.2.4). Statistically, a quasi-factor 
is a non-manipulated moderator variable that can alter the relation between the independent 
and dependent variable. However, a moderator is only a valid predictor if this variable is 
independent of the other independent variable(s), i.e., when the moderator is not 
confounded with the other factor(s) whose influence(s) the moderator is expected to 
condition (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
The last two rows in Table 34 indicate that participants’ political value preference 
for economic-individualism was independent of the six experimental conditions when 
considering both the metric latent variable (p = .117) and the categorical variable based on 
Table 34. Test of successful randomization of control variables in experimental groups and 













CV age 0.28  5, 827 833 0.926 
CV sex (0/1)  4.73 5 833 0.450 
CV education (0/1)  7.02 5 830 0.219 
CV income 0.46  5, 692 698 0.803 
CV affectedness by serious illness – self (0/1)  7.53 5 807 0.184 
CV affectedness by serious illness – strong ties (0/1)  6.94 5 819 0.225 
CV affectedness by serious illness – weak ties (0/1)  4.08 5 820 0.539 
CV topic interest 0.28  5, 827 833 0.926 
CV political knowledge 0.78  5, 827 833 0.566 
CV political leaning 0.92  5, 827 831 0.470 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 0.35  5, 827 833 0.885 
CV numeracy 0.37  5, 827 833 0.870 
CV need for closure 1.28  5, 827 833 0.271 
CV need for cognition 0.40  5, 827 833 0.846 
CV involvement in reading 1.55  5, 827 833 0.173 
CV involvement in thinking 1.18  5, 827 833 0.317 
QF value preference for humanitarianism 0.22  5, 827 833 0.955 
QF value preference for economic-individualism 1.77  5, 827 833 0.117 
QF value preference for economic-individualism (0/1)  9.75 5 833 0.083 
Note. CV = control variable, QF = quasi-factor, one-way ANOVAs performed for metric 
variables and χ2-tests for categorical variables 
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the median split (p = .083). That is, the categorical preference for economic-individualism 
is a valid quasi-experimental factor in the employed design. 
 
Merging of datasets 
A last relevant aspect of randomization is the merging of the two datasets obtained in the 
two rounds of data collection (see Subchapter 4.3.3). As explained, randomized 
assignment to the experimental groups in the first round of data collection only took place 
for the two groups without frames, whereas participants were assigned to all six 
experimental groups in round two with a weighting factor that accounted for the fact that 
some people were already assigned to the two groups without frames in round one. This 
procedure does not per se limit the possibility of correctly randomized group assignments 
for the merged dataset consisting of both rounds when two criteria are met. 
First, group assignment should not only be randomized in each round of data 
collection, but whether participants took part in the first or second round of data collection 
should also be randomized. Moreover, these participants should be selected from the same 
pool of potential participants. In this case, the probability that an individual participant will 
be in one of the six experimental groups is the same prior to the experiment, regardless of 
whether the data of this person were collected in round one or round two. The procedure 
employed in this study met this criterion by sampling the participants for both rounds using 
exactly the same quota-sampling procedure to sample participants from the online access 
panel by Respondi AG (see Subchapter 4.3.3). 
Second, even though the chances for an individual respondent were the same for 
being assigned to one of the six experimental groups, expecting no differences between 
dataset one and dataset two for the groups without frames is only internally valid when 
there is no unknown effect of an extraneous event that may have happened in the four days 
between the end of phase one and the beginning of phase two of data collection (i.e., a 
history effect, see Shadish et al., 2002, p. 56). If such event effect exists, merging the datasets 
would be invalid, because the treatment effects for the groups without frames would not 
only be the result of the treatment but also of a confounding unknown event. 
Given that this study collected data on an equal number of participants for the two 
groups without frames in both rounds of data collection, and that in both rounds 
assignment to these groups was random, the effects of external events that could have 
biased the results between the two rounds of data collection can be tested. The varying 
factor in the groups without frames was issue-specific argument strength against approval. 
If the effect of this variable was affected by an external event between the two phases of 
data collection, an interaction effect between issue-specific argument strength and the 
dataset variable (indicating whether the effect of issue-specific argument strength was tested 
in round one or round two) should be found when analyzing the groups without frames. 
Table 35 summarizes the results of this possible interaction effect on all measured 
dependent variables, mediators, and treatment check variables. No significant interaction 
effect was found, implying that no unexpected external event influenced the treatment 
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effects. That is, data collection in the two rounds and the subsequent merging of datasets 
did not threaten the internal validity of the experiment. 
Summary 
This subchapter showed that the randomization procedure was successful, which is an 
important prerequisite for the internal validity of this experiment. However, an 
experiment’s validity not only depends on randomization and the control over variables 
that could be confounded with the treatment conditions. It also depends on whether the 
experimental treatments themselves correctly manipulated the constructs of interest 
without unintentionally adding confounding variables to the treatments (Shadish et al., 
2002, pp. 64–82). Thus, Subchapter 4.4.2 elaborates on whether participants perceived the 
treatments as intended. 
Table 35. Test of interactions between issue-specific argument strength and dataset in 













DV issue attitude 0.90  1, 281 285 0.344 
DV attitude importance 0.26  1, 281 285 0.608 
DV attitude certainty 1.51  1, 281 285 0.221 
DV paying intention 0.27  1, 279 283 0.604 
MED belief importance economic-individualism 0.24  1, 281 285 0.628 
MED belief content economic-individualism 0.03  1, 281 285 0.861 
MED belief evaluation economic-individualism 0.04  1, 281 285 0.837 
MED belief importance humanitarianism 0.04  1, 281 285 0.853 
MED belief content humanitarianism 0.01  1, 281 285 0.915 
MED belief evaluation humanitarianism 0.07  1, 281 285 0.787 
TC recognition costs  3.37 4 285 0.498 
TC recognition efficacy  3.26 4 285 0.515 
TC perceived realism of costs 0.04  1, 281 285 0.846 
TC perceived realism of efficacy 0.30  1, 281 285 0.582 
TC perceived article direction 0.32  1, 281 285 0.570 
TC perceived article frame 0.55  1, 281 285 0.460 
TC perceived article contextualization 0.82  1, 281 285 0.367 
TC article evaluation 1.08  1, 281 285 0.300 
Note. Displayed are the values for the interaction between issue-specific argument strength 
(only groups without frames) and the dataset variable on dependent variables (DV), 
mediators (MED), and treatment check variables (TC), two-way ANOVAs performed for 
metric variables and χ2-tests for categorical variables 
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4.4.2 Treatment checks 
The construct validity of an experimental treatment depends on whether the employed 
manipulations actually manipulated the independent variables of interest without 
simultaneously adding any confounding variables to the experimental treatment (Shadish et 
al., 2002, pp. 64–82). To ensure this, manipulation checks can be a helpful tool (Kidd, 
1976). Unfortunately, the literature provides an equivocal understanding of what a 
manipulation check should measure and when it should be employed (O'Keefe, 2003⁠; Sigall 
& Mills, 1998). 
For example, O'Keefe (2003) argues that “message manipulation checks” that test 
whether participants perceive message properties (e.g., showing a layperson or an expert as 
the speaker of a statement) are unnecessary, because these properties should be 
independent of respondents’ perceptions. Instead, he proposed that only manipulation 
checks of psychological states (e.g., feeling well informed) or mediator variables (e.g., 
attributing higher credibility to the message from the expert than from the amateur) 
triggered by these properties are necessary in addition to analyzing the outcome effect (e.g., 
stronger persuasion when an expert is speaking). 
For this study, however, there is a good reason to test whether participants noticed 
the manipulated message properties. When dealing with a rather elusive concept such as 
emphasis frames (see Chapter 2.1), it is not sufficient that the researcher had the feeling to 
manipulate message properties as salience emphasis frames in a discernible  way, but it must 
be also ensured that the participants themselves perceived the manipulated cross-thematic 
frames and issue-specific arguments as intended without directly examining mediating 
psychological states (e.g., respondents’ interpretation of the issue under the displayed 
frame) or outcomes (e.g., issue attitude). That is, “message manipulation checks” – better 
known as treatment checks that measure whether treatments are noticed (Sigall & Mills, 
1998⁠; Trepte & Wirth, 2004) – are useful in this study alongside manipulation checks, which 
already look at the effects of message properties (see Subchapter 4.4.3 for formal 
manipulation checks). 
In addition, it is important that treatment checks reveal aspects that should vary 
according to the experimental condition (e.g., noticing different salience emphasis frames 
according to the framing conditions). Similarly, it is necessary to test for aspects that should 
not differ between experimental conditions to rule out confounding variables that might 
co-vary with manipulated message properties (e.g., all stimuli are likewise credible regardless 
of the framing condition). 
 
Recognition and perceived realism of the manipulation of issue-specific argument 
strength 
The first relevant aspect of the treatment checks is whether participants recognized the 
manipulation of issue-specific argument strength, which comprised of two aspects: the 
amount of increase in personal health insurance fees (CHF 10 or CHF 300) and the 
increased chance of recovery (constantly 30%) through approval of the new therapy. For 
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both aspects, participants had to select the correct amount shown in the stimulus with two 
single-choice questions (variables recognition costs and recognition efficacy, see Subchapter 4.3.2). 
The aim of these questions was first that the majority of participants recognized the 
issue-specific arguments correctly to be certain that the thematic information could have 
an effect at all. Second, the aim was that the correct recognition of the arguments did not 
differ between experimental groups and the strong issue-specific argument was not more 
easily recognized than the weak one. This would then be a possible competing explanation 
for the effects of thematic arguments that must be ruled out. 
Table 36 shows the distribution of participants’ correct and incorrect recognition 
of the mentioned amount of additional costs for all experimental groups separately and on 
aggregate. Across all groups, a vast majority of 81.2% of the respondents remembered the 
costs correctly, implying that the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength against 
approval was sufficiently recognized. However, testing for a balanced distribution between 
experimental groups, a Chi-squared-test revealed that the recognition rate differed slightly 
(Cramer’s V = .13) but significantly (p = .010) between groups. 
While five out of the six experimental groups demonstrated a similar recognition 
rate, varying between 80.3% and 87.4%, the group with the weak issue-specific argument 
against approval and an economic-individualism frame had a lower recognition rate of 
70.5%. Still, as the vast majority of the group provided a correct answer, it can be concluded 
that the manipulation was also recognized in this group. In addition, in all other conditions 
dealing with the weak cost argument, a lower recognition rate than in the groups with the 
Table 36. Distribution of recognizing correctly the costs of the therapy (i.e., varying issue-















































































Sum 142 143 132 147 132 137 833 
Note. Displayed is n with percentages in parentheses, χ2(df = 5) = 15.079, p = .010. Cramer’s 
V = .13 
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strong cost argument was not evident. Thus, it is unlikely that the weak issue-specific 
argument itself was responsible for the lower recognition rate. 
Instead, the most reasonable explanation is that the salience emphasis frame 
economic-individualism led to a lower recognition rate. Remembering the costs wrongly in 
this condition means that participants chose the high amount of costs (CHF 300) and not 
the correct low amount (CHF 10). In other words, the frame economic-individualism led 
to an overestimation of the costs brought about by the new therapy, which is a first 
indicator that the frame enhanced the perceived argument strength of the weak argument 
against approval. 
This would be aligned with H5 and H6, which proposed that frames alter the effects 
of argument strength and are tested more exhaustively later (see Part V). For the treatment 
check thus far, it can be concluded that participants mainly recognized the manipulation of 
issue-specific argument strength against approval, which is the first prerequisite for a valid 
hypotheses test. 
This is also true when examining the recognition rate for the issue-specific argument 
concerned with the increased chance of recovery through the new therapy (i.e., the constant 
strong issue-specific argument in favor of approval). Table 37 shows that 84.6% of 
respondents remembered the chance of recovery correctly, which is the vast majority and 
similar to the overall recognition rate for the cost argument. In addition, no significant 
differences were found between experimental groups (p = .692), meaning that the 
requirement that most participants recognized the issue-specific argument of efficacy in the 
informational part was fulfilled. 
Table 37. Distribution of recognizing correctly the efficacy of the therapy (i.e., constant 















































































Sum 142 143 132 147 132 137 833 
Note. Displayed is n with percentages in parentheses, χ2(df = 5) = 3.055, p = .692. Cramer’s 
V = .06 
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Subchapter 4.2.4 already discussed the realism of the chosen arguments for the 
manipulation of argument strength, indicating in particular that the price for new cancer 
therapies and the additional costs brought about by an approval thereof are in the range of 
the real expenses of the Swiss basic health insurance and personal insurance fees. Still, as 
participants are not experts in this field, they could perceive the chosen issue-specific 
arguments as unrealistic. Thus, two treatment check variables tested the perceived realism 
of the varying cost argument and the argument concerned with the efficacy of the new 
therapy (variables perceived realism of costs and perceived realism of efficacy, see Subchapter 4.3.2). 
To ensure that the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength was not 
confounded by different degrees of realism, first, the weak and the strong cost argument 
should not differ. Second, the perception of the realism of the constant argument for 
efficacy should not vary when accompanied with different cost arguments. Third, the level 
of perceived realism should be high for all issue-specific arguments and significantly differ 
from the scale midpoint, indicating more than a moderate degree of realism. To test this 
without bias through the salience emphasis frames that might affect the perception of 
realism by contextualizing the arguments, the perceived realism for the cost and the efficacy 
argument is examined only for the groups without frames. 
Starting with the perceived realism of the varying cost argument presented in the 
stimuli, Table 38 shows that participants perceived the weak cost argument (CHF 10) as 
realistic with a mean of M = 4.30 (SD = 1.76) on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. The mean 
was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (p = .047). In contrast, the mean of 
the perceived realism of the strong cost argument (CHF 300) was M = 3.43 (SD = 1.76), 
which was significantly lower than for the weak cost argument (p <.001, see Figure 14). 
Furthermore, testing this mean against the midpoint of the scale revealed it was significantly 
(p < .001) below the midpoint, indicating a rather low degree of realism (see Table 38). 
However, when testing the mean against the first value on the scale that indicates 
perception as slightly unrealistic – i.e., scale point 3 – a one-sample t-test showed that the 
mean was at least significantly higher than 3 (p = .004). 
Table 38. Perceived realism of costs against scale midpoint by issue-specific argument 
strength (only groups without frame) 
Issue-specific 
argument  
    
Scale point (scale 1-7) 
strength    3  4 (midpoint) 
(without frame) M SD n t df p  t df p 
Weak 
(low costs) 
4.30 1.76 142 8.77 141 < .001***  2.00 141 .047*  
Strong 
(high costs) 
3.43 1.76 143 2.94 142 .004**  -3.84 142 < .001*** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, one-sample t-tests performed (two-tailed), n = 285 
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Nevertheless, the significantly lower perceived realism of the strong cost argument 
compared to the weak cost argument is a problem for the internal validity of this study, as 
one could argue that realism co-varies with issue-specific argument strength. This objection 
is, of course, correct but not a dramatic threat to internal validity, because the manipulation 
check showed that the lower degree of realism of the strong argument did not affect the 
effectiveness thereof. High issue-specific argument strength against approval increased 
opposition to the approval of the new therapy significantly more than did the weak 
argument (see Subchapter 4.4.3 for further detail). That is, issue-specific argument 
strength had the relevant attitudinal effect, despite a moderate degree of realism. 
Regarding the constant issue-specific argument of increased efficacy of the new 
therapy, Table 39 shows that respondents perceived this argument as realistic regardless of 
whether it was accompanied by a weak (M = 4.87, SD = 1.31) or a strong cost argument 
(M = 4.60, SD = 1.41). For both situations, the mean for perceived realism of efficacy was 
significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (for both, p < .001), and the means did 
not differ significantly from each other (p = .103, see Figure 15). That is, the treatment 
check revealed that participants perceived this thematic argument as intended by the design. 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, two-
tailed t-test performed, 95% confidence interval for Cohen’s d in brackets, *** p < .001, 
n = 285 
p < .001***, 
d = .49 [.25, .73] 
Figure 14. Perceived realism of costs by issue-specific argument strength (only groups 
without frame) 
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Perceptions of manipulation of salience emphasis frames 
In addition to the perception of the factor issue-specific argument strength, the treatment 
checks must also show that respondents perceived the manipulation of the other factor 
salience emphasis frame as intended by the design. For this, the questionnaire measured 
four treatment check variables. The first important aspect is whether participants 
recognized the different salience emphasis frames in the news article (variable perceived article 
frame, see Subchapter 4.3.2). Here, the groups exposed to the economic-individualism 
frame should perceive the article as focusing more on the costs of the therapy than the 
groups with the humanitarianism frame, which should perceive the article’s frame as 
emphasizing the benefits of the new therapy. 
Moreover, the perception of both groups should differ from the midpoint of the 
scale in the respective direction of the frame. Furthermore, the groups without frames 
should be between the groups with the two different salience emphasis frames and should 
not differ from the midpoint of the scale. This would indicate that respondents did not 
Table 39. Perceived realism of efficacy against scale midpoint by issue-specific argument 




    
Scale midpoint (4) 
M SD n t df p 
Weak (low costs) 4.87 1.31 142 7.87 141 < .001*** 
Strong (high costs) 4.60 1.41 143 5.08 142 < .001*** 
Note. *** p < .001, one-sample t-tests performed (two-tailed), n = 285 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, two-
tailed t-test performed, 95% confidence interval for Cohen’s d in brackets, n = 285 
p = .103, 
d = .19 [-.04, .43] 
Figure 15. Perceived realism of efficacy by issue-specific argument strength (only groups 
without frame) 
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perceive that the article framed the issue with either the economic-individualism frame or 
the humanitarianism frame. 
Figure 16 provides the results for this treatment check based on a Welch one-way 
ANOVA, which accounted for unequal variances between the three framing conditions. 
The ANOVA indicated a significant main effect (p < .001) of the framing explaining 12.6% 
of the variance in the perception of the salience emphasis frame. Furthermore, a simple 
effects analysis using Tukey’s correction for multiple comparisons showed that all three 
framing conditions differed significantly from each other. That is, participants in the 
condition with the economic-individualism frame perceived the article as emphasizing the 
costs significantly more than did respondents in the condition without frames (p < .001, 
d = .63) and those in the condition with the humanitarianism frame (p < .001, d = .89). The 
latter two groups also differed significantly from each other (p = .004, d = -.28). 
These findings were corroborated when testing whether the means of the conditions 
differed from the scale midpoint (see Table 40). The mean for the salience emphasis frame 
economic-individualism (M = 3.21, SD = 1.54) was significantly (p < .001) below the 
midpoint of 4, indicating that respondents perceived the article as emphasizing the costs of 
the new therapy. In contrast, the mean for participants in the condition with the 
humanitarianism frame (M = 4.51, SD = 1.39) was significantly (p < .001) higher than the 
midpoint of the scale. 
In addition, respondents in the condition without frames did not perceive that the 
article employed a specific frame, as the mean (M = 4.12, SD = 1.35) did not differ 
significantly (p = .127) from the midpoint. That is, the treatment check for the first aspect 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, Welch 
one-way ANOVA (F(2,551)= 55.86, p < .001***, ηp2 = .126) with two-tailed simple effects 
tests with Tukey’s correction of p-values for multiple comparisons, 95% confidence interval 
for Cohen’s d in brackets, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, n = 833 
p = .004**, 
d = -.28 
[-.45, -.11] 
p < .001***, 
d = .89 [.70, 1.07] 
p < .001***, 
d = .63 [.46, .80] 
Figure 16. Perceived article frame by salience emphasis frame 
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of perception of the frames as intended by the design was successful and respondents 
recognized the manipulation of the salience emphasis frames. 
The second variable used to assess the perception of the frames was respondents’ 
perceived direction of the article, i.e., whether they perceived that the article opposed or 
supported the possible approval of the new therapy (variable perceived article direction, see 
Subchapter 4.3.2). The idea behind this variable is the same as for the perception of the 
salience emphasis frame explained earlier. If the frames were manipulated correctly, 
participants should perceive different stances of the article depending on the explicit 
salience frame used. That is, an article with the economic-individualism frame should be 
perceived as opposing the approval because it is too expensive, while respondents should 
perceive articles with the humanitarianism frame as supporting the approval. Again, articles 
without frames should be between the conditions with the different frames. 
Table 40. Perceived article frame against scale midpoint by salience emphasis frame 
     
Scale midpoint (4) 
Salience emphasis frame M SD n t df p 
Frame economic-
individualism 
3.21 1.54 279 -8.56 278 < .001*** 
No frame 4.12 1.35 285 1.53 284 .127 
Frame humanitarianism 4.51 1.39 269 6.02 268 < .001*** 
Note. *** p < .001, one-sample t-tests performed (two-tailed), n = 833 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, Welch 
one-way ANOVA (F(2,540)= 90.25, p < .001***, ηp2 = .207) with two-tailed simple effects 
tests with Tukey’s correction of p-values for multiple comparisons, 95% confidence interval 
for Cohen’s d in brackets, *** p < .001, n = 833 
p < .001***, 
d = .82 [.64, 1.00] 
p < .001***, 
d = 1.14 [.95, 1.33] 
p < .001***, 
d = -.44 
[-.61, -.27] 
Figure 17. Perceived article direction by salience emphasis frame 
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Figure 17 shows the results for this treatment check, which again employed a Welch 
one-way ANOVA to analyze participants’ perception of the article’s direction by the three 
framing conditions. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the factor salience 
emphasis frame (p < .001) accounting for 20.7% of the variance in this variable. 
Furthermore, all conditions again differed significantly from each other (all p < .001) in the 
expected directions with substantial effect sizes up to Cohen’s d = 1.14, according to an 
additional simple effects analysis using Tukey’s correction. 
Further one-sample t-tests of the means against the scale midpoint corroborated this 
finding (see Table 41). The mean of the condition with the economic-individualism frame 
(M = 3.53, SD = 1.62) was significantly (p < .001) lower than the midpoint, indicating that 
respondents perceived the article as opposing the approval. In contrast, the condition with 
the humanitarianism frame had a mean (M = 5.21, SD = 1.30) significantly (p < .001) higher 
than the midpoint, meaning this frame led to the perception that the article supported the 
approval. However, participants in the condition without frames perceived the article as 
rather supporting the approval, as the mean in this condition (M = 4.68, SD = 1.13) was 
also significantly (p < .001) higher than the midpoint of the scale. 
The expectation for this condition was that it would not differ from the midpoint, 
indicating that participants perceived the article as not taking a particular stance because 
there was no explicit frame contextualization. Only thematic information was presented, 
which did not explicitly favor an approval. The reason for this result is likely that the issue-
specific argument in the informational part supporting the approval was consistently strong, 
while the issue-specific argument for opposing it was sometimes weak and sometimes 
strong. This implies that the issue-specific arguments presented on average in the articles 
without frames were more in the direction of supporting the approval. This might have led 
to participants’ perception that the article supported the approval, despite that there was 
no explicit endorsement and the article only presented the facts. However, this is not a 
strong problem for internal validity, because the mean still differed significantly from that 
in the conditions that employed explicit salience emphasis frames (again, see Figure 17). 
These framing conditions pointed significantly in the correct direction (again, see Table 
41). Therefore, with minor limitations, the second treatment check variable showed that 
respondents perceived the salience emphasis frames as intended by the design. 
Table 41. Perceived article direction against scale midpoint by salience emphasis frame 
     
Scale midpoint (4) 
Salience emphasis frame M SD n t df p 
Frame economic-
individualism 
3.53 1.62 279 -4.83 278 < .001*** 
No frame 4.68 1.13 285 10.12 284 < .001*** 
Frame humanitarianism 5.21 1.30 269 15.19 268 < .001*** 
Note. *** p < .001, one-sample t-tests performed (two-tailed), n = 833 
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For the treatment checks concerned with the perception of the frames thus far, it 
was important that the frames differed from each other. In contrast, the next treatment 
check perceived article contextualization (see Subchapter 4.3.2) should reveal that the 
conditions with the salience emphasis frames did not differ from each other, and both 
should have a higher mean than the articles without frames. The purpose of this treatment 
check was to show that the isolated informational paragraph gives less context on the topic 
than situations in which salience emphasis frames explicitly explain the thematic 
information and emphasize with a superordinate political value the meaning of this 
information. In addition, the means of the groups with salience emphasis frames should be 
significantly above the midpoint of the scale, which would indicate that respondents 
perceived the articles with salience emphasis frames as contextualizing the topic of the new 
approval in a bigger context (i.e., with a political value). 
As expected, a one-way ANOVA confirmed a significant (p < .001), albeit small 
(ηp2 = .022) main effect of the factor salience emphasis frame. However, a further simple 
effect analysis using Tukey’s correction revealed that the single levels of this factor differed 
in directions other than expected (see Figure 18). Against the expectation, participants 
exposed to the economic-individualism frame perceived the article as contextualizing the 
issue significantly less than respondents in the conditions without frames (p = .031) and 
those exposed to the humanitarianism frame (p < .001). Furthermore, the humanitarianism 
frame was not perceived as contextualizing the issue more than when there was no frame 
(p = .170). 
 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, one-
way ANOVA (F(2,830)= 9.26, p < .001***, ηp2 = .022) with two-tailed simple effects tests 
with Tukey’s correction of p-values for multiple comparisons, 95% confidence interval for 
Cohen’s d in brackets, *** p < .001, * p < .05, n = 833 
p = .031*, 
d = .21 [.04, .38] 
p < .001***, 
d = .37 [.20, .54] 
p = .170, 
d = -.16 
[-.32, .01] 
Figure 18. Perceived article contextualization by salience emphasis frame 
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A one-sample t-test revealed that the humanitarianism frame had at least a mean 
significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (p < .001), which was not the case for 
the conditions without a frame (p = .102) but unfortunately also not for the economic-
individualism frame (p = .062, in the wrong direction, see Table 42). Thus, this treatment 
check did not confirm that the frames used in the articles unambiguously led to the 
perception that the articles contextualized the issue of the approval. 
This was somewhat surprising, given that the salience emphasis frames and the 
direction of the article were perceived as intended by the manipulation, and the 
manipulation of the framing paragraph used more than 150 words to explicitly 
contextualize the given thematic information with a specific political value, i.e., placed the 
topic within the broader context of either economic-individualism or humanitarianism (see 
Subchapter 4.2.4). One explanation for this unexpected result might be measurement 
error. Even though the articles with salience emphasis frames contextualized the thematic 
information more than did articles without frames, this contextualization was still one-sided 
and highlighted only one political value. Possibly, participants simply confused the 
questioned contextualization with the diversity of viewpoints presented in the article, 
which, in fact, was not higher in the articles with salience emphasis frames. This could 
explain why the condition without frames was not perceived as less contextualizing than 
the framing conditions. Thus, the threat to internal validity should not be overestimated 
based on this unsuccessful treatment check, because the framing itself was perceived as 
intended (see treatment check above). 
 
Article evaluation 
The last treatment check was participants’ evaluation of the article (variable article evaluation, 
see Subchapter 4.3.2). The perception of the salience emphasis frames should differ 
according to the framing condition, but should not affect the overall evaluation of the 
article and respondents should perceive the articles as equally credible and realistic, 
regardless of the framing condition. This requirement is important to ensure that the 
framing conditions only varied in the salience emphasis frame, but not in terms of other 
Table 42. Perceived article contextualization against scale midpoint by salience emphasis 
frame 
     
Scale midpoint (4) 
Salience emphasis frame M SD n t df p 
Frame economic-
individualism 
3.85 1.37 279 -1.87 278 .062 
No frame 4.13 1.34 285 1.64 284 .102 
Frame humanitarianism 4.33 1.30 269 4.23 268 < .001*** 
Note. *** p < .001, one-sample t-tests performed (two-tailed), n = 833 
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variables such as realism, which would imply a confounded manipulation to be avoided for 
the internal validity of the treatments. In addition, the evaluation of the articles should 
generally be high and above the midpoint of the scale to ensure that participants perceived 
the mock-up news articles as realistic, which is important for the external validity of the 
study. 
Table 43 indicates that the means of all three framing conditions were significantly 
(all, p < .001) higher than the midpoint of the scale with a mean of M = 4.88 (SD = 1.16) 
for the economic-individualism frame, a mean of M = 5.04 (SD = 1.10) for the condition 
without frames, and a mean of M = 4.92 (SD = 1.21) for the humanitarianism frame. This 
implies that the articles were perceived as realistic regardless of framing condition. 
Furthermore, a one-way-ANOVA revealed that the framing conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other (p = .253, ηp2 = .003). Thus, the requirement of equal realistic 
stimuli was fulfilled, strengthening the external validity of the experiment (see Figure 19). 
Table 43. Article evaluation (composite) against scale midpoint by salience emphasis frame 
     
Scale midpoint (4) 
Salience emphasis frame M SD n t df p 
Frame economic-
individualism 
4.88 1.16 279 12.66 278 < .001*** 
No frame 5.04 1.10 285 15.94 284 < .001*** 
Frame humanitarianism 4.92 1.21 269 12.49 268 < .001*** 
Note. *** p < .001, one-sample t-tests performed (two-tailed) 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, one-
way ANOVA (F(2,830)= 1.38, p = .253, ηp2 = .003) with two-tailed simple effects tests 
with Tukey’s correction of p-values for multiple comparisons, 95% confidence interval for 
Cohen’s d in brackets, n = 833 
p = .925, 
d = .03 [-.14, .20] 
p = .251, 
d = .14 [-.03, .30] 
p = .456, 
d = .10 
[-.07, .27] 
Figure 19. Article evaluation (composite) by salience emphasis frame 
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Table 44. Summary of treatment check results 
Variable Requirement Result Conclusion 
Recognition 
costs 
Vast majority correct + 
no differences between all 
experimental groups 
Vast majority correct + no 
differences except for 
lower recognition in group 






group as indicator 
for H5 and H6 
Recognition 
efficacy 
Vast majority correct + 
no differences between all 
experimental groups 
Vast majority correct + no 







No differences between 
groups without frame + 
higher than scale 
midpoint 
High costs with lower 
realism than low costs + 
high costs lower than 
scale-midpoint but higher 
than unrealistic value 
Requirement not 
fulfilled, but this 






No differences between 
groups without frame + 
higher than scale 
midpoint 
No differences between 
groups without frame + 






Groups without frame 
not different from scale 
midpoint + frame 
economic-individualism 
(lower) and frame 
humanitarianism 
recognized (higher than 
scale midpoint) + frame 
conditions differ 
Groups without frame not 
different from scale 
midpoint + frame 
economic-individualism 
(lower) and frame 
humanitarianism 
recognized (higher than 







Groups without frame 
not different from scale 
midpoint + frame 
economic-individualism 
contra (lower) and frame 
humanitarianism pro 
(higher than scale 
midpoint) + frame 
conditions differ 
Groups without frame 
slightly pro (higher than 
scale midpoint) + frame 
economic-individualism 
contra (lower) and frame 
humanitarianism pro 
(higher than scale 










Articles with frames 
higher than without 
frames + no differences 
between frames 
Frame economic-
individualism lower than 
frame humanitarianism 




Article evaluation No differences between 
frames + higher than 
scale midpoint 
No differences between 
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Summary 
This subchapter showed that with minimal exceptions, participants perceived the 
treatments as intended by the design (for an overview, see Table 44). First, the vast majority 
recognized the issue-specific arguments in the informational paragraph correctly without 
relevant differences between experimental groups that could threaten internal validity. 
Second, respondents did not perceive the thematic arguments employed for the 
manipulation of argument strength as unrealistic, even though the strong issue-specific 
argument against approval had slightly lower realism (that did not compromise its 
effectiveness, as described in the next Subchapter 4.4.3). Third, participants perceived the 
framing of the news articles as intended by the respective condition. Fourth, this was also 
the case for the perceived direction of the article, underlining that the frames in the stimuli 
were constructed correctly. This is despite that the test of the perceived article 
contextualization did not add evidence of the correct manipulation of the salience emphasis 
frames, because this measurement likely measured opinion diversity and not framing. Last, 
the different frames did not negatively affect the evaluation of the article in terms of its 
realism, and perceived credibility was high in all conditions, confirming external validity of 
the treatments. 
Therefore, the treatment checks revealed a rather high internal and external validity 
of the employed manipulations, and participants perceived the treatment properties 
differently according to the experimental condition. Simultaneously, the conditions 
demonstrated no differences where there were no differences expected between treatments. 
Thus, it can be ruled out that confounding variables were manipulated together with the 
independent variables of interest. However, this is meaningless for internal validity if issue-
specific argument strength did not bring about different baseline attitudes in the groups 
without explicit frames. This is examined in detail next in Subchapter 4.4.3. 
4.4.3 Manipulation checks 
In addition to participants’ perceptions of the treatments as intended by the experimental 
manipulations (see Subchapter 4.4.2), the most important prerequisite for successful 
implementation of the experimental design for internal validity is that the manipulation of 
issue-specific argument strength was not only recognized, but also brought about different 
issue attitudes in the groups without frames. In other designs, it would perhaps be sufficient 
to prove that the manipulation of thematic argument strength led to different perceptions 
in argument strength (i.e., participants perceive the strong issue-specific argument as 
stronger than the weak argument). However, as this study focuses on the suppression of 
argument effects through value-resonant framing (H5), an attitudinal issue-specific 
argument effect had to be evident without frames, which could then be suppressed by 
additional value-resonant framing. 
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That is, when no explicit frame was present that contextualized issue-specific 
argument strength, argument strength should demonstrate substantial and significant 
effects on issue attitude. In addition, this effect should not only exist on aggregate, but also 
for participants with a high preference for economic-individualism. This is the group for 
which a value-resonant frame was presented with varying argument strength in the design 
(see Subchapter 4.2.4), and thus, is the relevant group for which the suppression of the 
effects of issue-specific argument strength should occur according to the theory (see Part 
III). 
To test for the effect of argument strength in the two control groups without frames, 
a two-way ANOVA on issue attitude with the factors of issue specific argument strength 
and political value preference for economic-individualism was performed using the stats 
package in R. A prior Levene’s test revealed that the variances were not equally distributed 
in the respective conditions, indicating that the assumption of homogenous variances for 
computing ANOVAs was violated. However, while non-parametric tests exist for one-way 
ANOVAs to account for such violations, no suitable non-parametric tests are available for 
factorial ANOVAs for more than a 2x2 design (Field, 2009, p. 454). Thus, the results of 
classic parametric factorial AN(C)OVAs are reported throughout this book, even though 
some problems with heteroscedasticity might exist. Table 45 shows that the factor 
argument strength exerted a significant main effect on participants’ issue attitude (p < .001, 
ηp2 = .040), and the strong issue-specific argument against approval led to lower support 
for approval of the new therapy (M = -0.09, SD = 1.39, n = 143) than the weak argument 
(M = 0.46, SD = 1.20, n = 142) with a substantial effect size of Cohen’s d = .42 (see Figure 
20). 
Unsurprisingly, there was also a significant main effect of respondents’ political 
value preference (p < .001, ηp2 = .034). People with a higher preference for economic-
individualism showed a stronger tendency to oppose the approval (M = -0.04, SD = 1.34, 
n = 154) than participants with a lower preference for this value (M = 0.45, SD = 1.26, 
n = 131). This is consistent with previous research on motivated reasoning, which revealed 
that the processing and evaluation of political arguments is not unbiased but occurs in 
accordance with citizens’ political preferences (Taber et al., 2009⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
Thus, people more critical of the welfare state in general are also more critical about the 
approval of the new therapy. 
The ANOVA in Table 45 also revealed no significant interaction effect between 
issue-specific argument strength and respondents’ political value preference (p = .224). This 
indicates that the effect of issue-specific argument strength did not significantly differ for 
participants with a high or a low preference for economic-individualism, even though both 
groups varied in their general tendency to support the approval. However, the non-
significance of the interaction only confirms that effect of issue-specific argument strength 
does not differ between the two value preferences, but it does not prove whether argument 
strength had actually an effect when only examining respondents with a high preference for 
economic-individualism. 
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To confirm this, a simple effects analysis for the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength by the single level of respondents’ political value preference was run in R using the 
package emmeans. Figure 20 shows that the effect of issue-specific argument strength on 
aggregate in the groups without frames persisted when only examining respondents with a 
high preference for economic-individualism (p < .001), for whom the strong argument led 
to opposing the approval more strongly (M = -0.39, SD = 1.38, n = 79) than did a weak 
argument (M = 0.32, SD = 1.21, n = 75). The effect size for this issue-specific argument 
effect was even slightly higher (Cohen’s d = .55) than on aggregate. That is, the 
manipulation of argument strength in the design was successful and an attitudinal argument 
effect without frames was found for people with a high preference for economic-
individualism, whose diminishing influence through a value-resonant frame can later be 
tested. 
However, the simple effects analyses in Figure 20 also revealed that the 
manipulation of issue-specific argument strength did not significantly affect the issue 
attitude of participants with a low preference for economic-individualism (p = .133). This 
was despite that the descriptive statistics revealed that a strong argument decreased support 
for the approval (M = 0.28, SD = 1.32, n = 64) more than did the weak argument, which 
increased support (M = 0.61, SD = 1.18, n = 67). Citizens with a lower preference for 
economic-individualism generally care less about financial expenditures connected to social 
welfare (see Subchapter 4.3.5). This is likely why these participants were less sensitive to 
the differing amount of costs that constituted the varying issue-specific argument strength 
for opposing the approval. However, this is not problematic when testing the hypotheses 
concerned with the suppression of argument effects (H5 and H6), because the design 
includes only value resonance for participants with a high preference for economic-
individualism when testing the suppression effect (see Subchapter 4.2.4). 
Table 45. ANOVA of between-subjects effects of issue-specific argument strength by 











Adjusted model 3 8.17 .080 < .001*** 
Argument strength 1 13.11 .040 < .001*** 
Value preference for economic-individualism 1 9.93 .034 .001** 
Argument strength X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 1.48 .005 .224 
Note. R2 = .080, R2adjusted = .070, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 285 
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Note. *** p < .001, two-tailed simple effects tests, 95% confidence intervals for Cohen’s d 
in brackets, nvalue preference overall = 285, nhigh preference for economic-individualism = 154, 
nlow preference for economic-individualism = 131 
p < .001***, 
d = .55 
[.22, .87] 
p < .001***, 
d = .42 
[.19, .66] 
p = .133, 
d = .27 
[-.08, .62] 
Figure 20. Manipulation check for effects of issue-specific argument strength in control 
groups without frames (on aggregate and by political value preference) 
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Summary 
The last subchapters showed that the experiment met rather well the criteria of internal 
validity. First, the randomization procedure was successful, through which the influence of 
external third variables could be ruled out as a competing explanation for effects found 
between treatment conditions (see Subchapter 4.4.1). Second, participants perceived the 
experimental stimuli as intended, indicating the construct validity of the manipulations (see 
Subchapter 4.4.2). Third, the manipulation of issue-specific argument strength was 
successful and brought about different attitudes when no frames were present, allowing for 
the later test of whether additional value-resonant framing suppressed this issue-specific 
argument effect (see this subchapter). 
In sum, this provides a good foundation for an internally valid test of the hypotheses 
and research questions. However, this alone is still not sufficient while the statistical 
conclusion validity of this experiment remains unclear (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 42–53). 
Thus, the following Subchapter 4.4.4 provides important information on how the sample 
size was set to achieve adequate statistical power to detect effects using the given design of 
this experiment. 
4.4.4 Statistical power 
Regardless of a good design and valid operationalizations of an experiment to detect the 
(causal) effects of an independent variable on a dependent variable while ruling out the 
influence of confounding variables, the validity of statistical conclusions about the 
(in-)significance of such effects depends on whether the experiment has enough statistical 
power to uncover these relationships (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 42–48). When the sample 
size is too small and thus, statistical power is too low, a study will not be able to detect 
effects even if the effects exist in reality. In contrast, when a study has a sample size that is 
too large and is thus overpowered, even very small effect sizes will reach the level of 
statistical significance, despite being meaningless and only able to explain 0.01% of the 
variance in a variable, for example. Thus, it is important to calculate the correct sample size 
prior to data collection to obtain suitable statistical power for uncovering relevant effects. 
According to Cohen (1992), small effects in ANOVAs (the common statistical 
procedure for analyzing experiments) explain at least 1% of the variance and have an effect 
size of f = .1 (d = .2). An effect size of f = .25 (d = .5) is considered moderate, and large 
effects have an effect size of f = .4 (d = .8). The goal of this study was to have enough 
power to find at least effects with f = .15 (d =.3). While these are small effects, they are not 
directly at the lowest level of effect sizes barely considered effects at all. The detection of 
rather small effects is necessary, because some of the hypotheses predict that the effect of 
issue-specific argument strength is suppressed through value-resonant frames (H5 and H6). 
As such, only looking for strong effects would make the test of these hypotheses too easy, 
and it would be unclear whether the suppression was the result of too low power or of an 
actual non-effect of issue-specific argument strength when explicitly framed. 
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For the same reason, the targeted statistical power to detect an effect size of f = .15 
(d =.3) was set to 1-β = .85, which is a little higher than the common convention for 
statistical power of 1-β = .80 (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012, pp. 133–135⁠; Shadish et al., 2002, 
pp. 45–48). That is, this study aimed for a probability of 85% to find existing small effects 
of f = .15 (d =.3) statistically significant at the level of α = .05. 
Based on these criteria, the necessary sample size to achieve this statistical power for 
an ANOVA analyzing the 2x3x2 quasi-experimental design with its 12 groups was 
estimated before data collection using the program G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). The first line in Table 46 shows the results of this analysis and provides 
further information on the power for other effect sizes. As shown, to obtain a statistical 
power of 1-β = .85 to detect effects of at least f = .15 (d =.3), a sample size of n = 833 is 
needed. Thus, the quotas for recruiting the sample were calculated based on this sample 
size (see Subchapter 4.3.1). In addition, as data cleansing took place during data collection 
and only respondents with adequate participation quality were considered for these quotas 
(see Subchapter 4.3.3), the targeted sample size was simultaneously the final sample this 
study used after data collection for the data analyses. 
Of course, this sample size has an even higher statistical power to detect stronger 
effects. For instance, the power to uncover a medium effect of f = .2 is already 1-β = .99 in 
the ANOVA with the 12 groups. However, the sample size is not appropriate to test for 
very small effects of f = .1, as the probability for a correct detection is only around 40% 
(1-β = .43). 
Furthermore, the second row of Table 46 shows the statistical power of the given 
sample size for an ANCOVA with the 12 (quasi-)experimental groups and all possible 
control variables measured in this study (see Subchapter 4.3.2) that serve for the 
robustness checks of the results (for example, see Subchapter 5.1.6). When performing 
this analysis the power drops considerably for the targeted effect size of f = .15 and is only 
at 1-β = .65. However, for effects of at least f = .2, which are still rather weak effects, the 
statistical power is high enough (1-β = .93) to detect those effects if they are there. 
Table 46. Statistical power analysis 
 
Model 
f = .1 
(d = .2) 
f = .15 
(d = .3) 
f = .2 
(d = .4) 
f = .25 
(d = .5) 
ANOVA 
(df1 = 11, df2 = 821) 
.43 .85 .99 .99 
ANCOVA 
(df1 = 27, df2 = 805) 
.28 .65 .93 .99 
Note. Displayed is statistical power (1-β) of F-test for α error probability = .05 and n = 833 
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In sum, the study has sufficient power to detect even small effects. This is important 
in testing the suppression of the issue-specific argument effect through value-resonant 
frames to ensure no incorrect conclusions are drawn regarding non-effects due to a sample 
size that is too small. Now that the statistical power analysis has been described, the last 
relevant aspect pertaining to the internal validity of this study has been analyzed. Favorable 
results were found for all aspects of internal validity tested. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the hypotheses were tested through a valid, credible, and strong methodological attempt. 
Before presenting the results for the hypotheses (see Part V), the following Chapter 4.5 
summarizes the key aspects of the method employed in this study. 
4.5 Summary of methodology 
The last subchapters discussed extensively the methodology employed in this study to test 
the proposed hypotheses and research questions (see Part III). Before the results of the 
hypotheses tests are presented in the results chapter (see Part V), this chapter summarizes 
the key aspects of the method employed. This summary is written to be comprehensible 
without necessarily reading the more detailed subchapters of the methods section before 
(see entire Part IV). It mainly follows the methods section presented in the journal article 
related to the study reported in this book (Kaiser, 2019a). 
 
Sample and data cleansing 
An interlocked quota sample of residents of the German-speaking part of Switzerland 
representative for sex and aged between 18 and 69 years was recruited for the purposes of 
this study. Participants were sampled from the online access panel by Respondi AG and 
received vouchers for completing of the online study (N = 833). The sample consisted of 
n = 420 women (50.4%) and n = 413 men (49.6%) with an average age of M = 42.92 years 
(SD = 14.41) and an average income of around CHF 75,000 (around USD 75,000 at the 
field time of the study). Furthermore, about half the respondents (n = 440, 53%) had 
obtained at least a high school degree (see Subchapter 4.3.1). 
Before data collection, seven criteria for adequate participation quality were defined 
(see Subchapter 4.3.3): not accessing the online questionnaire with a smartphone, 
spending at least 20 seconds on the page screening the stimulus material, correctly 
recognizing the issue described in the stimulus, correctly answering three different 
instructed response items, and respondents’ self-assessment that they participated honestly 
and seriously. If respondents failed to meet any of these criteria, they were screened out 
directly during data collection and could not complete the questionnaire. Only those who 
met all of these criteria and completed the questionnaire (N = 833) were included in the 
data analysis without any further data cleansing after data collection (completion rate: 
45.2%). 
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This sample size was not a coincidence, but fixed a-priori based on a statistical power 
analysis to ensure that even small effect sizes of f = .15 (d = .3) could be detected with a 
power of 1-β = .85 in a three-way ANOVA with 12 groups (see Subchapter 4.4.4). 
 
Design and manipulation 
In February 2018, the sample participated in a randomized 2 (issue-specific argument 
strength) x 3 (salience emphasis frame) between-subjects online experiment with the 
additional quasi-experimental factor of political value preference (see also Table 47). In all 
conditions, participants read a mock-up online news article dealing with a new bowel cancer 
therapy and whether this therapy should receive approval from the politically responsible 
federal health ministry and be offered through compulsory basic health insurance. This 
move would increase insurance rates for all insured people in Switzerland, making the topic 
personally relevant to the participants. In addition, the superordinate topic of health politics 
reflects the classic political cleavage between the political values of economic-individualism 
and humanitarianism in social welfare attitudes (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001). These can 
be addressed well by communicative frames (see Subchapter 4.2.3). 
Table 47. (Non-)manipulation of issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis 
frames, and political value preference for a 2x3x2 (quasi-)experimental between-subjects 
design with 12 groups 
Quasi-factor political 




Factor issue-specific argument 
strength against approval 










High preference for 
economic-
individualism 
Weak argument against 
approval (CHF 10 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
I V IX 
Strong argument against 
approval (CHF 300 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
II VI X 
Low preference for 
economic-
individualism 
Weak argument against 
approval (CHF 10 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
III VII XI 
Strong argument against 
approval (CHF 300 costs) vs. 
strong argument for approval 
(30% efficacy) 
IV VIII XII 
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The stimulus articles contained four different parts: 1) a headline varying according 
to the frame condition, 2) a constant neutral picture to ensure the realism of the news 
article, 3) an informational paragraph introducing substantive information about the topic 
with varying issue-specific argument strength but without any explicit frame 
contextualization, 4) and a framing paragraph with varying salience emphasis frames 
contextualizing the given thematic information but without adding any new information 
about the therapy. Both paragraphs were the same length to avoid favoring either the 
framing or the argument effect. The mock-up online news articles had a realistic layout (see 
Subchapter 4.2.4). 
The first factor varied the issue-specific argument strength against the approval of 
the therapy as being strong or weak in the informational paragraph. Depending on the 
condition, participants read either that the new therapy would be considerably more 
expensive, increasing the yearly insurance rate by CHF 300 per capita (strong issue-specific 
argument against the approval), or that the new therapy would be only slightly more 
expensive than existing medicaments, leading to a small yearly insurance rate increase of 
CHF 10 (weak argument). The counter-argument in favor of the approval was constant in 
all conditions, mentioning that the new therapy is more effective than existing ones and 
would increase the probability of recovery from 20% to 30%. 
The second factor was the manipulation of the salience emphasis frame in the 
framing paragraph that contextualized the given information on the topic without adding 
any new information about the therapy. Since the approval of the new therapy is a social 
welfare measure dealing with direct assistance for the needy, the article applied either an 
economic-individualism or a humanitarianism frame (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001 ⁠; Shen 
& Edwards, 2005). The economic-individualism frame contextualized the topic by 
highlighting the additional costs of the new but only slightly more effective therapy, and 
argued using the well-known aspect that an approval would be a further example of 
seriously threatening the financial stability of the basic health care system. In contrast, the 
humanitarianism frame argued using the political value of providing aid for the sick and the 
weak. In this view, each new and more effective medical treatment should be available 
through basic health insurance to ensure the best medical care for everyone. As a third level, 
this factor also contained conditions without an explicit frame but with only the substantive 
information on the therapy which varied in issue-specific argument strength. This level 
served as an integrated control group for the effects of issue-specific argument strength 
when no explicit frames are present. 
The third factor was a non-manipulated quasi-factor obtained by delineating the 
sample after data collection into participants with a low or high preference for the political 
value of economic-individualism. Respondents answered this question at the end of the 
online experiment. To divide participants, the preference for this value was used and not 
the value of humanitarianism, because the issue-specific argument strength in the design 
varied only for the economic-individualism argument (i.e., amount of additional costs). As 
such, to analyze the suppression of issue-specific argument effects through a value-resonant 
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frame (H5 and H6), it was necessary to generate (mis-)matches between the salience 
emphasis frame of economic-individualism that employed the political value economic-
individualism to contextualize the issue and respondents’ political value preference 
regarding this value. This division enabled retaining the experimental logic of comparing 
different groups with either value resonance or non-resonance, facilitating the 
interpretation of results. However, robustness checks in the results section (e.g., in 
Subchapter 5.1.6) also secured the validity of the results beyond this dichotomization and 
treated the metric measurement for the political value preference for economic-
individualism as the third (quasi)-factor of the design. 
 
Procedure and measures 
The online access panel provider Respondi AG invited respondents to participate in the 
study based on predefined interlocked quotas for sex and age (see above). If participants 
followed the link sent with the invitation, they first had to give their informed consent to 
participate in the study. Then, the demographic variables of age, sex, residency, education, and 
income were measured. These variables were needed to ensure appropriate sampling and 
were employed as statistical control variables. Next, some filler questions appeared to 
distract respondents from the goal of the study. Among these questions, a single item was 
hidden to measure participants’ topic interest in health insurances on a scale ranging from 
1 = “not interested at all” to 6 = “very interested” as a further control variable (M = 4.58, 
SD = 1.57). Thereafter, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the experimental 
conditions and saw on the stimulus page the respectively manipulated online news article 
(for a longer discussion on the order of the questionnaire, see Subchapter 4.3.3). 
After the stimulus, the questionnaire included metric measurements for the 
dependent variable and for the mediators, which were all measured using three respective 
items on six-point scales (for the exact wording and measurement levels of all variables, see 
Subchapter 4.3.2). For issue attitude, higher values indicated stronger support for approval 
of the new cancer therapy (α = .97, ω = .97, M = 4.28, SD = 1.48). Afterward, the items 
for the mediators asked how expensive respondents perceived the new therapy to be (i.e., 
belief content, α = .94, ω = .94, M = 4.61, SD = 1.21), how important it is for them in general 
that approvals for new therapies are not too expensive (i.e., belief importance, α = .96, 
ω = .96, M = 3.54, SD = 1.52), and to judge whether the increase of costs is a compelling 
reason to oppose the approval of the new therapy (i.e., belief evaluation, α = .95, ω = .95, 
M = 3.05, SD = 1.54). While the mediator variables correlated significantly with each other, 
an analysis of multicollinearity when using all three mediators simultaneously to predict the 
final dependent variable of issue attitude revealed that they were still statistically distinct 
with variance inflation factors (VIF) not higher than VIF = 2.28 (see Subchapter 4.3.5). 
Subsequently, participants answered several treatment checks to ensure they 
perceived the treatments as intended by the design. Answering a single item, respondents 
rated on a seven-point scale whether the article emphasized the costs or the benefits of the 
new therapy (i.e., perceived article frame, M = 3.94, SD = 1.53). Furthermore, six items 
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measured on seven-point scales participants’ evaluation of the article in terms of credibility 
and realism (i.e., article evaluation, α = .88, ω = .88, M = 4.95, SD = 1.16). Beyond these two 
variables, the questionnaire included some further treatment check variables discussed in 
more detail in Subchapter 4.4.2. 
Next, participants answered a series of questions on the control variables and 
assessed their involvement in reading the article (α = .93, ω = .94, M = 5.64, SD = 1.12) and 
thinking about the issue described therein (α = .92, ω = .92, M = 4.74, SD = 1.72) through 
four respective items rated on seven-point scales. In addition, the questionnaire contained 
measurements for numeracy (α = .89, ω = .90, M = 5.69, SD = 1.22) based on a scale by 
Fagerlin et al. (2007), need for cognition (four items on seven-point scales, α = .85, ω = .86, 
M = 5.10, SD = 1.12), and need for cognitive closure (α = .88, ω = .88, M = 3.65, SD = 0.89) 
employing the items by Roets and van Hiel (2011), but on six-point scales. 
Thereafter, the quasi-experimental factor political value preference for economic-
individualism was measured through four self-constructed items asking participants to rate 
on six-point scales their agreement that financial considerations should constrain the aid 
given to individuals by society (α = .85, ω = .85, M = 3.73, SD = 1.13). Last, further control 
variables were measured: participants’ political value preference for humanitarianism (four items 
on six-point scales, α = .90, ω = .90, M = 3.74, SD = 1.16), centrality of social welfare attitudes 
(four items on six-point scales, α = .92, ω = .93, M = 3.97, SD = 1.16), political leaning 
(through a single item on an 11-point scale, M = 5.98, SD = 2.33), political knowledge (a single 
item on a seven-point scale, M = 4.22, SD = 1.50), and three nominal items measuring 
whether respondents are affected by a serious illness or personally know someone who is 
affected. 
An initial simultaneous confirmatory factor (CFA) analysis with all measurements 
containing more than one item revealed that some measures needed adjustment (for further 
information, see Subchapter 4.3.4). After dropping five of the 76 items, the CFA indicated 
satisfying model fit (CFI = .963, TLI = .960, RMSEA = .031, SRMR = .035). This made it 
possible to predict the factor scores for all measures with more than one item and to use 
the latent variables to test the hypotheses (see Part V). Through this procedure, all these 
variables have a mean of zero. To enable meaningful interpretations when using the latent 
variables, the original means and standard deviations of the composite indices were 
presented above. 
Before delineating the sample into participants with a low or high value preference 
for economic-individualism to obtain the quasi-experimental factor, the construct validity 
of the metric measurement had to be tested (see also Subchapter 4.3.5). A correlation test 
with respondents’ political leaning revealed a strong and significant correlation (r = .46, 
p < .001), indicating that adhering to the value of economic-individualism was related to a 
market-oriented ideology of “right” social welfare attitudes, as expected. Subsequently, the 
sample was split into two equally sized subgroups with either a low (n = 416, 49.9%) or a 
high preference for economic-individualism (n = 417, 50.1%) based on the median of the 
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latent variable (Mdn = .01 equating to about 3.74 on the composite index, i.e., relatively 
close to the midpoint of the scale). 
 
Tests of experimental validity 
Several additional tests were performed to ensure the validity of the experiment. A test of 
the independence of the non-manipulated quasi-experimental factor of political value 
preference for economic-individualism and the manipulated factors of issue-specific 
argument strength and salience emphasis frames revealed that the manipulations did not 
affect respondents’ political value preference. This enabled including this variable into the 
design as a quasi-experimental factor. The independence was the case for both the metric 
latent variable (p = .117) and the dichotomized variable in a low and high preference for 
economic-individualism (p = .083). Furthermore, attrition was unrelated to any of the 
experimental groups (p = .139), and all measured control variables were equally distributed 
in all manipulated treatment conditions (for the exact tests, see Subchapter 4.4.1). 
In addition, the treatment checks for the salience emphasis frame of the article and 
the evaluation of the article’s realism confirmed that participants perceived the treatments 
as intended by the design (for all treatment checks, see Subchapter 4.4.2). Respondents 
perceived articles employing the economic-individualism frame (M = 3.21, SD = 1.54) as 
emphasizing the costs significantly more strongly than participants in the groups without 
frames (M = 4.12, SD = 1.35, p < .001) or respondents in the conditions with the 
humanitarianism frame (M = 4.51, SD = 1.39, p < .001). The latter two also differed 
significantly from each other in the correct direction (p = .004). Furthermore, participants 
perceived the articles as credible and realistic, regardless of the salience emphasis frame 
employed, as no significant differences in article evaluation were evident between the 
different framing conditions (p = .253) and all means were significantly higher than the 
midpoint of the scale (all, p < .001). 
Finally, the most important prerequisite for valid design was that the manipulation 
of issue-specific argument strength brought about different issue attitudes in the conditions 
without frames to ensure an issue-specific argument effect was triggered by the 
informational paragraph. This should not only have been the case in the aggregate of all 
respondents in the groups without frames, but also for participants with a high preference 
for economic-individualism. This enables subsequently analyzing whether this effect is 
suppressed by additional value-resonant frame contextualization (H5 and H6). A simple 
effects analysis based on a two-way ANOVA confirmed that the strong cost argument 
(M = -0.09, SD = 1.39) led to significantly (p < .001) lower support for approval of the new 
therapy than the weak cost argument (M = 0.42, SD = 1.20), with a medium effect size 
(d = .42) when examining all respondents in the conditions without frames. This issue-
specific argument effect was even stronger (d = .55, p < .001) for participants with a high 
preference for economic-individualism, indicating that the chosen issue-specific argument 
strengths were a relevant predictor for issue attitude when no explicit frames were present 
(see Subchapter 4.4.3). 
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In sum, the methods section extensively discussed the methodological approach 
employed in this study and substantiated that the approach mostly fulfilled the prerequisites 
for adequate design (see Chapter 4.2), appropriate measurements (see Chapter 4.3), and 
internal and external validity (see Chapter 4.4). These are good foundations from which to 
test the hypotheses and research questions credibly and strongly and to attribute validity to 
the results of these tests. The results are provided in detail in the next part (see Part V).
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V RESULTS 
5.1 Effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude 
5.1.1 Descriptive group statistics and model overview 
After discussing the method employed in this study (see Part IV), the results of the 
experiment can now be provided. We start with the effects of issue-specific argument 
strength, salience emphasis frames, and political value preferences on the dependent 
variable of issue attitude toward the approval of the new therapy against cancer (H1-H7 
and RQ1-RQ2, see Part III; the journal article concerned with this study also briefly covers 
these results, see Kaiser, 2019a). 
First, a brief overview is provided of the descriptive statistics for citizens’ issue 
attitude by the individual experimental groups and of the factor means (see Figure 21 for 
a graphical display and Table 48 for the exact values). As indicated, there is considerable 
variation in issue attitude depending on the experimental conditions, suggesting that the 
manipulations affected the dependent variable in some way. In addition, many of the means 
not only differ but also their confidence intervals, indicating these differences are 
statistically relevant. 
For example, across all salience emphasis frames and both political value 
preferences, participants exposed to the strong issue-specific argument against approval 
more strongly opposed the approval of the new therapy (M = -0.26, SD = 1.51, 
CI = [-0.40, -0.12]) than respondents exposed to the weak argument (M = 0.27, SD = 1.33, 
CI = [0.14, 0.40]), indicating first supportive evidence for H1. Furthermore, across both 
issue-specific argument strengths and both value preferences, the economic-individualism 
frame led to lower support (M = -0.58, SD = 1.53, CI = [-0.76, -0.40]) than when no frame 
was present (M = 0.18, SD = 1.32, CI = [0.03, 0.34]) or the counter-frame humanitarianism 
was present (M = 0.41, SD = 1.30, CI = [0.25, 0.56]). This provided first insights that the 
hypotheses on the general effects of salience emphasis frames (H2 and H3) might be 
supported. 
However, to comprehensively test the hypotheses, it was insufficient to only 
examine descriptive differences or to compare confidence intervals of single means. Rather, 
a statistical model was needed to test all hypothesized effects in a single model that controls 
for the influence of all other main and interaction effects when estimating the significance 
of a specific effect. Such a model can provide general insights regarding the significance of 
effects, but is non-informative in terms of the direction of effects proposed in the 
hypotheses. To address this, the following subchapters use simple effects analyses (Field et 
al., 2012, pp. 790–794) and lucid descriptive statistics for the specific comparisons of 
groups as proposed by the specific hypotheses. The summarized descriptive statistics 
described in this subchapter only provide a first overview and transparent documentation. 
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Figure 21. Individual group and factor means for issue attitude with 95% confidence 
intervals 
Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, n = 833 
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Table 48. Descriptive statistics for issue attitude toward approval of the therapy by issue-















Overall Economic-individualism Overall -0.58 1.53 [-0.76, -0.40] 279 
No frame Overall 0.18 1.32 [0.03, 0.34] 285 
Humanitarianism Overall 0.41 1.30 [0.25, 0.56] 269 
Overall Overall 0.00 1.45 [-0.10, 0.10] 833 
Economic-individualism Weak -0.38 1.42 [-0.62, -0.13] 132 
 No frame Weak 0.46 1.20 [0.26, 0.66] 142 
 Humanitarianism Weak 0.72 1.11 [0.53, 0.91] 132 
 Overall Weak 0.27 1.33 [0.14, 0.40] 406 
 Economic-individualism Strong -0.76 1.61 [-1.02, -0.50] 147 
 No frame Strong -0.09 1.39 [-0.32, 0.14] 143 
 Humanitarianism Strong 0.10 1.40 [-0.13, 0.34] 137 





Economic-individualism Overall -0.73 1.56 [-0.98, -0.48] 149 
No frame Overall -0.04 1.34 [-0.26, 0.17] 154 
Humanitarianism Overall 0.12 1.39 [-0.14, 0.37] 114 
Overall Overall -0.24 1.48 [-0.39, -0.10] 417 
Economic-individualism Weak -0.57 1.40 [-0.90, -0.23] 69 
 No frame Weak 0.32 1.21 [0.04, 0.60] 75 
 Humanitarianism Weak 0.67 1.13 [0.36, 0.97] 55 
 Overall Weak 0.11 1.35 [-0.08, 0.30] 199 
 Economic-individualism Strong -0.87 1.68 [-1.24, -0.50] 80 
 No frame Strong -0.39 1.38 [-0.69, -0.08] 79 
 Humanitarianism Strong -0.40 1.42 [-0.77, -0.03] 59 





Economic-individualism Overall -0.41 1.49 [-0.66, -0.15] 130 
No frame Overall 0.45 1.26 [0.23, 0.67] 131 
Humanitarianism Overall 0.62 1.19 [0.43, 0.81] 155 
Overall Overall 0.24 1.38 [0.11, 0.38] 416 
Economic-individualism Weak -0.17 1.44 [-0.53, 0.20] 63 
 No frame Weak 0.61 1.18 [0.33, 0.90] 67 
 Humanitarianism Weak 0.76 1.10 [0.51, 1.01] 77 
 Overall Weak 0.43 1.29 [0.25, 0.61] 207 
 Economic-individualism Strong -0.63 1.52 [-1.00, -0.26] 67 
 No frame Strong 0.28 1.32 [-0.05, 0.61] 64 
 Humanitarianism Strong 0.48 1.27 [0.19, 0.76] 78 
 Overall Strong 0.06 1.44 [-0.14, 0.26] 209 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, 
M = 0.00 = latent grand mean 
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Regarding a simultaneous test of all hypotheses in a single model, a saturated three-
way ANOVA with the independent variables of issue-specific argument strength, salience 
emphasis frame, political value preference as a two-level quasi-factor, and all possible 
interactions between these variables was computed to explain the dependent variable of 
issue attitude (for the R-script for the data analysis, see https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-
DS-1013-1). To enable a meaningful interpretation of the main effects proposed in the 
hypotheses (H1–H4) while simultaneously testing interaction effects in the model (RQ1-
RQ2 and H5-H7), the ANOVA employed sum-to-zero contrasts, which are often used in 
regression approaches not to test against the grand mean but against defined groups 
(Darlington & Hayes, 2016, pp. 289–291). 
The economic-individualism frame was the central frame in the design, because 
issue-specific argument strength varied only for this salience emphasis frame (see 
Subchapter 4.2.4). Therefore, the ANOVA defined the economic-individualism frame as 
the reference group in the three-level factor frame to test its effects compared to situations 
without a frame and compared to the humanitarianism counter-frame. For the other two 
two-level factors of issue-specific argument strength and political value preference, the 
respective two levels were tested against each other in the model. That is, weak and strong 
issue-specific arguments were tested against each other in the model (H1); the frame 
economic-individualism was tested once against the no frame condition (H2) and once 
against the counter-frame humanitarianism (H3); low and high preference for the political 
value of economic-individualism were tested against each other (H4); and all two- and 
three-way interaction effects consisting of the frame variable were tested twice, once for 
situations with the economic-individualism frame and no frame (H5) and once for the 
groups with the economic-individualism frame compared to the counter-frame 
humanitarianism (H6). 
The decomposition of the three-level factor frame into two contrast variables (frame 
economic-individualism vs. no frame and frame economic-individualism vs. frame 
humanitarianism) has the additional advantage that the ANOVA can test the suppression 
effects in H5 and H6 with two separate three-way-interactions. This enables a clearer 
assessment when the suppression effect takes place: compared to situations without frames 
(H5) or compared to situations with a counter-frame (H6) or both. If the three-level factor 
was used as a single variable in the ANOVA, only one interaction term could be employed 
to test both hypotheses together and it would be unclear which of the comparisons drove 
the interaction. 
In addition, the delineation helps in assessing H7, which is concerned with the 
varying influence of citizens’ political value preference when salience emphasis frames and 
issue-specific argument strength are congruent or incongruent in a political message. This 
situation only applies for the levels with frames, but not to the level without frames, and 
can be tested with the same interaction effect used for H6. 
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Table 49 shows the results of this three-way ANOVA. The model itself was 
significant (p < .001) and explained 14.7% of the variance in issue attitude 
(R2adjusted = 13.5%). Furthermore, all proposed main effects were significant: issue-specific 
argument strength (H1, p < .001, ηp2 = .037), the economic-individualism frame compared 
to the no frame condition (H2, p < .001, ηp2 = .052), the economic-individualism frame 
compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism (H3, p < .001, ηp2 = .073), and 
participants’ value preference for economic-individualism (H4, p < .001, ηp2 = .024). 
The interactions between issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis 
frames were both insignificant (RQ1, p = .549, and p = .215), indicating that the main effect 
of frames did not differ according to issue-specific argument strength. The interactions 
Table 49. ANOVA of between-subjects effects of issue-specific argument strength, 
salience emphasis frames, political value preference (dichotomized), and their interactions 











Adjusted model 11 12.83 .147 < .001*** 
Argument strength 1 31.50 .037 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame  1 44.98 .052 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
1 64.81 .073 < .001*** 
Value preference for economic-individualism 1 20.59 .024 < .001*** 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
1 0.36 < .001 .549 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism 
1 1.54 .002 .215 
Argument strength X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 3.05 .004 .081 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame X 
value preference for economic-individualism 
1 0.48 < .001 .486 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 0.50 < .001 .482 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame X value preference 
for economic-individualism 
1 1.37 .002 .242 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism X value 
preference for economic-individualism 
1 4.13 .005 .043* 
Note. R2 = .147, R2adjusted = .135, * p < .05, *** p < .001, n = 833 
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between salience emphasis frames and political value preference were also insignificant 
(RQ2, p = .486, and p = .482), which is a first sign that the frames exerted comparable 
effects regardless of citizens’ value preference. 
Of the three-way interactions between issue-specific argument strength, salience 
emphasis frames, and political value preference, only the interaction comparing the effect 
of the economic-individualism frame and the counter-frame humanitarianism was 
significant (p = .043, ηp2 = .005). The three-way interaction consisting of the comparison 
between the economic-individualism frame and no frame was insignificant (p = .242). This 
indicates that the individual main effects of issue-specific argument strength, frames, and 
value preference did not differ according to the levels of the other variables when only 
considering conditions with no frame and the economic-individualism frame (H5). 
However, they did differ significantly when examining situations with different frames (H6 
and H7). 
Thus far, the statistically significant effects for the proposed hypotheses are evident, 
except for H5. However, the ANOVA itself provided no information about the direction 
of these effects; thus, it is insufficient for a full hypotheses test. Therefore, the following 
subchapters present for each single hypothesis and research question the relevant simple 
effects to determine the direction of the main effects and to decompose the interaction 
effects, enabling thorough interpretation of the results. 
5.1.2 Main effects of issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis 
frames, and political value preferences on issue attitude (H1-H4) 
Statistical results 
The first hypothesis (H1) proposed a main effect of issue-specific argument strength overall 
conditions, i.e., that issue attitude varies on average according to the manipulated argument 
strength to oppose the approval of the new therapy. The relevant main effect for this 
hypothesis was significant in the full ANOVA model (p < .001, ηp2 = .037, see Table 49), 
and a simple effects analysis revealed that the effect showed in the expected direction (see 
Figure 22). Participants exposed to the strong issue-specific argument against approval of 
the new therapy showed significantly (p < .001) lower support for the approval (M = -0.26, 
SD = 1.51) than respondents in the conditions with a weak issue-specific argument for this 
issue position (M = 0.27, SD = 1.33). Even though the effect size was rather weak 
(Cohen’s d = .37), this result completely supports H1. 
The second hypothesis (H2) postulated that when the economic-individualism 
frame contextualizes issue-specific arguments, participants oppose the approval more 
strongly than when no frame is present. Again, the ANOVA model already provided initial 
support for this hypothesis (p < .001, ηp2 = .052, see Table 49). 




Note. 95% confidence intervals for means computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples, 
*** p < .001, two-tailed simple effects tests (with Tukey’s correction of p-values for 
multiple comparisons in factor frame), 95% confidence interval for Cohen’s d in brackets, 
n = 833 
p < .001***, d = .37 [.24, .51] 
p < .001***, d = .53 [.36, .70] 
p < .001***, d = .69 [.52, .87] 
p = .30, d = -.17 [-.34, .00] 
p < .001***, d = -.34 [-.48, -.20] 
Figure 22. Factor means for issue attitude with 95% confidence intervals and main effects 
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A further simple effects analysis using Tukey’s correction for multiple comparisons 
in the three-level factor salience emphasis frame (see Figure 22) provided further evidence 
for H2, revealing that the direction of the effect was as expected. Respondents exposed to 
the economic-individualism frame showed significantly (p < .001) lower support for 
approval (M = -0.58, SD = 1.53) than those in conditions without additional framing 
(M = 0.18, SD = 1.32). This effect was medium-sized (d = .53).  
The simple effects analysis (see Figure 22) also supported the proposed direction 
of hypothesis H3, which proposed that the economic-individualism frame leads to 
opposing the approval significantly (p < .001) more strongly (M = -0.58, SD = 1.53) than 
when the counter-frame humanitarianism is present (M = 0.41, SD = 1.30). As already 
indicated by the full ANOVA model (see second contrast for frame effect in Table 49 with 
p < .001, ηp2 = .073), this effect was even stronger (d = .69) than the aforementioned effect 
of the economic-individualism frame compared to seeing no explicit frame. 
However, the simple effects analysis for the factor frame also revealed an aspect the 
full ANOVA model could not test, as this model only allows for a limited number of 
contrasts: the effect of the counter-frame humanitarianism compared to situations without 
frames. As Figure 22 shows, this effect was insignificant (p = .30, d = -.17), indicating that 
framing information with the political value of humanitarianism did not lead to stronger 
support for the approval. 
The additional simple effects analysis in Figure 22 specifies the direction of the 
main effect of respondents’ value preference for economic-individualism revealed in the 
full ANOVA model (p < .001, ηp2 = .024, see Table 49). As proposed by hypothesis H4, 
participants with a high preference for the political value of economic-individualism 
opposed the approval of the new therapy significantly (p < .001) more strongly than citizens 
with a low preference therefor, albeit with a rather small effect size (d = -.34). 
 
Interpretation of results for H1 to H4 
The statistical results for the main effects revealed that all three independent variables of 
interest – issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis frames, and citizens’ political 
value preference – affected participants’ attitude toward approval of the new therapy. 
The main effect of issue-specific argument strength supports H1 and confirms the 
general importance of new thematic information containing substantive, policy-relevant 
information in attitude formation. This result is aligned with the findings of Leeper and 
Slothuus (2017), who also disentangled thematic information and emphasis frames in their 
experiments (see Subchapter 2.8.1). This means there is a certain degree of rationality in 
citizens’ attitude formation, and they follow new information with high issue-specific 
argument strength for a specific issue position rather than new thematic information with 
low argument strength. In addition, the effect size of issue-specific argument strength 
across all conditions (i.e., including framed thematic information) is d = .37, which is 
comparable to the effect of argument strength when only considering situations without 
explicit framing but only new thematic information (d = .42, see the results of the 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 276 
 
manipulation check in Subchapter 4.4.3). Therefore, overall, a rather stable influence of 
issue-specific argument strength seems to be evident, regardless of the presence or absence 
of salience emphasis frames. 
Based on this result in isolation, it can be speculated whether former studies that 
confounded emphasis frames with new thematic information only revealed frame effects 
because of the significant influence of varying issue-specific information and that citizens 
form their attitudes rationally based on only substantive content about a topic and are thus 
not easily swayed by frames (cf. Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). However, the effect size of the 
significant influence of issue-specific argument strength across all conditions is rather small 
(d = .37), suggesting that thematic information is probably not the only relevant factor for 
attitude formation and that other variables may affect citizens’ issue attitudes. 
Given the results of this study, one additional factor that influences citizens’ issue 
attitude is salience emphasis framing without adding any further thematic information. 
When the economic-individualism frame contextualized the thematic information, citizens 
based their attitude formation on this frame and opposed the approval of the new therapy 
significantly more strongly than in situations without frames but only new thematic 
information (H2) and also compared to situations in which the counter-frame 
humanitarianism contextualized the thematic information (H3). That is, in contrast to the 
results of Leeper and Slothuus (2017), who did not find the effects of non-confounded 
frames, this study found unique effects of salience emphasis frames that are not 
confounded with the supply of further issue-specific information. This is likely because the 
study reported in this book used a more externally valid type of non-confounded frame 
(i.e., salience emphasis frame) and did not favor the occurrence of the effect of thematic 
information by design, which Leeper and Slothuus (2017) did (see Subchapter 2.8.1). 
The salience emphasis frames in the current study employed fundamental political 
values to contextualize the thematic information and to explain how to evaluate this 
information. When presented in a one-sided way, value emphasis frames significantly 
affected issue attitudes in many previous studies (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; Chong 
& Druckman, 2007a ⁠; Nelson, 2004 ⁠; Shen & Edwards, 2005), because they draw on 
available, accessible, and applicable considerations (Chong & Druckman, 2007c) deeply 
rooted in society and with cultural resonance (Entman, 1993). This alters how citizens 
interpret an issue (also see Subchapter 2.5.2). According to the results of this study, this is 
also the case when such value frames are not confounded with additional thematic 
information, but applied only as salience emphasis frames. This means that citizens are also 
susceptible to unique frame effects in one-sided framing situations. 
This result implies that the emphasis framing effects reported in the literature thus 
far might not be as exaggerated as feared by critics highlighting the confounding of frames 
and thematic information (e.g., Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). Possibly, former effects were 
also the result of frames and not only of varying thematic information, because the results 
presented here confirm that frames alone can effectively shift citizens’ issue attitudes. 
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Moreover, this result raises first concerns about citizens’ rationality in attitude 
formation under framing conditions. As explained in Subchapter 2.8.1, it can be 
problematic if citizens arbitrarily adopt different attitudes depending on changes to the 
frame, not on substantive thematic information, because this violates the principle of 
rationality of the consistency and coherence of preferences and choices (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). However, given that the effect of issue-specific argument strength 
persisted on average, it is an exaggerated conclusion that attitude formation is completely 
irrational when thematic information is framed. Nevertheless, the effect size of the framing 
effect of economic-individualism was at least descriptively stronger than the effect size of 
issue-specific argument strength. This suggests that salience emphasis frames at least biased 
rational attitude formation, which should only be based on substantive thematic 
information. 
Unsurprisingly, the effect of the economic-individualism frame was descriptively 
somewhat stronger compared to the situation in which the counter-frame humanitarianism 
contextualized the thematic information (d = .69) than compared to situations without 
additional framing but only new thematic information (d = .53). This is because in the 
former case, the effects of the two different (one-sided) salience emphasis frames pointed 
to different attitude directions, which accumulated to a higher effect size. This is a typical 
result for studies on emphasis framing effects in which treatment-treatment comparisons 
lead to stronger framing effects on average than treatment-control comparisons (for a meta-
analysis, see Leeper & Slothuus, 2017). 
However, the treatment-control comparison for the humanitarianism frame 
revealed that this salience emphasis frame did not significantly increase support for the 
approval compared to situations with only new thematic information (p = .30, d = -.17), 
although the mean difference was in the expected direction (see Figure 22). This non-effect 
likely is the result of a ceiling effect produced by the specific design of this study. Given 
the political issue selected for the experiment and the consistently strong issue-specific 
argument of saving lives in all stimuli (see Subchapter 4.2.4), the support for the approval 
on average was rather high with a grand mean of M = 4.28 (SD = 1.48) on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 6 (translating to M = 0.00 for the latent variable analyzed here, see Subchapter 
4.3.5). Presumably, the humanitarianism frame could simply not further increase the already 
high support for approval, because an approval of the new life-saving therapy against cancer 
could not be supported much more strongly on the scale. 
Thus, whereas the results support H3, namely that different salience emphasis 
frames lead to significantly different issue attitudes, H2 is only partially supported. The 
hypothesis remains unfalsified for the economic-individualism frame compared to thematic 
information without explicit framing, but not for the humanitarianism frame compared to 
situations without frames. Thus, the results for H2 should not be interpreted as meaning 
that salience emphasis frames always exert significant effects on issue attitude. Instead, the 
results should be considered proof of the theory that salience emphasis frames can have 
such an effect. 
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In addition to the main effects of frames and issue-specific argument strength, the 
third independent variable, citizens’ value preference for economic-individualism, also 
demonstrated the expected main effect, supporting H4. That is, political value preferences 
on average play across all conditions the expected role in attitude formation toward political 
issues. Citizens rely on their value preferences to evaluate issues or events under the 
umbrella of their core beliefs (Ciuk et al., 2017⁠; Feldman, 1988⁠; Jacoby, 2006), as already 
elaborated in Subchapter 2.5.1. This result is important as it elucidates the general 
relevance of this variable. Its more complex influence as a moderator of salience emphasis 
framing effects is analyzed in more detail in the following subchapters. 
In sum, this subchapter revealed significant main effects of the three independent 
variables of issue-specific argument strength (H1), salience emphasis frames (H2 and H3), 
and citizens’ political value preference (H4) on issue attitude. This indicates that all three 
variables are important in understanding citizens’ attitude formation. Next, Subchapter 
5.1.3 looks in more detail at the effects of salience emphasis frames to test for the 
persistence of frame effects when the informational setting of issue-specific argument 
strength varies (RQ1) and when frames are (non-)resonant with citizens’ political value 
preference (RQ2). 
5.1.3 Effects of salience emphasis frames by issue-specific argument 
strength and political value preferences (RQ1 and RQ2) 
Thus far, the presentation and interpretation of the results has focused on the main effects 
of the three independent variables of issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis 
frames, and political value preference. How valid these interpretations are and whether 
statistical main effects can be interpreted as unconditional main effects depends on whether 
no disordinal interactions exist (Reinard, 2006, pp. 214–220). Such interactions would 
indicate that depending on the levels of other factors, the effect of the same variable is in 
different directions and thus, the effect is not a real main effect, but a varying conditional 
effect. Furthermore, looking for interactions is necessary for the more complex hypotheses 
H5 to H7 and the research questions RQ1 and RQ2. 
This subchapter provides the results concerned with the first two research questions. 
Research question RQ1 asked whether the found main effects of the economic-
individualism frame only persist when contextualizing the already strong issue-specific 
argument for opposing the new approval or also when argument strength is weak for this 
issue position. RQ2 asked whether these frame effects only work when the salience frames 
are value-resonant or also when they are non-resonant, i.e., when participants with a low 
preference for economic-individualism are exposed to the economic-individualism frame. 
 
Statistical results 
The full ANOVA model presented in Table 49 in Subchapter 5.1.1 already indicated that 
the effects of the salience emphasis frames did not differ by issue-specific argument 
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strength, as the respective two-way interactions were insignificant (p = .549 and p = .215). 
However, this does not automatically mean, significant effects of frames were evident for 
the weak as well as for the strong issue-specific argument. Thus, a further simple effects 
analysis with Tukey’s correction was computed (see Figure 23). When considering only 
conditions with weak issue-specific argument strength to oppose the approval, the analysis 
revealed that the economic-individualism frame significantly (p < .001, d = .64) reduced 
support for the approval (M = -0.38, SD = 1.42) compared to situations without frames 
(M = 0.46, SD = 1.20) and compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism (M = 0.72, 
SD = 1.11, p < .001, d = .86). 
Similar results were found when issue-specific argument strength against the 
approval was strong. Again, the economic-individualism frame (M = -0.76, SD = 1.61) 
significantly reduced support (p < .001, d = .45) compared to no frame (M = -0.09, 
SD = 1.39) and compared to the humanitarianism frame (M = 0.10, SD = 1.40, p < .001, 
d = .57), albeit with slightly lower but still medium-sized effects. As such, the formal answer 
to research question RQ1 is that a salience emphasis frame affects citizens’ issue attitudes 
not only when the constellation of issue-specific arguments is already strong to have an 
attitude in the direction of the frame, but also when thematic argument strength is weak for 
such an opinion. However, as previously indicated by the pairwise comparisons for the 
main effect of salience emphasis frames (see Figure 22), the humanitarianism frame did 
not affect issue attitude compared to situations without frames regardless of whether the 
counter-argument of additional costs was weak (p = .29) or strong (p = .83). 
Regarding the question of the stability of framing effects according to citizens’ 
political value preference (RQ2), the full ANOVA model in Subchapter 5.1.1 provided 
first insights. The two respective two-way interactions concerned with the effects of 
salience emphasis frames according to respondents’ value preference were insignificant in 
this model (p = .486 and p = .482, see Table 49), indicating that the main effect of frames 
did not vary by participants’ value preference. Further decomposing these interactions with 
a simple effects analysis (see Figure 24), the results showed that the economic-
individualism frame significantly reduced (p < .001, d = .48) support for the approval 
(M = -0.73, SD = 1.56) compared to the no frame condition (M = -0.04, SD = 1.34) and 
compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism (p < .001, d = .57, M = 0.12, SD = 1.39) 
for respondents with a high preference for economic-individualism (i.e., for people for 
whom the frame economic-individualism was value-resonant). 
Likewise, the same effects occurred for participants with a low preference for 
economic-individualism, i.e., for respondents for whom the frame economic-individualism 
was non-resonant. When these participants were exposed to the non-resonant frame 
economic-individualism (M = -0.41, SD = 1.49), they supported the approval significantly 
less (p < .001, d = .62) than when no frame was present (M = 0.45, SD = 1.26) or when the 
value-resonant frame humanitarianism was displayed (p < .001, d = .77, M = 0.62, 
SD = 1.19). Given these results, the answer to research question RQ2 is that the economic-
individualism frame not only exerted effects on issue attitude when this salience emphasis 
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frame was value-resonant, but also when this frame was non-resonant. In contrast, the 
humanitarianism frame had no effects compared to situations without frames, regardless of 
whether this frame was value-resonant (p = .53) or non-resonant (p = .57). 
 
Note. *** p < .001, two-tailed simple effects tests with Tukey’s correction of p-values for 




























































































Figure 23. Simple effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude by issue-specific 
argument strength 
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Interpretation of results for RQ1 and RQ2 
The results for both research questions indicate that citizens’ rationality in attitude 
formation was violated under framing conditions. The first violation is that the economic-
individualism frame influenced participants’ issue attitude despite its reliance on weak issue-
Note. *** p < .001, two-tailed simple effects tests with Tukey’s correction of p-values for 




























































































Figure 24. Simple effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude by citizens’ political
value preference 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 282 
 
specific argument strength (RQ1). This implies that even substantive thematic information 
against the direction of the frame, which should guide rational attitude formation based on 
factual issue-specific argument strength, did not prevent a biased issue interpretation along 
the frame contextualization. This was despite that this contextualization did not provide 
any new issue-specific facts people did not already have in mind about the topic, and thus, 
did not change the informational basis for attitude formation. This counters the idea of 
fully rational attitude formation, because citizens’ attitude not only varies arbitrarily when 
substantive thematic information is framed differently (see the results for H2 and H3 in 
Subchapter 5.1.2), but also when thematic information provides compelling reasons to not 
bias one’s attitude in the direction of the salience emphasis frame. This is when a weak 
issue-specific argument for an attitude in accordance with the frame is accompanied by a 
persuasive issue-specific argument for the opposite attitude direction. 
Interestingly, the effect of the economic-individualism frame was descriptively 
somewhat stronger when contextualizing the weak issue-specific argument for the attitude 
suggested by the frame (dcompared to no frame = .64, dcompared to counter-frame = .86, see Figure 23) 
than for the strong argument for this attitude (dcompared to no frame = .45, 
dcompared to counter-frame = .57). However, as the respective two-way interactions between 
salience emphasis frames and issue-specific argument strength were clearly not significant 
(pcompared to no frame = .549 and pcompared to counter-frame = .215, see Subchapter 5.1.1), these 
descriptive differences in effect sizes should not be overestimated. Rather, this slightly 
stronger effect should be considered a robust indicator for the effectiveness of the frame 
even when it contextualizes only weak issue-specific arguments for its issue position. Still, 
the formal answer to RQ1 is that frames influence citizens’ issue attitudes regardless of the 
issue-specific argument strength the salience emphasis frame contextualizes. This is evident 
as the economic-individualism frame affected citizens issue attitude when contextualizing 
the weak and when contextualizing the strong issue-specific argument for its issue-position. 
At least at the descriptive level, this pattern of the independence of the frame effect 
also emerged for the non-significant effect of the humanitarianism frame (see Figure 23). 
However, these differences should be interpreted with caution. First, this frame is not very 
suitable to answer RQ1, because it only contextualized a constant issue-specific argument 
in the experiment (i.e., the constant increase of efficacy of the new therapy). Thus, the same 
descriptive pattern of this frame “effect” for the weak and the strong counter-argument 
concerned with the costs of the new therapy could have simply resulted from the constant 
issue-specific argument of the increased efficacy of the new therapy the humanitarianism 
frame emphasized. Second, both descriptive differences are insignificant and thus not 
interpretable as effects (as already was the case for the overall effect of this frame compared 
to situations without frames, see Subchapter 5.1.2). Thus, RQ1 is answered based only on 
the results concerned with the effects of the economic-individualism frame depending on 
the contextualized varying issue-specific argument strength for the issue position of this 
frame. Here, it is clear that this salience emphasis frame was effective regardless of issue-
specific argument strength. 
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The second violation of rationality in attitude formation is the effectiveness of the 
economic-individualism frame, even for citizens with a low preference for this political 
value, i.e., when this frame was non-resonant (RQ2). While the effects of a value-resonant 
frame on issue attitude should be interpreted as biased, they do not necessarily indicate 
irrationality, because following a value-resonant frame is not an arbitrary shift in attitude 
but an adoption of a suggested attitude aligned with one’s own political preferences. In 
contrast, the effects of a non-resonant frame are a strong indicator for less rational attitude 
formation under framing conditions (also see Subchapter 2.5.4). 
Across all conditions, citizens with a low preference for economic-individualism 
rather support the approval of the new and more expensive therapy (M = 0.24 equating to 
about M = 4.52 on the original scale ranging from 1 to 6, see Subchapter 5.1.2), because 
their value preference is to disagree with the importance of individual financial 
responsibility in social welfare (see Subchapter 4.3.5). That is, the attitude aligned with 
their preference should rather clearly support the approval if attitude formation is biased 
but at least rational in terms of being consistent with personal preferences. 
However, when the non-resonant frame economic-individualism contextualizes the 
thematic information for these citizens, participants demonstrate significantly less support 
for the approval of the new therapy than when no frame or the humanitarianism frame is 
present. This means that the non-resonant frame moved these citizens away from their 
preference of supporting the approval (see Figure 24). This indicates bounded rational 
attitude formation, because it is an arbitrary shift in issue attitude that cannot even be 
explained by shifts that are biased but at least aligned with personal preferences. 
An important constraint to this conclusion of bounded rationality is that this pattern 
of effective non-resonant frames only occurred for the economic-individualism frame, but 
not for the humanitarianism frame. The latter was not effective compared to situations 
without an explicit frame, despite that the descriptive pattern shows that this frame elicited 
(small) attitudinal differences of a comparable size regardless of citizens’ value preference 
(see Figure 24). Thus, the most suitable answer to RQ2 is that salience emphasis frames 
can have effects on citizens for whom the political value employed by the salience emphasis 
frame is non-resonant. However, frames do not always have such effects and thus, framing 
does not always threaten rational attitude formation (for the same conclusion on aggregate 
for all citizens, see also H2 in Subchapter 5.1.2). 
In sum, this subchapter demonstrated that salience emphasis frames can influence 
citizens’ issue attitude even when contextualizing a weak issue-specific argument strength 
for the position of the frame (RQ1) and when contextualizing thematic information by 
using a non-resonant political value (RQ2). This indicates that citizens can be susceptible 
to salience emphasis frames in situations in which other factors such as weak issue-specific 
argument strength or a non-matching political value preference should help prevent the 
effectiveness of frames. 
However, a significant influence of issue-specific argument strength and of citizens’ 
political value preference was still found across all conditions (see results for H1 and H4 in 
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Subchapter 5.1.2). This implies that frames do not determine alone how attitude formation 
takes place. Nevertheless, the next subchapter analyzes whether salience emphasis frames 
are even able to suppress the effect of issue-specific argument strength in certain situations, 
which would be an even stronger indicator for citizens’ susceptibility to emphasis framing 
effects than the results presented thus far (see Subchapter 5.1.4). 
5.1.4 Suppression of the effects of issue-specific argument strength through 
value-resonant salience emphasis frames (H5 and H6) 
Subchapter 5.1.3 showed that the economic-individualism frame influenced citizens’ issue 
attitudes, regardless of the issue-specific argument strength it contextualized. In other 
words, argument strength did not influence the effect of the salience emphasis frame. In 
contrast, hypotheses H5 and H6 focused on the question of whether the frame effect 
influenced the effect of issue-specific argument strength, compared once to situations 
without frames (H5) and once to those with the counter-frame humanitarianism (H6). 
Specifically, H5 and H6 proposed that the effect of the economic-individualism frame 
suppresses the effect of issue-specific argument strength when this frame is value-resonant, 
i.e., for participants who prefer economic-individualism. 
 
Statistical results 
The first test of these hypotheses in the full ANOVA model (see Table 49 in Subchapter 
5.1.1) revealed an insignificant three-way interaction for H5 (p = .242), but a significant 
three-way interaction for H6 (p = .043). However, these interaction effects must be 
decomposed through a simple effects analysis to determine what drives the interaction. 
This is because a significant three-way interaction itself only indicates that (at least) one of 
the effects of the three involved variables depends on the level of (at least) one other 
variable, but the interaction itself does not show which variable(s). To ensure the significant 
three-way interaction is actually the result of the hypothesized suppression effect of issue-
specific argument strength through a value-resonant salience emphasis frame, three aspects 
are necessary. 
First, no effect should be evident of argument strength for respondents with a high 
preference for economic-individualism when framed with the value-resonant frame 
economic-individualism. However, a clear and significant effect of argument strength 
should be revealed for participants with a high preference for economic-individualism when 
no frame is present (H5) and when exposed to the counter-frame humanitarianism (H6). 
Note that this alone is not sufficient to confirm that value resonance is responsible 
for this effect. Second, participants with a low preference for economic-individualism 
should demonstrate a different pattern of the effect of issue-specific argument strength in 
the respective framing conditions, because this would indicate that the economic-
individualism frame itself do not suppress the effect of argument strength. Rather, its effect 
in suppressing the issue-specific argument depends on whether the economic-individualism 
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frame is value-resonant or not. More accurately, a significant effect of thematic argument 
strength should emerge for participants with a low preference for economic-individualism, 
even though the argument is framed by the economic-individualism frame. 
These two requirements suggest that the effect of issue-specific argument strength 
varies according to whether or not a value-resonant salience emphasis frame is present. 
However, a third requirement is necessary. Specifically, it must be confirmed for 
participants with a high preference for economic-individualism that the value-resonant 
frame economic-individualism reduced support for the approval when contextualizing the 
weak argument to oppose the approval compared to the situation in which no frame or a 
counter-frame was present. If no effect of the value-resonant frame on the weak issue-
specific argument emerges, then it cannot be assumed that the suppression resulted from 
increasing the strength of the weak argument to oppose the approval, because the 
suppression could also stem from reducing the effect of the strong argument against the 
approval. 
To investigate first this last requirement, Figure 25 shows the simple effects of the 
salience emphasis frames depending on issue-specific argument strength and political value 
preference. The crucial comparison is the situation with weak argument strength for 
participants with a high preference for economic-individualism. As seen, the value-resonant 
frame economic-individualism significantly (p < .001, d = .69) reduced support for the 
approval (M = -0.57, SD = 1.40) compared to situations without frames (M = 0.32, 
SD = 1.21) and compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism (p < .001, d = .97, 
M = 0.67, SD = 1.13), both with rather strong effect sizes. As such, this requirement to 
support the hypothesis of a suppressed issue-specific argument effect through value-
resonant frames is fulfilled, and the value-resonant frame was effective even for the weak 
argument. 
In addition to this requirement, Figure 25 also exhibits the frame effects for the 
other levels of argument strength and value preference. Without focusing on each simple 
effect, this analysis revealed the comparable pattern seen in Figure 23 and Figure 24 in 
Subchapter 5.1.3. The economic-individualism frame significantly affected issue attitude 
compared to the no frame condition and compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism, 
whereas this counter-frame did not significantly affect issue attitude compared to the no 
frame condition, even though the descriptive statistics were in the expected direction. 
Regarding the two other requirements to support the hypothesized suppression 
effect of issue-specific argument strength through a value-resonant frame (H5 and H6), 
Figure 26 shows the simple effect of argument strength according to the levels of frame 
and the levels of respondents’ value preference. In the figure, the left panel shows the 
effects of arguments according to frame exposure when the preference for economic-
individualism was high. As seen, when the value-resonant frame economic-individualism 
contextualized the weak (M = -0.57, SD = 1.40) or the strong argument (M = -0.87, 
SD = 1.68) against the approval, argument strength did not significantly affect issue attitude 
(p = .17, d = .20). 






















































































































































































Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † p < .1, two-tailed simple effects tests with Tukey’s 
correction of p-values for multiple comparisons, 95% confidence intervals for Cohen’s d in 
brackets, n = 833 
Figure 25. Simple effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude by issue-specific 
argument strength and political value preference 
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In contrast, clear and strong issue-specific argument effects were evident for 
participants with a high preference for economic individualism when no frame was present 
(Mweak = 0.32, SDweak = 1.21, Mstrong = -0.39, SDstrong = 1.38, p < .001, d = .55) and when 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed simple effects tests, 95% confidence 
























































































Figure 26. Simple effects of issue-specific argument strength on issue attitude by salience 
emphasis frames and political value preference 
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the thematic arguments were framed with the counter-frame humanitarianism 
(Mweak = 0.67, SDweak = 1.13, Mstrong = -0.40, SDstrong = 1.42, p < .001, d = .83). 
Furthermore, the pattern of issue-specific argument effects by salience emphasis 
frames for citizens with a low preference for economic-individualism was reversed (see 
right panel in Figure 26). When the non-resonant frame economic-individualism 
contextualized the arguments, issue-specific argument strength had a significant influence 
(Mweak = -0.17, SDweak = 1.44, Mstrong = -0.63, SDstrong = 1.52, p = .049, d = .30), whereas 
argument strength did not when no frame (Mweak = 0.61, SDweak = 1.18, Mstrong = 0.28, 
SDstrong = 1.32, p = .15, d = .27) or the value-resonant frame humanitarianism was present 
(Mweak = 0.76, SDweak = 1.10, Mstrong = 0.48, SDstrong = 1.27, p = .19, d = .24). 
This strongly supports the hypothesized suppression of the effect of issue-specific 
argument strength through value-resonant salience emphasis frames. The simple effects not 
only support this suppression effect in comparison to the counter-frame (H6) but also 
compared to the no frame condition (H5). However, the differences in the significance of 
issue-specific argument effects for the latter were not strong enough to yield a significant 
three way-interaction in the full ANOVA model (p = .242, see Table 49), but only for the 
former (p = .043). That is, the results fully support H6 and partially support H5. 
 
Interpretation of the results for H5 and H6 
These results are a strong indicator for citizens’ susceptibility to value-resonant salience 
emphasis frames, because they imply that people simply follow “their” frame at the same 
magnitude, regardless of how compelling the issue-specific facts are for the issue position 
suggested by their frame. Moreover, the same citizens are aware of the issue-specific 
argument strength of thematic information as long as this is presented without additional 
explicit framing (H5) or when another (non-resonant) frame contextualizes the information 
(H6). That is, value-resonant frames can prevent that the relevant thematic facts and issue-
specific argument strength for one’s own side are sufficiently considered. This occurs 
despite that citizens are not generally unable to base their attitude on how compelling 
thematic information is, as long as external factors do not increase motivated reasoning 
regarding this information (for empirical support, see the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength for citizens with a high preference for economic-individualism when no frames 
are present in Figure 26, and Subchapter 2.8.3 for the theoretical argument of increased 
motivated reasoning due to value-resonant salience emphasis frames). 
How rational should this suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength be judged? First, the results suggest that citizens ignore the persuasive strength of 
fundamental facts about the issue, which does not indicate very rational attitude formation 
that should also incorporate the relevant thematic information about a specific topic. In 
contrast, value-resonant salience emphasis frames lead to a highly biased interpretation of 
this thematic information along one’s own value preferences. 
Still, it could be argued that this must not necessarily be irrational, because this bias 
implies a certain degree of consistency with one’s own preferences. As such, the value-
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resonant frame helps citizens interpret thematic information so that one’s specific issue 
attitude does not violate one’s general value preference. That is, it could be argued that the 
effect of the value-resonant frame is rather an indicator for increased rationality, because it 
shows that citizens rely more on their political value to interpret thematic information than 
when this frame is missing. For instance, it could be concluded that the economic-
individualism frame helped citizens holding this value to judge the low costs for the new 
therapy as a threat to their value preference, but they were unable to understand the 
consequences of an (even small) increase in costs for their preference when no explicit 
frame was present. 
However, the problem with this possible conclusion is that attitude formation only 
in accordance with one’s own preferences prevents the formation of differentiated and 
sophisticated attitudes that also consider issue-specific argument strength of thematic 
information. Dismissing argument strength and simply following preferred political values 
impedes deliberating the substantive content of topics and thus, it reduces the accuracy of 
attitude formation. 
In fact, the results show that citizens in favor of economic-individualism no longer 
differentiated between the different cost amounts when framed in terms of a general threat 
to their value preference, even though the weak issue-specific argument contained costs 30 
times lower than those in the strong argument. An increase of CHF 10 in personal insurance 
rates no longer differed from an increase of CHF 300, but led to the same relatively strong 
opposition to the approval of the new therapy. Moreover, this resulted from the stronger 
effect of the value-resonant frame when contextualizing the weak issue-specific argument 
rather than the strong argument (see left panel in Figure 25). Here, citizens needed to 
engage in stronger motivated reasoning about argument strength to arrive at an attitude 
aligned with their value preference made more salient by the value-resonant frame. Notably, 
these citizens considered the difference in issue-specific argument strength and followed 
the weak argument significantly less than the strong argument when no frames were present 
or the counter-frame humanitarianism was used (see Figure 26). 
Given that rationality also means forming the same attitude when substantive 
information is the same (i.e., relying always at the same magnitude on issue-specific 
argument strength), this inconsistency in the effect of argument strength induced by 
framing clearly violates the idea of the rational evaluation of thematic information. Thus, 
while it might be rational to a certain extent to interpret issue-specific arguments according 
to one’s own value preferences, rationality is violated when the degree of biased processing 
along these preferences increases so strongly because of value-resonant framing that it 
changes the effect of issue-specific argument strength. This is even more so when frames 
completely blind citizens to substantive thematic information, impeding accurate and 
rational attitude formation. 
In sum, this subchapter revealed that value-resonant salience emphasis frames can 
increase motivated reasoning about the substantive thematic information so strongly that 
the effect of issue-specific argument strength is suppressed. This is despite that argument 
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strength can influence issue attitude as long as no frame is present or a non-resonant 
counter-frame contextualizes thematic information. However, the bias with which citizens 
process framed messages along their value preferences should not only be influenced by 
the value resonance of salience emphasis frames, but also by message congruence, which 
could decrease motivated reasoning and play a counter-part in the irrationality in attitude 
formation elicited by a value-resonant frame. Subchapter 5.1.5 delves into this influence. 
5.1.5 Varying importance of citizens’ political value preferences for attitude 
formation (H7) 
Thus far, the three-way interactions were analyzed in Subchapter 5.1.4 in only two 
directions to investigate the suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength 
through value-resonant framing (H5 and H6). These were the stable influences of salience 
emphasis frames depending on issue-specific argument strength and value preference (see 
Figure 25) and the varying influence of argument strength depending on the frame and 
value preference (see Figure 26). However, to test hypothesis H7, the three-way interaction 
can also be examined in terms of the varying influence of value preference depending on 
issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames. 
This hypothesis H7 proposed that the influence of citizens’ political value preference 
on attitude formation increases when frames and argument strength are incongruent in a 
message (e.g., when issue-specific argument strength against approval is high, but a 
humanitarian frame suggesting supporting the approval contextualizes this argument) 
compared to when both are congruent (e.g., when issue-specific argument strength against 




The last three-way interaction in the full ANOVA model simultaneously tested H6 and H7, 
because it tested the varying effects of the three independent variables when only examining 
situations when (different) salience emphasis frames are present. The interaction excluded 
situations without framing in which argument strength and frames cannot be congruent, 
because there is no frame. As mentioned, this three-way interaction was significant at 
p = .043 with ηp2 = .005 (see Table 49 in Subchapter 5.1.1), indicating that the effect of 
value preference might differ. 
However, the previous subchapter showed that the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength also differed when considering the simple effects, whereas frame effects did not 
differ. Thus, based only on the significant three-way interaction, it cannot simply be 
assumed that value preference differed according to argument strength and frames. To test 
H7 in a valid way, a further simple effects analysis must be performed to decompose the 
effect of value preference. 
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Figure 27 shows the results of this analysis for two situations in which salience 
emphasis frames and issue-specific argument strength were congruent in the message and 
two situations in which they were incongruent. Regarding the congruent situations, when 
the strong issue-specific argument against approval was framed with the economic-
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † p < .1, two-tailed simple effects tests, 95% 

































































































Figure 27. Simple effects of political value preference on issue attitude by issue-specific 
argument strength and salience emphasis frames 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 292 
 
individualism frame, no significant effect of value preference was found (p = .29), and the 
attitude of participants with a high preference for economic-individualism (M = -0.87, 
SD = 1.68) did not differ from respondents with a low preference (M = -0.63, SD = 1.52). 
Likewise, when the humanitarianism frame contextualized the weak issue-specific argument 
against approval, there was no significant difference (p = .70) between participants holding 
the value of economic-individualism (M = 0.67, SD = 1.13) and respondents opposing it 
(M = 0.76, SD = 1.10). Therefore, when salience emphasis frames and argument strength 
were congruent, value preferences were ineffective in influencing attitude formation. 
In contrast, in incongruent situations, value preference had a significant influence. 
When the strong issue-specific argument against approval was framed in terms of 
humanitarianism, participants with a high preference for economic-individualism opposed 
the approval (M = -0.40, SD = 1.42) significantly stronger (p < .001, d = -.66) than did 
respondents with a low preference (M = 0.48, SD = 1.27). Similarly, participants with a 
high preference showed less support for the approval (M = -0.57, SD = 1.40) than 
respondents with a low preference (M = -0.17, SD = 1.44) when the humanitarianism frame 
contextualized the weak argument against approval, although this was only marginally 
significant (p = .088, d = -.29). Nevertheless, both results for incongruent situations imply 
that citizens rely on their political value preference to form their issue attitude. 
These results formally support hypothesis H7. The influence of citizens’ value 
preference on attitude formation varies and is significantly stronger in situations in which 
issue-specific argument strength and frames are incongruent. In contrast, value preference 
has no effect when both message properties are congruent, regardless of whether this 
congruence points to opposing or supporting the approval. 
 
Interpretation of results for H7 
Given the support for H7, it can be concluded that attitude formation under framing 
conditions is not always biased along citizens’ political value preferences, despite the strong 
evidence presented in the previous Subchapter 5.1.4 that value-resonant framing can 
increase motivated reasoning about weak issue-specific arguments for the issue position of 
the value-resonant frame. In contrast, the results in this subchapter revealed that frames 
can also contribute to reducing motivated reasoning, as long as frames contextualize high 
issue-specific argument strength for its issue position, i.e., when the message congruently 
points to one direction. 
When the economic-individualism frame contextualized the strong issue-specific 
argument against the approval, citizens with a low-preference for this political value – i.e., 
citizens for whom this frame was non-resonant – rather opposed the approval at the same 
magnitude as citizens with a high preference for economic-individualism, who received 
their value-resonant frame (see Figure 27). For both preferences, a compelling congruent 
message elicited no need for strong motivated reasoning, because no stark conflict existed 
between the different message features that needed to be reduced by interpreting the 
message along one’s preferences to regain cognitive consistency (see Subchapter 2.8.3). 
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That is, applying the congruent frame economic-individualism to the strong issue-
specific argument against the approval helped citizens with a low preference for economic-
individualism (who show across all conditions a tendency to support the approval, see the 
significant main effect for H4) recognize that compelling issue-specific arguments do not 
follow their default attitude (i.e., supporting the approval). Message congruence helped 
them adopt an attitude based on the substantial thematic information provided, and their 
attitude did not differ from the attitude of citizens adhering strongly to economic-
individualism. 
In contrast, when the humanitarianism frame contextualized the strong argument 
against the approval – i.e., when the message was incongruent and the thematic information 
had weak argument strength for the issue position of the humanitarianism frame that 
suggested supporting the approval – citizens engaged in motivated reasoning to reduce the 
cognitive conflict this incongruence elicited. This then polarized the attitudes of citizens 
with different political values. Citizens with a high preference for economic-individualism 
still followed the strength of the issue-specific argument despite exposure to the 
humanitarian frame, as this allowed them to form an attitude aligned with their default 
attitude on social welfare, namely rather opposing increasing costs. In contrast, citizens with 
a low preference for economic-individualism rather followed the humanitarianism frame in 
incongruent situations, despite the strong issue-specific argument to oppose the approval. 
This is because their value-resonant frame humanitarianism suppressed the effect of issue-
specific argument strength (see Subchapter 5.1.4) to enable these citizens to form an 
attitude aligned with their value of opposing financial constraints in social welfare. 
As such, message incongruence increased the biased processing of thematic 
information along political value preferences, whereas congruence decreased the influence 
of citizens’ political value preference on attitude formation and enabled a more rational and 
accurate evaluation of the argument strength of thematic information. In other words, 
when a salience emphasis frame contextualizes thematic information with high issue-
specific argument strength for the issue position of the frame, then frames can foster more 
rational attitude formation based on substantive thematic information for citizens that 
would not follow the stronger issue-specific argument when no congruent frame is present. 
Without a congruent frame, strong thematic arguments against citizens’ default attitude 
direction based on their political value preference would be less likely accepted. That is, 
frames can also lead to a more rational assessment of issue-specific argument strength by 
citizens not in favor of the general direction of this argument as long as a (non-resonant) 
salience emphasis frame contextualizes a strong thematic argument for its issue position. 
However, when issue-specific argument strength is weak for the issue position of the 
(resonant or non-resonant) frame – i.e., when a message is incongruent – attitudes become 
increasingly polarized because the effect of issue-specific argument strength is suppressed 
for citizens for whom the frame is value-resonant (see Subchapter 5.1.4 before). 
The results supporting H7 highlighted an important counter-part to citizens’ 
bounded rationality in attitude formation under the framing conditions described in 
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preceding subchapters. This subchapter clarified that salience emphasis frames can also 
help increase rationality, although only under very specific conditions. Before summarizing 
the results generated thus far (see Subchapter 5.1.7), the next subchapter (see Subchapter 
5.1.6) provides several robustness checks to ensure the stability thereof. 
5.1.6 Robustness checks 
The results for the effects of issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis frames, 
and citizens’ political value preference have thus far supported all hypotheses, except for 
H5, which they only partially supported. To secure these findings and challenge the 
hypotheses even further, this subchapter describes several robustness checks. Specifically, 
the entire analysis was re-run as an ANCOVA. The same model as the ANOVA in 
Subchapter 5.1.1 was employed, but expanded to include all 16 control variables measured 
in this study (see Subchapter 4.3.2): age, sex, education, income, need for cognitive closure, 
need for cognition, involvement in reading the stimulus article, involvement in thinking 
about the issue of the news article, centrality of social welfare attitudes, numeracy, political 
knowledge, political leaning, affectedness by a serious illness – self, affectedness by a serious 
illness – strong ties, affectedness by a serious illness – weak ties, and previous topic interest. 
Integrating these control variables in an ANCOVA allows to partial out their direct 
influence on issue attitude before assessing the effect of the experimental factors, 
eliminating possible confounds that (co-)influence the effects of the experimental 
manipulation (Field et al., 2012, pp. 704–707). This can be a more robust test of the 
hypotheses. Furthermore, the effects of the control variables themselves help better 
understand what drives attitude formation other than issue-specific argument strength, 
salience emphasis frames, and political value preferences. 
Table 50 shows the results of the ANCOVA model, revealing that the significance 
values (p-values) and effect sizes (ηp2) of the independent variables of argument strength, 
frames, and value preference and their interactions were nearly similar to those in the first 
ANOVA without covariates. That is, even after controlling for the 16 control variables, the 
significant effects of issue-specific argument strength (H1), of the economic-individualism 
frame compared to the no frame condition (H2) and compared to the counter-frame 
humanitarianism (H3), and of citizens’ political value preference (H4) persisted. 
Moreover, all two-way interactions (RQ1 and RQ2) and the three-way interaction 
for the suppression of the effects of issue-specific argument strength through a value-
resonant frame compared to the no frame condition (H5) remained insignificant. However, 
the second three-way interaction concerned with the suppression compared to a non-
resonant frame (H6) not only remained significant but demonstrated even higher statistical 
significance (p = .004) and a stronger effect size (ηp2 = .012) than in the initial ANOVA 
model (p = .043, ηp2 = .005, see Subchapter 5.1.1). This indicates that the results of the 
initial ANOVA were robust, even after controlling for all covariates, strengthening support 
for the hypotheses. 
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Table 50. ANCOVA of between-subjects effects of issue-specific argument strength, 
salience emphasis frames, political value preference (dichotomized), their interactions, and 
all control variables on issue attitude 
Factor df F ηp2 p 
Adjusted model 27 6.86 .221 < .001*** 
CV age 1 12.13 .018 < .001*** 
CV sex (men = 1) 1 0.25 < .001 .618 
CV education (high = 1) 1 0.98 .001 .323 
CV income 1 0.99 .001 .321 
CV need for closure 1 17.90 .027 < .001*** 
CV need for cognition 1 1.42 .002 .234 
CV involvement reading 1 1.42 .002 .233 
CV involvement thinking 1 4.73 .007 .030* 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 1 2.05 .003 .152 
CV numeracy 1 0.50 < .001 .479 
CV political knowledge 1 0.21 < .001 .646 
CV political leaning 1 0.55 < .001 .459 
CV affectedness by serious illness – self (yes = 1) 1 6.03 .009 .014* 
CV affectedness by serious illness – strong ties (yes = 1) 1 .00 < .001 .956 
CV affectedness by serious illness – weak ties (yes = 1) 1 .03 < .001 .860 
CV topic interest 1 6.56 .010 .009** 
Argument strength 1 25.66 .038 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame  1 25.76 .038 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
1 42.98 .062 < .001*** 
Value preference for economic-individualism 1 18.57 .028 < .001*** 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
1 0.34 < .001 .562 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism 
1 1.57 .002 .210 
Argument strength X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 1.10 .002 .295 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame X 
value preference for economic-individualism 
1 0.82 .001 .365 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 1.94 .003 .164 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame X value preference 
for economic-individualism 
1 0.76 .001 .385 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism X value 
preference for economic-individualism 
1 4.13 .012 .004** 
Note. R2 = .221, R2adjusted = .189, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, CV = control variable, 
n = 678 (lower n due to missing values for control variables) 
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In addition to the stability of the hypothesized effects, Table 50 also provides 
information on the influences of the added control variables on issue attitude toward 
approval of the new therapy against cancer. Of the demographic variables age, sex, 
education, and income, only age significantly predicted issue attitude. Older people tended 
to oppose the approval more strongly than younger respondents (b = -0.014, p < .001). 
Possibly, older people need the help of the health insurance system more than 
younger ones. Thus, the older may have perceived the possible approval as a distribution 
conflict between financial resources in the health system to cure their own diseases and the 
financial resources the same system would have to spend for the approval of the new 
therapy, which would help others but not them. Thus, they may oppose the approval more 
strongly to ensure the health services they need for themselves can be financed. 
However, the significant control variable of affectedness by serious illness (self) 
suggests that when respondents suffer(ed) from a serious illness such as cancer, their 
support for the approval was significantly stronger, regardless of age (b = 0.363, p = .014), 
than that of those not affected by such illnesses. Unsurprisingly, people who suffer(ed) 
from cancer generally exhibit more solidarity with others with a comparable disease and are 
more willing to support the approval. In addition, previous interest in the topic of health 
insurances significantly increased support for approval (b = 0.093, p = .009). 
Of the other control variables, only two significantly influenced issue attitude: need 
for cognitive closure (b = 0.240, p < .001) and involvement in thinking about the issue of 
the news article (b = -0.086, p = .030). Respondents with a high need for cognitive closure 
search for (fast) answers to problems (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). For them, simply 
supporting the approval of the more effective therapy despite counter-arguments regarding 
the additional financial expenses was likely the easiest way to cope with the question about 
their issue attitude. 
This explanation is corroborated by the significant but negative influence of 
involvement in thinking, implying that people who thought less extensively about the 
approval supported it more strongly. However, the explanatory power of all control 
variables together accounted for only about 5% of the variance compared to the about 13% 
explained by the (quasi-)experimental factors (R2adjusted = .135 in the ANOVA without 
covariates, R2adjusted = .189 in the ANCOVA with covariates). That is, the influences of the 
hypothesized communicative effects and of the political value preferences were more 
important in attitude formation than demographics or personality variables. 
Regarding the robustness of the hypothesized effects, the ANCOVA in Table 50 
only added control variables to the model, but still relied on the dichotomized variable for 
value preference based on the median split to estimate the influence of citizens’ political 
value preference for economic-individualism in attitude formation (see Subchapter 4.3.5). 
This dichotomization helped follow the experimental paradigm of comparing different 
groups, and eased interpretation of the interaction effects. However, dichotomization can 
negatively influence the correct estimation of significance and effect sizes. Thus, it is 
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recommended to use metric variables in the statistical model when possible (MacCallum, 
Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). 
Thus, the second robustness check in Table 51 used the metric latent measurement 
for value preference, not the dichotomized variable, as a quasi-experimental factor in a 
second ANCOVA model. All other variables were the same as in the first ANCOVA. The 
levels of significance and effect sizes in this new ANCOVA (see Table 51) were very similar 
to those in the initial ANOVA model (see Subchapter 5.1.1), again supporting all 
hypotheses except H5. Unsurprisingly, the influences of the covariates were also the same 
as in the first ANCOVA. However, the model differed from the first ANOVA model in 
one important aspect. While the two-way interaction between issue-specific argument 
strength and political value preference was insignificant in the initial ANOVA using the 
dichotomized variable for value preference (p = .081), the same interaction was significant 
when using the metric variable (p = .031). 
Figure 26 in Subchapter 5.1.4 helps clarifying this interaction. The effect of issue-
specific argument strength was generally stronger for participants with a high preference 
for economic-individualism than for respondents with a low preference for this value 
(except when the frame was value-resonant, supporting H5 and H6). This pattern, albeit 
with an insignificant interaction, was already present when analyzing only the groups 
without frames in the manipulation check for issue-specific argument strength (see 
Subchapter 4.4.3). As explained in the interpretation of the results of the manipulation 
check, citizens with a lower preference for economic-individualism generally care less about 
financial expenditures connected to social welfare. Thus, these people were less sensitive to 
the differing costs that constituted the varying issue-specific argument strength for 
opposing the approval. However, the experiment focused on citizens with a high preference 
for economic-individualism, because the design only enabled testing this group for the 
suppression of issue-specific argument effects through a value-resonant frame (see 
Subchapter 4.2.4). 
As indicated by the still significant three-way interaction in the ANCOVA model 
with the metric variable for the preference for economic-individualism (p = .038, see last 
line in Table 51), the hypothesized suppression of this argument effect when participants 
with a higher preference for economic-individualism were exposed to the value-resonant 
frame economic-individualism compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism (H6) 
persisted in this robustness check. Thus, the generally lower effect of issue-specific 
argument strength for citizens with a low preference for economic-individualism, as 
indicated by the now significant two-way interaction when using the metric variable for 
value preference, did not contradict the evidence for the hypotheses presented thus far. 
Instead, the additional ANCOVA confirms the robustness of the results. 
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Table 51. ANCOVA of between-subjects effects of issue-specific argument strength, 
salience emphasis frames, political value preference (metric), their interactions, and all 
control variables on issue attitude 
Factor df F ηp2 p 
Adjusted model 27 8.22 .254 < .001*** 
CV age 1 10.93 .016 < .001*** 
CV sex (men = 1) 1 0.15 < .001 .700 
CV education (high = 1) 1 1.72 .003 .190 
CV income 1 2.23 .003 .136 
CV need for closure 1 25.51 .038 < .001*** 
CV need for cognition 1 2.36 .004 .125 
CV involvement reading 1 1.05 .002 .305 
CV involvement thinking 1 4.23 .006 .040* 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 1 1.70 .003 .193 
CV numeracy 1 0.70  .001 .403 
CV political knowledge 1 0.02 < .001 .880 
CV political leaning 1 0.57 < .001 .449 
CV affectedness by serious illness – self (yes = 1) 1 6.25 .009 .013* 
CV affectedness by serious illness – strong ties (yes = 1) 1 0.05 < .001 .819 
CV affectedness by serious illness – weak ties (yes = 1) 1 0.09 < .001 .769 
CV topic interest 1 5.40 .008 .020* 
Argument strength 1 23.15 .034 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame  1 22.81 .034 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
1 41.03 .059 < .001*** 
Value preference for economic-individualism 1 47.40 .068 < .001*** 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
1 0.37 < .001 .543 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism 
1 1.41 .002 .236 
Argument strength X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 4.65 .007 .031* 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame X 
value preference for economic-individualism 
1 0.03 < .001 .872 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 0.10 < .001 .754 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame X value preference 
for economic-individualism 
1 0.78 < .001 .779 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism X value 
preference for economic-individualism 
1 4.30 .007 .038* 
Note. R2 = .254, R2adjusted = .223, * p < .05, *** p < .001, CV = control variable, n = 678 
(lower n due to missing values for control variables) 
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Thus far, the robustness checks added control variables to the initial ANOVA model 
in the first step (see Table 50), and in a second step, tested the stability of the hypothesized 
effects by not only including covariates but also integrating the metric latent variable for 
citizens’ preference for economic-individualism as a quasi-experimental factor, rather than 
the dichotomized variable (see Table 51). However, all analyses used the same predicted 
latent variables derived from the simultaneous confirmatory factor analysis for the final 
measurement model. The final measurement model excluded five items to increase model 
fit, because the model fit of the initial measurement model employing all measured variables 
did not satisfy all cut-off criteria for an appropriate confirmatory factor analysis (see 
Subchapter 4.3.4). To test whether the decision to adjust the measurement model 
influenced the results of the hypotheses tests, Table 52 shows a final robustness check 
using the predicted latent values based on the full measurement model, again integrating all 
16 control variables and the metric variable for value preference, not the dichotomized 
variable. 
The results of this last ANCOVA were highly similar to those of the previous 
ANCOVA and still supported all hypotheses, again except H5. Strong issue-specific 
arguments to oppose the approval significantly decreased support (p < .001, H1), as did the 
economic-individualism frame compared to the no frame condition (p < .001, H2) and 
compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism (p < .001, H3). Similarly, a higher value 
preference for economic-individualism led to significantly lower support (p < .001, H4). In 
addition, the three-way interaction, which tested for the suppression effect of issue-specific 
argument strength through value-resonant salience emphasis frames compared to a 
counter-frame (H6) and for the varying importance of value preferences (H7), remained 
significant (p = .037). 
In sum, this subchapter described the three different robustness checks employed 
to test the stability of the effects found in the main ANOVA model (see Subchapter 5.1.1). 
All three robustness checks supported the results of the ANOVA, regardless of whether or 
not all 16 control variables were added (see Table 50), the metric variable for value 
preference was integrated as a quasi-factor instead of the dichotomized variable (see Table 
51), and the analysis was re-run with the predicted latent variables based on a different 
measurement model (see Table 52). Therefore, the robustness of the statistical results of 
testing the hypotheses and research questions concerned with the dependent variable of 
issue attitude was confirmed, increasing the stability of the findings. 
Next, Subchapter 5.1.7 summarizes these findings and the major conclusions 
thereof. Thereafter, Chapter 5.2 explores the mediation effects underlying these direct 
effects on issue attitude. 
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Table 52. ANCOVA of between-subjects effects of issue-specific argument strength, 
salience emphasis frames, political value preference (metric), their interactions, and all 
control variables on issue attitude with initial measurement model with all items 
Factor df F ηp2 p 
Adjusted model 27 8.29 .256 < .001*** 
CV age 1 10.79 .016 .001** 
CV sex (men = 1) 1 0.12 < .001 .727 
CV education (high = 1) 1 1.68 .003 .195 
CV income 1 2.30 .004 .129 
CV need for closure 1 27.31 .040 < .001*** 
CV need for cognition 1 2.35 .004 .126 
CV involvement reading 1 1.05 .002 .307 
CV involvement thinking 1 3.80 .006 .052 
CV centrality of social welfare attitudes 1 1.54 .002 .215 
CV numeracy 1 0.67  .001 .413 
CV political knowledge 1 0.02 < .001 .876 
CV political leaning 1 0.58 < .001 .448 
CV affectedness by serious illness – self (yes = 1) 1 6.19 .009 .013* 
CV affectedness by serious illness – strong ties (yes = 1) 1 0.05 < .001 .819 
CV affectedness by serious illness – weak ties (yes = 1) 1 0.08 < .001 .773 
CV topic interest 1 5.21 .008 .023* 
Argument strength 1 23.10 .034 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame  1 23.10 .034 < .001*** 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
1 41.12 .059 < .001*** 
Value preference for economic-individualism 1 48.06 .069 < .001*** 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
1 0.39  < .001 .532 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism 
1 1.46 .002 .227 
Argument strength X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 4.75 .007 .030* 
Frame economic-individualism vs. no frame X 
value preference for economic-individualism 
1 0.03 < .001 .874 
Frame economic-individualism vs. 
humanitarianism X value preference for 
economic-individualism 
1 0.10 < .001 .751 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame X value preference 
for economic-individualism 
1 0.08 < .001 .781 
Argument strength X frame economic-
individualism vs. humanitarianism X value 
preference for economic-individualism 
1 4.35 .007 .037* 
Note. R2 = .256, R2adjusted = .223, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, CV = control variable, 
n = 678 (lower n due to missing values for control variables) 
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5.1.7 Summary 
The results regarding the (interaction) effects of the three independent variables of issue-
specific argument strength, salience emphasis frames, and citizens’ political value 
preference on issue attitude presented in Subchapter 5.1.1 to Subchapter 5.1.5 answered 
the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 and mainly supported the proposed hypotheses H1 
to H7, even after extensive robustness checks (see Subchapter 5.1.6). 
Hypothesis H1 stated that issue-specific argument strength exerts an independent 
main effect on issue attitude across all framing conditions and both political value 
preferences. The empirical results support this hypothesis (see Subchapter 5.1.2). On 
aggregate, participants opposed the approval of the new therapy more strongly when its 
costs were high than when they were low, i.e., when issue-specific argument strength for 
opposing the approval was strong. 
This result indicates that citizens follow issue-specific argument strength and 
demonstrate a certain degree of rationality in their attitude formation in the sense of relying 
on the persuasive strength of the facts provided for a specific political topic. However, the 
effect size was rather small (d = .37), indicating that substantive thematic information did 
not play a very prominent role in attitude formation and that additional effects of salience 
emphasis frames might threaten citizens’ rationality in attitude formation (for a short 
overview of the results for H1-H7 and RQ1 and RQ2, see Table 53). 
In fact, salience emphasis frames influenced citizens’ issue attitude as an 
independent main effect across the levels of issue-specific argument strength and citizens’ 
political value preference. Specifically, the economic-individualism frame significantly 
reduced support for the approval of the new therapy compared to situations without 
explicit frames (supporting H2) and compared to situations in which only the counter-
frame humanitarianism contextualized the issue (supporting H3). However, the 
humanitarianism frame had no effect compared to situations when no explicit frame was 
present but only new thematic information (not supporting H2). This indicates that even 
though salience emphasis frames can potentially influence citizens’ issue attitude, this 
potential does not always translate into attitudinal effects (for a more elaborate explanation, 
see Subchapter 5.1.2). 
Nevertheless, the results for the economic-individualism frame, the frame of interest 
in the methodological design of this study (see Subchapter 4.2.4), are unambiguous, 
revealing relatively strong effects (dcompared to no frame = .53, dcompared to counter-frame = .69). This 
implies that citizens are susceptible to framing effects, even when the frames are 
constructed as salience emphasis frames that do not add any further issue-specific 
information. This result is not only important in terms of supporting the theoretical concept 
of unique and non-confounded emphasis framing effects (see Chapter 2.8), but it is also 
an initial sign for some irrationality in citizens’ attitude formation. It indicates that citizens 
arbitrarily change their issue attitudes based on the presentation of salience emphasis frames 
despite the presence of the same substantive thematic information. 
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Hypothesis H4 proposed that also the third variable of interest, i.e., citizens’ political 
value preference (for economic-individualism), influenced respondents’ issue attitude as an 
independent main effect across all experimental conditions (see Subchapter 5.1.2). 
Although the effect size was rather small (d = -.34), this result confirms the general 
relevance of political value preferences in attitude formation. However, while it can be to 
Table 53. Summary of hypotheses H1-H7 and research questions RQ1 and RQ2 
concerning direct (interaction) effects on the dependent variable of issue attitude 
Hypothesis /research question Statistical result Answer to hypothesis / 
research question 
H1: Main effect issue-specific 
argument strength 
Main effect significant and 
in expected direction 
Entirely supported 
H2: Main effect of salience 
emphasis frame compared to no 
frame 
Main effect significant and 
in expected direction for 
economic-individualism  
frame but not for 
humanitarianism frame 
Supported for frame of 
interest but not for 
counter-frame 
H3: Main effect of salience 
emphasis frame compared to 
counter-frame 
Main effect significant and 
in expected direction 
Entirely supported 
H4: Main effect political value 
preference 
Main effect significant and 
in expected direction 
Entirely supported 
RQ1: Frame effect for strong and 
weak issue-specific argument? 
Two-way interaction 
insignificant and simple 
effects show effects on 
both levels 
Frame effect for strong and 
weak issue-specific 
argument 
RQ2: Frame effect when value-
resonant and non-resonant? 
Two-way interaction 
insignificant and simple 
effects show effects on 
both levels 
Frame effect when value-
resonant and non-resonant 
H5: Suppression of issue-specific 
argument effect through value-
resonant frame compared to no 
frame  
Three-way-interaction 
insignificant but simple 
effects as expected 
Not supported by 
interaction but simple 
effects as hypothesized 
H6: Suppression of issue-specific 
argument effect through value-
resonant frame compared to 
counter-frame 
Three-way-interaction 
significant and simple 
effects as expected 
Entirely supported 
H7: Effect of value preference 
when incongruent message but 
not when congruent message 
Three-way-interaction 
significant and simple 
effects as expected 
Entirely supported 
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some extent rational to interpret new thematic information under the umbrella of one’s 
core beliefs to achieve consistent understanding of issue-specific information, it can also be 
problematic for the formation of rational attitudes, because the effect implies a biased 
processing of this information along one’s own preferences. 
Regarding the effects of salience emphasis frames, the first two research questions 
asked about the stability of such framing effects under different conditions. Research 
question RQ1 asked whether such frames are only effective when contextualizing strong 
issue-specific arguments for its issue position or also when argument strength in thematic 
information is weak for the position of the frame. The results revealed that the economic-
individualism frame not only led to lower support of the approval of the new therapy when 
contextualizing the thematic information that the costs would be high for this approval 
(CHF 300, strong issue-specific argument), but also when contextualizing the low costs 
(CHF 10, weak argument). That is, weak issue-specific arguments did not prevent citizens 
from being susceptible to the effects of salience emphasis frames (see Subchapter 5.1.3). 
This raises stronger concerns about citizens’ rationality in attitude formation than did the 
results on the main effect of frames (see above), because it suggests that citizens’ attitude 
not only varies arbitrarily when different frames contextualize the same substantive 
information, but also when the thematic information contains only less compelling issue-
specific argument strength for having an attitude aligned with the salience emphasis frame. 
Research question RQ2 asked about another conditionality of salience emphasis 
framing effects, namely whether frames only influence issue attitude when the frame is 
value-resonant and matches citizens’ political value preferences or also when the frame is 
non-resonant. Again, framing effects were persistent and the economic-individualism frame 
not only reduced the support of citizens with a high preference for the political value of 
economic-individualism, but also of citizens not adhering to this value (see Subchapter 
5.1.3). Particularly the effects of the non-resonant frame further put into question citizens’ 
rationality in attitude formation, as they imply that changes in attitudes due to salience 
emphasis frames can be so arbitrary that citizens even form attitudes against their core 
values, while thematic information is still the same. 
However, the strongest indicators for irrationality in citizens’ attitude formation 
under framing conditions are the results for hypotheses H5 and H6 regarding the 
suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength through value-resonant 
framing (see Subchapter 5.1.4). While the three-way interactions formally supported this 
suppression effect compared to situations with a counter-frame (H6), but not compared to 
situations without explicit framing (H5), the simple effects analysis clearly demonstrated 
that value-resonant frames led citizens to no longer differentiate between the weakly and 
strongly persuasive issue-specific facts for the issue position of their value-resonant frame. 
While the persuasiveness of the facts in the thematic information influenced citizens’ issue 
attitude when there was no value-resonant frame, the value-resonant frame made the weak 
issue-specific argument as compelling as the strong argument. Consequently, citizens’ issue 
attitude simply followed their value-resonant frame at the same magnitude, and they formed 
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the same attitude, regardless of the issue-specific argument strength of the thematic 
information. 
However, the results for hypothesis H7 revealed that frames can at least sometimes 
help reduce motivated reasoning along individual political value preferences and thus, can 
sometimes lead to less biased processing of political messages (see Subchapter 5.1.5). In 
most conditions, citizens relied on their value preferences when interpreting thematic 
information and frames. However, when salience emphasis frames contextualized strong 
issue-specific arguments for its issue position (i.e., when the message was congruent), then 
even citizens for whom the frame was non-resonant accepted this issue position, following 
the stronger issue-specific argument even though it was against their default attitude on 
social welfare based on their value preference. This then suppressed the influence of value 
preferences, and citizens with different political preferences formed the same issue attitude 
based on the strong issue-specific information emphasized by the congruent frame. 
In sum, these results indicate that despite the general influence of the issue-specific 
argument strength of new thematic information (H1), salience emphasis frames affected 
citizens’ issue attitudes when no further issue-specific information was provided, 
highlighting the potential effectiveness of frames themselves (H2 and H3). These unique 
frame effects were relatively strong and showed a rather high degree of stability in different 
situations. The effects of salience emphasis frames occurred whether or not the frame 
contextualized issue-specific arguments that were themselves strongly or weakly persuasive 
for an attitude in the direction of the frame (RQ1) and regardless of citizens’ political value 
preference (RQ2), even though value preferences also influenced citizens’ issue attitude 
independently (H4). 
Moreover, value-resonant frames that matched citizens’ value preference suppressed 
the effect of issue-specific argument strength. Here, citizens completely ignored the weak 
argument strength for the issue position of their frame but simply followed this frame in 
the same way as when this frame contextualized strong issue-specific arguments for its issue 
position (H5 and H6). These results imply that salience emphasis frames can threaten 
rational attitude formation based on substantive thematic information, and foster the biased 
processing of issue-specific information. However, salience emphasis frames can 
sometimes help reduce motivated reasoning about thematic information along political 
value preferences when such frames contextualize strong issue-specific arguments for its 
issue position (i.e., when messages are congruent, see H7). 
However, the results thus far have not focused on the exact psychological 
mechanisms responsible for the effects of salience emphasis frames. Thus, the next chapter 
“zooms” into these effects and presents a series of mediation analyses to answer the 
question regarding via which mechanisms frames influence citizens’ issue attitudes (H8-H9 
and RQ3, see Chapter 5.2). 
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5.2 Mediation analyses: The mechanisms behind salience 
emphasis framing effects 
5.2.1 Mediation of the effects of salience emphasis frames and issue-specific 
argument strength via belief content change and belief importance change 
(H8 and H9) 
The previous Chapter 5.1 discussed the direct effects of issue-specific argument strength, 
salience emphasis frames, and political value preferences on issue attitude. The next 
subchapters “zoom” into these effects and examine via which mechanisms (i.e., mediators) 
the independent variables of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames 
affect citizens’ issue attitude. That is, the explanations for these effects are investigated 
through mediation analyses that simultaneously tested for multiple competing mediators to 
determine what drives the effects of the independent variables (Hayes, 2018, pp. 149–167). 
For this, the focus was on the mediators concerned with economic-individualism, 
because the design only varied the issue-specific argument strength connected with 
economic-individualism, namely the amount of additional costs an approval of the new 
therapy would bring about (see Subchapter 4.2.4). The first mediation hypothesis 
proposed that the effect of issue-specific argument strength for economic-individualism is 
mediated via belief content for economic-individualism, but not via belief importance (H8, 
see Part III). In other words, the higher costs for the new therapy in the stimuli increases 
the perception that the new therapy is expensive, which decreases support for approval. 
Furthermore, issue-specific argument strength does not affect how important respondents 
judge financial considerations in general when considering medical approvals (i.e., 
importance of the salience emphasis frame economic-individualism). 
In contrast, hypothesis H9 proposes that the effect of the economic-individualism 
frame should work via the belief importance of economic-individualism, but not via belief 
content. That is, this frame first strengthens the general relevance participants attribute to 
financial considerations, which subsequently decreases support for approval, whereas the 




To analyze these two hypotheses, a structural equation mediation analysis was run in R with 
the package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) by integrating the measurement model of the involved 
latent variables and using the MLR estimator, as in the confirmatory factor analysis before 
(see Subchapter 4.3.4). Because the mediation analysis builds on a multiple regression 
approach, it was necessary to delineate the three-level factor frame to ensure the single 
effects could be interpreted. Thus, the analysis used the same sum-to-zero contrasts that 
do not test against the grand mean but against predefined groups, as done when testing the 
direct effects of the independent variables on issue attitude (see Subchapter 5.1.1). 
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Figure 28 provides the results of this structural equation mediation analysis. The 
full model demonstrated a satisfactory model fit (CFI = .995, TLI = .992, RMSEA = .036, 
and SRMR = .018) and revealed that strong issue-specific argument strength significantly 
increased the belief content that the new therapy was expensive (b = .84, p < .001). In turn, 
higher belief content significantly reduced support for approval of the new therapy 
(b = -.33, p < .001). This indirect effect was significant (b = -.28, p < .001, see Table 54), 
thereby supporting H8. 
In contrast, issue-specific argument strength did not affect the general belief 
importance of the economic-individualism frame (b = .15, p = .15), while belief importance 
was related to issue attitude (b = -.27, p < .001). Consequently, the indirect effect was 
insignificant (b = -.04, p = .16). A contrast test between these two indirect effects (see 
Hayes, 2018, pp. 163–166) further confirmed that the indirect effect via belief content was 
significantly stronger than via belief importance (b = -.24, p < .001). However, the direct 
effect of issue-specific argument strength on issue attitude was still significant (b = -.21, 
p = .025), implying that its effect was only partially mediated by the significant effect via 
belief content. Thus, belief content change did not completely explain why issue-specific 
argument strength affected issue attitude. 
Contrary to hypothesis H9, the effect of the economic-individualism frame on issue 
attitude was not mediated by the belief importance of this political value, not compared to 
situations without frames (indirect effect: b = -.01, p = .85) or that with the counter-frame 
humanitarianism (indirect effect: b = -.04, p = .21). Instead, the effect of the salience 
emphasis frame was significantly mediated via belief content in comparison to the no frame 
(indirect effect: b = -.09, p = .005) and to the counter-frame condition (indirect effect: 
b = -.08, p = .010). Specifically, the economic-individualism frame led participants to 
perceive the new therapy as significantly more expensive (bcompared to no frame = .29, 
pcompared to no frame = .002, bcompared to counter-frame = .26, pcompared to counter-frame = .006). In turn, this 
increased belief content decreased support for approval (b = -.33, p < .001). 
Furthermore, the indirect effect via belief content was significantly stronger than via 
belief importance for the effect of the salience emphasis frame compared to the no frame 
condition, as revealed in a contrast test of the two indirect effects (b = -.09, p = .027). 
However, also the direct effect of the frame remained significant (bcompared to no frame = -.69, 
pcompared to no frame < .001, bcompared to counter-frame = -.89, pcompared to counter-frame < .001), indicating 
that belief content only partially mediated the frame effect on issue attitude. 










(R2 = .005) 
Issue attitude 




(R2 = .144) 
-.69 
[-.90, -.47] 
p < .001*** 
Note. Results are based on SEM using MLR estimator with n = 833, χ2(df = 42) = 82.45, 
CFI = .995, TLI = .992, RMSEA = .036, SRMR = .018, measurement model included but 
not shown for reasons of clarity, displayed are unstandardized coefficients with 95% 
confidence intervals in brackets, significant paths (p < .05) in black, insignificant paths 

















Figure 28. Mediation of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change and belief importance change of economic-
individualism 




Interpretation of results for H8 and H9 
Based on the results of this mediation analysis, it must be concluded that separating new 
thematic information and salience emphasis frames did not help to explain the 
contradictory findings of former (confounded) framing studies on the mediation of framing 
effects (see Subchapter 2.8.4). On one hand, at least H8 was empirically supported. 
Different new thematic information with varying argument strength unsurprisingly changed 
Table 54. Effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 












Total effect of issue-specific 
argument strength on issue 
attitude 
-.52 .10 [-.71, -.33] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.21 .09 [-.39, -.03] .025* 
Indirect via belief content -.28 .04 [-.36, -.19] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief importance -.04 .03 [-.09, .02] .162 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.24 .05 [-.33, -.14] < .001*** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
-.79 .12 [-1.03, -.55] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.69 .11 [-.90, -.47] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.09 .03 [-.16, -.03] .005** 
Indirect via belief importance -.01 .03 [-.07, .06] .850 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.09 .04 [-.16, -.01] .027* 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
-1.02 .12 [-1.26, .77] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.89 .11 [-1.10, -.67] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.08 .03 [-.15, -.02] .010* 
Indirect via belief importance -.04 .03 [-.11, .02] .207 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.04 .04 [-.12, .04] .295 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 833 
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the belief content for the issue, which then influenced citizens issue attitude. For instance, 
the information that the new therapy would lead to an increase of CHF 300 in personal 
insurance rates per year led to the belief content that the new therapy is more expensive 
than when the information stated that the increase is only CHF 10 per year, and the more 
expensive the therapy was judged, the less it was supported. On the other, the results 
provide no evidence for the mediation of salience emphasis framing effects via changes in 
citizens’ belief importance (not supporting H9). 
That is, when citizens were exposed to the economic-individualism frame, they did 
not rate economic considerations as a more important standard of valuation for interpreting 
the issue, despite that the frame explicitly stated the importance of economic considerations 
in interpreting the issue. In contrast, different salience emphasis frames that did not contain 
any further issue-specific information slightly changed belief content about the issue, 
thereby affecting citizens’ issue attitude, albeit only as a partial mediation that did not fully 
explain the framing effect (see the remaining significant direct effect of the frame variables 
on issue attitude in Table 54). These results raise two relevant questions. First, why did 
salience emphasis frames not influence the belief importance of the employed political 
value in the frame? Second, why did salience emphasis frames change the content of beliefs 
without presenting new substantive content about the issue? 
Starting with the first question, an explanation could be that the political values 
employed in the frames were fundamental values. Citizens demonstrate very stable 
preferences for these values (see Subchapter 2.5.1), and single exposure to a value frame 
might not be sufficient to change the importance of the political value, not even for the 
single interpretation of the specific topic. Probably, salience emphasis frames that employ 
less fundamental values than economic-individualism and humanitarianism can more easily 
work via changes in belief importance, because the personal importance of these values is 
less persistent and thus, can more easily be changed through the one-time reception of a 
single salience emphasis frame. 
Interestingly, some studies that found that emphasis framing effects were mediated 
via belief importance change employed issue-specific frames that did not use fundamental 
cross-thematic political values, but specific and less established standards of reference as 
frames (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2011⁠; Lecheler et al., 2009⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012). This 
may have provided more room for changes in the importance of these frames, because 
citizens did not already have stable preferences regarding these frames. However, other 
studies that employed more general value emphasis frames found significant mediation 
effects of the frames via belief importance change (Druckman & Nelson, 2003⁠; Nelson, 
2004⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997⁠; Nelson & Oxley, 1999). 
As such, employing value emphasis frames should not necessarily inhibit the 
mediation of framing effects via belief importance change. However, it is likely that the 
political values employed in this study impeded changes in the importance of these values 
as standards for interpreting the issue, because both values represent a core political 
cleavage in western societies (see Subchapter 4.2.3) and thus, are unlikely to change in 
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importance after single frame exposure. However, note that the salience emphasis frames 
employing these fundamental values were effective in changing citizens’ attitude, as the 
strong and direct effects of the frame variables in Figure 28 show (see also the results in 
Chapter 5.1). This mediation analysis simply revealed that a change in belief importance is 
not responsible for the effects of salience emphasis frames. 
In contrast, the effects of salience emphasis frames were unexpectedly mediated via 
changes in citizens’ belief content about the issue, although only slightly. Previous studies 
showed that emphasis frames confounded with new thematic information also influence 
the content citizens know about an issue (e.g., Lecheler et al., 2009⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2012). However, the theoretical idea of this study was that the effects of frames should not 
work via belief content change when thematic information and salience emphasis frames 
are disentangled as two controlled independent variables. Here, only thematic information 
should change belief content, as it is the only factor providing new thematic information 
that could change belief content (see Subchapter 2.8.4). Thus far, the only explanation in 
the literature for why emphasis frames can affect belief content is the provision of new 
beliefs (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Slothuus, 2008). However, given that the salience 
emphasis frames did not contain new thematic information, this explanation does not 
explain the unexpected result that the frames in this study changed belief content. 
Instead, it seems that salience emphasis frames more directly affect how thematic 
information is processed, which then changes belief content without having to provide new 
information. For instance, the economic-individualism frame explicitly defined the amount 
of additional costs as expensive, which might have changed the content citizens stored in 
their memory about how expensive the new therapy was compared to citizens exposed to 
the humanitarianism frame, which did not define the same issue-specific information about 
the costs as being expensive. Thus, even salience emphasis frames can alter belief content, 
but not because the frames add new beliefs by providing new thematic information, but 
because they change what citizens store in their memory as factual content about a topic 
by redefining the facts themselves. 
However, the indirect effects of the economic-individualism frame on issue attitude 
via belief content change were rather small (bcompared to no frame = -.09, 
bcompared to counter-frame = -.08, see Table 54) and only partially mediated the frame effects. This 
implies that this explanation only partially clarifies why salience emphasis frames affect 
citizens’ attitude. Nevertheless, this result and its explanation is on one hand problematic 
for hypothesis H9, which proposed that salience emphasis frames work via belief 
importance changes but not via changes in belief content. On the other, this result is 
simultaneously a first indicator that salience emphasis frames are more directly involved in 
the processing of thematic information itself rather than strengthening the importance of a 
specific frame of reference. Thus, the effects might work via the additionally proposed 
mediator of belief evaluation noted in research question RQ3, which is addressed in the 
next subchapter (see Subchapter 5.2.2). 
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Before integrating this additional mediator into the next model, the interim 
conclusion for the mediation processes of the effects of thematic information with varying 
argument strength and of salience emphasis frames is that new thematic information affects 
citizens’ issue attitude via changes in belief content (supporting H8). However, salience 
emphasis frames do not influence the belief importance citizens attribute to the frame in 
interpreting the issue (rejecting H9). 
5.2.2 Mediation of the effects of salience emphasis frames and issue-specific 
argument strength via belief content change, belief importance change, and 
belief evaluation change (RQ3) 
The first mediation analysis, described in the previous Subchapter 5.2.1, revealed that the 
classic mediator of belief importance could not explain the effects on issue attitude, even 
though it often serves as an explanation for emphasis framing effects in the literature (e.g., 
Druckman & Nelson, 2003⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ⁠; Nelson, Oxley et al., 1997 ⁠; Nelson 
& Oxley, 1999⁠; Slothuus, 2008), as outlined in Subchapter 2.3.3. In contrast, the effects of 
the salience emphasis frame were significantly mediated via belief content. However, the 
indirect frame effects via this mediator were rather small and only partially explained the 
effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude. Thus, there is still room for other 
mediators that might explain the effects of salience emphasis frames, such as the mediator 
of belief evaluation change introduced in Subchapter 2.8.4. 
Specifically, research question RQ3 asked whether salience emphasis frames directly 
affect the processing of presented thematic information by making the presented issue-
specific arguments more compelling (i.e., belief evaluation change), not by changing the 
belief itself (i.e., the belief content about whether the therapy is expensive or not) and not 
by increasing the relevance of the salience emphasis frame as a valuation standard for the 
topic (i.e., belief importance). Thus, this subchapter reports a second mediation analysis 
integrating all three mediators simultaneously – belief content and belief importance 
derived from the literature and the newly proposed belief evaluation – to test whether the 
explanatory power of the mediation analysis is increased. 
 
Statistical results 
Even after integrating belief evaluation as a third mediator, the overall model fit of the 
structural equation mediation model was highly similar to that of the first model, showing 
again satisfactory values with CFI = .994, TLI = .991, RMSEA = .036, and SRMR = .020 
(see Figure 29), enabling an interpretation of the mediation analysis. The indirect effects 
of the salience emphasis frames via belief importance remained insignificant 
(bcompared to no frame = .00, pcompared to no frame = .84, bcompared to counter-frame = .01, 
pcompared to counter-frame = .51, see Table 55), while the mediation of the frame effects via belief 
content were only marginally significant (bcompared to no frame = -.03, pcompared to no frame = .063, 
bcompared to counter-frame = -.03, pcompared to counter-frame = .076). 
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In contrast, the indirect effect via belief evaluation was significant for the economic-
individualism frame compared to the no frame condition and compared to the condition 
with the counter-frame humanitarianism (bcompared to no frame = -.24, pcompared to no frame = .002, 
bcompared to counter-frame = -.30, pcompared to counter-frame < .001). Participants exposed to this frame 
perceived the issue-specific cost argument as more compelling (bcompared to no frame = .41, 
pcompared to no frame = .001, bcompared to counter-frame = .53, pcompared to counter-frame < .001), which then 
significantly reduced support for approval (b = -.57, p < .001). 
According to a contrast test (see Table 56), the indirect effect of the salience 
emphasis frames via belief evaluation was significantly stronger than via belief content 
(bcompared to no frame = .21, pcompared to no frame = .005, bcompared to counter-frame = .28, 
pcompared to counter-frame < .001) and via belief importance (bcompared to no frame = .24, 
pcompared to no frame = .002, bcompared to counter-frame = .31, pcompared to counter-frame < .001). However, 
the direct effect of the economic-individualism frame remained significant 
(bcompared to no frame = -.52, pcompared to no frame < .001, bcompared to counter-frame = -.70, 
pcompared to counter-frame < .001). This indicates that the significant mediation via belief 
evaluation only partially explained the effects of salience emphasis frames. Nevertheless, 
the formal answer to research question RQ3 is that salience emphasis frames (partially) 
influence citizens’ issue attitude via changes in the evaluation of beliefs. 
However, not only the effects of the salience emphasis frames were mediated via 
belief evaluation change. The issue-specific argument effect was also significantly mediated 
via the newly introduced mediator of belief evaluation (indirect effect: b = -.34, p < .001). 
Higher issue-specific argument strength led to the evaluation that this thematic argument 
is more compelling (b = .60, p < .001), which subsequently decreased support for approval 
(b = -.57, p < .001). According to the contrast test, the indirect effect of issue-specific 
argument strength via belief evaluation change was also significantly stronger than the one 
via belief content (b = .35, p < .001), while the indirect effect via belief content remained 
significant (b = -.08, p = .022), as it did in the first mediation analysis reported in the 
previous Subchapter 5.2.1. Compared to the first mediation model, issue-specific 
argument strength no longer directly affected issue attitude in the second mediation model 
(b = -.10, p = .24). This suggests that the issue-specific argument effect was fully explained 
by the mediation after integrating the significant mediator of belief evaluation. That is, the 
newly introduced mediator of belief evaluation change did not only explain the effects of 
the salience emphasis frames but also the effect of issue-specific argument strength. 
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Note. Results are based on SEM using MLR estimator with n = 833, χ2(df = 72) = 137.42, 
CFI = .994, TLI = .991, RMSEA = .036, SRMR = .020, measurement model included but 
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p < .001*** 
Figure 29. Mediation of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and belief
evaluation change of economic-individualism 




Table 55. Effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and belief 











Total effect of issue-specific 
argument strength on issue 
attitude 
-.52 .10 [-.71, -.33] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.10 .09 [-.27, .07] .240 
Indirect via belief content -.08 .04 [-.16, -.01] .022* 
Indirect via belief importance .01 .01 [-.01, .02] .501 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.34 .07 [-.48, -.21] < .001*** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
-.79 .12 [-1.03, -.55] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.52 .10 [-.72, -.33] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.03 .02 [-.06, .00] .063† 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .00 [-.01, .0] .844 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.24 .07 [-.38, -.09] .002** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
-1.02 .12 [-1.26, -.77] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.70 .10 [-.90, -.49] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.03 .01 [-.05, .00] .076† 
Indirect via belief importance .01 .01 [-.01, .02] .506 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.30 .08 [-.45, -.15] < .001*** 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 833 






Table 56. Contrasts for effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis 
frames on citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and 











Mediation of issue-specific 
argument strength 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.09 .04 [-0.16, -0.02] .018* 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.26 .08 [.10, .42] .001** 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.35 .07 [.21, .49] < .001*** 
Mediation of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.03 .02 [-.06, .00] .077† 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.21 .07 [.06, .35] .005** 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.24 .08 [.09, .39] .002** 
Mediation of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.03 .02 [-.06, .00] .072† 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.28 .08 [.12, .43] < .001*** 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.31 .08 [.14, .47] < .001*** 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 833 
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Interpretation of statistical results for RQ3 
Before delving into the mediation of the effects of salience emphasis frames, some 
interpretative words are necessary for the mediation of the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength, even though this mediation is not a formal aspect of research question RQ3. 
Unsurprisingly, the argument strength of thematic information influenced citizens’ 
knowledge about the issue (i.e., belief content change, also see the initial mediation in 
Subchapter 5.2.1) and how compelling citizens evaluated this information to oppose the 
approval of the new therapy (i.e., belief evaluation change). Both these aspects then 
influenced their issue attitude. Subchapter 2.8.3 and Subchapter 2.8.4 noted that thematic 
information often contains specific persuasiveness for a specific issue position. Therefore, 
the experiment intentionally manipulated issue-specific argument strength to vary how 
compelling the thematic information was considered in opposing the approval (see 
Subchapter 4.2.4). As such, citizens exposed to the strong issue-specific argument of high 
additional expenditures not only rated the new therapy as more expensive (i.e., belief 
content) but also evaluated this higher cost as a more compelling issue-specific argument 
to oppose the approval of the therapy (i.e., belief evaluation), as intended by the 
manipulation. 
This result again highlights that issue-specific information can be persuasive, which 
is an important reason political communication research should separate this factor from 
salience emphasis frames (see Subchapter 2.8.1 and Subchapter 2.8.2). The result also 
implies a certain degree of rationality in citizens’ attitude formation, showing that citizens 
can recognize the issue-specific facts (i.e., belief content) and can (accurately) evaluate the 
persuasive quality thereof (i.e., belief evaluation) to adopt an attitude based on the 
persuasive quality of thematic information. 
However, this rationality is simultaneously questioned when considering the 
mediation of the effects of salience emphasis frames on issue attitude via belief evaluation 
change (RQ3). In fact, the economic-individualism frame biased citizens’ evaluation of how 
compelling the issue-specific argument strength was for opposing the approval. This means 
they did not exclusively rely on the thematic facts itself to evaluate how compelling these 
facts are, but the salience emphasis frames directly changed their processing and evaluation 
of the persuasiveness of thematic information. Salience emphasis frames reduce citizens’ 
ability to judge issue-specific information in an unbiased way. Rather, the frames seem to 
foster motivated reasoning about the argument strength of this information. The frames 
provide a standard of reference to evaluate the information, which here led to the 
directional goal of evaluating this information in a way consistent with the frame (see 
Subchapter 2.8.4). 
As in the initial mediation that did not consider belief evaluation (see Subchapter 
5.2.1), the salience emphasis frames did not alter the general importance of the political 
value suggested by the frame. Thus, the frames did not change belief importance, but they 
changed more directly the processing and evaluation of the thematic information itself. 
Therefore, even if salience emphasis frames did not change the importance citizens 
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attributed to the political value employed by the frame, the influence of this reference to a 
political value existed by serving as an anchor from which to evaluate the thematic 
information in accordance with the frame. In other words, citizens do not need to accept 
the salience emphasis frame as a more important valuation standard, but the frame still 
changes how citizens perceive the persuasiveness of issue-specific information. 
Nevertheless, this frame effect, which according to the data does not work via belief 
importance, should not be understood as a simple heuristic influence of salience emphasis 
frames on issue attitude. This is because its influence on the evaluation of beliefs implies a 
certain degree of systematic processing of issue-specific argument strength. However, this 
systematic evaluation is biased by exposure to salience emphasis frames. Specifically, 
compared to the no frame condition and compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism, 
the economic-individualism frame changed the perceived persuasiveness of issue-specific 
information about the additional costs due to an approval of the new therapy, and citizens 
evaluated the same cost amount as a more compelling reason to oppose the approval. 
Furthermore, the mediation of the framing effects via changes in belief evaluation, 
but not via changes in belief importance, may explain the results for research question RQ2 
(see Subchapter 5.1.3). These results indicated that frames not only influenced citizens 
adhering to the political value employed by the salience emphasis frame but also affected 
citizens with a low preference for this value. Likely, effects of non-resonant frames occur 
because salience emphasis frames do not must necessarily change the importance of a 
political value citizens do not hold, which can be rather complicated given the high stability 
of value preferences even though a frame only tries to change the importance of the value 
for the specific issue at hand. Salience emphasis frames seem to alter the evaluation of issue-
specific argument strength more directly and thus, there is no need to change the 
importance of valuation standards. 
This explanation and the mediation of frame effects via belief evaluation but not via 
belief importance has consequences in terms of assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude 
formation. In fact, citizens change their attitude arbitrarily depending on different salience 
emphasis frames even without accepting the importance of the standard of reference that 
actually guides their evaluation of issue-specific information and thus, their attitude 
formation. That is, the change in belief evaluation is not substantiated by identifiable 
reasons such as learning that a specific political value is more important in understanding 
an issue. If this was the case, changes in attitudes could be interpreted as at least a somewhat 
rational adoption of different salience emphasis frames. However, as frames did not affect 
belief importance, but directly affected the evaluation of issue-specific argument strength, 
this mediation analysis provides additional evidence for irrationality in citizens’ attitude 
formation under framing conditions. 
Another important aspect of the results reported here is that the mediation of 
salience emphasis framing effects still worked partially via changes in belief content, 
although this indirect effect was small and the mediation via belief evaluation change was 
significantly stronger (see the contrast tests in Table 56). As noted in Subchapter 5.2.1, 
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the mediation of the frame effects via changes in belief content were unexpected and imply 
that salience emphasis frames already bias the information intake of thematic facts about 
an issue. Specifically, the economic-individualism frame led citizens to more likely store in 
their memory that the therapy is more expensive and leads to additional costs than when 
this frame was not present. 
Interestingly, the result that salience emphasis frames bias information intake and 
the storing of basic facts about the issue in the memory already emerged in one of the 
treatment checks. Table 36 in Subchapter 4.4.2 clarified that the vast majority of 
participants correctly recognized the amount of additional costs an approval of the new 
therapy would bring about, with one exception. When the low cost was contextualized by 
the economic-individualism frame, respondents recognized the cost significantly less 
correctly, and more often incorrectly thought that the additional expenditures were high. 
This suggests that salience emphasis frames alter the content of citizens’ beliefs about an 
issue, even if these salience emphasis frames do not provide any further thematic 
information. Nevertheless, the significantly stronger mediator for framing effects was still 
belief evaluation change, implying that salience emphasis frames more strongly bias the 
processing and evaluation of thematic information than does information intake. 
However, even though the newly introduced mediator belief evaluation change 
could significantly explain the effects of salience emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude, 
the direct effects of the frames on issue attitude persisted (see Figure 29 and Table 55). 
This indicates that belief evaluation change only partially explains the framing effects. While 
introducing the new mediator helped better understanding the psychological processes 
behind salience emphasis framing effects, further explanations of these effects are needed. 
Previous studies on the mediation of framing effects also found a remaining direct effect, 
meaning that thus far, there is no “exhaustive model of the psychological mechanisms of 
framing effects” (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012, p. 196). In this study, it may have been 
beneficial to also include emotions as a further mediator to explain in more depth the 
mechanisms behind framing. Emotions can (partly) explain emphasis framing effects (e.g., 
Kühne & Schemer, 2015⁠; Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015), and especially when 
working with identity-relevant value frames, emotions may be influential, as political values 
are often emotionally charged (cf. B. T. Scheufele & Gasteiger, 2007). However, limited 
space in the questionnaire meant that the focus of this study was on introducing belief 
evaluation change as a further cognitive mediator to better understand the multidimensional 
mediation process of framing effects. 
In sum, the results presented in this subchapter addressed research question RQ3. 
It was clarified that the effects of salience emphasis frames also work via changes in the 
evaluation of beliefs about an issue without changing the importance of the political value 
suggested by the frame. Before summarizing all results concerning the mediation of salience 
emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 5.2.4), the next Subchapter 5.2.3 describes 
several robustness checks of these findings to ensure the statistical validity of the results. 
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5.2.3 Robustness checks 
To secure the findings of the mediation model containing all three mediators explained in 
Subchapter 5.2.2, two further robustness checks were performed. The first robustness 
check extended the mediation model by including participants’ value preference for 
economic-individualism as a two-level quasi-factor together with all possible interactions 
between issue-specific argument strength, salience emphasis frames, and citizens’ political 
value preference to ensure that the indirect effects found were invariant to respondents’ 
value preference. 
The overall fit of this model was satisfactory with CFI = .994, TLI = .991, 
RMSEA = .026, SRMR = .014 (see Figure 30). Furthermore, the indirect effects of the 
economic-individualism frame via belief evaluation on issue attitude remained significant 
(see Table 57) compared to the no frame condition (b = -.25, p < .001) and compared to 
the counter-frame humanitarianism (b = -.26, p < .001). Again, no significant mediation of 
the frame effect via belief importance was found (bcompared to no frame = .00, pcompared to no frame 
= .77, bcompared to counter-frame = .00, pcompared to counter-frame = .66), and only a marginally significant 
indirect effect via belief content occurred (bcompared to no frame = -.03, pcompared to no frame = .055, 
bcompared to counter-frame = -.02, pcompared to counter-frame = .087). 
A contrast test (see Table 58) further validated that the indirect effects of the 
salience emphasis frames via belief evaluation were significantly stronger than via belief 
content (bcompared to no frame = .22, pcompared to no frame = .002, bcompared to counter-frame = .24, 
pcompared to counter-frame = .002) and via belief importance (bcompared to no frame = .25, 
pcompared to no frame = .001, bcompared to counter-frame = .26, pcompared to counter-frame = .001). However, 
the direct effect of the economic-individualism frame on issue attitude again remained 
significant (bcompared to no frame = -.52, pcompared to no frame < .001, bcompared to counter-frame = -.69, 
pcompared to counter-frame < .001). This indicates that the effects of the salience emphasis frames 
was still only partially mediated by the indirect effect via belief evaluation. 
For the effects of issue-specific argument strength, the results were the same as 
when citizens’ political value preference and the interactions were not considered. No direct 
effect of issue-specific argument strength on issue attitude was found (b = -.12, p = .18), 
but a significant indirect effect via belief evaluation (b = -.34, p < .001) and also via belief 
content emerged (b = -.08, p = .021). A contrast analysis again revealed that the indirect 
effect via belief evaluation was significantly stronger than via belief content (b = .34, 
p < .001). This demonstrates that the effect of issue-specific argument strength was mainly 
mediated via a change in belief evaluation. 
As such, the first robustness check supports the findings of the earlier mediation 
analysis, confirming the solidity of the results. Moreover, Table 57 shows that the 
respective total effect of the three-way interaction for the suppression of the issue-specific 
argument effect through value-resonant framing compared to the counter-frame (H6) 
remained significant (b = .99, p = .039), as in the ANOVA model (see Subchapter 5.1.1). 
Thus, this suppression effect is also robust when tested through a structural equation 
approach. 
EMPHASIS FRAMING EFFECTS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 320 
 
 
Figure 30. Mediation of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and belief 
evaluation change of economic-individualism controlled for citizens’ political value 
preference (dichotomized) and all possible interactions between argument strength, frames, 









(R2 = .099) 
Issue attitude 




(R2 = .181) 
Note. Results are based on SEM using MLR estimator with n = 833, χ2(df = 136) = 204.34, 
CFI = .994, TLI = .991, RMSEA = .026, SRMR = .014, value preference for economic-
individualism, all interactions, and measurement model included but not shown for reasons 
of clarity, displayed are unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in 
brackets, significant paths (p < .05) in black, insignificant paths (p > .05) in grey, * p < .05, 
























p < .001*** 
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Table 57. Effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and belief 
evaluation change of economic-individualism controlled for citizens’ political value 
preference (dichotomized) and all possible interactions between argument strength, frames, 











Total effect of issue-specific 
argument strength on issue 
attitude 
-.53 .10 [-.72, -.35] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.12 .09 [-.28, .05] .175 
Indirect via belief content -.08 .04 [-.16, -.01] .021* 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .01 [-.01, .02] .514 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.34 .07 [-.47, -.21] < .001*** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
-.80 .12 [-1.04, -57] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.52 .10 [-.72. -.32] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.03 .02 [-.06, .00] .055† 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .00 [-.01, .01] .766 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.25 .07 [-.39, -.11] < .001*** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
-.98 .12 [-1.21, -.74] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.69 .10 [-.89, -.50] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.02 .01 [-.05, .00] .087† 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .01 [-.01, .01] .660 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.26 .08 [-.41, -.11] .001** 
Total effect of value preference 
for economic individualism (as 
quasi-factor) 
-.42 .10 [-.61, -.23] < .001*** 
Total effect of argument strength 
X frame economic-individualism 
vs. no frame X value preference 
for economic individualism 
.56 .48 [-.39, 1.51] .245 
Total effect of argument strength 
X frame economic-individualism 
vs. frame humanitarianism X 
value preference for economic 
individualism 
.99 .48 [.05, 1.94] .039* 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 833 
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In addition to the first robustness check, a second robustness check was performed 
by expanding the model in two ways: the metric latent variable for respondents’ value 
preference for economic-individualism was used as a quasi-factor instead of the 
dichotomized variable and all 16 control variables were integrated in the model. 
This final structural equation model also demonstrated a satisfactory model fit with 
CFI = .974, TLI = .965, RMSEA = .033, and SRMR = .042 (see Figure 31), enabling 
interpretation of the mediation model. Again, a significant indirect effect of the economic-
Table 58. Contrasts for effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis 
frames on citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and 
belief evaluation change of economic-individualism controlled for citizens’ political value 
preference (dichotomized) and all possible interactions between argument strength, frames, 











Mediation of issue-specific 
argument strength 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.09 .04 [-.16, -.02] .017* 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.25 .08 [.10, -41] .002** 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.34 .07 [.21, .48] < .001*** 
Mediation of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.03 .02 [-.07, .00] .061† 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.22 .07 [.08, .36] .002** 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.25 .07 [.11, .40] .001** 
Mediation of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.03 .02 [-.06, .00] .093† 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.24 .08 [.09, .38] .002** 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.26 .08 [.11, .42] .001** 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 833 
V RESULTS 323 
individualism frame via belief evaluation was evident (see Table 59) compared to the no 
frame condition (b = -.19, p = .008) and compared to the counter-frame humanitarianism 
(b = -.19, p = .012). Furthermore, the mediation of the effects of the salience emphasis 
frames via belief importance remained insignificant (bcompared to no frame = .00, 
pcompared to no frame = .94, bcompared to counter-frame = .00, pcompared to counter-frame = .73). 
In addition, the previously marginally significant indirect effect of the economic-
individualism frame via belief content was significant in this robustness check when 
compared to the no frame condition (b = -.04, p = .045), but it was insignificant compared 
to the counter-frame humanitarianism (b = -.03, p = .135). However, the contrast test of 
the two significant indirect effects still revealed that the mediation of the effects of the 
salience emphasis frames via belief evaluation was stronger than via belief content 
(bcompared to no frame = .16, pcompared to no frame = .031, bcompared to counter-frame = .16, 
pcompared to counter-frame = .027, see Table 60). Nevertheless, the direct effect of the economic-
individualism frame compared to the no frame condition (b = -.41, p < .001) and compared 
to the counter-frame humanitarianism (b = -.66, p < .001) remained significant, again 
indicating that the analyzed mediators only partially explain the frame effects on citizens’ 
issue attitude. 
Regarding the effect of issue-specific argument strength, the coefficients in the 
mediation model remained stable. Again, the direct effect of thematic argument strength 
on issue attitude was insignificant (b = -.14, p = .123), whereas the indirect effect via belief 
content (b = -.12, p = .002) and via belief evaluation (b = -.25, p < .001) were still significant. 
However, a contrast test revealed that compared to previous models, the indirect path via 
belief evaluation was no longer significantly stronger than via belief content (b = .13 
p = .102). In addition to the mediated main effects of issue-specific argument strength and 
salience emphasis frames, this last robustness check also revealed that the total effect for 
the three-way interaction that tested the suppression effect hypothesized in H6 was still 
significant (see Table 59). This again confirms the stability of this effect noted earlier when 
directly examining issue attitude by the means of ANOVAs and ANCOVAs (see 
Subchapter 5.1.1 and Subchapter 5.1.6). 
Based on the robustness checks of the tests of the mediation hypotheses, it can be 
concluded that even after controlling for the influence of 16 control variables and after 
employing the metric measure for the quasi-factor value preference, the mediation models 
always suggested the same interpretation: belief importance did not mediate the attitudinal 
effects of salience emphasis frames, but belief evaluation did and to a lesser extent, also 
belief content. That is, the robustness checks confirmed the aforementioned interpretation 
(see Subchapter 5.2.2) that framing influences issue attitudes less via strengthening the 
general applicability of specific assessment criteria such as a political value in interpreting 
an issue (i.e., belief importance). Rather, it directly affects the evaluation of the thematic 
information itself (i.e., belief evaluation). 
The next Subchapter 5.2.4 briefly summarizes the main results for the mediating 
mechanisms of salience emphasis frames and the main implications of these results. 
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Note. Results are based on SEM using MLR estimator with n  = 680 (lower n due to missing 
values for control variables), χ2(df = 406) = 686.67, CFI = .974, TLI = .965, 
RMSEA = .033, SRMR = .042, value preference for economic-individualism (metric), all 
interactions, and measurement model included (except for control variables) but not 
shown for reasons of clarity, displayed are unstandardized coefficients with 95% 
confidence intervals in brackets, significant paths (p < .05) in black, insignificant paths 
























p < .001*** 
Figure 31. Mediation of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and belief 
evaluation change of economic-individualism controlled for all 16 control variables, 
citizens’ political value preference (metric), and all possible interactions between argument 
strength, frames, and value preference 
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Table 59. Effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis frames on 
citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and belief 
evaluation change of economic-individualism controlled for all 16 control variables, 
citizens’ political value preference (metric), and all possible interactions between argument 











Total effect of issue-specific 
argument strength on issue 
attitude 
-.51 .11 [-.72, -.30] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.14 .09 [-.32, .04] .123 
Indirect via belief content -.12 .04 [-.20, .05] .002** 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .00 [-.01, .01] .721 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.25 .07 [-.38, -.12] < .001*** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
-.65 .13 [-.91, -.38] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.41 .11 [-.63, -.19] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.04 .02 [-.08, .00] .045* 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .00 [-.01, .01] .939 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.19 .07 [-.34, -.05] .008** 
Total effect of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
-.88 .13 [-1.14, -.62] < .001*** 
Direct effect -.66 .11 [-.88, -.45] < .001*** 
Indirect via belief content -.03 .02 [-.07, .01] .135 
Indirect via belief importance .00 .00 [-.01, .01] .734 
Indirect via belief evaluation -.19 .08 [-.34, -.04] .012* 
Total effect of value preference 
for economic individualism 
(metric) 
-.30 .06 [-.41, -.19] < .001*** 
Total effect of argument strength 
X frame economic-individualism 
vs. no frame X value preference 
for economic individualism 
.07 .26 [-.44, .58] .794 
Total effect of argument strength 
X frame economic-individualism 
vs. frame humanitarianism X 
value preference for economic 
individualism 
.51 .23 [.06, .97] .027* 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 680 (lower n due to missing values for control 
variables) 





Table 60. Contrasts for effects of issue-specific argument strength and salience emphasis 
frames on citizens’ issue attitude via belief content change, belief importance change, and 
belief evaluation change of economic-individualism controlled for all 16 control variables, 
citizens’ political value preference (metric), and all possible interactions between argument 











Mediation of issue-specific 
argument strength 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.12 .04 [-.20, -.05] .002** 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.13 .08 [-.03, .28] .102 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.25 .07 [.12, .38] < .001*** 
Mediation of frame economic-
individualism vs. no frame 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.04 .02 [-.08, .00] .055† 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.16 .07 [.01, .30] .031* 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.19 .08 [.05, .34] .010* 
Mediation of frame economic-
individualism vs. 
humanitarianism 
    
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief importance 
-.03 .02 [-.07, .01] .178 
Contrast belief content vs. 
belief evaluation 
.16 .07 [.02, .30] .027* 
Contrast belief importance vs. 
belief evaluation 
.19 .08 [.04, .34] .014* 
Note. CI = 95% confidence interval for unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error, 
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, n = 833 
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5.2.4 Summary 
The results presented in the previous Subchapter 5.2.1 and Subchapter 5.2.2 explored 
the psychological mediation processes underlying the direct effects of salience emphasis 
frames on citizens’ issue attitude described in Chapter 5.1. The findings showed a high 
degree of stability, even after a series of robustness checks (see Subchapter 5.2.3). This 
subchapter summarizes the main results of the mediation analyses. Part VI then discusses 
the broader societal implications of all individual findings provided in the entire result 
section (see Part V). 
The basic rationale proposed in Subchapter 2.8.4 was that the separation of salience 
emphasis frames and of new thematic information with varying issue-specific argument 
strength can explain why the studies reviewed in Subchapter 2.3.3 found that 
(confounded) emphasis frames sometimes affect citizens’ issue attitude via changing what 
people know about the issue (i.e., via belief content change), and sometimes work via 
changing the importance of the standard of reference emphasized by the frame in 
interpreting the issue (i.e., via belief importance change). 
As hypothesis H8 proposed, when thematic information was separated from 
salience emphasis frames, the results of the mediation analyses revealed that different 
thematic information with varying issue-specific argument strength influenced citizens’ 
issue attitude via changing their belief content about the issue (see Subchapter 5.2.1, also 
see Table 61 for a summary of the results for all hypotheses and research concerned with 
the mediation of the effects of salience emphasis frames). However, contrary to hypothesis 
H9, salience emphasis frames also changed citizens’ belief content about the issue, and the 
economic-individualism frame led citizens to believe that the costs for the new therapy 
were higher than when no frame was present or when the counter-frame humanitarianism 
contextualized the thematic information. This was despite that the salience emphasis frame 
added no further thematic information about the topic. 
Moreover, salience emphasis frames did not affect the importance citizens attributed 
to the political value the frame emphasized as the important standard of reference by which 
to interpret the topic. Thus, the separation of salience emphasis frames and thematic 
information did not prove that salience emphasis frames work via changes in belief 
importance. This means that hypothesis H9 is rejected, even though previous studies 
revealed that even confounded frames also influence the importance of beliefs. Presumably, 
the political values employed by the salience emphasis frames in this study were too 
fundamental. Therefore, the importance of these values could not be easily changed even 
to interpret only the specific issue at hand (for a longer discussion, see Subchapter 5.2.1). 
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However, the mediation analysis in Subchapter 5.2.2 revealed the newly introduced 
mechanism of belief evaluation change (see Subchapter 2.8.4) as the most influential 
mediator of salience emphasis framing effects (RQ3). Specifically, the economic-
individualism frame altered how compelling citizens evaluated the amount of costs as 
thematic information to oppose the approval. As such, the frame worked by directly biasing 
the evaluation of the argument strength of issue-specific information. Most important, the 
salience emphasis frame influenced the evaluation of beliefs without affecting the 
importance citizens attributed to the frame of reference. This implies that citizens do not 
need to accept the frame as a more important valuation standard. Nevertheless, this frame 
effectively changes how citizens perceive the persuasiveness of issue-specific information. 
This raises further concerns about citizens’ rationality in attitude formation, which was 
already questioned by the results on the direct effects of salience emphasis frames (see 
Chapter 5.1). The result of this mediation analysis highlights how arbitrarily citizens base 
their attitude on salience emphasis frames without substantiating these changes with 
identifiable reasons such as accepting the importance of a political value to interpret 
thematic information. 
Now that the results for all proposed hypotheses and research questions have been 
presented and interpreted individually for each hypothesis and research question, the next 
and last part of this book (see Part VI) discusses the results more broadly. Moreover, 
potential societal implications are highlighted based on these results. 
Table 61. Summary of hypotheses H8-H9 and research question RQ3 on the mediation 
processes behind the effects of thematic information with varying issue-specific argument 
strength and of salience emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude  
Hypothesis /research 
question 
Statistical result Answer to hypothesis / 
research question 
H8: Effect of issue-
specific argument 
strength mediated via 
belief content change 
Effect of issue-specific argument 
strength on belief content significant + 
effect of belief content on issue 
attitude significant + indirect effect 
significant 
Entirely supported 
H9: Effect of salience 
emphasis frame 
mediated via belief 
importance change 
No effect of salience emphasis frame 
on belief importance + indirect effect 
insignificant 
Rejected 
RQ3: Effect of salience 
emphasis frame 
mediated via belief 
evaluation change? 
Effect of salience emphasis frame on 
belief evaluation significant + effect of 
belief evaluation on issue attitude 
significant + indirect effect significant 
Effect of salience 
emphasis frame 
mediated via belief 
evaluation change 
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VI DISCUSSION 
6.1 Implications of the results for assessing the strength of 
salience emphasis framing effects and citizens’ rationality 
in attitude formation 
The proposed theoretical and empirical separation of thematic information and the newly 
introduced concept of salience emphasis frames (see Subchapter 2.8.1 and Subchapter 
2.8.2) enabled an externally valid and precise test of the unique effects of emphasis frames 
on citizens’ issue attitude. This was a test of unique frame effects that “most, if not all” 
former studies on framing effects could not perform, because they confounded emphasis 
frames through the provision of further thematic information, making it impossible to 
detect the isolated effects of frame emphases (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017, p. 3). 
Furthermore, integrating varying issue-specific argument strength of new thematic 
information and citizens’ political value preference as additional variables in the process of 
framing effects enabled a stepwise test of the effectiveness of frames when circumstances 
became increasingly more challenging for unique frame effects (see Subchapter 2.8.3). 
This allowed assessing more precisely than previous studies the superordinate research 
question of this book: How susceptible are citizens to framing effects and how rational is 
their attitude formation under framing conditions? 
Part III delineated this superordinate question into testable hypotheses and 
subordinate research questions about the influence of salience emphasis frames on citizens’ 
issue attitude. Clear effects of salience emphasis frames and detectable irrationality in 
citizens’ attitude formation were expected. These effects were tested using a quantitative, 
experimental approach with a quasi-representative sample of German-speaking Swiss 
citizens (see Part IV). 
 
Assessing the strength of salience emphasis framing effects 
Given the robust empirical results discussed in Part V, the expectation that salience 
emphasis frames influence citizens’ issue attitudes was not falsified. Although new thematic 
facts about a political issue were not ineffective and issue-specific argument strength 
significantly affected citizens’ issue attitude on aggregate (H1), salience emphasis frames 
significantly altered issue attitudes without the provision of any new thematic information 
(H2 and H3). 
Moreover, salience emphasis frames not only were effective when contextualizing 
thematic information with high issue-specific argument strength for the issue position of 
the frame, but also when issue-specific arguments were only weakly persuasive for this 
position (RQ1). That is, the results revealed the unique effects of salience emphasis frames 
that were persistent and independent of the factual content presented about the topic. 
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In addition, salience emphasis frames not only affected citizens for whom the frame 
was value-resonant and matched their political value preference, but the frames also 
influenced citizens for whom the frame was non-resonant (RQ2). However, citizens’ 
political value preference for economic-individualism exerted an independent main effect 
on their issue attitude (H4). 
Moreover, the effects of value-resonant salience emphasis frames were so strong 
they suppressed the effects of issue-specific argument strength (H5 and H6). In general, 
respondents were able to recognize the persuasive strength of thematic information about 
the issue and adopted an issue attitude according to the issue-specific argument strength 
when no frame or a counter-frame was present. However, when the frame was value-
resonant, participants completely ignored the thematic facts about the issue containing only 
weak issue-specific argument strength for the issue position suggested by their frame and 
formed an attitude aligned with their frame in the same way as when the frame 
contextualized thematic information with high argument strength for its issue position. 
In addition, when salience emphasis frames contextualized thematic information 
with low issue-specific argument strength for its issue position – i.e., when messages were 
incongruent – issue attitudes became increasingly polarized between citizens with different 
political value preferences. In contrast, frames suppressed the influence of value 
preferences on attitude formation when contextualizing compelling thematic information 
for its issue position (H7). 
Based on these results, it can be concluded that citizens are rather susceptible to 
salience emphasis framing effects. These effects demonstrated a high degree of stability and 
were rather strong, despite that the circumstances became increasingly more challenging 
for the occurrence of unique framing effects such as reliance on weak issue-specific 
argument strength or non-resonance with citizens’ political value preferences. That is, even 
when frames are not confounded with the supply of further thematic information, their 
effects are comparable to those revealed in previous confounded studies on simple 
emphasis framing effects in one-sided framing situations (see Chapter 2.2). 
Thus, critics’ concerns that the empirical paradigm regarding researching emphasis 
framing effects in political communication overrates the strength of framing effects (Leeper 
& Slothuus, 2017⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017) seems somewhat exaggerated. The 
results here revealed that salience emphasis frames can actually be the powerful political 
tool with minimal costs but potentially strong effects, as proposed in the literature (Jacoby, 
2000). This is because it can work as a subtle form of media influence (D. A. Scheufele, 
2000) that exerts attitudinal effects without having to change existing beliefs via the supply 
of new and compelling issue-specific information, but by simply changing the frame of 
reference for the interpretation of thematic information (Chong, 2000). In other words, 
political actors do not necessarily need the power to control thematic information, as long 
as they can provide applicable salience emphasis frames to contextualize the given 
information about a political issue. 
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Furthermore, the results reported here imply that the concept of emphasis framing 
is not “dead.” It has been confirmed as a unique form of political communication that can 
have persuasive effects independently from persuasion effects based on the supply of new 
thematic information. The more general implications of this result for future research on 
emphasis framing effects are highlighted in Chapter 6.3. Before then, it is important to 
elaborate the meaning of the strong influences of salience emphasis frames found for 
assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation under framing conditions. 
 
Assessing citizens’ rationality in attitude formation under framing conditions 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) define rationality as the consistency and coherence of 
preferences (e.g., for specific decisions, attitudes, or behavior) when confronted with the 
same thematic information. That is, if citizens’ attitude formation is to be judged as rational, 
they should not arbitrarily change their attitude but should consistently form the same 
attitude if no new thematic information is provided that alters the informational foundation 
of this attitude. As such, a rational attitude formation should be based on thematic 
information, but should not be affected by the additional presentation of salience emphasis 
frames that do not add any further information people do not already have in mind, because 
these frames do not alter the level of information relevant to the attitude. 
Given this definition, former studies on emphasis framing effects, which 
confounded the presentation of frames through providing additional thematic information, 
could not fully assess citizens’ rationality in attitude formation, despite contending that 
emphasis framing effects indicate citizens’ incompetence in forming attitudes (cf. 
Druckman, 2001a). Chong and Druckman (2007b) legitimately argued that when emphasis 
frames provide new thematic information, a framing effect does not necessarily imply 
arbitrary shifts in citizens’ attitudes, but can also result from learning from new information 
and point to the rational adoption of attitudes in accordance with changing substantive 
information. That is, former emphasis framing studies were not able to convincingly test 
irrationality in attitude formation because they provided varying information along with the 
varying emphasis frames (see Subchapter 2.8.1). 
In contrast, the proposed conceptualization of salience emphasis frames can provide 
a formal test of rationality, because such frames do not change the informational basis of 
attitudes. This suggests that the effects of such frames are unjustified by changing thematic 
information. Rather, the attitudinal effects are arbitrary changes only because of the 
presentation of frames. That is, once supporting and once opposing exactly the same policy 
only because a salience emphasis frame emphasizes a certain aspect while the substantive 
thematic information remains constant does not reflect the consistent – i.e., rational – 
formation of attitudes based on the same fundamental facts about an issue. 
While the results for hypothesis H1 showed that citizens to some extent formed 
their issue attitude based on the issue-specific argument strength of thematic information 
(see Subchapter 5.1.2), further results of this study demonstrated that the principle of 
rationality was violated multiple times. First, the additional presentation of salience 
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emphasis frames that contextualized the thematic information changed citizens’ issue 
attitude, implying an arbitrary shift in attitudes based only on changes of the frame (H2 and 
H3, see Subchapter 5.1.2). Second, thematic information with a weak issue-specific 
argument strength for the issue position of the frame did not prevent arbitrary shifts in 
attitudes induced by additional salience emphasis frames (RQ1, see Subchapter 5.1.3). That 
is, these shifts occur even when there are good reasons to not arbitrary change one’s attitude 
along the frame. 
Third, sceptics might argue now that these changes in attitudes are actually not so 
arbitrary, but might only occur when the salience emphasis frame matches citizens’ political 
value preference. In such a case, citizens would change their attitude when thematic 
information is constant, but this change would at least be limited to frames aligned with 
citizens’ general political preferences. Thus, the effects could still be justified as at least 
somewhat rational. However, the results for research question RQ2 clearly indicate that 
non-resonant salience emphasis frames that do not match citizens’ political value 
preference also exert attitudinal effects (see Subchapter 5.1.3). Essentially, attitudes not 
only arbitrarily oscillate on aggregate between the presentations of different salience 
emphasis frames, but also when these frames violate citizens’ political value preferences. 
Fourth, the results for hypotheses H5 and H6 indicate that when value-resonant 
salience emphasis frames can alter the influence of thematic information on citizens’ issue 
attitude, even completely suppressing the effect of issue-specific argument strength (see 
Subchapter 5.1.4). This result is the strongest indicator for bounded rationality in citizens’ 
attitude formation, highlighting the unimportance of substantive information when citizens 
form an attitude under certain framing conditions. In fact, citizens completely ignored 
issue-specific argument strength for the issue position of their value-resonant frame, 
following the frame at the same magnitude as when their frame contextualized strong issue-
specific arguments for the issue position. Thus, the irrationality in citizens’ attitude 
formation can be strong enough to render substantive thematic information meaningless 
under some framing conditions. In addition, the same citizens base their attitude on the 
issue-specific argument strength of thematic information under other framing conditions 
(i.e., when no frame or a non-resonant frame is present). This again emphasizes how 
arbitrary attitude formation takes place when different salience emphasis frames are present 
while the thematic information remains the same. 
Nevertheless, sceptics might argue that the isolated result that citizens’ simply follow 
their value preference while completely ignoring thematic facts about the issue indicates a 
form of rational attitude formation, as citizens successfully pursue the directional goal of 
attitude formation aligned with their political preferences rather than pursuing the goal of 
accurate attitude formation that follows issue-specific argument strength. However, there 
is a decisive reason for why the result implies bounded rationality. Specifically, this 
ignorance of issue-specific argument strength is not stable, but it varies in an arbitrary way 
for the same citizens depending on the framing condition. Issue-specific argument strength 
had an influence when no frame or the non-resonant frame was present, but not when a 
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value-resonant frame was used. This indicates that different framing conditions influenced 
citizens to employ different goals (either accuracy goals or directional goals) to interpret the 
same substantive thematic information, leading to different attitudes for the same thematic 
information. 
That is, the suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength through 
value-resonant framing actually underlines how unstable – i.e., irrational – attitude 
formation takes place under framing conditions, even though one can find interpretations 
for why each single attitude might be the result of rationally following a specific information 
processing goal. Put differently, it can be inaccurate but rational to interpret thematic 
information with certain bias. However, it is irrational when this bias does not always 
emerge for the same thematic information and varies based on framing, because this 
instability violates the rationality principle of the coherence of decisions when the 
informational setting remains unchanged. A person may be biased, but not irrational when 
supporting a questionable president. However, when the same person opposes the 
president seconds later without having collected any new information about the president, 
this person is undoubtedly irrational because the attitudinal shift is unsubstantiated. 
Furthermore, the results for hypothesis H7 revealed that when salience emphasis 
frames contextualized strong issue-specific arguments for its issue position, i.e., when the 
frame was congruent with the thematic information, these frames could at least depolarize 
attitudes of citizens with different political values (see Subchapter 5.1.5). From a normative 
perspective, this result may be desirable. However, again, citizens’ attitudes were unstable 
and became increasingly polarized between citizens holding different political values when 
the same thematic information was contextualized by an incongruent frame suggesting the 
opposite issue attitude than the issue-specific argument strength of thematic information. 
That is, on one hand, the isolated result of a less biased assessment of issue-specific 
argument strength based on a congruent frame indicates that frames can foster citizens’ 
rationality in the sense of more accurate attitude formation based on the substantive 
thematic information On the other, however, the fact that a different frame for the same 
thematic information polarized citizens’ issue attitude implies again that salience emphasis 
frames inhibit consistent and rational attitude formation. Rather, they elicit very different 
results when citizens are confronted with the same thematic information. 
The conclusion that salience emphasis frames can lead to bounded rationality in 
citizens’ attitude formation is further corroborated by the results of the mediation analyses 
that tested the psychological mechanisms responsible for framing effects (see Chapter 5.2). 
The analyses revealed that issue-specific argument strength affected citizens’ issue attitude 
via changes in people’s knowledge about the issue (i.e., belief content change, H8). 
However, the decisive mediator of framing effects was the newly introduced mediator of 
belief evaluation change (RQ3), not belief importance change (not supporting H9), which 
is often expected to mediate emphasis framing effects (see Subchapter 2.8.4). Specifically, 
salience emphasis frames directly bias citizens’ evaluation of the argument strength of 
thematic information (i.e., the persuasiveness of the facts about an issue) without 
VI DISCUSSION 334 
 
simultaneously strengthening the cognitive importance of the valuation standard suggested 
by the frame. 
Thus, the shifts in citizens’ issue attitudes evoked by salience emphasis frames were 
the result of biasing the systematic processing of the substantive content of the political 
topic, even though citizens did not agree more strongly with the importance of the frame 
that elicited this bias. Essentially, the change in belief evaluation and thereby in citizens’ 
issue attitude is not substantiated by identifiable reasons such as learning that a specific 
value is more important in understanding an issue. This highlights again that salience 
emphasis framing effects are not the result of rational learning – not of new thematic 
information or of what is the important standard of valuation. Rather, the frames lead to 
unsubstantiated and arbitrary – i.e., irrational – changes in citizens’ issue attitude. 
However, the definition of rationality by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) is not the 
only way to define (ir-)rational attitude formation. Other definitions might lead to judging 
some isolated framing effects as rational, especially the effects of value-resonant frames, as 
these effects could be interpreted as rational in the sense of achieving the directional goal 
of being aligned with prior beliefs, i.e., with one’s fundamental political value preferences. 
Many definitions of rationality in attitude formation take this functional, goal-oriented 
approach to rationality (for an overview, see Kruglanski & Boyatzi, 2012⁠; Kruglanski & 
Orehek, 2009). This approach negates that only accurate attitude formation is rational, 
arguing that any formed attitude can be rational if it helps achieve a specific goal such as 
reinforcing existing attitudes or protecting one’s identity a better than other attitudes. That 
is, the goal-oriented approach to rationality would interpret the attitudinal effects of value-
resonance as rather rational. 
In addition, further concepts of rationality are more concerned with the cognitive 
efficiency of decision-making and attitude formation (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
The basic premise of this approach is that full rationality in the classic economical sense of 
optimization (e.g., of decision, attitudes, and behavior) is difficult to achieve because people 
often do not have complete information (Downs, 1957). Moreover, even if they had all 
relevant information needed to form a rational judgment, they have only a limited cognitive 
capacity to consider all information when forming a judgment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). Therefore, it can be rational to not extensively deliberate decisions but simply 
employ frugal, quick cognitive algorithms such as one-reason decision-making, which might 
not yield optimal – i.e., fully accurate – results, but sill satisfying results. Using this 
understanding to interpret the results, the effects of the salience emphasis frames employed 
in this study may not imply a fully rational attitude formation, but still an efficient and 
satisfying attitude formation. In fact, the economic-individualism and humanitarianism 
frames dealt with important and culturally shared political values that derive their strength 
from being applicable to many issues and from allowing a meaningful and still relatively 
accurate interpretation of political issues. Thus, it might be efficient to base one’s attitude 
on such frames to form a meaningful issue attitude. 
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Certainly, these two further understandings of rationality have merits. However, the 
strength of the definition of rationality by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) is that it offers a 
clear reference for when to judge attitude formation as rational, namely consistently arriving 
at the same conclusion when substantive information remains unchanged. The problem 
with the other definitions of rationality, especially goal-oriented approaches, is their focus 
on isolated decisions (or formed attitudes) through which one will always find post hoc a 
reason to qualify any attitude as rational by assuming that the attitude resulted from 
pursuing a specific goal. In contrast, the point of reference in the definition of rationality 
via the postulate of consistency is not a single decision or attitude formation, but the 
reproducibility of the attitudinal outcome when there is no substantive reason to change 
one’s attitude, i.e., when substantive information remains the same. That is, the point of 
reference for assessing rationality is clearly identifiable and additional (shaky) assumptions 
about what makes the formation of a single attitude rational or irrational are not needed. 
In sum, the results of this study revealed clear violations of rational attitude 
formation when citizens form issue attitudes when salience emphasis frames are present. 
These violations refer to arbitrary attitudinal shifts not substantiated by changes in thematic 
information. In particular, salience emphasis frames can reduce the influence of substantive 
thematic facts about an issue on citizens’ issue attitude, even though citizens are generally 
able to form their attitudes based on substantive thematic information when no explicit 
frames are present. However, the societal consequences of citizens’ susceptibility to salience 
emphasis framing effects have not yet been discussed. Thus, the next Chapter 6.2 
elaborates potential implications of the usage of explicit frames in contemporary political 
communication processes. 
6.2 Potential societal implications of the results 
The existence of emphasis framing effects has often been considered an indicator for the 
potentially strong influence of political actors on public opinion (cf. Chong & Druckman, 
2007b). The results presented in this book imply that such influences do not even require 
the provision of additional substantive thematic information, but can also work via salience 
emphasis frames, i.e., via highlighting the importance of interpreting the issue under the 
umbrella of a specific political value. Depending on which political value the frame 
emphasizes for the topic, citizens form significantly different issue attitudes even when 
thematic information does not change (see Subchapter 5.1.2). This means that political 
actors can influence public opinion without providing compelling new facts about an issue, 
which can be a cost-intensive task (e.g., producing credible evidence through scientific 
studies, finding experts that can provide compelling information about the issue). 
In contrast, it can be sufficient to highlight a specific frame that suggests the 
intended issue attitude, a form of communication that does not require a complicated 
discussion about the credibility of each single issue-specific fact, but that affects citizens by 
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simply defining “what an issue is about” (Z. Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 55). Thus, it seems 
that framing is that assumed in the literature: a powerful tool to influence public opinion 
with minimal costs (Jacoby, 2000). This raises concerns about the validity of democratic 
decisions when citizens can be so easily manipulated (cf. Druckman, 2001a). Are the results 
of democratic elections nothing more than the result of an easily manipulated electorate? 
Do most of our attitudes stem from simple single exposure to a specific frame? Would 
referenda have completely different results, if they were repeated a few days later? 
Of course not. Such interpretations of easily manipulated citizens neglect that while 
emphasis framing is a powerful tool, it does not belong to a single political force. It can be 
employed by all political actors because of its minimal costs. The fundamental result of this 
study is that single salience emphasis frames can lead to unsubstantiated, arbitrary shifts in 
citizens’ issue attitudes. When exposed to one frame, citizens form an attitude aligned with 
this frame; when exposed to an opposite counter-frame, they form the opposite attitude 
even when the thematic information remains the same. That is, while salience emphasis 
frames have the potential to influence citizens’ attitudes, other frames do so too. 
Thus, the existence of salience framing effects does not necessarily lead to a strong 
influence of a specific political actor on public opinion and thereby to problematic 
democratic decisions. For instance, in sociological research, framing is often considered an 
important tool that gives communicative power to social movements with otherwise less 
privileged access to political resources (Benford & Snow, 2000). Employing salience 
emphasis frames can help these movements bring new perspectives into public discussion, 
name injustice and counter the frames of powerful elites. That is, whether framing effects 
do have problematic societal consequences such as a manipulated electorate with arbitrary 
issue attitudes, depends much more on whether citizens are only exposed to one salience 
emphasis frame for an issue or whether the media system (or the general structure of the 
public sphere) fosters citizens’ exposure to different frames for the same topic. 
 
Frame competition can limit problematic societal consequences of framing effects 
The research discussed in Subchapter 2.4.2 showed that when two competing emphasis 
frames are simultaneously presented for the same topic at the same time, the single framing 
effects cancel each other out (K. M. Hansen, 2007⁠; Hartman & Weber, 2009⁠; Sniderman 
& Theriault, 2004). Moreover, when both frames are equally applicable, citizens tend to 
take the middle position between the different frames (Chong & Druckman, 2007a). Thus, 
while single frames can lead to arbitrary shifts in citizens’ issue attitudes, simultaneous frame 
competition can prevent such shifts, meaning that citizens are not simply swayed in one 
attitudinal direction. More important, when citizens are exposed to frames with different 
applicability at the same time, they rather follow the more applicable frame (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007a). This suggests a degree of accuracy when citizens weight the 
importance of different emphasis frames for an issue. 
Unfortunately, we do not yet exactly know how the simultaneous frame competition 
of two equally applicable salience emphasis frames influences citizens’ evaluation of 
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substantive thematic information because former studies did not separate emphasis frames 
and thematic information (see Subchapter 2.8.1). It would be highly interesting to know 
whether simultaneous frame competition not only helps in preventing the effects of single 
salience emphasis frames, but whether it also fosters a more accurate evaluation of issue-
specific argument strength. Possibly, the effects of the two equally applicable salience 
emphasis frames cancel each other out, and then citizens use what remains as the third 
factor in the message to form their issue attitude: the issue-specific argument strength. 
However, it is also possible that citizens form biased attitudes along their political value 
preferences when competing salience emphasis frames are simultaneously present. 
Nevertheless, Subchapter 2.5.3 indicated that the effects of value-resonant frames 
seem weaker in situations of simultaneous frame competition than in single one-sided 
framing situations (Chong & Druckman, 2007a). Furthermore, multiple frames do not 
seem to further polarize citizens with different values because they also learn about other 
views on the topic (Beattie & Milojevich, 2017⁠; for how media frame diversity enhances 
audience frame diversity, also see Huang, 2010). As such, while simultaneous frame 
competition might not prevent the biased evaluation of issue-specific argument strength, 
this bias could be substantially weaker than the strong biases found for single value-
resonant salience emphasis frames that completely suppress the effect of issue-specific 
argument strength (see the results for H5 an H6 in Subchapter 5.1.4). 
However, research on asynchronous frame competition has also revealed that 
competition between different frames does not always lead to weaker framing effects (see 
Subchapter 2.6.3). When emphasis frames are not immediately countered by another 
frame with the opposite valence but with some time delay, arbitrary attitudinal shifts still 
occur in the way that the frame at t1 influences citizens’ attitude in one direction and the 
counter-frame at t2 reverses this attitude in the opposite direction. This is especially so when 
the initial framing effect leads to a memory-based attitude (Chong & Druckman, 2010⁠, 
2013), when the influenced attitude is held with weak attitude certainty (Matthes 
& Schemer, 2012), when citizens have less political knowledge (Lecheler & de Vreese, 
2013), or when they have a lower need to evaluate (Chong & Druckman, 2010). 
These results show that simultaneous competition between different frames, not the 
competition itself, seems to reduce citizens’ susceptibility to emphasis framing effects. 
Therefore, one-sided emphasis frames, which are not immediately contested, can rather 
easily manipulate citizens, even when these frames are salience emphasis frames, as shown 
by the results reported in this book. Political actors might (ab-)use this tool to serve their 
particular interests. However, the best countermeasure for citizens’ susceptibility to framing 
effects and their arbitrary shifts in issue attitudes seems to be the simultaneous presentation 
of competing frames. 
When competing frames are simultaneously presented for an issue, framing can then 
even help citizens better understand political issues. Contemporary societies are 
characterized by a high degree of differentiation (Chernilo, 2002) and acceleration (Rosa, 
2003), which increase the complexity of issues relevant to society that need public 
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discussion to organize democratic and collectively binding decisions related to these issues. 
Given the complexity of relevant issues in contemporary societies such as the functioning 
of financial markets, the structure of social security systems, or the emergence of new 
disruptive technologies, it can be challenging for citizens to understand the issues and to 
form clear preferences for how society should deal with the,. 
Emphasis frames in political communication can help citizens solve this problem 
because frames make “sense of relevant issues” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3), 
“suggest how events should be understood“ (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, p. 641), and thus 
serve as an important mechanism to reduce the complexity of the social world. In particular, 
value emphasis frames can reduce the complexity of issues to a relatively small set of 
fundamental questions about which political values citizens prefer (see Chapter 2.5). The 
potential advantage of this reduction is that not only highly specialized experts are able to 
understand the issue, but it also enables ordinary citizens to form issue attitudes aligned 
with their value preferences. That is, employing simultaneous frame competition in political 
communication can help to integrate a relevant share of the population into the political 
discourse, not necessarily as participatory actors, but at least as empowered citizens that 
form attitudes toward complex issues relevant to society based on their political value 
preferences. 
 
Problematic societal consequences of framing effects when simultaneous frame 
competition is missing 
However, when this reduction of complexity via framing becomes too narrow and only 
one-sided salience emphasis frames are present, attitude formation aligned with political 
values is endangered, because citizens also follow one-sided salience emphasis frames that 
counter their value preferences when their preferred political value is not emphasized (see 
Subchapter 5.1.3). That is, when a single political camp has the power to dominate the 
public discourse, this camp can abuse salience emphasis framing, employing them to lead 
citizens to form issue attitudes that counter their own interests. The electorate’s influenced 
attitudes might then also legitimize specific political decisions that are actually the 
preference of the frame sponsor, not of citizens. Thus, the potential danger of one-sided 
emphasis framing for democracies is on one hand, its power in divert citizens’ attitudes 
from their values, which can distort democratic decisions. 
On the other hand, when only their value-resonant salience emphasis frame is 
present, citizens form attitudes aligned with their political values, but these are overly 
biased, ignoring the substantive thematic content. Here, attitude formation is blind toward 
relevant issue-specific information (see Subchapter 5.1.4). Importantly, when explicit 
frames are missing, the same citizens demonstrate a less biased evaluation of thematic 
information and base their attitude on the substantive content of an issue. This confirms 
their general ability to accurately deliberate issue-specific information. As such, one-sided 
value-resonant salience emphasis frames can stop citizens from scrutinizing how well 
thematic information speaks for an attitude aligned with their political value preference. 
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These resonant salience emphasis frames simply reinforce citizens’ existing worldview. 
Given that value-resonant one-sided frames can limit citizens’ capacity to learn from new 
information, whether and how constructive deliberation about the substantive content of 
societal relevant issues is possible under this framing condition has to be questioned. 
Through uncontested value-resonant framing, people tend to stick to their 
respective ideology when processing political information, making it difficult to find any 
consensus between different political camps regarding the interpretation of an issue. Thus, 
when each camp is exposed to only their respective value-resonant frame, which biases the 
evaluation of issue-specific argument strength, framing can transform the idealized concept 
of democratic deliberation about the most compelling facts of an issue (cf. Cooke, 2000) 
into a polarizing fight between camps with different deeply rooted, identity-relevant, and 
stable political values. A clash between different “value camps” makes it less likely that they 
will find any common ground regarding an issue, because it makes citizens less open to 
substantive thematic information that could serve as the common ground for pragmatic 
discussions about the pros and cons of a specific evaluation of an issue. This can paralyze 
the democratic decision-making process when different value camps are initially equally 
large and no side can convince (parts of) the other from its issue position in order to gain 
a democratic majority. 
Of course, competing political value preferences are often not equally distributed in 
a specific society, but one value camp often has the majority by default. This prevents the 
immediate paralysis of democratic decision-making, because one camp can prevail with its 
majority. However, such a situation is still a value-loaded conflict in which value-identities 
are highly salient, which can reduce the perceived legitimacy of this decision for the defeated 
minority of citizens not adhering to the political value guiding the decision of the majority. 
Public discussion without explicit framing amplifies the relevance of political value 
preferences less strongly. Thus, ideally, the discussion is about the best issue-specific 
arguments, which subsequently elicit higher acceptance of the democratic decision taken, 
because everyone agrees with the better issue-specific arguments (cf. Cooke, 2000). 
However, it can be difficult for public discussion under conditions of explicit value 
emphasis framing and salient value identities, which inhibits citizens with different value 
preferences from judging the same thematic information equally, to generate agreement for 
a specific democratic decision among citizens with different value preferences. 
From the viewpoint of citizens in the defeated value camp, substantive thematic 
information clearly indicates why the decision should differ from the one of the majority. 
Thus, they believe this decision is not legitimized by the issue-specific facts. In contrast, 
citizens holding the competing political value preference judge citizens that disagree with 
the democratic decision as irrational, because in their view, the same substantive thematic 
information justifies the decision. This perceived illegitimacy of the viewpoint of citizens 
with different political values may reinforce one’s own political value preference as the right 
way to judge political issues in general, further polarizing the different value camps and 
rendering consensual democratic decisions less likely in the long term. 
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Toward a public sphere that limits citizens’ irrationality induced by one-sided 
framing 
To prevent the potential negative societal consequences of emphasis framing effects and to 
ensure the functioning of democratic societies, the structure of the public sphere should 
ensure simultaneous competition between different emphasis frames for an issue. This 
would prevent that a single political actor shapes the discourse, as one-sided salience 
emphasis frames can lead citizens to form attitudes that violate their political value 
preferences. It also seems necessary that this frame competition reaches citizens with 
different political value preferences, because when competition only occurs at the aggregate 
level of the public sphere, but individual citizens are only exposed to their value-resonant 
frame in a one-sided way, this can lead to very strong forms of motivated reasoning about 
issue-specific information, which could inhibit political decisions that span political camps. 
Another option to avoid these potential negative societal consequences due to 
citizens’ susceptibility to salience emphasis framing effects is, of course, that political actors 
forego the use of explicit value emphasis frames and limit their communication to providing 
issue-specific facts. This would bring the contest between the best issue-specific arguments 
to the fore and citizens’ attitude formation could occur aligned with substantive thematic 
information, rather than aligned with salience emphasis frames and political value 
preferences. 
However, it would be naive to expect political actors to limit their strategic 
communication to providing issue-specific facts or include their political competitors’ 
frames into their own strategic communication. In Western liberal democracies, political 
actors ranging from parties to social movements compete for institutional and interpretative 
power. Likely, they do not voluntarily dispense with a powerful communicative tool like 
framing, which they expect will provide them with an advantage in political competition. 
Therefore, the public sphere needs intermediaries that aggregate the various emphasis 
frames and foster situations in which citizens are simultaneously exposed to multiple frames 
for an issue, not to the strategic communication of a single political actor. 
This emphasizes the importance of unpartisan, professional journalism in a well-
functioning democratic public sphere. Journalism that adheres to the news diversity 
standard (cf. Porto, 2007) and follows the professional norm of balanced reporting (cf. 
Hopmann, van Aelst, & Legnante, 2012) is likely the best way to ensure frame diversity, 
because this journalistic communication integrates various perspectives in the coverage of 
an issue or event (for a similar conclusion, see e.g., Beattie & Milojevich, 2017). In contrast, 
strategic communication by single political actors (e.g., via social media) often presents only 
their emphasis frames, omitting the frames of political competitors, thus threatening 
citizens’ rational attitude formation. 
Moreover, it seems insufficient that a balanced reporting exists only on the level of 
the media system (i.e., external pluralism) or on the level of single media outlets (i.e., internal 
pluralism, see Hallin & Mancini, 2004 for the differentiation between internal and external 
pluralism). To ensure citizens are simultaneously exposed to multiple frames for the same 
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issue and that no time delay is in play, balanced reporting should also be evident on the 
level of single media pieces (i.e., immediate pluralism). 
Of course, professional journalism does not always report in a perfectly balanced 
way, and thus does not always meet the news diversity standard (for cross-country variation 
in the degree of partisan media in Western democracies, see e.g., Brüggemann, Engesser, 
Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014 ⁠; Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2019). However, 
the prominent role of professional journalism as a constitutive element of the public sphere 
in Western democracies (see, e.g., Strömbäck, 2005), which at least attempts balanced 
reporting, seems to have prevented much of the irrationality that can result from one-sided 
framing effects. If not, more arbitrary political preferences in the electorate of Western 
societies or a much stronger polarization within these societies would have been evident in 
the past. 
However, the structure of the public sphere is changing, which may render the 
societal influence of one-sided salience emphasis frames more problematic in the future. 
Professional journalism is under high economic pressure (Björkroth & Grönlund, 2018), 
and the emergence of new intermediaries such as social media platforms has introduced a 
powerful new competitor in journalism’s role in structuring the public sphere (van Dijck & 
Poell, 2013). Of course, the rise of online platforms such as Google or Facebook does not 
necessarily mean citizens are exposed more often to one-sided emphasis frames. From a 
technical perspective, the potential for more frame diversity is even higher on these 
platforms, because the by far smaller distribution costs of communication enables political 
actors with less economic power to participate in the discourse and disseminate their 
frames. In addition, technically, these platforms can rather easily bundle different emphasis 
frames for an issue and present them simultaneously to citizen. 
However, when these platforms and their algorithms foster citizens’ general 
tendency of (partisan) selective exposure, i.e., the selection of attitude-consonant 
information and frames (Stroud, 2010), the potential for more frame diversity can easily 
transform into increased exposure to one-sided value-resonant emphasis frames. As 
mentioned, this exposure can render substantive thematic information irrelevant, meaning 
citizens will simply reinforce their existing worldviews, which can polarize societies in the 
long term. Therefore, societies should carefully monitor current developments regarding 
the restructuring of the public sphere and citizens’ exposure to political information to 
prevent that citizens’ general tendency to be susceptible to one-sided salience emphasis 
frames does not play a potentially more harmful role in democracies in the future. 
6.3 General implications for the future of research on 
emphasis framing effects 
In addition to the discussion of the results for citizens’ rationality in attitude formation 
under framing conditions (see Chapter 6.1) and the potential societal consequences that 
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can result from the existence of salience emphasis framing effects (see Chapter 6.2), the 
future of research on emphasis framing and its effects in political communication must be 
elaborated. 
The concept of emphasis framing has attracted much attention over the past decades 
(Borah, 2011a ⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017), which has much to do with the high 
integrative power of the framing approach (Matthes, 2007b ⁠, 2012). In the 
“multiparadigmatic research program” (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 879) of framing as a “bridging 
model” (Reese, 2007, p. 150), the entire process of public communication can be tracked 
analytically, from the construction of frames by political actors (e.g., Hänggli & Kriesi, 
2012) via the handling of these frames by intermediaries such as news media (e.g., 
Brüggemann, 2014) to citizens’ individual responses to these frames (e.g., Schemer et al., 
2012) and the repercussions of their responses on political actors (e.g., Benford & Snow, 
2000). Thus, the concept of emphasis framing potentially allows overcoming fractured 
analyses of single subordinate phenomena of political communication concerned with the 
public negotiation of the meaning of societal issues. Furthermore, it offers a holistic 
perspective that covers all relevant actors involved in and affected by emphasis framing 
(Entman, 1993 ⁠; Entman et al., 2009). 
However, the price of this integrative power is an increased theoretical vagueness 
about what emphasis framing is and is not. The concept has inspired so many studies in the 
past decades that the literature is filled with various definitions and empirical 
operationalizations of framing (Matthes, 2007b ⁠, 2009), and some scholars have begun 
criticizing the increasing theoretical and empirical vagueness of the concept (e.g., Cacciatore 
et al., 2016 ⁠; Krippendorff, 2017⁠; D. A. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). This culminated in an 
official discussion on whether political communication research should completely 
abandon the term framing – a discussion that was held during the business meeting of the 
division of Political Communication at the annual conference of the International 
Communication Association (ICA) in Fukuoka/Japan in 2016. Besides the general plethora 
of (emphasis) framing definitions and empirical operationalizations, critics’ main argument 
for dropping the concept of framing is that it is increasingly indistinguishable from other 
types of communication and a “catch-all-phrase” (Cacciatore et al., 2016, p. 20) for actually 
very different phenomena. 
This book seriously considered the more general critique of the concept of emphasis 
framing by clarifying the specific type of framing investigated, namely emphasis frames and 
their effects on citizens’ issue attitudes (see Chapter 2.1), rather than thoughtlessly using 
the term “framing” as a superfluous label. Importantly, this study responded to a crucial 
criticism of the empirical paradigm of researching emphasis framing effects: that “most, if 
not all” (Leeper & Slothuus, 2017, p. 3) previous studies on emphasis framing effects 
confounded the presentation of frames with the provision of further issue-specific 
information (see Chapter 2.8). By carefully separating the effects of salience emphasis 
frames and of new issue-specific information, this study avoided using the term framing as 
a “catch-all-phrase,” but enabled clearly testing the existence of unique emphasis framing 
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effects in competition with persuasion effects based on the provision of different thematic 
information. 
The results presented in this book not only revealed that unique attitudinal effects 
of salience emphasis frames exist, but also that these frame effects can suppress the effects 
of issue-specific information (see Chapter 5.1). Given this clear empirical evidence that 
emphasis framing effects are an independently existing phenomenon of communicative 
effects that can be separated theoretically and empirically from other forms of persuasive 
influences, it would not be wise to completely abandon the term framing. Not pursuing the 
analysis of emphasis framing in future research only because the term is often used in 
misleading ways cannot be an answer to the framing phenomena revealed in this book. 
Rather, future research should continue to engage with the relevant concept of emphasis 
framing, but should be more careful in defining and operationalizing the frames under 
investigation. 
The proposed conceptualization of salience emphasis frames (see Subchapter 
2.8.2) can be a fruitful starting point for a better understanding of emphasis framing effects, 
because it does not mix the theory of framing with other types of persuasion. Instead, it 
draws on the idea of cross-thematic and well-known interpretative frames such as political 
core values. The same wine-red picture frame can surround different paintings ranging from 
a Kandinsky to a Picasso. Similarly, the same salience emphasis frame humanitarianism can 
encompass different issues ranging from social security systems to foreign policy. 
Understanding emphasis frames in this way prevents that any single thematic information 
(or to continue the metaphor, any single painting) is considered a frame, which increasingly 
fragments the concept of emphasis framing with each new study on issue-specific frames, 
threatening the survivability of the framing approach. That is, sticking to a rather small set 
of cross-thematic emphasis frames that are “socially shared and persistent over time” 
(Reese, 2001, p. 11) in society allows stopping the ongoing fragmentation of emphasis 
framing research and helps increase the comparability of various studies by investigating 
the same emphasis frame(s) in different situations, from frame building to framing effects. 
As such, the emphasis framing approach can be fruitful in extracting the substantive 
interpretative principles guiding political communication about issues and events and its 
subsequent (conditional) effects, instead of treating single facts and cross-thematic frames 
in the same way. 
Some readers might still be concerned that the clear separation of salience emphasis 
frames and new thematic information narrows the framing concept too strongly. In reality, 
political actors do not limit their usage of frames to the presentation of cross-thematic 
emphasis frames, but they often also provide issue-specific information that supports the 
respective frame-setting. This is a valid point, and, of course, it can be relevant to analyze 
also selection emphasis frames, not only salience emphasis frames (see Subchapter 2.8.2). 
However, when analyzing selection emphasis frames, it is very important to restrict this to 
cross-thematic frames to avoid that the frames are indistinguishable from single issue 
positions. This would help avoid the further fragmentation of the concept of framing. In 
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addition, researchers should clearly indicate the type of cross-thematic frames they are 
analyzing (i.e., selection emphasis frames or salience emphasis frames). This is important 
because depending on whether thematic information co-varies with the presentation of 
frames or not, the implications of framing effects in terms of assessing citizens’ rationality 
in attitude formation can strongly differ (see Chapter 6.1). 
In sum, the results reported in this book revealed that the concept of emphasis 
framing effects is not “dead,” because unique effects of salience emphasis frames exist. 
Thus, one cannot simply drop the concept of emphasis framing or mix it theoretically and 
empirically with other forms of persuasion such as the provision of new issue-specific 
information. Now that these more general implications for the future of the emphasis 
framing approach in political communication research have been highlighted, Chapter 6.4 
provides more specific suggestions on how to improve research on salience emphasis 
framing effects in future studies. This discussion is structured along the methodological 
limitations of this study. 
6.4 Methodological and statistical limitations of this study 
and their implications for future research 
General methodological limitations of experimental and survey research 
From a methodological perspective, this study has limitations, as does any other social 
scientific work. Some limitations relate to problems of experiments and survey research in 
general, and others derive from the specific operationalization of concepts in this study. 
Beginning with the former aspect, one fundamental limitation of experiments is that they 
are part of a somewhat outdated paradigm of media effects that implicitly assumes a 
unidirectional cause and effect relationship from a media message on the audience (Bennett 
& Iyengar, 2008). 
In the changing media landscape, which is developing into a high-choice media 
environment (Prior, 2007), the presented experimental approach ignores that citizens select 
the communicative content to which they expose themselves. Thus, it is unclear whether 
the causing variables manipulated in this experiment only exist in the experimental situation 
of forced exposure or an actual part of citizens’ real information diet, which is the 
precondition that they can exert any effect in reality. Furthermore, even if citizens’ expose 
themselves to political information containing the manipulated variables, there are good 
reasons to expect that not everyone does so equally. Rather, those who expose themselves 
to the causing variables are in reality a systematic group based on their selection decision 
(e.g., citizens with more interest in politics or in the issue under investigation). 
The social media landscape may provide more opportunities for incidental exposure 
to political information that decreases selectivity (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016) and increases 
the chance that everyone has the same probability of exposure to the manipulated causes. 
However, this potential is limited by the systematic selection biases citizens employ when 
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they decide to follow such news suggestions and expose themselves to it (Kaiser, Keller, & 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2018). That is, in reality, not everyone has the same probability of 
exposure to the causing variables, as is the case in a randomized experiment with forced 
exposure. This might have different effects due to (unknown) moderator variables that vary 
in reality, but not in the experiment. 
Future experimental research on the attitudinal effects of media messages should 
not forego the crucial advantage of experiments using randomization. Rather, it should try 
to incorporate citizens’ selectivity in the experimental setting and conceptualize persuasive 
effects as a cascade starting with randomly assigned arrays of messages over participants’ 
selection of and exposure to one (or more) of these messages and moving to the attitudinal 
effects evoked by exposure to these selected messages.  
This study could not solve the problem of analyzing unidirectional causality that 
ignores citizens’ selection behavior. However, it did at least consider the potential 
bidirectionality between the causing variables and different characteristics of citizens by 
integrating their political value preference as a quasi-experimental factor in the design to 
analyze how different people react to the causing variables. Nevertheless, even if different 
groups of citizens were analyzed, exposure took place in an artificial setting for them all, 
which may led them to process the experimental stimuli differently than they would have 
in reality (e.g., with less awareness after a long workday). 
In addition, experiments not only create a situation of forced exposure, but by 
explicitly asking participants for their opinion also of forced attitude formation. In reality, 
citizens may process political information without directly forming an attitude. Thus, the 
attitudes measured in experiments may only exist because the researcher pushed 
respondents to answer attitudinal questions. A further general problem of surveys and 
survey experiments is non-response error based on self-selection to participate in a study, 
which can generate systematic differences between the sampled respondents and the entire 
population (Krosnick, Lavrakas, & Kim, 2014) even when demographic variables are 
sampled correctly. This limitation also applies to this study and complicates the validity of 
statistical conclusions. 
 
Specific methodological limitations of this study and possible improvements in 
future studies 
Regarding the more specific limitations in terms of the operationalization in this research, 
the study tried to avoid sampling errors by employing a stratified randomized sampling 
strategy (Krosnick et al., 2014) based on predefined quotas representative of sex and the 
age of the German-speaking Swiss population aged between 18 and 69 years (see 
Subchapter 4.3.1). However, as participants were sampled from an online access panel, 
and people who sign up for such panels are a systematic group that differs from the 
population in terms of personality (Brüggen & Dholakia, 2010), the drawn sample has the 
problem of coverage error prior to sampling (Krosnick et al., 2014). This indicates that the 
study is not fully representative of Swiss citizens. 
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Furthermore, the data cleansing procedure employed increased the general problem 
of non-response error mentioned earlier. In fact, only around half the respondents who 
started the experiment finished it with appropriate participation quality and were 
subsequently included in data analysis (see Subchapter 4.3.3). While missing values were 
equally distributed in all experimental groups and thus, data cleansing did not threaten the 
experiment’s internal validity (see Subchapter 4.4.1), those who did not finish the 
questionnaire may have been a systematic group, impeding generalization of the findings 
to all Swiss citizens. For example, the exclusion of participants who did not read the 
stimulus news article for at least 20 seconds and could not answer an easy question about 
the content of the article generated rather high means for process involvement in the 
sample. This indicated that the sample mainly consisted of people who read the article at 
least reasonably carefully. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the results reported in this book 
only apply to people with medium or high process involvement and that no effects would 
have been found had the data not been cleansed and respondents with low process 
involvement included in the sample. 
However, no data cleansing would have been similarly problematic, because it could 
have impeded finding an existing effect because of the statistical noise added by inattentive 
participants (Berinsky et al., 2014). Thus, this study decided to employ the data cleansing 
procedure, as mentioned, in favor of internal validity despite the disadvantages for 
generalization. In sum, the limitations regarding the sample suggest that respondents were 
not fully representative of Swiss citizens. Nevertheless, the sample was relatively diverse in 
terms of demographics and political variables (see Subchapter 4.3.1 and Subchapter 
4.3.5), which allows drawing – with some caution – conclusions beyond the sample and 
generalizing the findings to the population. 
The study also has some limitations in terms of the design and manipulations. First, 
only the effects of situations with one-sided salience emphasis frames were investigated. As 
noted in Subchapter 2.4.2, previous research suggests that messages with one-sided frames 
exert generally stronger effects than messages with competing frames (Beattie & Milojevich, 
2017⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007a). Therefore, it could be argued that it was comparatively 
easy to find salience emphasis frame effects in this study than it would have been in more 
realistic situations of simultaneous frame competition. 
Nevertheless, the thematic information the frames contextualized was two-sided, 
implying that the employed salience emphasis frames had to compete with countering 
information and the messages themselves were not one-sided. Thus, the test for salience 
emphasis framing effects was more difficult than suggested by only examining one-sided 
framing conditions (for a more in-depth discussion, see Subchapter 4.2.2). Still, further 
studies should investigate the effects of salience emphasis frames in two-sided framing 
situations to analyze whether these situations foster more accurate attitude formation based 
on substantive thematic information or lead to weaker effects of value resonance than one-
sided salience emphasis frames (see Chapter 6.2). 
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Another relevant limitation is that this study investigated short-term framing effects. 
However, it is unclear how durable such effects are, a limitation that often applies to 
experimental research (Gaines, Kuklinski, & Quirk, 2007). As Chapter 2.6 revealed, 
emphasis framing effects based on single one-sided exposure can persist for up to two 
weeks (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011), but when the same frame is not repeated over time, 
frame effects significantly decrease after two weeks and more so after six weeks (Lecheler, 
Keer et al., 2015). In addition, a counter-frame presented later in time can reverse initial 
framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2010 ⁠, 2013 ⁠; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013). Thus, the 
framing effects found in this study are probably susceptible to changes over time in a real 
life setting. 
However, if the thematic information remains constant, further arbitrary changes in 
citizens’ issue attitude based on the later presentation of a competing salience emphasis 
frame would rather strengthen the conclusion of bounded rationality in attitude formation. 
Thus, not having investigated the long-term effects of salience emphasis frames in this 
study should not compromise the conclusions drawn here. Nevertheless, it is worth further 
investigating the dynamics of salience emphasis framing effects to better understand the 
(non-)persistence of framing effects and its consequences on behavioral variables. To 
realistically capture the dynamic dimension of framing effects over time, future studies 
should also go beyond the experimental approach and use other research designs such as 
linkage analyses as a supplement, which bring together the content of real media messages, 
individual exposure to these messages, and the effects thereof on citizens’ attitude and 
behavior (for further reading on linkage analysis, see e.g., Scharkow & Bachl, 2017). 
Furthermore, the experimental design of this study only enabled investigating the 
suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength (H5 and H6) through one of 
two employed salience emphasis frames. This was because the constraints of an achievable 
sample size restricted the design to only being able to vary the issue-specific argument 
strength aligned with one frame (the economic-individualism frame, see Subchapter 4.2.4). 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the suppression effect found is a general phenomenon or 
only applies to the investigated salience emphasis frame. However, the described 
psychological mechanisms of motivated reasoning considered responsible for the effect 
should be invariant to specific emphasis frames or political value preferences (Slothuus 
& de Vreese, 2010 ⁠; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Thus, one can assume that the same suppression 
would also take place for other value-resonant salience emphasis frames. 
Nevertheless, future research should examine whether the results can be replicated 
with different salience emphasis frames employing different political values. Furthermore, 
the literature would benefit from more theoretical and empirical work on comparisons of 
the effectiveness of different value emphasis frames. Some studies have already introduced 
this aspect under the term “frame strength” (e.g., Aarøe, 2011⁠; Chong & Druckman, 2007a ⁠; 
Druckman et al., 2013), but these studies only considered a small number of emphasis 
frames and confounded them by providing further thematic information. Here, it would be 
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worthwhile empirically investigating the set of common value emphasis frames in a specific 
culture and their relative influence on attitude formation for a wide range of political topics. 
In addition, the experiment here only employed a single political issue, because this 
study did not have infinite resources. A relevant threat to the external validity of 
experiments using a single issue is the unknown interactions of the causal relationship over 
variations in topics and settings (Shadish et al., 2002, pp. 86–90). It cannot be ruled out that 
the effects found for the chosen political issue do not occur with a different political topic, 
because (unknown) variables might differ between the issues, such as the degree of partisan 
conflict (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010) or issue salience (Bechtel et al., 2015). For more 
secure generalizations beyond the chosen topic, it would be more convincing to provide 
evidence for other political topics by running the same experiment again using a different 
issue (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007a ⁠, 2010⁠; Druckman et al., 2013) or by employing a 
multi-stimulus design integrating varying political issues in a single experiment (e.g., Kaiser 
et al., 2018). 
However, the problem of single issue experiments can be minimized by selecting a 
topic that is on average on the dimensions on which issues typically differ (i.e., not too 
polarized, not too specific, not too broad, no clear issue ownership etc.) and by discussing 
transparently the generalizability of the issue selected, as done in Subchapter 4.2.3. 
Nevertheless, replications of the results are needed in future research by employing other 
political issues in the stimuli. As long as the results are not replicated with other topics, the 
interpretation of the results provided here is, of course, allowed and necessary, although a 
high degree of uncertainty still remains in terms of generalization beyond the specific 
political issue at hand. 
Furthermore, the external validity of the employed manipulations for issue-specific 
argument strength and salience emphasis frames and their relation in the experiment can 
be scrutinized. Specifically, the salience emphasis frames contextualized the thematic 
information rather explicitly by using clear and value-charged statements with an explicit 
stance on the issue. In reality, value emphasis frames are not always so explicitly constructed 
and might employ less persuasive appeals to motivate people to understand a topic under 
a specific political value. Nevertheless, participants perceived the stimulus news article 
containing these salience emphasis frames as realistic, credible, and professional (see 
Subchapter 4.4.2), indicating that the chosen construction of frames was not too far away 
from reality. 
Regarding issue-specific argument strength, the manipulations were also rather 
specific, working with numerical values to vary thematic argument strength without 
changing the argument itself (the amount of additional expenses brought about by the new 
therapy). Of course, such numerical representations do not work for all kinds of issue-
specific arguments. However, numbers and figures are an integral part of the political 
discourse; thus, they are a valid vehicle for the manipulation of issue-specific argument 
strength (Mérola & Hitt, 2016⁠; Pedersen, 2016⁠; Pedersen & Larsen, 2018). In addition, the 
manipulation checks revealed it was possible to manipulate argument strength by 
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employing numbers without having to change the issue-specific argument itself (see 
Subchapter 4.4.3). 
Still, the perfect relation between issue-specific argument strength and salience 
emphasis frames that can be applied to these arguments without adding any new thematic 
information might not always be as unambiguous as for the manipulations employed in this 
study. An economic-individualism frame can rather easily contextualize the issue-specific 
argument of financial costs without adding any new information, as this argument is a 
subset of the superordinate political value. However, the same frame can may not as easily 
contextualize thematic information without adding any new information when it is not 
already implicitly connected to the frame (see Subchapter 2.8.2). 
Nevertheless, there are many other areas for situations in which salience emphasis 
frames can be applied. Examples are the following: an environmental frame could 
contextualize the amount by which carbon dioxide is reduced through a new policy 
measure, an egalitarian frame could contextualize how educational measures improve the 
chance of graduation of children with less privileged backgrounds, or a law and order frame 
could contextualize how many crimes can be prevented by a new surveillance tool. That is, 
many policies or societal developments are connected to indications of quantity, and for 
such situations, value framing as simple salience emphasis framing could bias the perception 
of the issue-specific argument strength indicated through these quantities. 
However, note that in this study, the specific argument strengths for opposing the 
approval (i.e., the amount of additional costs) were carefully selected to avoid floor and 
ceiling effects. This was achieved by creating the issue-specific cost arguments effective 
enough to exert differential effects on issue attitude, but not too effective to ensure that 
the additional economic-individualism frame could still have an influence. This had the 
disadvantage that the humanitarianism counter-frame could not exert effects on top of the 
already strong counter-argument of saving lives (see Subchapter 5.1.2). Furthermore, it 
elucidates the problem that salience emphasis frames will not always influence issue-specific 
argument strength. When thematic information has very high argument strength for a 
specific issue position, salience emphasis frames will most likely not have additional 
attitudinal effects. 
Thus, the results should not be interpreted as indicating that salience emphasis 
frames always exert strong effects that suppress the effect of issue-specific argument 
strength when value-resonant. Instead, the results should be read as a proof of theory that 
frames can have such effects. Future research could investigate the point at which –  i.e., at 
which effect size – issue-specific argument strength becomes too influential for the 
additional occurrence of salience emphasis framing effects to better understand in which 
informational settings such frames are (in-)effective. 
In addition, while this study found statistically significant attitudinal effects, these 
effects were merely slightly different response patterns in a questionnaire depending on the 
experimental group. These differences were often not larger than a single scale point on a 
six-point scale (e.g., participants in one group checked number 4 on average and in another 
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group number 5). That is, there were no dramatic shifts in issue attitudes, and consequences 
of this different response patterns on other variables such as observable behavior were not 
investigated. On the other hand, exposure to emphasis frames likely occurs more frequently 
in reality, more than only once as in this study. However, the repetition of an emphasis 
frame over time can reinforce initial framing effects (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2013), as 
discussed in Subchapter 2.6.2. Thus, the differences in response patterns found in the 
questionnaire might translate into salience emphasis framing effects that are more 
substantial in reality. 
 
Statistical limitations 
In addition, some limitations derive from the statistical analyses. The Levene’s tests prior 
to most of the ANOVAs and ANCOVAs showed a problem with heteroscedasticity, i.e., 
unequal variances between the experimental groups, which violates the assumption of 
homoscedasticity to allow for ANOVAs. However, while non-parametric tests exist for 
one-way ANOVAs to account for such violations, there are no suitable non-parametric 
tests available for factorial ANOVAs of more than a 2x2 design (Field, 2009, p. 454). Thus, 
classic parametric factorial AN(C)OVAs were conducted in this study to analyze the rather 
complex 2x3x2 design. In addition, several robustness checks, described in Subchapter 
5.1.6, and persistent total effects in the mediation analyses (see Subchapter 5.2.3) indicate 
the stability of the results in all statistical analyses performed. 
Furthermore, using sum-to-zero-contrasts to decompose the three-level factor 
salience emphasis frame for the factorial ANOVAs, ANCOVAs, and meditation models 
can be subject to criticism. Usually, such contrasts must be fully orthogonal – i.e., no 
contrast should contain the same group more than once – to not encounter a multiple 
comparison problem increasing the type I error rate (Field, 2009, pp. 360–364). The 
contrasts for the analyses in this study were not fully orthogonal, but the same economic-
individualism frame was used in two comparisons in the full models: against the level 
without frames and against the level with the counter-frame humanitarianism. This coding 
of the contrasts was the only meaningful way to test the hypotheses in a theoretically 
appropriate way (for an extensive discussion, see Subchapter 5.1.1). Any orthogonal 
contrast coding would not have allowed a simultaneous test of all hypotheses in a single 
model, but would have added orthogonal, but unnecessary, comparisons not relevant to 
the specific hypotheses (e.g., Helmert contrasts, see Field, 2009, p. 371). 
However, even if using a conservative adjustment of p-values for the non-
orthogonal sum-to-zero contrast in the models and doubling the p-values, as recommended 
by the Bonferroni correction (Field, 2009, pp. 372–373), all main effects would remain 
significant at the level of p < .001. An exception is the significant three-way interaction for 
the suppression of the effect of issue-specific argument strength due to value-resonant 
framing compared to the counter-frame (H6). In some models, this suppression effect 
would be only marginally significant at the level of p < .1 after a conservative Bonferroni 
correction. However, as this three-way interaction was very stable in the robustness checks 
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with the ANCOVAs (see Subchapter 5.1.6) and in the total effects in the robustness 
checks for the mediation analyses (see Subchapter 5.2.3), the issue of non-orthogonality 
does not strongly affect the validity of the results. In addition, the simple effects analyses 
used to decompose the three-way interactions employed corrections for multiple 
comparisons in the factor salience emphasis frame (see Subchapter 5.1.4). 
Regarding the robustness checks for the effects on issue attitude (see Subchapter 
5.1.6), whether some of the integrated covariates are theoretically moderator variables that 
condition the found effects rather than pure covariates can be questioned. For example, a 
high need for cognition could lead to stronger effects for issue-specific argument strength 
than for salience emphasis frames; a high need for closure could strengthen frame effects 
that unambiguously address how to evaluate the topic; or a higher income could weaken 
the effects of the issue-specific argument dealing with additional costs, because these 
additional costs may affect people with more money less than they affect people with a 
lower income. 
However, integrating only one of these variables as a further quasi-experimental 
factor in the design would mean testing four-way interactions through a four-factorial 
design when examining the suppression effect conditioned by a further moderator. Such 
an analysis is not only very complicated to interpret but it also requires much more statistical 
power than this study could provide. Nevertheless, some of these models were computed 
when exploring the data, but these analyses did not reveal robust evidence of the 
conditional influences of the control variables on the effects proposed in the hypotheses. 
A further criticism of the results could pertain to how the suppression of the effect 
of issue-specific argument strength emerged through value-resonant framing. It could be 
argued that the suppression simply stemmed from a ground effect of the strong issue-
specific argument against the approval for participants with a high preference for 
economic-individualism. In fact, the effect of the value-resonant frame economic-
individualism for this group was only marginally significant (with p = .06, d = .32 compared 
to no frame and p = .10, d = .30 compared to the counter-frame, see Figure 25 in 
Subchapter 5.1.4). This might suggest that the salience emphasis frame did not push 
participants to oppose the approval more strongly than did the strong issue-specific 
argument. Based on this result, this could be argued as the actual explanation for the found 
suppression effect, not that the value-resonant frame reinforced the issue-specific argument 
strength of the weak argument so strongly it was as effective as the strong argument. 
However, two aspects refute this critique. First, the mean for the situation where the 
value-resonant frame contextualized the strong argument was M = -0.87 for the latent 
variable, equal to about M = 3.40 on the composite scale ranging from 1 to 6. That is, there 
was space on the scale to more strongly oppose the approval, countering the idea of a 
potential ground effect. Second, the effect of the value-resonant frame economic-
individualism when contextualizing the weak issue-specific argument had the highest effect 
size of all simple effects reported in this book (d = .97 compared to the non-resonant 
counter-frame humanitarianism, again see Figure 25). This implies that the suppression 
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effect must have resulted from the strong influence of the value-resonant salience emphasis 
frame on the weak issue-specific argument, increasing its persuasiveness to that of the 
strong issue-specific argument. 
A further limitation relates to the interpretation of the mediation analyses discussed 
in Chapter 5.2. Whereas the experimental design of this study ensured a test of causality 
for the effects of the independent variables on the mediator variables and the dependent 
variable of issue attitude, the design could not formally prove the causal relationship 
between the mediator(s) and the dependent variable. Even after finding a significant 
indirect effect of the independent variable via a mediator on the dependent variable in a 
mediation analysis, it remains unclear whether the independent variable affected first the 
mediator and in a second step, this mediator influenced the dependent variable, or whether 
the independent variable changed the dependent variable and this dependent variable 
subsequently affected the mediator (Hayes, 2018, pp. 15–19). 
To be certain about the causal direction between the mediator(s) and dependent 
variable, a second experimental test would be needed that directly manipulated the 
mediator(s) and checked the causal effect on issue attitude. However, as in most single 
experiments, this formal test was not performed in this study, because it would require an 
additional experiment. Nevertheless, the mediation analyses provided first insights into the 
causal mechanisms behind salience emphasis framing effects, even though these insights 
were correlational. Important, the newly introduced mediator of belief evaluation change 
was an influential explanation of salience emphasis framing effects, and such frames seem 
to directly bias the processing and evaluation of issue-specific argument strength. 
However, belief evaluation change only partially mediated the effects of salience 
emphasis frames on citizens’ issue attitude, implying the (unmeasured) existence of 
additional mediators not incorporated into this study. Most important, the study would 
have benefited from examining emotions as a further mediator of emphasis framing effects, 
which was not possible because of limited space in the questionnaire. However, emotions 
have been shown to (partially) mediate the effects of emphasis frames (Clifford, 2019⁠; 
Feinholdt et al., 2017⁠; H. J. Kim & Cameron, 2011 ⁠; Kühne, 2013 ⁠, 2014⁠; Kühne et al., 2015 ⁠; 
Kühne & Schemer, 2015 ⁠; Lecheler, Bos et al., 2015⁠; Lecheler, Schuck, & de Vreese, 2013⁠; 
Nabi, 2003⁠; Schuck & Feinholdt, 2015). Moreover, emotions should be relevant when 
salience emphasis frames employ appeals to citizens’ political values, as these values not 
only represent citizens’ cognitive preferences, but also their emotionally charged identity-
relevant preferences (cf. B. T. Scheufele & Gasteiger, 2007). Here, this study could not 
present the “exhaustive model of the psychological mechanisms of framing effects” lacking 
(Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012, p. 196) in the literature (see Subchapter 5.2.2). Future studies 
should try to integrate all mediators relevant for framing effects, such as belief content 
change, belief importance change, belief evaluation change, and emotions in a single 
theoretical model to better assess empirically the relative influence of these competing 
mediators. 
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Finally, this book did not cover the statistical results concerned with further 
dependent variables measured in the questionnaire (see Subchapter 4.3.2), but it focused 
only on the central dependent variable, namely citizens’ issue attitude. Still, note that neither 
salience emphasis frames nor issue-specific argument strength affected citizens’ attitude 
importance or their attitude certainty in a series of additionally computed statistical models 
(see https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1013-1 for the entire R-script for the data 
analysis). That is, while salience emphasis frames affected citizens’ issue attitude (see 
Chapter 5.1), these attitudes were not held with higher certainty or considered more 
important than when no frames were present. Previous studies found that attitude certainty 
and attitude importance increased the resistance to subsequent persuasive attempts 
(Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006 ⁠; Tormala & Petty, 2002). Subchapter 2.6.3 highlighted 
that this is also the case for delayed counter-framing. The fact that salience emphasis frames 
can change attitudes but not the resilience of these attitudes stresses again how arbitrarily 
citizens base their issue attitude on frames without forming strong and persistent attitudes, 
which are therefore susceptible to further arbitrary changes when counter-frames are 
presented later in time (cf. Chong & Druckman, 2010). That is, the results regarding these 
two additional dependent variables support the central conclusion of this book, namely that 
attitude formation under conditions of salience emphasis framing is characterized by 
bounded rationality. 
In contrast to the null findings for attitude certainty and attitude importance, salience 
emphasis frames slightly influenced citizens’ paying intention, i.e., the amount of additional 
costs they would be willing to pay for their insurance rates. However, this effect was not 
robust and the non-significant main models in which this significant effect occurred hinder 
a valid interpretation of this effect. Moreover, the measure of paying intention was itself 
biased, because asking for a specific amount of money while simultaneously presenting an 
obvious anchor in the stimuli (i.e., the amount of additional costs for the manipulation of 
issue-specific argument strength) can generate strong anchor effects (Wilson, Houston, 
Etling, & Brekke, 1996) that confound the measurement. Thus, the results for salience 
emphasis frame effects based on this measure can be misleading and are not interpretable 
in a reliable way. 
 
Summary 
In sum, the limitations of this study mainly concern external validity including not having 
a fully representative sample, relying on experimental survey data, examining the effects 
with only one political issue and two salience emphasis frames, and focusing on single 
exposure and short-term effects. Given that this study ensured high internal validity for the 
tests of the direct effects on issue attitude (see Chapter 4.4) by making some concessions 
to the degree of external validity, the results of this study should not be interpreted as 
meaning that salience emphasis frames always exert strong effects that can suppress the 
effects of issue-specific argument strength. Instead, the results should be understood as a 
proof of theory that frames can have such effects. 
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Moreover, salience emphasis framing effects found in a single survey experiment are 
far from durable attitudes in a real world setting, more far from actual individual behavior 
based on influenced attitudes, and even more far from finally influencing collective 
behavior of societies through framing effects in political communication. For each single 
step, there are hundreds – if not thousands – of competing variables that might prevent 
salience emphasis framing effects on citizens’ issue attitudes from subsequently leading to 
irrational decisions in democracies. Thus, interpreting the results regarding societal 
consequences can only be highly speculative. 
Nevertheless, ignoring the evidence that salience emphasis frames can suppress the 
effects of issue-specific argument strength, as demonstrated in this study, cannot reasonably 
address the fundamental generalization problem of social scientific research and should not 
prevent deliberating potential consequences for society. Such consequences are at the heart 
of social science and always worthy of discussion because of their potential relevance. 
Therefore, Chapter 6.2 discussed the potential implications of the results for democracies, 
even though they are speculative and not corroborated by empirical data on the macro-
level. The next and last chapter of this book (see Chapter 6.5) summarizes the main 
conclusions based on the existence of salience emphasis framing effects. 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
For dozens of years, research on communication and media effects has focused on the 
question of how susceptible citizens react to communicative attempts that try to change 
their attitudes (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2011). Many different types of communication 
have been analyzed to determine their effectiveness in changing political attitudes. 
However, less types have received more attention in political communication research than 
the examination of attitudinal effects elicited by emphasis frames (D. A. Scheufele 
& Iyengar, 2017). Numerous empirical studies (see Chapter 2.2 to Chapter 2.7) suggested 
that simple changes in the emphasis on a specific aspect of an issue or event can produce 
“(sometimes large) changes of opinion” (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 104). The often 
replicated result that citizens’ attitudes can be manipulated by a rather easily applicable 
communicative tool such as making a specific aspect of a topic more salient has raised 
strong concerns regarding citizens’ rationality in attitude formation under (one-sided) 
framing conditions (cf. Druckman, 2001a), which is an important prerequisite for the 
functioning of democracies. 
However, recent critics on the emphasis framing approach in political 
communication (e.g., Cacciatore et al., 2016 ⁠; Leeper & Slothuus, 2017 ⁠; D. A. Scheufele 
& Iyengar, 2017) argue that former effect-oriented studies confounded the concept of 
different frame emphases through varying issue-specific information. Thus, the strength of 
(one-sided) framing effects on citizens’ issue attitudes might be overstated in the literature, 
and may only be classic persuasion effects induced by providing new issue-specific 
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information (see Subchapter 2.8.1). In addition, this confounding makes it impossible to 
assess citizens’ rationality in attitude formation, because attitudinal shifts based on frames 
could similarly result from rationally learning from new issue-specific information and thus, 
may not be arbitrary. As such, the potential negative societal consequences of emphasis 
framing effects may do not need to be so strongly feared. 
Based on this criticism, this study introduced the concept of salience emphasis 
frames as a type of emphasis frame not confounded through the provision of further 
thematic information. Rather, it works by contextualizing the given thematic information 
with well-known and cross-thematic patterns of interpretation such as political values (see 
Subchapter 2.8.2). This conception of emphasis frames enables determining whether 
unique effects of frames exist independently from issue-specific information, which is 
important in the theoretical survivability of the emphasis framing approach as a unique 
concept of communicative influences. Moreover, this conception enables testing more 
precisely how rationally citizens’ attitude formation takes place under framing conditions.  
Furthermore, integrating the two additional variables of varying issue-specific 
argument strength as a property of thematic information and citizens’ political value 
preference (see Subchapter 2.8.3) enabled testing for the effects of salience emphasis 
frames in differently challenging situations. For instance, when the salience emphasis frame 
(did not) match(ed) citizens’ value preference or when the thematic information (only) 
contained a weak (strong) issue-specific argument strength for an issue attitude in 
accordance with the salience emphasis frame. This enables better assessing the conditions 
under which (one-sided) salience emphasis framing effects occur. 
In addition, the separation of salience emphasis frames and new thematic 
information allowed a more fine-grained exploration of the different psychological 
mechanisms that mediate the attitudinal effects of these two variables. Besides this more 
differentiated perspective of the mediators that were previously proposed in the literature, 
Subchapter 2.8.4 also introduced a new mediator for the effects of salience emphasis 
frames, namely belief evaluation change, which captures more directly how such frames 
bias the systematic processing of issue-specific argument strength. 
Based on experimental data (see Part IV), the results of this study (see Part V) 
revealed that unique effects of (one-sided) salience emphasis frames exist, and that citizens 
formed significantly different issue attitudes depending on which salience emphasis frame 
contextualized the same thematic information. Several mediation analyses indicated that 
such frames exert their effects via changing how compelling citizens evaluate the issue-
specific argument strength for an attitude in accordance with the frame to be, while not 
affecting the importance citizens attribute to the emphasized political value that biased their 
evaluation of thematic information. Moreover, salience emphasis frames not only 
influenced citizens’ issue attitude on aggregate but also when contextualizing thematic 
information with a weak issue-specific argument strength for an issue attitude aligned with 
the frame and when the frame was non-resonant with citizens’ political value preference. 
However, the strongest effects of salience emphasis frames occurred when the frame was 
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value-resonant, which fully suppressed the effects of issue-specific argument strength. 
When a value-resonant frame contextualized weak issue-specific argument strength for its 
issue position, citizens followed their frame at the same magnitude as they would when this 
frame contextualized thematic information with high issue-specific argument strength for 
this issue position. 
As such, the results indicate that salience emphasis frames have unique effects 
independent of the provision of thematic information. Moreover, these effects occur under 
various conditions. Thus, it does not seem wise to abandon the idea of emphasis framing 
in future political communication research, because salience emphasis frames have been 
confirmed as an existing phenomenon of communicative influences that can be 
distinguished theoretically and empirically from persuasion based on the supply of new 
thematic information (see Chapter 6.3). However, future research should more carefully 
define and operationalize emphasis frames to prevent further fragmentation of the 
emphasis framing approach and to not further threaten the scientific survivability of this 
approach, which captures an empirically unique and influential form of media influence 
that can even suppress other forms of communicative effects such as the provision of 
substantive thematic information. 
In addition, the results elucidate citizens’ bounded rationality in attitude formation 
under (one-sided) framing conditions (see Chapter 6.1). Despite constant thematic 
information, citizens formed significantly different attitudes depending on the emphasis on 
a certain aspect of this issue-specific information. This implies arbitrary and thus irrational 
attitudinal shifts that are not substantiated by changing thematic information. Moreover, 
these changes cannot even be explained by learning that the emphasized political value is 
more important in interpreting the issue, because the mediation analyses revealed that the 
effects were not mediated via belief importance changes, but via belief evaluation changes. 
This indicates that salience emphasis frames lead to arbitrary shifts in citizens’ evaluation 
of thematic information without agreeing (more) on the reason for this shift. Furthermore, 
changes in issue attitudes also occurred for citizens that did not hold the political value 
emphasized by the frame as more important in issue interpretation. This implies that 
salience emphasis framing effects violate rationality in the sense of inconsistent attitudes 
when thematic information remains unchanged and in the sense of also showing these 
inconsistencies in violation to one’s general political value preference. However, most 
problematic for citizens’ rationality in attitude formation is the result that while citizens can 
generally form their issue attitude based on substantive thematic information, they can 
completely ignore the issue-specific argument strength of thematic information when 
contextualized with a value-resonant frame. 
This bounded rationality in citizens’ attitude formation under one-sided framing 
conditions can have problematic societal consequences for democracies (see Chapter 6.2). 
On one hand, framing can lead citizens to form issue attitudes based on emphasized 
political values they do not prefer. This means that political actors with the power to set 
the frame for an issue can push citizens away from their values, which could distort 
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democratic decisions. On the other, when citizens only expose themselves to their value-
resonant frame, making them unable to evaluate issue-specific facts accurately, consensual 
agreements about political issues become less likely between citizens with different political 
values. This is because they cannot agree on the evaluation of substantial thematic facts that 
could otherwise serve as a basis for the mutual deliberation of issues. Instead, the increased 
biased evaluation of issue-specific facts along competing political values triggered by value-
resonant frames rather fosters the political polarization of societies. 
Taken together, it was shown that one-sided salience emphasis frames exert unique 
effects on citizens’ issue attitude, which can threaten rational attitude formation based on 
substantive thematic information, which can be dangerous for the democratic decision-
making process. However, previous results on selection emphasis framing revealed that the 
best way to avoid problematic framing effects is simultaneously presenting competing 
frames for an issue, leading citizens to take the middle position between different emphasis 
frames. Thus, to prevent that the revealed tendency of citizens for irrational attitude 
formation based on one-sided salience emphasis frames translates into potentially harmful 
consequences for democracies, societies should ensure a balanced public connection that 
covers all relevant frames for political issues for all citizens. 
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